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COMMENTARY

ON

ST. PAUL'S

EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

BY

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PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY, NEUCHATEL.

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Translated from the French

BY REV. A. CUSIN, M.A., EDINBURGH.

VOLUME FIRST.

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

PREFACE.

NO one will deny that there is room for some emotion in giving to the public a Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. It avails nothing that the author is only the interpreter of a given text. The contents of that text, accepted or rejected, affect his readers so decisively, that the author, who serves them as a guide, feels himself at every step under a burden of the gravest responsibility.

This consideration cannot weigh with me, however, to prevent me from offering to the church, and especially to the churches of the French language, this fruit of a study which, in the course of my theological teaching, I have been called again and again to renew.

I shall here state frankly an anxiety which fills my mind. I believe the divine conception of salvation, as expounded by St. Paul in this fundamental work, to be more seriously threatened at this moment than ever it was before. For not only is it combated by its declared adversaries, but it is abandoned by its natural defenders. In the divine acts of expiation and justification by faith, which formed, according to the apostle's declaration, *the gospel which he had received by the revelation of Jesus Christ* (Gal. i.), how many Christians see nothing more, and would have the church henceforth to see nothing more, than a theological system, crammed with Jewish notions, which St. Paul had himself conceived by meditating on Jesus Christ and His work!

It will not be long, I fear, ere we see what becomes of the life of individuals and of the church, as soon as its roots cease to strike into the fruitful soil of apostolical revelation. A religious life languishing and sickly, a sanctification without vigour or decision, and no longer distinguished by any marked feature from the simple morality of nature,—such will be the

goal, very soon reached, of that rational evolution on which the church, and particularly our studious youth, are invited to enter. The least obscuration of the divine mind, communicated to the world by means of apostolical revelation, has for its immediate effect a diminution of spiritual life and strength.

Must the church of France, in particular, lose the best part of its strength at the very moment when God seems at length to be bringing France into its arms? This would be the last tragedy of its history—sadder still than all the bloody but heroic days of its past.

It is neither the empty affirmations of free thought, nor the vague teachings of a semi-rationalism,—which does not know itself whether it believes in a revelation or not,—which will present a sufficient basis for the religious elevation of a whole nation. For there is needed a doctrine which is firm, positive, divine, like *the gospel of Paul.*

When the Epistle to the Romans appeared for the first time, it was to the church a word in season. Every time that, in the course of the ages, it has recovered the place of honour which belongs to it, it has inaugurated a new era. It was so half a century ago, when that revival took place, the powerful influence of which remains unexhausted to this hour. To that movement, which still continues, the present commentary seeks to attach itself. May it also be in some measure to the church of the present a word in season!

I may be justly charged with not having more completely ransacked the immense library which has gradually formed round St. Paul's treatise. My answer is: I might have . . . but on condition of never coming to an end. Should I have done so?

And as I have been obliged to set a limit to my study, I have been obliged to restrict also the exposition of the results of my labour. If I had allowed myself to cross the boundaries of exposition properly so called, to enter more than I have sometimes done into the domain of dogmatic developments, or into that of practical applications, the two volumes would have been soon increased to four or six. It was better for me to incur the charge of dryness, which will not repel any serious reader, than to fall into prolixity, which would

have done greatly more to injure the usefulness of the Commentary.

The pious Sailer used to say: "O Christianity, had thy one work been to produce a St. Paul, that alone should have rendered thee dear to the coldest reason." May we not be permitted to add: And thou, O St. Paul, had thy one work been to compose an Epistle to the Romans, that alone should have rendered thee dear to every sound reason.

May the Spirit of the Lord make all *of His own* that He has deigned to put into this work, fruitful within the church, and in the heart of every reader!

THE AUTHOR.

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INTRODUCTION.

COLERIDGE calls the Epistle to the Romans "the profoundest book in existence." Chrysostom had it read to him twice a week. Luther, in his famous preface, says: "This Epistle is the chief book of the New Testament, the purest gospel. It deserves not only to be known word for word by every Christian, but to be the subject of his meditation day by day, the daily bread of his soul. . . . The more time one spends on it, the more precious it becomes and the better it appears." Melanchthon, in order to make it perfectly his own, copied it twice with his own hand. It is the book which he expounded most frequently in his lectures. The Reformation was undoubtedly the work of the Epistle to the Romans, as well as of that to the Galatians; and the probability is that every great spiritual revival in the church will be connected as effect and cause with a deeper understanding of this book. This observation unquestionably applies to the various religious awakenings which have successively marked the course of our century.

The exposition of such a book is capable of boundless progress. In studying the Epistle to the Romans we feel ourselves at every word face to face with the unfathomable. Our experience is somewhat analogous to what we feel when contemplating the great masterpieces of medieval architecture, such, for example, as the Cathedral of Milan. We do not know which to admire most, the majesty of the whole or the finish of the details, and every look makes the discovery of some new perfection. And yet the excellence of the book with which we are about to be occupied should by no means discourage the expositor; it is much rather fitted to stimulate him. "What book of the New Testament," says Meyer, in his preface to the fifth edition of his commentary, "less entitles the expositor to spare his pains than this, the greatest and richest of all the apostolic works?" Only it

must not be imagined that to master its meaning nothing more is needed than the philological analysis of the text, or even the theological study of the contents. The true understanding of this masterpiece of the apostolic mind is reserved for those who approach it with the heart described by Jesus in His Sermon on the Mount, the heart *hungering and thirsting after righteousness.* For what is the Epistle to the Romans? The offer of the *righteousness of God* to the man who finds himself stripped by the law of his *own righteousness* (i. 17). To understand such a book we must yield ourselves to the current of the intention under which it was dictated.

M. de Pressensé has called the great dogmatic works of the Middle Ages "the cathedrals of thought." The Epistle to the Romans is the cathedral of the Christian faith.

Sacred criticism, which prepares for the exposition of the books of the Bible, has for its object to elucidate the various questions relating to their origin; and of those questions there are always some which can only be resolved with the help of the exegesis itself. The problem of the composition of the Epistle to the Romans includes several questions of this kind. We could not answer them in this introduction without anticipating the work of exegesis. It will be better, therefore, to defer the final solution of them to the concluding chapter of the commentary. But there are others, the solution of which is perfectly obvious, either from the simple reading of the Epistle, or from certain facts established by church history. It cannot be other than advantageous to the exposition to gather together here the results presented by these two sources, which are fitted to shed light on the origin of our Epistle. It will afford an opportunity at the same time of explaining the different views on the subject which have arisen in the course of ages.

An apostolical epistle naturally results from the combination of two factors: the personality of the author, and the state of the church to which he writes. Accordingly, our introduction will bear on the following points: 1. The Apostle Paul; 2. The Church of Rome; 3. The circumstances under which the Epistle was composed.

In a supplementary chapter we shall treat of the preservation of the text.

CHAPTER I.

THE APOSTLE ST. PAUL.

IF we had to do with any other of St. Paul's Epistles, we should not think ourselves called to give a sketch of the apostle's career. But the Epistle to the Romans is so intimately bound up with the personal experiences of its author, it so contains the essence of his preaching, or, to use his own expression twice repeated in our Epistle, *his Gospel* (ii. 16, xvi. 25), that the study of the book in this case imperiously requires that of the man who composed it. St. Paul's other Epistles are fragments of his life; here we have his life itself.

Three periods are to be distinguished in St. Paul's career: 1. His life as a Jew and Pharisee; 2. His conversion; 3. His life as a Christian and apostle. In him these two characters blend.

I. *St. Paul before his Conversion.*

Paul was born at Tarsus in Cilicia, on the confines of Syria and Asia Minor (see his own declarations, Acts xxi. 39, xxii. 3). Jerome mentions a tradition, according to which he was born at Gischala in Galilee.[1] His family, says he, had emigrated to Tarsus after the devastation of their country. If this latter expression refers to the devastation of Galilee by the Romans, the statement contains an obvious anachronism. And as it is difficult to think of any other catastrophe unknown to us, the tradition is without value.[2]

Paul's family belonged to the tribe of Benjamin, as he

[1] *De Vir. illust.* c. 5.

[2] It is not quite exact to say, as Lange has done in Herzog's *Encyclopedia*, art. "Paulus," that Jerome retracted this assertion in his *Commentary on the Epistle to Philemon*. The phrase: *talem fabulam accepimus*, implies no intention of the kind (see Hausrath in Schenkel's *Bibellexicon*, art. "Paulus").

himself writes, Rom. xi. 1 and Phil. iii. 5. His name, Saul or Saül, was probably common in this tribe in memory of the first king of Israel, taken from it. His parents belonged to the sect of the Pharisees; compare his declaration before the assembled Sanhedrim (Acts xxiii. 6): "I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee," and Phil. iii. 5. They possessed, though how it became theirs we know not, the right of Roman citizens, which tends, perhaps, to claim for them a somewhat higher social position than belonged to the Jews settled in Gentile countries. The influence which this sort of dignity exercised on his apostolic career can be clearly seen in various passages of Paul's ministry (comp. Acts xvi. 37 et seq., xxii. 25–29, xxiii. 27).

The language spoken in Saul's family was undoubtedly the Syro-Chaldean, usual in the Jewish communities of Syria. But the young Saul does not seem to have remained a stranger to the literary and philosophical culture of the Greek world, in the midst of which he passed his childhood. "Tarsus," even in Xenophon's time, as we find him relating (*Anab.* i. 2. 23), was "a city large and prosperous." In the age of Saul it disputed the empire of letters with its two rivals, Athens and Alexandria. In what degree Greek culture is to be ascribed to the apostle, has often been made matter of discussion. In his writings we meet with three quotations from Greek poets: one belongs both to the Cilician poet Aratus (in his *Phænomena*) and to Cleanthes (in his *Hymn to Jupiter*); it is found in Paul's sermon at Athens, Acts xvii. 28: "As certain also of your own poets have said, We are also his offspring;" the second is taken from the *Thaïs* of Menander; it occurs in 1 Cor. xv. 33: "Evil companionships corrupt good manners;" the third is borrowed from the Cretan poet Epimenides, in his work on *Oracles;* it is found in the Epistle to Titus i. 12: "One of themselves, a prophet of their own, said: The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies." Are these quotations proofs of a certain knowledge of Greek literature which Paul had acquired? M. Renan thinks not. He believes that they can be explained as borrowings at second hand, or even from the common usage of proverbs circulating in everybody's mouth.[1] This sup-

[1] *Les Apôtres*, p. 167.

position might apply in all strictness to the second and third quotation. But there is a circumstance which prevents us from explaining the first, that which occurs in the discourse at Athens, in the same way. Paul here uses this form of citation: "*Some* of your poets have said . . ." If he really expressed himself thus, he must have known the use made by the *two* writers, Aratus and Cleanthes, of the sentence quoted by him. In that case he could not have been a stranger to their writings. A young mind like Paul's, so vivacious and eager for instruction, could not live in a centre such as Tarsus without appropriating some elements of the literary life which flourished around it.

Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that his education was essentially Jewish, both in respect to the instruction he received and to the language used.[1] Perhaps he was early destined to the office of Rabbin. His rare faculties naturally qualified him for this function, so highly honoured of all in Israel. There is connected with the choice of this career a circumstance which was not without value in the exercise of his apostolical ministry. According to Jewish custom, the Rabbins required to be in a position to gain their livelihood by means of some manual occupation. This was looked upon as a guarantee of independence and a preservative from sin. The received maxim ran thus: "The study of the law is good, provided it be associated with a trade. . . . Otherwise, it is useless and even hurtful."[2] Saul's parents chose a trade for him which was probably connected with the circumstances of the country where they dwelt, that of *tentmaker* (σκηνοποιός, Acts xviii. 3), a term which denoted the art of making a coarse cloth woven from the hair of the Cilician goats, and used in preference to every other kind in the making of tents. The term used in the Book of the Acts thus denotes the work of weaving rather than tailoring.

When we take account of all the circumstances of Saul's childhood, we understand the feeling of gratitude and adoration which at a later date drew forth from him the words,

[1] Hausrath has with much sagacity collected the facts which establish the influence of the Aramaic language on the style of Paul (*Bibellex.*, art. "Paulus," IV. 409).

[2] *Pirké Abot*, II. 2.

Gal. i. 15: "God, who *separated me from my mother's womb.*" If it is true that Paul's providential task was to free the gospel from the wrappings of Judaism in order to offer it to the Gentile world in its pure spirituality, he required, with a view to this mission, to unite many seemingly contradictory qualities. He needed, above all, to come from the very heart of Judaism; only on this condition could he thoroughly know life under the law, and could he attest by his own experience the powerlessness of this alleged means of salvation. But, on the other hand, he required to be exempt from that national antipathy to the Gentile world with which Palestinian Judaism was imbued. How would he have been able to open the gates of the kingdom of God to the Gentiles of the whole world, if he had not lived in one of the great centres of Hellenic life, and been familiarized from his infancy with all that was noble and great in Greek culture, that masterpiece of the genius of antiquity? It was also, as we have seen, a great advantage for him to possess the privilege of a Roman citizen. He thus combined in his person the three principal social spheres of the age, Jewish legalism, Greek culture, and Roman citizenship. He was, as it were, a living point of contact between the three. If, in particular, he was able to plead the cause of the gospel in the capital of the world and before the supreme tribunal of the empire, as well as before the Sanhedrim at Jerusalem and the Athenian Areopagus, it was to his right as a Roman citizen that he owed the privilege. Not even the manual occupation learned in his childhood failed to play its part in the exercise of his apostleship. When, for reasons of signal delicacy, which he has explained in chap. ix. of his first Epistle to the Corinthians, he wished to make the preaching of the Gospel, so far as he was concerned, *without charge*, in order to secure it from the false judgments which it could not have escaped in Greece, it was this apparently insignificant circumstance of his boyhood which put him in a position to gratify the generous inspiration of his heart.

The young Saul must have quitted Tarsus early, for he himself reminds the inhabitants of Jerusalem, in the discourse which he delivers to them, Acts xxii., that he had been "brought up in this city." In chap. xxvi. 4 he thus

expresses himself not less publicly: "All the Jews know my manner of life from my youth at Jerusalem." Ordinarily it was at the age of twelve that Jewish children were taken for the first time to the solemn feasts at Jerusalem. They then became, according to the received phrase, "*sons of the law.*" Perhaps it was so with Saul, and perhaps he continued thenceforth in this city, where some of his family seem to have been domiciled. Indeed, mention is made, Acts xxiii. 16, of a son of his sister who saved him from a plot formed against his life by some citizens of Jerusalem.

He went through his Rabbinical studies at the school of the prudent and moderate Gamaliel, the grandson of the famous Hillel. "Taught," says Paul, "at the feet of Gamaliel, according to the perfect manner of the law of our fathers" (Acts xxii. 3). Gamaliel, according to the Talmud, knew Greek literature better than any other doctor of the law. His reputation for orthodoxy nevertheless remained unquestioned. Facts will prove that the young disciple did not fail to appropriate the spirit of wisdom and lofty prudence which distinguished this eminent man. At his school Saul became one of the most fervent zealots for the law of Moses. And practice with him kept pace with theory. He strove to surpass all his fellow-disciples in fulfilling the traditional prescriptions. This is the testimony which he gives of himself, Gal. i. 14; Phil. iii. 6. The programme of moral life traced by the law and elaborated by Pharisaical teaching, was an ideal ever present to his mind, and on the realization of which were concentrated all the powers of his will. He resembled that young man who asked Jesus "by the doing of what work" he could obtain eternal life. To realize the law perfectly, and to merit the glory of the kingdom of heaven by the righteousness thus acquired—such was his highest aspiration. Perhaps there was added to this ambition another less pure, the ambition of being able to contemplate himself in the mirror of his conscience with unmixed satisfaction. Who knows whether he did not flatter himself that he might thus gain the admiration of his superiors, and so reach the highest dignities of the Rabbinical hierarchy? If pride had not clung like a gnawing worm to the very roots of his righteousness, the fruit of the tree could not have been so bitter; and the

catastrophe which overturned it would be inexplicable. Indeed, it is his own experience which Paul describes when he says, Rom. x. 2, 3, in speaking of Israel: "I bear them record that they have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge. For they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God" [that which God offers to the world in Jesus Christ].

Three natural characteristics, rarely found in union, must have early shown themselves in him, and attracted the attention of his masters from his student days: vigour of intellect —it was in this quality that he afterwards excelled St. Peter; strength of will — perhaps he was thus distinguished from St. John; and liveliness of feeling. Everywhere we find in him an exuberance of the deepest or most delicate sensibility, taking the forms of the most rigorous dialectic, and joined to a will fearless and invincible.

In his exterior Saul must have been of a weakly appearance. In 2 Cor. x. 10 he reproduces the reproach of his adversaries: "His bodily appearance is weak." In Acts xiv. 12 et seq. we see the Lycaonian crowd taking Barnabas for Jupiter, and Paul for Mercury, which proves that the former was of a higher and more imposing stature than the latter. But there is a wide interval between this and the portrait of the apostle, drawn in an apocryphal writing of the second century, the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, a portrait to which M. Renan in our judgment ascribes far too much value.[1] Paul is described in this book as "a man little of stature, bald, short-legged, corpulent, with eyebrows meeting, and prominent nose." This is certainly only a fancy portrait. In the second century nothing was known of St. Paul's apostolate after his two years' captivity at Rome, with which the history of the Acts closes; and yet men still know at that date what was the appearance of his nose, eyebrows, and legs! From such passages as Gal. iv. 13, where he mentions a sickness which arrested him in Galatia, and 2 Cor. xii. 7, where he speaks of a *thorn in the flesh*, a *messenger of Satan* buffeting him, it has been concluded that he was of a sickly and nervous temperament; he has even been credited with epileptic fits.

[1] *Les Apôtres*, p. 170.

But the first passage proves nothing; for a sickness in one particular case does not imply a sickly constitution. The second would rather go to prove the opposite, for Paul declares that the bodily affliction of which he speaks was *given* him,—that is to say, inflicted for the salutary purpose of providing the counterpoise of humiliation, to the exceeding greatness of the revelations which he received. The fact in question must therefore rather be one which supervened during the course of his apostleship. Is it possible, besides, that a man so profoundly shattered in constitution could for thirty years have withstood the labours and sufferings of a career such as that of Paul notoriously was?[1]

Marriage takes place early among the Jews. Did Saul marry during his stay at Jerusalem? Clement of Alexandria, and Eusebius among the ancients, answer in the affirmative. Luther and the Reformers generally shared this view. Hausrath has defended it lately on grounds which are not without weight.[2] The passages, 1 Cor. vii. 7: "I would that all men were even as I myself" (unmarried), and ver. 8: "I say to the unmarried and widows, It is good for them if they abide even as I," do not decide the question, for Paul might hold this language as a widower not less than if he were a celibate. But the manner in which the apostle speaks, ver. 7, of the *gift* which is granted him, and which he would not sacrifice, of living as an unmarried man, certainly suits a celibate better than a widower.

Had Saul, during his sojourn at Jerusalem, the opportunity of seeing and hearing the Lord Jesus? If he studied at the capital at this period, he can hardly have failed to meet Him in the temple. Some have alleged in favour of this supposition the passage, 2 Cor. v. 16: "Yea, though we have *known* Christ *after the flesh*, yet now henceforth know we Him no more." But this phrase is rather an allusion to the pretensions of some of his adversaries, who boasted of their personal relations to the Lord; or more simply still, it denotes the

[1] In an interesting article (*Revue chrétienne*, March 1878) M. Nyegard has taken up and supported the view of several German theologians, and of Rückert in particular (Gal. iv. 14), that the weakness in question was a disease of the eyes. The argument of this writer is ingenious. But none of his proofs seem to us convincing.

[2] *Bibellex.*, art. "Paulus."

carnal nature of the Messianic hope current among the Jews. As there is not another word in Paul's Epistles fitted to lead us to suppose that he himself saw the Lord during His earthly life, Renan and Mangold have concluded that he was absent from the capital at the time of the ministry of Jesus, and that he did not return to it till some years later, about the date of Stephen's martyrdom. But even had he lived abroad at that period, he must as a faithful Jew have returned to Jerusalem at the feasts. It is certainly difficult to suppose that St. Paul did not one time or other meet Jesus, though his writings make no allusion to the fact of a knowledge so purely external.

Saul had reached the age which qualified him for entering on public duties, at his thirtieth year. Distinguished above all his fellow-disciples by his fanatical zeal for the Jewish religion in its Pharisaic form, and by his hatred to the new doctrine, which seemed to him only a colossal imposture, he was charged by the authorities of his nation to prosecute the adherents of the Nazarene sect, and, if possible, to root it out. After having played a part in the murder of Stephen, and persecuted the believers at Jerusalem, he set out for Damascus, the capital of Syria, with letters from the Sanhedrim, which authorized him to fill the same office of inquisitor in the synagogues of that city. We have reached the fact of his conversion.

II. *His Conversion.*

In the midst of his Pharisaical fanaticism Saul did not enjoy peace. In chap. vii. of the Epistle to the Romans, he has unveiled the secret of his inner life at this period. Sincere as his efforts were to realize the ideal of righteousness traced by the law, he discovered an enemy within him which made sport of his best resolutions, namely lust. "I knew not sin but by the law; for I had not known lust except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." And thus he made the most important experience of his life, that which he has expressed in these words of the Epistle to the Romans (iii. 20): "By the law is the knowledge of sin." The painful feeling of his powerlessness to realize virtue was, if I may so call it, the negative preparation for the crisis which trans-

formed his life. His soul, hungering and thirsting after righteousness, found the attempt vain to nourish itself with its own works; it did not succeed in satisfying itself.

Another circumstance, fitted to prepare for the change in a more positive way, occurred at this period. An inactive witness of Stephen's martyrdom, Saul could calmly contemplate the bloody scene,—see the brow of the martyr irradiated with heavenly brightness, and hear his invocation addressed to the glorified Son of man, in which was revealed the secret of his love and triumphant hope. His soul was no doubt deeply pierced in that hour; and it was with the view of cicatrizing this wound that he set himself with redoubled violence to the work of destruction which he had undertaken. "The hour shall come," Jesus had said to His apostles, "in which whosoever shall kill you will think that he renders God worship." It was really with this thought that the young persecutor raged against the Christians. Nothing but an immediate interposition on the part of Him whom he was thus persecuting could arrest this charger in his full career, whom the sharp prickings by which he felt himself inwardly urged only served to irritate the more.

The attempt has been made in modern times to explain in a purely natural way the sudden revolution which passed over the feelings, convictions, and life of Saul.

Some have described it as a revolution of an exclusively inward character, and purely moral origin. Holsten, in his work on the *Gospel of Peter and Paul* (1868), has brought to this explanation all the resources of his remarkable sagacity. But his own master, Baur, while describing the appearing of Jesus at the moment of Saul's conversion as "the external reflection of a spiritual process," could not help acknowledging, after all, that there remains in the fact something mysterious and unfathomable: "We do not succeed by any analysis, either psychological or dialectical, in fathoming the mystery of the act by which God revealed His Son in Saul." [1]

The fact is, the more we regard the moral crisis which determined this revolution, as one slowly and profoundly prepared for, the more does its explanation demand the inter-

[1] *Das Christenthum und die christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*, 3d ed. p. 45.

position of an external and supernatural agent. We cannot help recalling the picture drawn by Jesus, of "the stronger man" overcoming "the strong man," who has no alternative left save to give himself up with all that he has into the hands of his conqueror. Saul himself had felt this sovereign interposition so profoundly, that in 1 Cor. ix. he distinguishes his apostleship, as the result of constraint, from that of the Twelve, which had been perfectly free and voluntary (vv. 16–18 comp. with vv. 5, 6). He, Paul, was taken by force. He was not asked: Wilt thou? It was said to him, *Woe to thee, if thou obey not!* For this reason it is that he feels the need of introducing into his ministry, as an afterthought, that element of free choice which has been so completely divorced from its origin, his voluntarily renouncing all pecuniary recompense from the churches, and imposing on himself the burden of his own support, and even sometimes that of his fellow-labourers (comp. Acts xx. 34). This fact is the striking testimony borne by the conscience of Paul himself to the purely passive character of the transformation which was wrought in him.

The account given in the Acts harmonizes with this declaration of the apostle's conscience. The very shades which are observable in the three narratives of the fact contained in the book, prove that a mysterious phenomenon was really perceived by those who accompanied Saul, and that the fact belongs in some way to the world of sense. They did not discern the person who spoke to him, so it is said, Acts ix. 7, but they were struck with a brightness surpassing that of ordinary sunlight (xxii. 9, xxvi. 13); they did not hear distinctly the words which were addressed to him (Acts xxii. 9), but they heard the sound of a voice (Acts ix. 7).[1] Sometimes these striking details of the narrative have been alleged as contradictions. But the hypothesis has become inadmissible since criticism, by the pen of Zeller himself, has established beyond dispute the unity of authorship and composition characterizing the whole book. Supposing even the author

[1] It is to be observed that in the former of the two passages the writer uses the accusative (*τὴν φωνήν*), and in the latter the genitive (*τῆς φωνῆς*); in the former case he had in view the penetration of the *meaning* of the words; in the latter, the confused perception of the sound of the voice.

to have used documents, it is certain that he has impressed on his narrative from one end to the other the stamp of his style and thought. In such circumstances, how could there possibly be a contradiction in a matter of fact? It must therefore be admitted that while Saul alone *saw* the Lord and *understood* His words, his fellow-travellers observed and heard something extraordinary; and this last particular suffices to prove the objectivity of the appearance.

Paul himself was so firmly convinced on this head, that when proving the reality of his apostleship, 1 Cor. ix. 1, he appeals without hesitation to the fact that he has *seen the Lord*, which cannot apply in his judgment to a simple vision; for no one ever imagined that a vision could suffice to confer apostleship. In chap. xv. of the same Epistle, ver. 8, Paul closes the enumeration of the appearances of the risen Jesus to the apostles with that which was granted to himself; he therefore ascribes to it the same reality as to those, and thus distinguishes it thoroughly from all the visions with which he was afterwards honoured, and which are mentioned in the Acts and Epistles. And the very aim of the chapter proves that what is in his mind can be nothing else than a bodily and external appearing of Jesus Christ; for his aim is to demonstrate the reality of our Lord's *bodily* resurrection, and from that fact to establish the reality of the resurrection in general. Now all the visions in the world could never demonstrate either the one or the other of these two facts: Christ's bodily resurrection and ours. Let us observe, besides, that when Paul expressed himself on facts of this order, he was far from proceeding uncritically. This appears from the passage, 2 Cor. xii. 1 et seq. He does not fail here to put a question to himself of the very kind which is before ourselves. For in the case of the Damascus appearance he expresses himself categorically, he guards himself on the contrary as carefully in the case mentioned 2 Cor. xii. 1 et seq. against pronouncing for the external or purely internal character of the phenomenon: "I know not; God knoweth," says he. Gal. i. 1 evidently rests on the same conviction of the objectivity of the manifestation of Christ, when He appeared to him as *risen*, to call him to the apostleship.

M. Renan has evidently felt that, to account for a change

so sudden and complete, recourse must be had to some external factor acting powerfully in Saul's moral life. He hesitates between a storm bursting on Lebanon, a flash of lightning spreading a sudden brilliance, or an increase of ophthalmic fever producing in the mind of Saul a violent hallucination. But causes so superficial could never have effected a moral change so profound and durable as that to which Paul's whole subsequent life testifies. Here is the judgment of Baur himself, in his treatise, *Der Apostel Paulus*,[1] on a supposition of the same kind: "We shall not stop to examine it, for it is a pure hypothesis, not only without anything for it in the text, but having its obvious meaning against it." M. Reuss[2] thus expresses himself: "After all that has been said in our time, the conversion of Paul still remains, if not an absolute miracle in the traditional sense of the word (an effect without any other cause than the arbitrary and immediate interposition of God), at least a psychological problem insoluble to the present hour."

Keim, too, cannot help acknowledging the objectivity of the appearance of Christ which determined so profound a revolution. Only he transports the fact from the world of the senses into the not less real one of the spirit. He thinks that the glorified Lord really manifested Himself to Paul by means of a spiritual action exercised over his soul. This explanation is the forced result of these two factors: on the one hand, the necessity of ascribing an objective cause to the phenomenon; on the other, the predetermined resolution not to acknowledge the miracle of our Lord's bodily resurrection. But we shall here apply the words of Baur: "Not only has this hypothesis nothing for it in the text, but it has against it its obvious meaning." It transforms the three narratives of the Acts into fictitious representations, since, according to this explanation, Saul's fellow-travellers could have seen nothing at all.

If Paul had not personally experienced our Lord's bodily presence, he would never have dared to formulate the paradox, offensive in the highest degree, and especially to a Jewish theologian (Col. ii. 9): "In Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead *bodily*."

[1] 2d ed. p. 78.

[2] *Les Epîtres pauliniennes*, p. 11.

With Saul's conversion a supreme hour struck in the history of humanity. If, as Renan justly says, there came with the birth of Jesus the moment when "the capital event in the history of the world was about to be accomplished, the revolution whereby the noblest portions of humanity were to pass from paganism to a religion founded on the divine unity,"[1] the conversion of Paul was the means whereby God took possession of the man who was to be His instrument in bringing about this unparalleled revolution.

The moment had come when the divine covenant, established in Abraham with a single family, was to extend to the whole world, and embrace, as God had promised to the patriarch, *all the families of the earth.* The universalism which had presided over the primordial ages of the race, and which had given way for a time to the particularism of the theocracy, was about to reappear in a more elevated form and armed with new powers, capable of subduing the Gentile world. But there was needed an exceptional agent for this extraordinary work. The appearing of Jesus had paved the way for it, but had not yet been able to accomplish it. The twelve Palestinian apostles were not fitted for such a task. We have found, in studying Paul's origin and character, that he was the man specially designed and prepared beforehand. And unless we are to regard the work which he accomplished, which Renan calls "the capital event in the history of the world," as accidental, we must consider the act whereby he was enrolled in the service of Christ, and called to this work, as one directly willed of God, and worthy of being effected by His immediate interposition. Christ Himself, with a strong hand and a stretched-out arm, when the hour struck, laid hold of the instrument which the Father had chosen for Him. These thoughts in their entirety form precisely the contents of the preamble to the Epistle which we propose to study (Rom. i. 1–5).

What passed in the soul of Saul during the three days which followed this violent disturbance, he himself tells us in the beginning of chap. vi. of the Epistle to the Romans. This passage, in which we hear the immediate echo of the Damascus experience, answers our question in the two words:

[1] *Vie de Jésus*, p. 1.

A death, and a resurrection. The death was that of the self-idolatrous Saul, death to his own righteousness, or, what comes to the same thing, to the law. Whither had he been led by his impetuous zeal for the fulfilling of the law? To make war on God, and to persecute the Messiah and His true people! Some hidden vice must certainly cleave to a self-righteousness cultivated so carefully, and which led him to a result so monstrous. And that vice he now discerned clearly. In wishing to establish his own righteousness, it was not God, it was himself whom he had sought to glorify. The object of his adoration was his *ego*, which by his struggles and victories he hoped to raise to moral perfection, with the view of being able to say in the end: Behold this great Babylon which I have built! The disquietude which had followed him on this path, and driven him to a blind and bloody fanaticism, was no longer a mystery to him. The truth of that declaration of Scripture, which he had till now only applied to the Gentiles, was palpable in his own case. "There is not a just man, no, not one" (Rom. iii. 10). The great fact of the corruption and condemnation of the race, even in the best of its representatives, had acquired for him the evidence of a personal experience. This was to him that death which he afterwards described in the terms: "I through the law am dead to the law" (Gal. ii. 19).

But, simultaneously with this death, there was wrought in him a resurrection. A justified Saul appeared in the sphere of his consciousness in place of the condemned Saul, and by the working of the Spirit this Saul became a *new creature* in Christ. Such is the forcible expression used by Paul himself to designate the radical change which passed within him (2 Cor. v. 17).

Accustomed as he was to the Levitical sacrifices demanded by the law for every violation of legal ordinances, Saul had no sooner experienced sin within him in all its gravity, and with all its consequences of condemnation and death, than he must also have felt the need of a more efficacious expiation than that which the blood of animal victims can procure. The bloody death of Jesus, who had just manifested Himself to him in His glory as the Christ, then presented itself to his view in its true light. Instead of seeing in it, as hitherto,

the justly-deserved punishment of a false Christ, he recognised in it the great expiatory sacrifice offered by God Himself to wash away the sin of the world and his own. The portrait of the Servant of Jehovah drawn by Isaiah, of that unique person on whom God lays the iniquity of all . . . he now understood to whom he must apply it. Already the interpretations in the vulgar tongue, which accompanied the reading of the Old Testament in the synagogues, and which were afterwards preserved in our *Targums*, referred such passages to the Messiah. In Saul's case the veil fell; the cross was transfigured before him into the instrument of the world's salvation; and the resurrection of Jesus, which had become a palpable fact since the Lord had appeared to him bodily, was henceforth the proclamation made by God Himself of the justification of humanity, the monument of the complete amnesty offered to our sinful world. "My *righteous* Servant *shall justify* many," were the words of Isaiah, after having described the resurrection of the Servant of Jehovah as the sequel of His voluntary immolation. Saul now contemplated with wonder and adoration the fulfilment of this promise, the accomplishment of this work. The new righteousness was before him as a free gift of God in Jesus Christ. There was nothing to be added to it. It was enough to accept and rest on it in order to possess the blessing which he had pursued through so many labours and sacrifices, peace with God.

He entered joyfully into the simple part of one accepting, believing. Dead and condemned in the death of the Messiah, he lived again justified in His risen person. It was on this revelation, received during the three days at Damascus, that Saul lived till his last breath.

One can understand how, in this state of soul, and as the result of this inward illumination, he regarded the baptism in the name of Jesus which Ananias administered to him. If in Rom. vi. he has presented this ceremony under the image of a death, burial, and resurrection through the participation of faith in the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus, he has, in so expressing himself, only applied to all Christians his own experience in his baptism at Damascus.

To the grace of justification, of which this ceremony was to him the assured seal, there was added that of regeneration

by the creative operation of the Spirit, who transformed his reconciled heart, and produced a new life within it. All the energy of his love turned to that Christ who had become his substitute, guilty, in order to become the author of his righteousness, and to the God who had bestowed on him this unspeakable gift. Thus there was laid within him the principle of a true holiness. What had been impossible for him till then, self-emptying and life for God, was at length wrought in his at once humble and joyful heart. Jesus, who had been his substitute on the cross, in order to become his righteousness, was easily substituted for himself in his heart in order to become the object of his life. The free obedience which he had vainly sought to accomplish under the yoke of the law, became in his grateful heart, through the Spirit of Christ, a holy reality. And he could henceforth measure the full distance between the state of a slave and that of a child of God.

From this experience there could not but spring up a new light on the true character of the institutions of the law. He had been accustomed to regard the law of Moses as the indispensable agent of the world's salvation; it seemed to him destined to become the standard of life for the whole race, as it had been for the life of Israel. But now, after the experience which he had just made of the powerlessness of this system to justify and sanctify man, the work of Moses appeared in all its insufficiency. He still saw in it a pedagogical institution, but one merely temporary. With the Messiah, who realized all that he had expected from the law, the end of the Mosaic discipline was reached. "Ye are complete in Christ" (Col. ii. 10); what avails henceforth what was only the *shadow* of the dispensation of Christ (Col. ii. 16, 17)?

And who, then, was He in whose person and work there was thus given to him the fulness of God's gifts without the help of the law? A mere man? Saul remembers that the Jesus who was condemned to death by the Sanhedrim was so condemned as a blasphemer, for having declared Himself the Son of God. This affirmation had hitherto seemed to him the height of impiety and imposture. Now the same affirmation, taken with the view of the sovereign majesty of Him

whom he beheld on the way to Damascus, stamps this being with a divine seal, and makes him bend the knee before His sacred person. He no longer sees in the Messiah merely a son of David, but the Son of God.

With this change in his conception of the Christ there is connected another not less decisive change in his conception of the Messiah's work. So long as Paul had seen nothing more in the Messiah than the son of David, he had understood His work only as the glorification of Israel, and the extension of the discipline of the law to the whole world. But from the time that God had revealed to him in the person of this son of David according to the flesh (Rom. i. 2, 3) the appearing of a divine being, His own Son, his view of the Messiah's work grew with that of His person. The son of David might belong to Israel only; but the Son of God could not have come here below, save to be the Saviour and Lord of all that is called man. Were not all human distinctions effaced before such a messenger? It is this result which Paul himself has indicated in those striking words of the Epistle to the Galatians (i. 16): "When it pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb and called me by His grace, to *reveal His Son* in me,[1] *that I might preach Him among the heathen* . . ." His Son, the heathen: these two notions were necessarily correlative! The revelation of the one must accompany that of the other. This relation between the divinity of Christ and the universality of His kingdom is the key to the preamble of the Epistle to the Romans.

The powerlessness of the discipline of the law to save man, the freeness of salvation, the end of the Mosaic economy through the advent of the Messianic salvation, the divinity of the Messiah, the universal destination of His work,—all these elements of Paul's new religious conception, of *his gospel*, to quote the phrase twice used in our Epistle (ii. 16, xvi. 23),[2] were thus

[1] Baur and his school have used the phrase *in me* to set aside the idea of an outward revelation in the matter of his conversion. Not only would this interpretation make Paul contradict himself, as we have shown, but, moreover, it mistakes the real bearing of the phrase *in me*. It denotes not the fact of the appearance, but the whole inner process connected with it, and which we have sought to reproduce in these pages. The *revelation of the Son* in Paul's heart is not identical with His visible appearing; it was the consequence of it.

[2] Elsewhere only in 2 Tim. ii. 8.

involved in the very fact of his conversion, and became more or less directly disentangled as objects of consciousness in that internal evolution which took place under the light of the Spirit during the three days following the decisive event. What the light of Pentecost had been to the Twelve as the sequel of the contemplation of Jesus on the earth, which they had enjoyed for three years, that, the illumination of those three days following the sudden contemplation of the glorified Lord, was to St. Paul.

Everything is connected in this masterpiece of grace (1 Tim. i. 16). Without the external appearance, the previous moral process in Paul would have exhausted itself in vain efforts, and only resulted in a withering blight. And, on the contrary, without the preparatory process and the spiritual evolution which followed the appearance, it would have been with this as with that resurrection of which Abraham spoke, Luke xvi. 31 : "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither would they believe though one rose from the dead." The moral assimilation being wanting, the sight even of the Lord would have remained unproductive capital both for Paul and the world.

III. *His Apostleship.*

St. Paul became an apostle at the same time as a believer. The exceptional contemporaneousness of the two facts arose from the mode of his conversion. He himself points to this feature in 1 Cor. ix. 16, 17. He did not become an apostle of Jesus, like the Twelve, after being voluntarily attached to Him by faith, and in consequence of a freely-accepted call. He was taken suddenly from a state of open enmity. The divine act whereby he was made a believer resulted from the choice by which God had designated him to the apostleship.

The apostleship of St. Paul lasted from twenty-eight to thirty years; and as we have seen that Paul had probably reached his thirtieth year at the time of his conversion, it follows that this radical crisis must have divided his life into two nearly equal parts of twenty-eight to thirty years each.

Paul's apostolic career embraces three periods: the first is

a time of preparation; it lasted about *seven* years. The second is the period of his active apostleship, or his three great missionary journeys; it covers a space of *fourteen* years. The third is the time of his imprisonments. It includes the two years of his imprisonment at Cesarea, and the two of his captivity at Rome, with the half-year's voyage which separated the two periods; perhaps there should be added to these *four* or *five* years a last time of liberty, extending to one or *two* years, closing with a last imprisonment. Anyhow, the limit of this third period is the martyrdom which Paul underwent at Rome, after those five or seven years of final labour.

I.

An apostle by right, from the days following the crisis at Damascus, Paul did not enter on the full exercise of his commission all at once, but gradually. His call referred specially to the conversion of the Gentiles. The tenor of the message which the Lord had addressed to him by the mouth of Ananias was this: "Thou shalt bear my name before the Gentiles, and their kings, and the children of Israel" (Acts ix. 15). This last particular was designedly placed at the close. The Jews, without being excluded from Paul's work, were not the first object of his mission.

In point of fact, it was with Israel that he must commence his work, and the evangelization of the Jews continued with him to the end to be the necessary transition to that of the Gentiles. In every Gentile city where Paul opens a mission, he begins with preaching the gospel to the Jews in the synagogue. There he meets with the proselytes from among the Gentiles, and these form the bridge by which he reaches the purely Gentile population. Thus there is repeated on a small scale, at every step of his career, the course taken on a grand scale by the preaching of the gospel over the world. In the outset, as the historical foundation of the work of Christianization, we have the foundation of the Church in Israel by the labours of Peter at Jerusalem and in Palestine,—such is the subject of the first part of the Acts (i.–xii.); then, like a house built on this foundation, we have the establishment of the church among the Gentiles by Paul's labours,—such is the subject of the second part of the Acts (xiii.–xxviii.).

Notwithstanding this, Baur has alleged that the course ascribed to Paul by the author of the Acts, in describing his foundations among the Gentiles, is historically inadmissible, because it speaks of exaggerated pains taken to conciliate the Jews, such as were very improbable on the part of a man like St. Paul.[1] But the account in the Acts is fully confirmed on this point by Paul's own declarations (Rom. i. 16, ii. 9, 10). In these passages the apostle says, when speaking of the two great facts, salvation in Christ and final judgment: "To the Jews *first*." He thus himself recognises the right of priority which belongs to them in virtue of their special calling, and of the theocratic preparation which they had enjoyed. From the first to the last day of his labours, Paul ceased not to pay homage in word and deed to the prerogative of Israel.

There is nothing wonderful, therefore, in the fact related in the Acts (x. 20), that Paul began immediately to preach in the Jewish synagogues of Damascus. Thence he soon extended his labours to the surrounding regions of Arabia. According to Gal. i. 17, 18, he consecrated three whole years to those remote lands. The Acts sum up this period in the vague phrase "many days" (ix. 23). For the apostle it doubtless formed a time of mental concentration and personal communion with the Lord, which may be compared with the years which the apostles passed with their Master during His earthly ministry. But we are far from seeing in this sojourn a time of external inactivity. The relation between Paul's words, Gal. i. 16, and the following verses, does not permit us to doubt that Paul also consecrated these years to preaching. The whole first chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians rests on the idea that Paul did not wait to begin preaching the gospel till he had conferred on the subject with the apostles at Jerusalem, and received their instructions. On the contrary, he had already entered on his missionary career when for the first time he met with Peter.

After his work in Arabia, Paul returned to Damascus, where his activity excited the fury of the Jews to the highest pitch. The city was at that time under the power of Aretas, king of Arabia. We do not know the circumstances which had withdrawn it for the time from the Roman dominion, nor how

[1] *Paulus*, 2d ed. I. pp. 368, 369.

many years this singular state of things lasted. These are interesting archæological questions which have not yet found their entire solution. Nevertheless, the fact of the temporary possession of Damascus by King Aretas or Hareth at this very time cannot be called in question, even apart from the history of the Acts.[1]

At the close of this first period of evangelization, Paul felt the need of making the personal acquaintance of Peter. With this view he repaired to Jerusalem. He stayed with him fifteen days. It was not that Paul needed to learn the gospel in the school of this apostle. If such had been his object, he would not have delayed three whole years to come seeking this instruction. But we can easily understand how important it was for him at length to confer with the principal witness of the earthly life of Jesus, though he knew that he had received from the Lord Himself the knowledge of the gospel (Gal. i. 11, 12). What interest must he have felt in the authentic and detailed account of the facts of the ministry of Jesus, an account which he could not obtain with certainty except from such lips! Witness the facts which he recites in 1 Cor. xv., and the sayings of our Lord which he quotes here and there in his Epistles and discourses (comp. 1 Cor. vii. 10; Acts xx. 35).

For two weeks, then, Paul conferred with the apostles (Acts ix. 27, 28); the indefinite phrase: *the apostles*, used in the Acts, denotes, according to the more precise account given in the Epistle to the Galatians, Peter and James. Paul's intention was to remain some time at Jerusalem; for, notwithstanding the risk which he ran, it seemed to him that the testimony of the former persecutor would produce more effect here than anywhere else. But God would not have the instrument which He had prepared so carefully for the salvation of the Gentiles to be violently broken by the rage of the Jews, and to share the lot of the dauntless Stephen. A vision of the Lord, which Paul had in the temple, warned him to leave the city immediately (Acts xxii. 17 et seq.). The apostles conducted him to the coast at Cesarea. Thence he repaired—

[1] The fact is established by the interruption of the Roman coins of Damascus under Caligula and Claudius, and by the existence of a coin of this city stamped "of Aretas the Philhellene" (see Renan, *Les Apôtres*, p. 175).

the history in the Acts does not say how (ix. 30), but from Gal. i. 21 we should conclude that it was by land—to Syria, and thence to Tarsus, his native city; and there, in the midst of his family, he awaited new directions from the Lord.

He did not wait in vain. After the martyrdom of Stephen, a number of believers from Jerusalem, from among the Greek-speaking Jews (*the Hellenists*), fleeing from the persecution which raged in Palestine, had emigrated to Antioch, the capital of Syria. In their missionary zeal they had overstepped the limit which had been hitherto observed by the preachers of the gospel, and addressed themselves to the Greek population.[1] It was the first time that Christian effort made way for itself among Gentiles properly so called. Divine grace accompanied the decisive step. A numerous and lively church, in which a majority of Greek converts were associated with Christians of Jewish origin, arose in the capital of Syria. In the account given of the founding of this important church by the author of the Acts (xi. 20–24), there is a charm, a fascination, a freshness, which are to be found only in pictures drawn from nature.

The apostles and the church of Jerusalem, taken by surprise, sent Barnabas to the spot to examine more closely this unprecedented movement, and give needed direction. Then Barnabas, remembering Saul, whom he had previously introduced to the apostles at Jerusalem, went in search of him to Tarsus, and brought him to this field of action, worthy as it was of such a labourer. Between the church of Antioch and Paul the apostle there was formed from that hour a close union, the magnificent fruit of which was the evangelization of the world.

After labouring together for a whole year at Antioch, Barnabas and Saul were sent to Jerusalem to carry aid to the poor believers of that city. This journey, which coincided with the death of the last representative of the national sovereignty of Israel, Herod Agrippa (Acts xii.), certainly took place in the year 44; for this is the date assigned by the

[1] The received reading: *to the Hellenists*, absolutely falsifies the meaning of the passage (Acts xi. 20). It has already been corrected in our translations (Fr. . . . English *Grecians*, should be *Greeks*); the reading should be: *to the Hellenes*, according to the oldest manuscripts (*Sinaiticus*, *Alexandrinus*, etc.), and according to the context, which imperatively demands the mention of a fact of a wholly new character.

detailed account of Josephus to the death of this sovereign. It was also about this time, under Claudius, that the great famine took place with which this journey was connected, according to the Acts. Thus we have here one of the surest dates in the life of St. Paul. No doubt this journey to Jerusalem is not mentioned in the first chapter of Galatians among the sojourns made by the apostle in the capital which took place shortly after his conversion, and to explain this omission some have thought it necessary to suppose that Barnabas arrived alone at Jerusalem, while Paul stayed by the way. The text of the Acts is not favourable to this explanation (Acts xi. 30, xii. 25). The reason of Paul's silence about this journey is simpler, for the context of Gal. i., rightly understood, does not at all demand, as has been imagined, the enumeration of *all* the apostle's journeys to Jerusalem in those early times. It was enough for his purpose to remind his readers that his *first* meeting with the apostles had not taken place till long after he had begun his preaching of the gospel. And this object was fully gained by stating the date of his *first* stay at Jerusalem subsequent to his conversion. And if he also mentions a later journey (chap. ii.), the fact does not show that it was the second journey absolutely speaking. He speaks of this new journey (the third in reality), only because it had an altogether peculiar importance in the question which formed the object of his letter to the churches of Galatia.

II.

The second part of the apostle's career includes his three great missionary journeys, with the visits to Jerusalem which separate them. With these journeys there is connected the composition of Paul's most important letters. The fourteen years embraced in this period must, from what has been said above, be reckoned from the year 44 (the date of Herod Agrippa's death) or a little later. Thus the end of the national royal house of Israel coincided with the beginning of the mission to the Gentiles. Theocratic particularism beheld the advent of Christian universalism.

Paul's three missionary journeys have their common point of departure in Antioch. This capital of Syria was the cradle

of the mission to the Gentiles, as Jerusalem had been that of the mission to Israel. After each of his journeys Paul takes care to clasp by a journey to Jerusalem the bond which should unite those two works among Gentiles and Jews. So deeply did he himself feel the necessity of binding the churches which he founded in Gentile lands to the primitive apostolic church, that he went the length of saying: "lest by any means I should run, or had run, *in vain*" (Gal. ii. 2).

The first journey was made with Barnabas. It did not embrace any very considerable geographical space; it extended only to the island of Cyprus, and the provinces of Asia Minor situated to the north of that island. The chief importance of this journey lies in the missionary principle which it inaugurates in the history of the world. It is to be observed that it is from this time Saul begins to bear the name of *Paul* (Acts xiii. 9). It has been supposed that this change was a mark of respect paid to the proconsul Sergius Paulus, converted in Cyprus, the first-fruits of the mission to the Gentiles. But Paul had nothing of the courtier about him. Others have found in the name an allusion to the spirit of humility—either to his small stature, or to the last place occupied by him among the apostles (παῦλος, in the sense of the Latin *paulus, paululus, the little*). This is ingenious, but far-fetched. The true explanation is probably the following: Jews travelling in a foreign country liked to assume a Greek or Roman name, and readily chose the one whose sound came nearest to their Hebrew name. A *Jesus* became a *Jason*, a *Joseph* a *Hegesippus*, a *Dosthai* a *Dositheus*, an *Eliakim* an *Alkimos*. So, no doubt, Saul became Paul.

Two questions arise in connection with those churches of southern Asia Minor founded in the course of the first journey. Are we, with some writers (Niemeyer, Thiersch, Hausrath, Renan in *Saint Paul*, pp. 51 and 52), to regard these churches as the same which Paul afterwards designates by the name of churches of Galatia, and to which he wrote the *Epistle to the Galatians* (Gal. i. 2; 1 Cor. xvi. 1)? It is certain that the southern districts of Asia Minor, Lycaonia, Pisidia, etc., which were the principal theatre of this first journey, belonged at that time, administratively speaking (with the exception of Pam-

phylia), to the Roman province of Galatia. This name, which had originally designated the northern countries of Asia Minor, separated from the Black Sea by the narrow province of Paphlagonia, had been extended by the Romans a short time previously to the districts situated more to the south, and consequently to the territories visited by Paul and Barnabas. And as it cannot be denied that Paul sometimes uses official names, he might have done so also in the passages referred to. This question has some importance, first with a view to determining the date of the Epistle to the Galatians, and then in relation to other questions depending on it. According to our view, the opinion which has just been mentioned falls to the ground before insurmountable difficulties.

1. The name Galatia is nowhere applied in Acts xiii. and xiv. to the theatre of the first mission. It does not appear till later, in the account of the second mission, and only after Luke has spoken of the visit made by Paul and Silas to the churches founded on occasion of the first (xvi. 5). When Luke names Phrygia and *Galatia* in ver. 6, it is unquestionable that he is referring to different provinces from those in which lay the churches founded during the first journey, and which are mentioned vv. 1–5.

2. In 1 Pet. i. 1, Galatia is placed between Pontus and Cappadocia, a fact which forbids us to apply the term to regions which are altogether southern.

3. But the most decisive reason is this: Paul reminds the Galatians (iv. 13) that it was sickness which forced him to stay among them, and which thus led to the founding of their churches. How is it possible to apply this description to Paul's first mission, which was expressly undertaken with the view of evangelizing the countries of Asia, whither he repaired with Barnabas?

From all this it follows that Paul and Luke used the term Galatia in its original and popular[1] sense; that the apostle did not visit the country thus designated till the beginning of his second journey, and that, consequently, the Epistle to the Galatians was not written, as Hausrath thinks, in the course of the second journey, but during the third, since this Epistle

[1] "The inscriptions," says Renan himself, "prove that the old names remained" (p. 50).

assumes that *two* sojourns in Galatia had taken place previously to its composition.[1]

A second much more important question arises when we inquire what exactly was the theoretic teaching and the missionary practice of Paul at this period. Since Rückert's time, many theologians, Reuss, Sabatier, Hausrath, Klöpper, etc., think that Paul had not yet risen to the idea of the abrogation of the law by the gospel.[2] Hausrath even alleges that the object which Paul and Barnabas had in Asia Minor was not at all to convert the Gentiles—were there not enough of them, says he, in Syria and Cilicia?—but that their simple object was to announce the advent of the Messiah to the *Jewish* communities which had spread to the interior. He holds that it was the unexpected opposition which their preaching met with on the part of the Jews, which led the two missionaries to address themselves to the Gentiles, and to suppress in their interest the rite of circumcision. To prove this view of the apostle's teaching in those earliest times, there are alleged: (1) the fact of the circumcision of Timothy at this very date (Acts xvi. 3); (2) these words in Gal. v. 11: "If I *yet* preach circumcision, why do I *yet* suffer persecution? Then is the offence of the cross ceased;" (3) the words, 2 Cor. v. 16: "Yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we Him *no more*."[3]

Let us first examine the view of Hausrath. Is it credible that the church of Antioch, itself composed chiefly of Christians of Greek origin and uncircumcised (comp. the very emphatic account of this fact, Acts xi. 20 et seq.), would have dreamt of drawing the limits supposed by this critic to the commission given to its messengers? This would have been to deny the principle of its own foundation, the free preaching of the gospel to the *Greeks*. The step taken by this church was accompanied with very solemn circumstances (a revelation of the Holy Spirit, fasting and prayer on the part of the

[1] "Ye know how on account of sickness I preached the gospel unto you *at the first*" (πρότερον, the first of two times).

[2] Reuss, *Hist. de la théol. chrét.* I. 345 et seq.; Sabatier, *L'Apôtre Paul*, pp. 3-6. Renan in *Saint Paul*, p. 72, says: "Paul, who *in the earliest part of his preaching*, as it seems, preached circumcision, *now* declared it useless."

[3] Comp. especially Klöpper, *Das zweyte Sendschreiben an die Gemeinde zu Korinth*, pp. 286-297.

whole church, an express consecration by the laying on of hands, Acts xiii. 1 et seq.). Why all this, if there had not been the consciousness that they were doing a work exceptionally important and in certain respects new? And instead of being a step in advance, this work would be in reality, on the view before us, a retrograde step as compared with what had already taken place at Antioch itself! The study of the general course of the history of the Acts, and of the progress which it is meant to prove, forces us to the conclusion that things had come to a decisive moment. The church undertook for the first time, and with a full consciousness of the gravity of its procedure, the conquest of the Gentile world.

The question, what at that time was the apostle's view in regard to the abrogation of the law, presents two aspects, which it is important to study separately. What did he think of subjecting the Gentiles to the institutions of the law? and did he still hold its validity for believing Jews?

According to Gal. i. 16, he knew positively from the first day that if God had revealed *His Son* to him in so extraordinary a way, it was "that he might proclaim Him *among the Gentiles.*" This conviction did not follow his conversion; it accompanied it. Why should the Lord have called a new apostle, in a way so direct and independent of the Twelve, if it had not been with a view to a new work destined to complete theirs? It is with a deliberate purpose that Paul, in the words quoted, does not say *the Christ*, but *His Son.* This latter expression is tacitly contrasted with the name *Son of David*, which designates the Messiah only in His particular relation to the Jewish people.

Now it cannot be admitted that Paul, knowing his mission to be destined to the Gentiles, would have commenced it with the idea of subjecting them to the discipline of the law, and that it was not till later that he modified this point of view. According to Gal. i. 1 and 11–19, the gospel which he now preaches was taught him *by the revelation of Jesus Christ*, and without human interposition. And when did this revelation take place? Ver. 15 tells us clearly: "when it pleased God to reveal His Son to him," that is to say, at the time of his conversion. His mode of preaching the gospel therefore dates from that point, and we cannot hold, without contradicting his

own testimony, that any essential modification took place in the contents of his preaching between the days following his conversion and the time when he wrote the Epistle to the Galatians. Such a supposition, especially when an Epistle is in question in which he directly opposes the subjection of the Gentiles to circumcision, would imply a reticence unworthy of his character. He must have said: It is true, indeed, that at the first I did not think and preach on this point as I do now; but I afterwards changed my view. Facts on all sides confirm the declaration of the apostle. How, if during the first period of his apostleship he had circumcised the Gentile converts, could he have taken Titus *uncircumcised* to Jerusalem? How could the emissaries who had come from that city to Antioch have found a whole multitude of believers on whom they sought to impose circumcision? How would the Christians of Cilicia, who undoubtedly owed their entrance into the church to Paul's labours during his stay at Tarsus, have still needed to be reassured by the apostles in opposition to those who wished to subject them to circumcision (Acts xv. 23, 24)? Peter in the house of Cornelius does not think of imposing this rite (Acts x. and xi.); and Paul, we are to suppose, was less advanced than his colleague, and still less so than the evangelists who founded the church of Antioch!

It is more difficult to ascertain precisely what Paul thought at the beginning of his apostleship as to the abolition or maintenance of the Mosaic law for believing Jews. Rationally speaking, it is far from probable that so consequent a thinker as St. Paul, after the crushing experience which he had just had of the powerlessness of the law either to justify or sanctify man, was not led to the conviction of the uselessness of legal ordinances for the salvation not only of Gentiles, but of Jews. This logical conclusion is confirmed by an express declaration of the apostle. In the Epistle to the Galatians, ii. 18–20, there are found the words: "*I through the law* am dead *to the law*, that I might live unto God; I am crucified with Christ." If it was *through* the law that he died *to* the law, this inner crisis cannot have taken place till the close of his life under the law. It was therefore in the very hour when the law finished its office as a schoolmaster to bring him to Christ, that this law lost its religious value for his conscience, and

that, freed from its yoke, he began to *live* really *unto God* in the faith of Christ crucified. This saying, the utterance of his inmost consciousness, supposes no interval between the time of his personal breaking with the law (a death) and the beginning of his new life. His inward emancipation was therefore one of the elements of his conversion.[1] It seems to be thought that the idea of the abrogation of the law was, at the time of Saul's conversion, a quite unheard-of notion. But what then had been the cause of Stephen's death? He had been heard to say "that Jesus of Nazareth would destroy this temple and change the institutions which Moses had delivered" (Acts vi. 13, 14). Among the accusers of Stephen who repeated such sayings, Saul himself was one. Stephen, the *Hellenist*, had thus reached before Paul's conversion the idea of the abolition of the law which very naturally connected itself with the fact of the destruction of the temple, announced, as was notorious, by Jesus. Many prophetic sayings must have long before prepared thoughtful minds for this result.[2] Certain of the Lord's declarations also implied it more or less directly.[3] And now by a divine irony Saul the executioner was called to assert and realize the programme traced by his victim!

The gradual manner in which the Twelve had insensibly passed from the bondage of the law to the personal school of Christ, had not prepared them so completely for such a revolution. And now is the time for indicating the true difference which separated them from Paul, one of the most difficult of questions. They could not fail to expect as well as Stephen and Paul, in virtue of the declarations already quoted, the abrogation of the institutions of the law. But they had not perceived in the cross, as Paul did (Gal. ii. 19, 20), the principle of this emancipation. They expected some external event which would be the signal of this abolition, as well as of the passage from the present to the future economy; the glorious appearing of Christ, for example, which would be as it were the miraculous counterpart of the Sinaitic promulgation of the law. From this point of view it is easy to explain their expectant attitude as they considered the progress of

[1] The same result is reached by analysing the passage Phil. iii. 4-8.

[2] Jer. xxxi. 31 et seq.; Mal. i. 11, etc.

[3] Mark ii. 18, vii. 15, 16, xiii. 1, 2, etc.

Paul's work. On the other hand, we can understand why he, notwithstanding his already formed personal conviction, did not feel himself called to insist on the practical application of the truth which he had come to possess in so extraordinary a way. The Twelve were the recognised and titled heads of the church so long as this remained almost wholly the Judeo-Christian church founded by them. Paul understood the duty of accommodating his step to theirs. So he did at Jerusalem in the great council of which we are about to speak, when he accepted the compromise which guarded the liberty of the Gentiles, but supported the observances of the law for Christians who had come from Judaism. And later still, when he had founded his own churches in the Gentile world, he did not cease to take account with religious respect of Judeo-Christian scruples relating to the Mosaic law. But it was with him a matter of charity, as he has explained 1 Cor. ix. 19-22; and this wise mode of action does not authorize the supposition that at any time after his conversion his teaching was contrary to the principle so exactly and logically expressed by him: "Christ is the end of the law" (Rom. x. 4).

The circumcision of Timothy in Paul's second journey, far from betraying any hesitation in his mind on this point, is wholly in favour of our view. Indeed, Paul did not decide on this step, because he still regarded circumcision as obligatory on believing Jews. The point in question was not Timothy's salvation, but the influence which this young Christian might exercise on the Jews who surrounded him: "Paul took and circumcised him," says the narrative, "*because of the Jews who were in those regions.*" If this act had been dictated by a strictly religious scruple, Paul must have carried it out much earlier, at the time of Timothy's baptism. The latter, indeed, was already a Christian when Paul arrived at Lystra the second time and circumcised him. ("*There was there a disciple,*" we read in Acts xvi. 1.) At the beginning of the second journey, Timothy was therefore a believer and a member of the church, though not circumcised. This fact is decisive. It was precisely because the legal observance had become in Paul's estimation a matter religiously indifferent, that he could act in this respect with entire liberty, and put

himself, if he thought good, "under the law with those who were under the law, that he might gain the more."[1] Such was the course he followed on this occasion.

The words, Gal. v. 11: "If I *yet* preach circumcision, why do I *yet* suffer persecution?" on which Reuss mainly supports his view, do not warrant the conclusion drawn from them by means of a false interpretation. Paul is supposed to be alluding to a calumnious imputation made by his adversaries, who, it is said, led the Galatians to believe that previously, and elsewhere than among them, Paul had been quite ready to impose circumcision on his Gentile converts. Paul, according to the view in question, is replying to this charge, that if to the present hour he *yet* upheld circumcision, as he had really done in the earliest days after his conversion, the Jews would not continue to persecute him as they were still doing. But the reasoning of Paul, thus understood, would assume a fact notoriously false, namely, that he had only begun to be persecuted by the Jews after he had ceased to make the obligatoriness of circumcision one of the elements of his preaching of the gospel. Now it is beyond dispute that persecution broke out against Paul immediately after his conversion, and even at Damascus. It was the same at Jerusalem soon after.[2] It is therefore absolutely impossible that Paul could have thought for a single instant of explaining the persecutions to which he was subjected by the Jews, by the fact that he had *ceased* at a given point of his ministry to preach circumcision, till then imposed by him. Besides, if Paul had really been accused in Galatia of having acted and taught there differently from what he had done previously and everywhere else, he could not have confined himself to replying thus in passing, and by a simple allusion thrown in at the end of his letter, to so serious a charge. He must have explained himself on this main point in the beginning in chap. i. and ii., where he treats of all the questions relating to his person and apostleship.

We therefore regard the proposed interpretation as inadmis-

[1] 1 Cor. ix. 19-22.—The situation was evidently quite different when it was attempted to *constrain* him to circumcise Titus at Jerusalem. Here the question of *principle* was at stake. In this position there could be no question of concession.

[2] Acts ix. 23-29.

sible. The change of which the apostle speaks is not one which had taken place in his system of preaching; it is a change which he might freely introduce into it now if he wished, and one by which he would immediately cause the persecution to which he was subjected to cease. "If I would consent to join to my preaching of the gospel that of circumcision, for which I was fanatically zealous during the time of my Pharisaism, the persecution with which the Jews assail me would instantly cease. Thereby the offence of the cross would no longer exist in their minds. Transformed into an auxiliary of Judaism, the cross itself would be tolerated and even applauded by my adversaries." What does this signify? The apostle means, that if he consented to impose circumcision on those of the Gentiles whom he converted by the preaching of the cross, the Jews would immediately applaud his mission. For his conquests in Gentile lands would thus become the conquests of Judaism itself. In fact, it would please the Jews mightily to see multitudes of heathen entering the church on condition that all those new entrants by baptism became at the same time members of the Israelitish people by circumcision. On this understanding it would be the Jewish people who would really profit by Paul's mission; it would become nothing more than the conquest of the world by Israel and for Israel. The words of Paul which we are explaining are set in their true light by others which we read in the following chapter (Gal. vi. 12): "As many as desire to make a fair show in the flesh, they constrain you to be circumcised, only lest they should suffer persecution for the cross of Christ." Certain preachers therefore, Paul's rivals in Galatia, were using exactly the cowardly expedient which Paul here rejects, in order to escape persecution from the Jews. To the preaching of the cross to the Gentiles they added the obligatoriness of circumcision, and the Jews easily tolerated the former in consideration of the advantage which they derived from the latter. This anti-Christian estimate was probably that of those intriguers at Jerusalem whom Paul calls, Gal. ii., *false brethren unawares brought in.* Christianity, with its power of expansion, became in their eyes an excellent instrument for the propagation of Judaism. So we find still at the present day many liberalised Jews applauding the work of the Christian

church in the heathen world. They consider Christianity to be the providential means for propagating Israelitish monotheism, as paving the way for the moral reign of Judaism throughout the whole world. And they wait with folded arms till *we* shall have put the world under *their* feet. The difference between them and St. Paul's adversaries is merely that the latter allowed themselves to act so because of the theocratic promises, while modern Jews do so in name of the certain triumph to be achieved by their purely rational religion.

Thus the words of Paul, rightly understood, do not in the least imply a change which had come over his teaching in regard to the maintenance of circumcision and the law.

As to the passage 2 Cor. v. 16, we have already seen that the phrase: *knowing Christ no more after the flesh,* does not at all refer to a new view posterior to his conversion, but describes the transformation which had passed over his conception of the Messiah in that very hour.

We are now at the important event of the *council of Jerusalem,* which stands between the first and second journey.

Subsequently to their mission to Cyprus and Asia Minor, which probably lasted some years, Paul and Barnabas returned to Antioch, and there resumed their evangelical work. But this peaceful activity was suddenly disturbed by the arrival of certain persons from Jerusalem. These declared to the believing Gentiles that salvation would not be assured to them in Christ unless they became members of the Israelitish people by circumcision. To understand so strange an allegation, we must transport ourselves to the time when it was given forth. To whom had the Messianic promises been addressed? To the Jewish people, and to them alone. Therefore the members of this people alone had the right to appropriate them; and if the Gentiles wished to share them, the only way open to them was to become Jews. The reasoning seemed faultless. On the other hand, Paul understood well that it cut short the evangelization of the Gentile world, which would never be made Christian if in order to become so it was first necessary to be incorporated with the Jewish nation. But more than all else, the argument appeared to him to be radically vicious, because the patriarchal promises,

though addressed to the Jews, had a much wider range, and really concerned the whole world.

Baur asserted that those who maintained the particularistic doctrine at Antioch represented the opinion of the Twelve, and Renan has made himself the champion of this view in France. Baur acknowledges that the narrative of the Acts excludes, it is true, such a supposition. For this book expressly ascribes the lofty pretensions in question to a retrograde party, composed of former Pharisees (Acts xv. 1–5), and puts into the mouth of the apostles the positive disavowal of such conduct. But the German critic boldly solves this difficulty, by saying that the author of the Acts has, as a result of reflection, falsified the history with the view of disguising the conflict which existed between Paul and the Twelve, and of making the later church believe that these personages had lived on the best understanding. What reason can Baur allege in support of this severe judgment passed on the author of the Acts? He rests it on the account of the same event given by Paul himself in the beginning of Gal. ii., and seeks to prove that this account is incompatible with that given in the Acts. As the question is of capital importance in relation to the beginnings of Christianity, and even for the solution of certain critical questions relative to the Epistle to the Romans, we must study it here more closely. We begin with the account of Paul in Galatians; we shall afterwards compare it with that of the Acts.

According to the former (Gal. ii.), in consequence of the dispute which arose at Antioch, Paul, acting under guidance from on high, determined to go and have the question of the circumcision of the Gentiles decided at Jerusalem by the apostles (ver. 1). "A proof," observes Reuss, "that Paul was not afraid of being contradicted by the heads of the mother church."[1] This observation seems to us to proceed on a sounder psychology than that of Renan, who asserts, on the contrary, that at Antioch "there was a distrust of the mother church." It was in the same spirit of confidence that Paul resolved to take with him to Jerusalem a young Gentile convert named Titus. The presence of this uncircumcised member in the church assemblies was meant to assert

[1] *Hist. de la théol. chrét.* II. p. 310.

triumphantly the principle of liberty. This bold step would have been imprudence itself, if, as Renan asserts, the church of Jerusalem had been "hesitating, or favourable to the most retrograde party."

Paul afterwards (ver. 2) speaks of a conference which he had with the persons of most repute in the apostolic church, —these were, as we learn from the sequel, Peter and John the apostles, and James the Lord's brother, the head of the council of elders at Jerusalem; Paul explained to them in detail (*ἀνεθέμην*) the gospel as he preached it among the Gentiles, free from the enforcement of circumcision and legal ceremonies generally. He completes the account, ver. 6, by subjoining that his three interlocutors found nothing to add to his mode of teaching (*οὐδὲν προσανέθεντο*). In Greek, the relation between this term *added* and that which precedes (*communicated*) is obvious at a glance. Paul's teaching appeared to them perfectly sufficient. Paul interrupts himself at ver. 3, to mention in passing a corroborative and significant fact. The *false brethren brought in*, maintained that Titus should not be admitted to the church without being circumcised. In other circumstances, Paul, in accordance with his principle of absolute liberty in regard to external rites (1 Cor. ix. 20), might have yielded to such a demand. But in this case he refused; for the question of principle being involved, it was impossible for him to give way. Titus was admitted as an uncircumcised member. True, Renan draws from the same text an entirely opposite conclusion. According to him, Paul yielded for the time, and Titus underwent circumcision. This interpretation, which was Tertullian's, is founded on a reading which has no authorities on its side except the most insufficient;[1] as little can it be maintained in view of the context. As to the apostles, they must necessarily have supported Paul's refusal, otherwise a rupture would have been inevitable. But not only were the bonds between them not broken; they were, on the contrary, strengthened. Paul's apostolic call, with a view to the Gentiles, was expressly recognised by those three men, the reputed heads of the church (vv. 7–9); Peter in his turn was unanimously recognised as

[1] The omission of *οἷς*, ver. 5, in the *Cantabrigiensis*, two Codd. of the old Latin translation, and in some Fathers, exclusively Greco-Latin authorities.

called of God to direct the evangelization of the Jews. Then the five representatives of the whole church gave one another the *hand of fellowship*, thus to seal the unity of the work amid the diversity of domains. Would this mutual recognition and this ceremony of association have been possible between Paul and the Twelve, if the latter had really maintained the doctrine of the subjection of the Gentiles to circumcision? St. Paul in the Epistle to the Galatians (i. 8) makes this declaration: "Though we or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed!" Now the contents of this preaching of the gospel by Paul are also found thus stated in the Epistle (vv. 2–4): "Behold, I say unto you, that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." And he would have recognised, he, Paul, as coming from God equally with his own, the apostleship of Peter, and the teaching of Peter (ii. 7, 8), of Peter preaching circumcision! The result flowing from Paul's narrative is not doubtful. The liberty of the Gentiles in respect of circumcision was expressly recognised at Jerusalem by the apostles and the church. The narrow Judaizers alone persisted in their obstinacy, and formed a minority ever more and more hostile to this apostolic course.

It is less easy to know from Paul's account what was agreed on in regard to converts from among the *Jews*. The apostle's entire silence on this point leads us to suppose that the question was not once raised. Paul was too prudent to demand a premature solution on so delicate a point. His silence indicates that the old practice, according to which Judeo-Christians continued to observe the law, was tacitly maintained.

We pass now to the account given in Acts. Luke does not speak of the revelation which determined Paul to submit the question to the jurisdiction of the apostles. Natural as it is for Paul to mention this biographical detail, the explanation of its omission in a history of a more general character is equally easy.

Acts presents the picture of a plenary assembly of the church before which the question was discussed, especially by Peter and James. This account differs from that of Galatians, in which we read only of a private conference. Reuss does

not think that this difference can be explained. But a private talk between the leaders of two negotiating parties does not exclude a public meeting in which all interested take part. After mentioning the exposition which he gave of his teaching, without saying exactly to whom, ver. 2, Paul adds an explanatory remark in the words: "and that *privately* to them which were of reputation."[1] By this remark it would seem that he desires tacitly to contrast the private conversation which he relates with some other and more general assembly which the reader might have in his mind while perusing his narrative. The conclusion was therefore prepared in the private conversation, and then solemnly confirmed in the plenary council. Luke's narrative is the complement of Paul's. The interest of Paul, in his attitude to the Galatians, was to prove the recognition of his gospel and apostleship by the very apostles who were being opposed to him; hence the mention of the private conference. Luke, wishing to preserve the deeply interesting and precious document which emanated from the council of Jerusalem, required above all to narrate the latter.

According to Luke, the speeches of Peter and James conclude alike for the emancipation of the Gentiles. This is perfectly in keeping with the attitude ascribed to them by St. Paul: "*they added nothing* to my communication." James speaks of it in the Acts, at the close of his speech, as a matter of course, and about which there is no need of discussion, that as to the Christians of Jewish origin, the obligation to live conformably to the observances of the law remains as before. Now we have just seen that this is exactly what follows from Paul's silence on this aspect of the question.

Finally, in its letter to Gentile believers, the council asks them to abstain from three things, meats offered to idols, animals that have been strangled, and impurity (vv. 28, 29). Is not this demand in contradiction to the words of Paul: *they added nothing to me?* No, for the apostolical letter in the Acts immediately adds: "From which things if ye keep yourselves, *ye shall do well.*" The phrase used would have been very different if it had been meant to express a condition of salvation added to Paul's teaching. The measure which is

[1] Δέ is here taken in the same exegetical sense as Rom. iii. 22 (*to wit*). This is also Baur's understanding.

here called for is so on the ground of the interests of the church.

In fact, this was the price paid for union between the two parties of which Christendom was composed. Without the two former conditions, the life of Gentile believers continued, in the view of Jewish Christians, to be polluted with idolatry, and penetrated through and through with malign, and even diabolical influences.[1] As to the third demand, it figures here because impurity was generally considered among the Gentiles to be as indifferent, morally speaking, and consequently as allowable, as eating and drinking (1 Cor. vi. 12–14). And we can the better understand why licentiousness is specially mentioned in this passage, when we remember that the most shameless impurities had in a manner their obligatory and religious part in idolatrous worships.[2]

As to the delicate question whether this compromise should be merely temporary, or if it had a permanent value in the view of the church of Jerusalem, no one even thought of suggesting the alternative. They moved as the occasion demanded. Every one thought that he had fulfilled his task by responding to the necessities of the present situation. The really important fact was, that the emancipation of the Gentiles from legal observances was irrevocably recognised and proclaimed by the Judeo-Christian church. Paul might assuredly congratulate himself on such a result. For though Jewish believers remained still tacitly subject to the Mosaic ritual, no positive decision had been passed on the subject, and the apostle was too far-seeing not to understand what must

[1] According to certain Jewish theories represented by the *Clementine Homilies* (viii. 15), animal food renders man ὁμοδίαιτος (*commensal*), the table companion of demons as well as paganism and its diabolical feasts. Blood in particular, as the vehicle of souls, must be carefully avoided.

[2] All that has been said with the view of identifying these three demands laid down at Jerusalem with the so-called *Noachian* commandments, as well as the conclusions drawn therefrom,—for example, the assimilation of the new converts to the former Gentile proselytes (see Reuss especially),—has not the slightest foundation in the text. One is forced, besides, by this parallel to give a distorted meaning to the word πορνία, *unchastity*, as if in this decree it denoted marriages within certain degrees of relationship which were forbidden by the law and allowed in heathendom. But there is nothing here to warrant us in giving to this word so frequently used a different meaning from that which it has throughout the whole of the New Testament.

eventually follow the liberty granted to the Gentiles. Once these were set free from the Mosaic discipline, it was thereby established that the Messianic salvation was not bound up with the institutions of the law. Entrance into the church was independent of incorporation with Israel. All that Paul desired was implicitly contained in this fact. Levitical ritual thus descended to the rank of a simple national custom. By remaining faithful to it, believing Jews kept up their union with the rest of the elect people, an indispensable condition of the mission to Israel, till the day when God, by a striking dispensation, should Himself put an end to the present order of things. Paul was too prudent not to content himself with such a result, the consequences of which the future could not fail to develope.

The conclusion to which we are thus brought, on this important and difficult question, is in its general features at one with that which has been recently stated by three men of undoubted scientific eminence, Weizsäcker, Harnack, and even Keim. The first, in his admirable treatise on the church of Corinth,[1] thus expresses himself on the question: "The apostles remained Jews, and confined themselves to the mission among the Jews. But they granted to Gentile Christianity so thorough a recognition, that we must conclude that their religious life had its centre of gravity no longer in the law, but in their faith as such. . . . In fact, Paul never reckoned the Twelve among his adversaries. He always distinguished them expressly from these, both before the conflict, by choosing them as arbiters, and after it" (Gal. ii.). Harnack, the man of our day who perhaps best knows the second century, thus expressed himself recently: "The apocalyptic writings are the last strongholds within which a once powerful party still entrenches itself, whose watchword was: either Judeo-Christian or Gentile-Christian (the Tübingen school). The influence of Judeo-Christianity on the catholic church in the course of formation, must henceforth be estimated at an almost inappreciable quantity."[2] Keim, in a recent work,[3]

[1] *Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, 1876.

[2] *Theol. Literaturzeitung* (review of the publication of the Ascension of Isaiah, by Dillmann), 1877.

[3] *Aus dem Urchristenthum*, I. pp. 64–89.

demonstrates the general harmony of the narratives given by Paul and Luke, except on one point (the conditions imposed on Gentile-Christians in the Acts, which he holds to be a gloss added to the original account); and he appreciates almost exactly as we do the mutual attitude of Paul and the Twelve. Impartial science thus returns to the verdict of old Irenæus: "The apostles granted us liberty, us Gentiles, referring us to the guidance of the Holy Spirit; but they themselves conformed piously to the institutions of the law established by Moses."[1] The exposition of Renan, given under Baur's influence, is a mere fancy picture.

Returning to Antioch, Paul and Barnabas took with them Silas, one of the eminent men belonging to the church of Jerusalem, who was charged with delivering the reply of the council to the churches of Syria and Cilicia.[2] Soon afterwards Paul set out with Silas on his *second missionary journey*, after separating from Barnabas on account of Mark, the cousin of the latter (Col. iv. 10). The texts give no ground for supposing that this rupture took place on account of any difference of view regarding the law, as some critics of a fixed idea have recently alleged. Barnabas and Paul had gone hand in hand in the conferences at Jerusalem, and the sequel will prove that this harmony continued after their separation. Paul and Silas together crossed the interior of Asia Minor, visiting the churches founded in the course of the first journey. Paul's destination now was probably Ephesus, the religious and intellectual centre of the most cultivated part of Asia. But God had decided otherwise. The country whose hour had struck was Greece, not Asia Minor; Paul understood this later. The two heralds of the gospel were arrested for some time, by an illness of St. Paul, in the regions of Galatia. This country, watered by the river Halys, was inhabited by the descendants of a party of Celts who had passed into Asia after the inroad of the Gauls into Italy and Greece, about 280 B.C. This illness led to the founding of the churches of Galatia (Gal. iv. 14).

[1] *Adv. Hær.* iii. 12. 15: *Gentibus quidem* (apostoli) *libere agere permittebant, concedentes nos spiritui sancto; . . . ipsi religiose agebant circa dispositionem legis quæ est secundum Mosem.*

[2] The arguments of M. Renan (*St. Paul*, p. 92) against the authenticity of this, the oldest document of the church, are too easily refuted to require that we should examine them in this sketch.

When they resumed their journey the two missionaries were arrested in the work of preaching by some inward hindrance, which prevented them from working anywhere. They thus found themselves led without premeditation to Troas, on the Egean Sea. There the mystery was cleared up. Paul learned from a vision that he was to cross the sea, and, beginning with Macedonia, enter on the evangelization of Europe. He took this decisive step in company with Silas, young Timothy, whom he had associated with him in Lycaonia, and, finally, the physician Luke, who seems to have been at Troas at that very time. This is at least the most natural explanation of the form *we* which here meets us in the narrative of the Acts (xvi. 10). The same form ceases, then reappears later as the author of the narrative is separated from the apostle, or takes his place again in his company (xx. 5, xxi. 1 et seq., xxviii. 1 et seq.). Renan concludes from the passage, xvi. 10, without the least foundation, that Luke was of Macedonian extraction. We believe rather (comp. p. 24) that he was a native of Antioch. Such also is the tradition found in the *Clementine Recognitions* and in Eusebius.

In a short time there were founded in Macedonia the churches of Philippi, Amphipolis, Thessalonica, and Berea. St. Paul was persecuted in all these cities, generally at the instigation of the Jews, who represented to the Roman authorities that the Christ preached by him was a rival of Cæsar. Constantly driven forth by this persecution, he passed southwards, and at length reached Athens. There he gave an account of his doctrine before the Areopagus. Thereafter he established himself at Corinth, and during a stay of about two years, he founded in the capital of Achaia one of his most flourishing churches. We may even conclude from the inscription of 2 Corinthians (i. 1: "To the church of God which is at Corinth, with all the saints which are *in all Achaia*") that numerous Christian communities were formed in the country districts round the metropolis.

After having concluded this important work, the founding of the churches of Greece, Paul went up to Jerusalem. There is mention in the Acts of a vow fulfilled before his departure from Greece (xviii. 18). By whom? By Aquila, Paul's companion? So some commentators have held. But if

Aquila is the nearest subject, Paul is the principal subject of the clause. Was the religious act called a vow contrary to the spirituality of the apostle? Why should it have been so more than a promise or engagement (comp. 1 Tim. vi. 12–14)? Anyhow, Acts xxi. shows us how he could find himself in a state of life so full of complications that Christian charity constrained him to find his way out of it by concessions of an external nature. From Jerusalem Paul went to Antioch, the cradle of the mission to the Gentiles.

Here we must place an incident, the character of which has been not less misrepresented by criticism than that of the conferences at Jerusalem. Peter was then beginning his missionary tours beyond Palestine; he had reached Antioch. Barnabas, after visiting the Christians of Cyprus along with Mark, had also returned to this church. These two men at first made no scruple of visiting the Gentile members of the church, and eating with them both at private meals (as had been done before by Peter at the house of Cornelius) and at the love-feasts. This mode of acting was not strictly in harmony with the agreement at Jerusalem, according to which believers of Jewish origin were understood to keep the Mosaic law. But, following the example of Christ Himself, they thought that the *moral* duty of brotherly communion should, in a case of competing claims, carry it over *ritual* observance. Peter probably recalled such sayings of Jesus as these: "Not that which goeth into the man defileth the man, but that which goeth forth from the man;" or, "Have ye not heard what David did when he was an hungered, and they that were with him . . .?" (Matt. xii. 1–4). Finally, might he not apply here the direction which he had received from above at the time of his mission to Cornelius (Acts x. 10 et seq.)? As to Barnabas, since his mission in Asia, he must have been accustomed to subordinate Levitical prescriptions to the duty of communion with the Gentiles. Thus all went on to the general satisfaction, when there arrived at Antioch some believers of Jerusalem, sent by James. Their mission was, not to lay more burdens on the Gentiles, but to examine whether the conduct of Judeo-Christians continued true to the compromise made at Jerusalem. Now, according to the rigorous interpretation of that document, Peter and Barnabas,

both of them Jews by birth, were at fault. They were therefore energetically recalled to order by the newcomers.

We know Peter's character from the Gospel history. He allowed himself to be intimidated. Barnabas, whose natural easiness of disposition appears in the indulgence he showed to his cousin Mark, could not resist the apostle's example. Both were carried the length of breaking gradually with the Gentile converts.

Here we have a palpable proof of the insufficiency of the compromise adopted by the council of Jerusalem, and can understand why Paul, while accepting it as a temporary expedient (Acts xvi. 4), soon let it fall into abeyance.[1] This agreement, which, while freeing the Gentiles from Mosaic observances, still kept Jewish Christians under the yoke of the law, was practicable no doubt in churches exclusively Judeo-Christian, like that of Jerusalem. But in churches like those of Syria, where the two elements were united, the rigorous observance of this agreement must result in an external separation of the two elements, and the disruption of the church. Was this really meant by James, from whom those people came? If it is so, we ought to remember that James was the brother of Jesus, but not an apostle; that blood relationship to the Lord was not by any means a guarantee of infallibility, and that Jesus, though He had appeared to James to effect his conversion, had not confided to him the direction of the church. He was raised to the head of the flock of Jerusalem,—nothing more. But it is also possible that the newcomers had gone beyond their instructions. Paul instantly measured the bearing of the conduct of his two colleagues, and felt the necessity of striking a decisive blow. He had gained at Jerusalem the recognition of the liberty of the Gentiles. The moment seemed to him to have arrived for deducing all the practical consequences logically flowing from the decision which had been come to, and without which that decision became illusory. Founding on the previous conduct of Peter himself at Antioch, he showed him his inconsistency. He who for weeks had eaten with the Gentiles and like them, was now for forcing them, unless they

[1] This is one of the principal reasons for which M. Renan attacks its authenticity. The reason is not a solid one, as our account shows.

chose to break with him, to place themselves under the yoke of the law, a result which had certainly not been approved at Jerusalem! Then Paul took advantage of this circumstance at last to develope openly the contents of the revelation which he had received, to wit, that the abrogation of the law is involved in principle in the fact of the cross when rightly understood, and that it is vain to wait for another manifestation of the divine will on this point: "I am crucified with Christ; and by that very fact dead to the law and alive unto God" (Gal. ii. 19, 20). Baur and his school, and Renan with them, think that this conflict proves a contrariety of principles between the two apostles. But Paul's words imply the very reverse. He accuses Peter of not *walking uprightly*, according to the truth of the gospel,—that is to say, of being carried away by the fear of man. This very rebuke proves that Paul ascribes to Peter a conviction in harmony with his own, simply accusing him as he does of being unfaithful to it in practice. It is the same with Barnabas. For Paul says of him, that he was carried away into the same *hypocrisy*. Thus the incident related by Paul fully establishes the conclusion to which we had come, viz. that Peter did no more than Paul regard the observance of the law as a condition of salvation, even for the Jews. And it is evidently to draw this lesson from it that Paul has related the incident with so much detail. For what the disturbers of the Gentile Christian churches alleged was precisely the example and authority of the Twelve.

After this conflict the apostle entered on his *third journey*. This time he realized the purpose which he had formed when starting on his previous journey, that of settling at Ephesus, and carrying the gospel to the heart of the scientific and commercial metropolis of Asia Minor. He passed through Galatia. He found the churches of this country already disturbed by the solicitations of some Judaizing emissary, who had come no doubt from Antioch, and who by means of certain adepts sought to introduce circumcision and the other Mosaic rites among the Christians of the country. For the time being Paul allayed the storm, and, as Luke says (Acts xviii. 23), "he *strengthened* all the disciples" in Galatia and Phrygia. But this very word proves to us how much their

minds had been shaken. At Ephesus there awaited him his faithful friends and fellow-workers, Aquila and his wife Priscilla; they had left Corinth with him, and had settled in Asia undoubtedly to prepare for him. The two or three years which Paul passed at Ephesus form the culminating point of his apostolical activity. This time was in his life the counterpart of Peter's ministry at Jerusalem after Pentecost. The sacred writer himself seems in his narrative to have this parallel in view (comp. Acts xix. 11, 12 with v. 15, 16). A whole circle of flourishing churches, that very circle which is symbolically represented in the apocalyptic description by the image of seven golden candlesticks with the Lord standing in the midst of them, rises amid those idolatrous populations: Ephesus, Miletus, Smyrna, Laodicea, Hierapolis, Colosse, Thyatira, Philadelphia, Sardis, Pergamos, and other churches besides, mentioned in the writings of the second century. The work of Paul at this period was marked by such a display of the power of the Holy Spirit, that at the end of those few years paganism felt itself seriously threatened in those regions, as is proved by the tumult excited by the goldsmith Demetrius.

But this so fruitful period of missionary activity was at the same time the culminating point of his contention with his Judaizing adversaries. After his passage through Galatia they had redoubled their efforts in those regions. These persons, as we have seen, did not oppose the preaching of the cross. They even thought it well that Paul should Christianize the Gentile world, provided it were to the profit of Mosaism. In their view the law was the real end, the gospel the means. It was the reversal of the divine plan. Paul rejected the scheme with indignation, though it was extremely well fitted to reconcile hostile Jews to the preaching of Christ. Not being able to make him bend, they sought to undermine his authority. They decried him personally, representing him as a disciple of the apostles, who had subsequently lifted his heel against his masters. It is to this charge that Paul replies in the first two chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians. Next, they maintained the permanence of the law. Such is the doctrine which Paul overthrows in chap. iii. and iv., by showing the temporary and purely preparatory character of

the Mosaic dispensation. Finally, they denied that a doctrine severed from all law could secure the moral life of its adherents. Such is the subject of the last two chapters, which show how man's sanctification is provided for by the life-giving operation of the Holy Spirit, the consummation of justification, much better than by his subjection to legal prohibitions. This letter was written shortly after Paul's arrival at Ephesus (comp. the phrase: *so soon*, i. 6). The passage, 1 Cor. xvi. 1, seems to prove that it succeeded in re-establishing the authority of the apostle and the supremacy of the gospel in Galatia.

But the Judaizing emissaries followed Paul at every step. Macedonia does not seem to have presented a favourable soil for their attempts; they therefore threw themselves upon Achaia. They were careful here not to speak of circumcision or prescriptions about food. They knew that they had to do with Greeks; they sought to flatter their philosophical and literary tastes. A speculative gospel was paraded before the churches. Next, doubts were sown as to the reality of the apostleship of Paul, and by and by even as to the uprightness and purity of his character. The First Epistle to the Corinthians gives us all throughout, as Weizsäcker has well shown, the presentiment of a threatening storm, but one which the apostle seeks to prevent from bursting. Severe allusions are not wanting; but the didactic tone immediately becomes again the prevailing one. It is in the second letter that the full violence of the struggle is revealed. This letter contains numerous allusions to certain personal encounters of the utmost gravity, but posterior to the sending of the first. It obliges the attentive reader to suppose a sojourn made by Paul at Corinth *between* our two letters preserved in the canon, and even a lost intermediate letter posterior to this visit.[1] The interval between the dates of First and Second Corinthians must, if it is so, have been more considerable than is usually held; the general chronology of Paul's life does not, as we shall see, contradict this view. The lost letter intermediate between our two canonical Epistles must

[1] Such at least is the conviction to which we have been led by the attentive study of the texts, in more or less entire harmony with several critics of our day.

have been written under the influence of the most painful experiences and the keenest emotions. Paul then saw himself for some time on the eve of a total rupture with that church of Corinth which had been the fruit of so many labours. Led away by his adversaries, it openly refused him obedience. Some dared to raise the gravest imputations against his veracity and disinterestedness; his apostleship was audaciously ridiculed; Paul was charged with being ambitious and boastful; he pretended to preach the gospel without charge, but he nevertheless filled his purse from it by means of his messengers: all this was said of the apostle of the Corinthians at Corinth itself, and the church did not shut the mouths of the insolent detractors who spoke thus! But who then were they who thus dared to challenge the apostle of the Gentiles in the midst of his own churches? Paul in his Second Epistle calls them ironically *apostles by way of eminence* [*chiefest*, Eng. transl.]. This was, no doubt, one of the titles with which their adherents saluted them. Baur and his school do not fear to apply this designation to the Twelve in Paul's sense of it. "These *apostles by way of eminence*," says the leader of the school,[1] "undoubtedly denote the apostles themselves, whose disciples and delegates the false apostles of Corinth professed to be." Hilgenfeld says more pointedly still:[2] "The apostles by way of eminence can be no other than the original apostles." This opinion has spread and taken root. We should like to know what remains thereafter of the apostleship of Paul and of the Twelve, nay, of the mission of Jesus Himself? Happily, sound criticism treats such partial and violent assertions more and more as they deserve. We have already stated the conclusion which has now been reached on this question by such men as Weizsäcker, Keim, Harnack. It is easy, indeed, to prove that the phrase: "apostles by way of eminence," which St. Paul employs, borrowing it ironically from the language used at Corinth, could not designate the Twelve. 1. We read, 2 Cor. xi. 6, that Paul was described at Corinth as a *man of the commonalty* (ἰδιώτης, *rude*, Eng. transl.) *in language*, as compared with the superior apostles. Now, what reasonable man could have put the Twelve above

[1] *Paulus*, I. 309.

[2] *Einl. in's N. T.* p. 298.

Paul in the matter of speech? Comp. Acts iv. 13, where the apostles are called *men of the commonalty*, or *unlettered*, while Paul was regarded as a man of high culture and vast knowledge (Acts xxvi. 24). 2. If it had been wished to designate the Twelve by the phrase: "the more eminent apostles," the very word would have made a place beneath them for an apostle of an inferior order. And for whom, if not for Paul? Now, his adversaries were not content at this time to make him an apostle of an inferior order; they contrasted him with the Twelve, as a false apostle with the only true. We are thus led to conclude that the apostles *par excellence*, who were being exalted at Corinth in order to blacken Paul, were no other than those lofty personages from Jerusalem who, in the transactions related Acts xv. and Gal. ii., had openly resisted the apostles, and affected to give law to them as well as to the whole church, those very persons whom Paul has designated in Galatians as *false brethren brought in*. In Acts it is related that after Pentecost many priests (vi. 7) and Pharisees (xv. 5) entered the church. These new Christians of high rank and great theological knowledge brought with them their pretensions and prejudices, and they ill brooked the authority of simple and uncultured men like the Twelve. They looked upon them as narrow-minded. They treated them with disdain; and from the height of their theological erudition thought it deplorable that so glorious a work, from which they might have drawn so much advantage, had fallen into such poor hands. They therefore tried audaciously to snatch the direction of the church from the apostles. Thus, apostles by way of eminence, arch-apostles, far from being a name intended to identify them with the Twelve, was rather meant to exalt them above the apostles. It was they who, after the council of Jerusalem, in opposition to the Twelve no less than to Paul; though under their name, had organized the counter mission which Paul soon met in all the churches founded by him. Most commentators justly hold that these people and their adherents at Corinth formed the party which in 1 Cor. i. 12 is named by Paul the party *of Christ*. In this case it is easy to understand the meaning of the designation. It means, in contradistinction to those who were carried

away with enthusiasm for this or that preacher, those who would not submit either to Paul or the Twelve, and who appealed from them to the authority of Christ alone. Thus the party called *that of Christ* is contrasted (1 Cor. i. 12) with that of Peter, as well as with that of Paul or Apollos.[1]

At the time when Paul wrote our Second Epistle to the Corinthians, the hottest moment of the conflict was past. This Epistle in many of its parts is a shout of victory (comp. especially chap. vii.). It was intended, while drawing closely the bond between the apostle and the portion of the church which had returned into communion with him, finally to reduce the rebellious portion to submission or powerlessness;[2] and it appears to have gained its end. Paul, regarding this church as henceforth restored to him, came at length, in the end of the year 58, to make his long-expected sojourn among them; he passed the month of December of this year at Corinth, and the first two months of the following year. Then he set out, shortly before the feast of Passover, on a last visit to Jerusalem. For some time past vast plans filled his mind (Acts xix. 21). Already his thoughts turned to Rome and the West. Paul was in the highest degree one of those men who think they have done nothing so long as anything remains for them to do. The East was evangelized; the torch of the gospel was at least lighted in all the great capitals of Asia and Greece, Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth. To these churches it fell to spread the light in the countries which surrounded them, and so to continue the apostolic work. Egypt and Alexandria had probably been visited, perhaps by Barnabas and Mark after their journey to Cyprus. The West remained. This was the field which now opened to the view and thoughts of the apostle. But already the gospel has preceded him to Rome. He learns the fact . . . What matters it? Rome becomes to him a mere point of passage. And his goal, receding with the rapid march of the

[1] There is nothing more curious than to see how Baur seeks to get rid of this distinction between the party of Christ and that of Peter, which is absolutely destructive of his system: "The partisans of Peter and of Christ," he says, "were not two different parties, but only two different names for one and the same party," *Paulus*, I. 297, 298.

[2] The last four chapters are, as it were, the ultimatum addressed to this party.

gospel, will now be Spain.[1] His Christian ambition drives him irresistibly to the extremity of the known world. A duty, however, still detained him in the East. He wished to pay Jerusalem a last visit, not only to take leave of the metropolis of Christendom, but more especially to present to it, at the head of a numerous deputation of Gentile Christians, the homage of the whole pagan world, in the form of a rich offering collected in all the churches during these last years in behalf of the Christians of Jerusalem. What more fitted to cement the bond of love which he had endeavoured to form and keep up between the two great portions of Christendom!

All the deputies of the churches of Greece and Asia, his travelling companions, were already assembled at Corinth to embark with him for Syria, when he learned that the freighted vessel and its cargo were threatened with dangers by sea. He therefore took the way by Macedonia, celebrated the Passover feasts at Philippi, and hastened the rest of his journey so as to arrive at Jerusalem for Pentecost. There he solemnly deposited the fruit of the collection in the hands of the elders of the church presided over by James. In the conference which followed, James communicated to him the prejudices with which he was regarded by the thousands of believing Jews who were daily arriving at Jerusalem to celebrate the feast. Paul had been represented to them as a deadly enemy of the law, whose one aim was to destroy Mosaism among the Jews throughout the whole world. James proposed to him to give the lie to these rumours, by himself carrying out a Levitical ceremony in the temple before the eyes of all. The proposal was that he should join some Jews who were then discharging a vow of *Nazariteship*, and take upon himself the common expense.

M. Renan represents St. Paul as if he must have been greatly embarrassed by this proposition, because he could not conceal from himself that the rumour spread against him was thoroughly well founded. To consent to James's proposal was therefore deliberately to create a misunderstanding, "to commit an unfaithfulness towards Christ." Yet this writer thinks that Paul, under constraint of charity, managed to overcome his repugnance; as if charity authorized dissimula-

[1] Observe the delicate expression of this thought, Rom. xv. 24.

tion! M. Reuss seems to hesitate between two views: either Luke, incapable of rising to the height of Paul's pure spirituality, has not given an exact representation of the facts, or we must blame Paul himself: "If things really passed as the text relates, . . . it must be confessed that the apostle lent himself to a weak course of which we should hardly have thought him capable; . . . for the step taken was either a profession of Judaism or the playing of a comedy."[1] Both alternatives are equally false, we answer with thorough conviction. In fact, Paul could with perfect sincerity give the lie to the report spread among the Judeo-Christians of the East. If, on the one hand, he was firmly opposed to every attempt to subject Gentile converts to the Mosaic law, on the other, he had never sought to induce the Jews to cast it off arbitrarily. This would have been openly to violate the Jerusalem compromise. Did not he himself, in many circumstances when he had to do with Jews, consent to subject himself to legal rights? Have we not already quoted what he wrote to the Corinthians: "To those that are under the law I became as under the law" (1 Cor. ix. 20)? The external rite being a thing indifferent in his eyes, he could use it in the service of charity. And if he sometimes conformed to it, it is perfectly certain that he could never allow himself to become its fanatical adversary. He left it to time to set free the conscience of his countrymen, and did not dream of hastening the hour by a premature emancipation. And therefore, whatever may be said to the contrary, he could protest without weakness and without charlatanism against the assertion which represented him in the East as the deadly destroyer of Mosaism among all the members of the Jewish nation.

The circumstance to which we have been referring was, as is well known, the occasion of his being arrested. Here begins the last period of his life, that of his *imprisonments*.

III.

After his imprisonment and a show of trial at Jerusalem, Paul was transferred to Cesarea. In this city he passed two

[1] *Hist. apostol.* pp. 208, 209.

whole years, vainly expecting to be liberated by the governor Felix. In the year 60 the latter was recalled; and either in this year, or more probably the following, his successor, Festus, arrived. Here is the second principal date in the apostle's life, which, with the aid of the Roman historians, we can fix with tolerable certainty. In the year 61 (some say 60) Paul appeared before Festus, when, to put an end to the tergiversations of the provincial authority, he appealed to the imperial tribunal. It was a right which his Roman citizenship gave him. Hence his departure for Rome in the autumn following the arrival of Festus. We are familiar with the circumstances of his voyage, and of the shipwreck which detained him at Malta for the winter. He did not arrive at Rome till the following spring. We learn from the last two verses of the Acts that he continued there for two years as a prisoner, but enjoying much liberty of action. He could receive his fellow-workers who traversed Europe and Asia, who brought him news of the churches, and in return carried to them his letters (Colossians, Ephesians, Philemon, Philippians).

Here Luke's history closes abruptly. From this time we have nothing to guide us except patristic traditions of a remarkably confused character, or suppositions still more uncertain. Some assert that Paul perished, like Peter, in the persecution of Nero, in August of the year 64; on the other hand, certain statements of the Fathers would lead us to think that Paul was liberated at the close of the two years mentioned in the Acts; that he was able to fulfil the promise which he had made to Philemon and to the Philippians to visit them in the East (Philem. 22; Phil. ii. 24); and that he accomplished his utmost purpose, that of carrying the gospel to Spain. If the pastoral Epistles are really by the apostle, as we cannot help thinking, they are the monument of this last period of his activity. For it does not seem to us possible to place them at any period whatever of Paul's ministry anterior to his first captivity at Rome.

As no church in Spain claims the honour of being founded by the apostle, we must hold, on this supposition, that he was seized shortly after his arrival on Iberian soil, and led prisoner to the Capital to be judged there. The Second Epistle to Timothy would, in that case, be the witness of this last cap-

tivity; and Paul's martyrdom, which, according to the testimony of the Roman presbyter Caius (second century), took place on the Ostian Way, must be placed about the year 66 or 67. This is the date indicated by Eusebius.[1]

We have thus, for fixing the chronology of the life of the apostle, two dates which are certain: that of his journey to Jerusalem with Barnabas at the time of Herod Agrippa's death (Acts xii.), in 44; and that of his appearing before Festus on the arrival of the latter in Palestine (Acts xxv.), in 61 (or 60). It remains to us, by means of those fixed points, to indicate the approximate dates of the principal events of the apostle's life.

Festus died the same year as he arrived in Palestine, consequently before the Passover of 62.

Paul cannot therefore have been sent by him to Rome, at the latest, till the autumn of the year 61. Paul's arrest at Jerusalem took place two years earlier, at Pentecost, consequently in the spring of 59.

The third missionary journey, which immediately preceded this arrest, embraces his stay at Ephesus, which lasted about three years (Acts xix. 8, 10, xx. 31), and various journeys into Greece besides, perhaps more important and numerous than is generally thought. If to this we add his stay in Achaia (Acts xx. 3), and the last journey to Jerusalem, we are led backwards to the autumn of the year 54 as the beginning of his third journey.

His second mission, the Greek one, of which Corinth was the centre, cannot have lasted less than two years, for the Book of Acts reckons eighteen months and one or two more to his sojourn at Corinth alone (Acts xviii. 11, 18). We may therefore ascribe to this second missionary journey the two years between the autumn of 52 and that of 54.

The council of Jerusalem, which was held very shortly before this time, must consequently be placed at the beginning of 52, or about the end of 51.

The first missionary journey, that of Paul and Barnabas in Asia Minor, as well as the two sojourns at Antioch before and after, filled the few years preceding.

Thus, going back step by step, we reach the other date

[1] But while erroneously placing the persecution of Nero in that year.

which must serve as a guiding-point, that of Herod Agrippa's death, in 44. Now the time at which we arrive, following Paul's career backwards, is exactly the date when Barnabas seeks him at Tarsus, to bring him to Antioch, where they laboured together in the church, and whence they were delegated to Jerusalem in regard to the approaching famine; the date of Herod Agrippa's death, in 44.

The length of Paul's stay at Tarsus before Barnabas sought him there is not exactly indicated, but it seems to have been considerable. We may reckon it at three or four years, and we come to the year 40 as that in which Paul's first visit to Jerusalem, after his conversion, took place.

This visit was preceded by Paul's journey to Arabia (Gal. i. 18), and his two sojourns at Damascus before and after it; he himself reckons this period at three years (i. 18). Paul's conversion would thus fall about the year 37.

Paul must then have been at least thirty years of age. We may therefore place his birth about the year 7; and if he died in 67, assign to his earthly life a duration of sixty years.

This entire series of dates appears to us in itself to be clear and logical. But, more than that, history in general presents a considerable number of points of verification, which very interestingly confirm this biographical sketch. We shall mention six of them.

1. We know that Pilate was recalled from his government in the year 36. This circumstance serves to explain the martyrdom of Stephen, which is intimately connected with Saul's conversion. Indeed, the right of pronouncing sentence of death having been withdrawn from the Jews by the Roman administration prior to the death of Jesus, it is not likely that they would have indulged in so daring an encroachment on the power of their masters as that of putting Stephen to death, if the representative of the Roman power had been in Palestine at the time. There is therefore ground for thinking that the murder of Stephen must be placed in the year 36, the time of the vacancy between Pilate and his successor. An event of the same kind took place, according to Josephus, about the year 62, when the high priest Ananias put James the brother of Jesus to death, in the interval which separated the death of Festus from the arrival of Albinus his

successor. The absence of the governor, it would seem, awoke in the heart of the people and their leaders the feeling of their ancient national independence.

2. The journey of Paul and Barnabas to Jerusalem, recorded in Acts xi. and xii. (on occasion of the famine announced by Agabus), must have taken place, according to our chronology, in the year 44 (Herod Agrippa's death). Now we know from the historians that the great famine overtook Palestine in the reign of Claudius, in 45 or 46, which agrees with the date assigned to this journey.

3. St. Paul declares, Gal. ii. 1, that it was fourteen years *after his conversion* (such is the most probable meaning of the passage) when he repaired to Jerusalem with Barnabas to confer with the apostles (Acts xv.). If, as we have seen, this conference took place in 51, it really falls in the fourteenth year after the year 37, the date of the apostle's conversion.

4. We have been led to the conclusion that the apostle arrived at Corinth about the end of the year 52. Now it is said (Acts xviii. 1) that Paul on arriving at this city made the acquaintance of a family of Jewish origin, that of Aquila and Priscilla, who had recently come from Italy in consequence of the decree of the Emperor Claudius commanding the expulsion of Jews from Rome. "Claudius," says Suetonius, "banished from Rome the Jews, who were perpetually raising insurrections." From various indications furnished by Roman historians, this decree must belong to the last days of the life of Claudius. Now this emperor died in 54; the date of the decree of banishment thus nearly coincides with that of Paul's arrival at Corinth.

5. Towards the end of his stay at Corinth, Paul was charged before the proconsul of Achaia, called Gallio. This proconsul is not an unknown personage. He was the brother of the philosopher Seneca, a man of great distinction, who plays a part in his brother's correspondence. He was consul in the year 51; his proconsulship must have followed immediately thereafter. Gallio was thus really, at the time indicated in Acts, proconsul of Achaia.

6. Josephus relates that, while Felix was governor of Judea, an Egyptian excited several thousands of Jews to insurrection, and proceeded to attack Jerusalem. The band

was destroyed by Felix, but the leader escaped. Now we know from Acts that, towards the end of Felix' government, the Roman captain who was commanding at Jerusalem suspected Paul of being an Egyptian who had incited the people to rebellion (Acts xxi. 38). All the circumstances harmonize. It was the very time when the escaped fanatic might have attempted a new rising.

If we recapitulate the principal dates to which we have been led, we find that the apostle's life is divided as follows:—

From 7–37: His life as a Jew and Pharisee.

From 37–44: The years of his preparation for his apostleship.

From 44–51: His first missionary journey, with the two stays at Antioch, before and after, and his journey to the council of Jerusalem.

From 52–54: His second missionary journey; the founding of the churches of Greece (the two Epistles to the Thessalonians).

From 54–59: The third missionary journey; the stay at Ephesus, and the visits to Greece and to Jerusalem (the four principal Epistles, Galatians, 1st and 2d Corinthians, Romans).

From 59 (summer) to 61 (autumn): Arrest at Jerusalem, captivity at Cesarea.

From 61 (autumn) to 62 (spring): Voyage, shipwreck; arrival at Rome.

From 62 (spring) to 64 (spring): Captivity at Rome (Colossians, Ephesians, Philemon, Philippians).

From 64 (spring) to 66 or 67: Liberation, second captivity, martyrdom (pastoral Epistles).

How are we to account for the institution of this extraordinary apostleship side by side with the regular apostleship of the Twelve?

The time had come, in the progress of the kingdom of God, when the particularistic work founded in Abraham was at length to pass into the great current of humanity, from which it had been kept apart. Now, the normal mode of this unparalleled religious revolution would have been this: Israel itself, with the work of the Messiah before it, really and joyfully proclaiming throughout the whole world the completion of salvation, and the end of the theocratic economy. It was

to prepare Israel for this task, the glorious crown of its history, that Jesus had specially chosen the Twelve. Apostles to the elect nation, they were to make it the apostle of the world.

But man seldom answers completely to the task which God has destined for him. Instead of accepting this part, the part of love, in the humility of which it would have found its real greatness, Israel strove to maintain its theocratical prerogative. It rejected the Redeemer of the world rather than abandon its privileged position. It wished to save its life, and it lost it.

Then, in order to replace it, God required to call an exceptional instrument and found a special apostleship. Paul was neither the substitute of Judas, whom the Twelve had prematurely replaced (Acts ii.), as has been thought, nor that of James the son of Zebedee, whose martyrdom is related Acts xii. He is the substitute for a converted Israel, the man who had, single-handed, to execute the task which fell to his whole nation. And so the hour of his call was precisely, as we have seen, that, when the blood of the two martyrs, Stephen and James, sealed the hardening of Israel and decided its rejection.

The calling of Paul is nothing less than the counterpart of Abraham's.

The qualities with which Paul was endowed for this mission were as exceptional as the task itself. He combined with the power of inward and meditative concentration all the gifts of practical action. His mind descended to the most minute details of ecclesiastical administration (1 Cor. xiv. 26–37, *e.g.*) as easily as it mounted the steps of the mystic ladder whose top reaches the divine throne (2 Cor. xii. 1–4, *e.g.*).

A not less remarkable combination of opposite powers, which usually exclude one another, strikes us equally in his writings. Here we meet, on the one hand, with the dialectical rigour which will not quit a subject till after having completely analyzed it, nor an adversary till it has transfixed him with his own sword; and, on the other, with a delicate and profound sensibility, and a concentrated warmth of heart, the flame of which sometimes bursts forth even through the forms of the severest argumentation. The Epistle to the Romans will furnish more than one example.

The life of St. Paul is summed up in a word: a unique man for a unique task.

CHAPTER II.

THE CHURCH OF ROME.

AFTER having made acquaintance with the author of our Epistle, it is important for us to form a just idea of the church to which it was addressed. Three questions arise here:—1. How was the church of Rome founded? 2. Were the majority of its members of Jewish or Gentile origin? 3. Was its religious tendency particularistic or Pauline?

These three subjects, the *foundation*, *composition*, and *tendency* of the church, are undoubtedly intimately related. They may, however, be studied separately. To avoid repetition, we shall treat the last two under a common head.

I. *Foundation of the Roman Church.*

Among the apostolic foundations mentioned in the Book of Acts, that of the church of Rome does not appear. Reuss sees a lacuna in this silence. But is not the omission a proof of the real course of things? Does it not show that the foundation of the Roman church was not distinguished by any notable event such as the historian can lay hold of; that it took place in a sort of stealthy manner, and was not the work of any individual of mark?

What are the oldest known proofs of the existence of a Christian church at Rome?

In the first place, our Epistle itself, which assumes the existence, if not of a completely organized church, at least of several Christian groups in the capital; in the second place, the fact related in the first part of Acts xxviii. On his arrival at Rome in the spring of the year 62, Paul is welcomed by *brethren* who, on the news of his approach, come to receive him at the distance of a dozen leagues from the city. How was such a Christian community formed?

Three answers are given to the question.

I. The Catholic Church ascribes the founding of the church of Rome to the preaching of Peter. This apostle, it is said, came to Rome to preach the gospel and combat the heresies of Simon the magician, at the beginning of the reign of the Emperor Claudius (41–54). But it is very probable that this tradition rests in whole or in part on a gross mistake, of which Justin Martyr is the first author.[1] If the apostle had really come to Rome so early, and had been the first to propagate the gospel there, Paul evidently could not write a long letter to this church without mentioning its founder; and if we consider that this letter is a didactic writing of great length, a more or less complete exposition of the gospel, we shall conclude that he could not, in consistency with his own principles, have addressed it to a church founded by another apostle. For he more than once declares that it is contrary to his apostolic practice "to enter into another man's labours," or "to build on the foundation laid by another" (Rom. xv. 20; 2 Cor x. 16).

Strange that a Protestant writer, Thiersch, is almost the only theologian of merit who still defends the assertion of Peter's sojourn at Rome in the beginning of the reign of Claudius. He supports it by two facts: the passage Acts xii. 17, where it is said that, delivered from his prison at Jerusalem, Peter went *into another place*,—a mysterious expression used, according to this critic, to designate Rome; and next, the famous passage of Suetonius, relative to the decree of Claudius banishing the Jews from Rome, because they ceased not "to rise at the *instigation of Chrestus*."[2] According to Thiersch, these last words are a vague indication of the introduction of Christianity into Rome at this period by St. Peter, and of the troubles which the fact had caused in the Roman synagogue. These arguments are alike without solidity. Why should not Luke have specially named Rome if St. Peter had really withdrawn thither? He had no reason to make a

[1] *Apol.* i. c. 26. Justin takes a statue raised to a Sabine god (*Semo Sancus*) in an island of the Tiber for a statue erected to the magician Simon of the Book of Acts. This statue was rediscovered in 1574 with the inscription: SEMONI SANCO DEO FIDIO. Such at least is one of the sources of the legend. Eusebius (ii. 14) has followed Justin.

[2] *Claud.* c. 25: *Judæos impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantes Româ expulit.*

mystery of the name. Besides, at this period, from 41 to 44, Peter can hardly have gone so far as Rome; for in 51 (Acts xv.) we find him at Jerusalem, and in 54 only at Antioch. Paul himself, the great pioneer of the gospel in the West, had not yet, in 42, set foot on the European continent, nor preached in Greece. And the author of the Acts, in chap. vi.–xiii., enumerates very carefully all the providential circumstances which paved the way for carrying the gospel into the Gentile world. Assuredly, therefore, Peter had not up to that time crossed the seas to evangelize Rome. As to the passage of Suetonius, it is very arbitrary to make *Chrestus* a personification of Christian preaching in general. The true Roman tradition is much rather to be sought in the testimony of a deacon of the church who lived in the third or fourth century, and is known as a writer under the name of Ambrosiaster or the false Ambrose (because his writings appear in the works of St. Ambrose), but whose true name was probably Hilary. He declares, to the praise of his church, that the Romans had become believers "without having seen a single miracle *or any of the apostles*."[1] Most Catholic writers of our day, who are earnest and independent, combat the idea that Peter sojourned at Rome under the reign of Claudius.

After all we have said, we do not mean in the least to deny that Peter came to Rome about the end of his life. The testimonies bearing on this stay seem to us too positive to be set aside by judicious criticism.[2] But in any case, his visit cannot have taken place till after the composition of the Epistle to the Romans, and even of the letters written by Paul during his Roman captivity in 62 and 63 (Col. Phil. Eph. Philem.). How, if Peter had at that time laboured simultaneously with him in the city of Rome, could Paul have failed to name him among the preachers of the gospel whom he mentions, and from whom he sends greetings? Peter cannot therefore have arrived at Rome till the end of the year 63 or the beginning of 64, and his stay cannot have lasted more than a few months till August 64, when he

[1] *Commentaria in XIII. epistolas Paulinas.*

[2] The testimonies are those of Clement of Rome, Clement of Alexandria, Dionysius of Cor., the author of the Fragment of Muratori, Irenæus, Tertullian, and Caius.

perished as a victim of the persecution of Nero. As Hilgenfeld says: "To be a good Protestant, one need not combat this tradition."[1] It is even probable that, but for the notoriety of this fact, the legend of the founding of the church of Rome by St. Peter could never have arisen and become so firmly established.

II. The second supposition by which it has been sought to explain the existence of this church—for in the absence of everything in the form of narrative one is reduced to hypothesis—is the following: Jews of Rome who had come to Jerusalem at the time of the feasts were there brought into contact with the first Christians, and so carried to Rome the seeds of the faith. Mention is made indeed, Acts ii. 10, of Roman pilgrims, some Jews by birth, the others proselytes, that is to say, Gentiles originally, but converted to Judaism, who were present during the events of the day of Pentecost. At every feast thereafter this contact between the members of the rich and numerous Roman synagogue and those of the church of Jerusalem must have been repeated, and must have produced the same result. If this explanation of the origin of the church of Rome is established, it is evident that it was by means of the synagogue that the gospel spread in this city.

M. Mangold, one of the most decided supporters of this hypothesis,[2] alleges two facts in its favour—(1) the legend of Peter's sojourn at Rome, which he acknowledges to be false, but which testifies, he thinks, to the recollection of certain original communications between the apostolic church, of which Peter was the head, and the Roman synagogue; (2) the passage of Suetonius, which we have already quoted, regarding the troubles which called forth the edict of Claudius. According to Mangold, these troubles were nothing else than the violent debates raised among the members of the Roman synagogue by the Christian preaching of those pilgrims on their return from Jerusalem.

But, as we have seen, the legend of Peter's preaching at Rome seems to have an entirely different origin from that which Mangold supposes; and the interpretation of the passage of Suetonius which he proposes, following Baur, is very

[1] *Einl.* p. 624.

[2] *Der Römerbrief und die Anfänge der römischen Gemeinde*, 1866.

uncertain. According to Wieseler and many other critics, Chrestus—the name was a very common one for a freedman—simply designates here an obscure Jewish agitator; or, as seems to us more probable, Suetonius having vaguely heard of the expectation of the Messias (of the *Christ*) among the Jews, regarded the name as that of a real living person to whom he ascribed the constant ferment and insurrectionary dispositions which the Messianic expectation kept up among the Jews. The word *tumultuari, to rise in insurrection*, used by the Roman historian, applies much more to outbreaks of rebellion than to intestine controversies within the synagogue. How could these have disturbed the public order and disquieted Claudius?

There are two facts, besides, which seem to us opposed to this way of explaining the founding of the church of Rome.

1. How comes it that no circumstance analogous to that which on the above hypothesis gave rise to the Roman church, can be proved in any of the other great cities of the empire? There were Jewish colonies elsewhere than at Rome. There were such at Ephesus, Corinth, and Thessalonica. Whence comes it that, when Paul arrived in these cities, and preached in their synagogues for the first time, the gospel appeared as a thing entirely new? Is there any reason for holding that the Christianity of Palestine exercised a more direct and prompt influence on the synagogue of Rome than on that of the other cities of the empire?

2. A second fact seems to us more decisive still. It is related in Acts xxviii. that Paul, three days after his arrival at Rome, called together to his hired house, where he was kept prisoner, the rulers of the Roman synagogue. The latter asked him to give precise information as to the doctrine of which he was the representative. "For," said they, "we have heard this sect spoken of, and we know that it meets with opposition everywhere" (in every synagogue). The narrative does not state the inference drawn by them from these facts; but it was evidently this: "Not knowing the contents of this new faith, we would like to learn them from lips so authoritative as thine." What proves that this was really the meaning of the Jews' words is, that they fixed a day for Paul when they would come to converse with him on the subject. The

conference bore, as is stated in the sequel of the narrative, "on the kingdom of God and concerning Jesus," taking as the starting-point "the law of Moses and the prophets" (ver. 23). Now, how are we to understand this ignorance of the rulers of the synagogue in respect of Christianity, if that religion had really been preached among them already, and had excited such violent debates as to provoke an edict of banishment against the whole Jewish colony?

It has been sought to get rid of this difficulty in different ways. Reuss has propounded the view that the question of the rulers of the synagogue did not refer to Christianity in general, but to Paul's individual teaching, and the opposition excited against him by the Judeo-Christian party.[1] But this view would have imperatively demanded the Greek form ἃ σὺ φρονεῖς, and not merely ἃ φρονεῖς. Besides, the sequel of the narrative very clearly shows that Paul's exposition bore on the kingdom of God and the gospel in general, and not merely on the differences between Paulinism and Judaizing Christianity.

Others have taken the words of the Jews to be either a feint, or at least a cautious reserve. They measured their words, it is said, from the fear of compromising themselves, or even, so Mangold thinks, from the desire of extorting some declaration from the apostle which they might use against him in his trial. The rest of the narrative is incompatible with these suppositions. The Jews enter very seriously into the discussion of the religious question. On the day fixed they come to the appointed place of meeting in greater numbers than formerly. During a whole day, *from morning till night*, they discuss the doctrine and history of Jesus, referring to the texts of Moses and the prophets. On the part of men engaged in business, as must have been the case with the rulers of the rich Jewish community established at Rome, such conduct testifies to a serious interest. The result of the interview furnishes like proof of the sincerity of their conduct. This result is twofold; some go away convinced, others resist to the last. This difference would be inconceivable if they had come to Paul already acquainted with the preaching of the gospel merely to lay a snare for him.

[1] Again quite recently in his *Histoire Apostolique*, pp. 247, 248.

Olshausen has proposed a different solution. According to him, the banishment of the Jews by Claudius led to a complete rupture between the synagogue and the Judeo-Christians. For the latter naturally sought to evade the decree of expulsion. And so it happened that, when the banished Jews returned to Rome, there was no longer anything in common between them and the church; the Roman Jews soon lost all recollection of Christian doctrine. But Baur and Mangold have thoroughly refuted this supposition. It ascribes much more considerable effects to the edict of Claudius than it can ever have had in reality. And how could a short time of exile have sufficed to efface from the minds of the Jewish community the memory of Christian preaching, if it had already made itself heard in full synagogue?

Baur has discarded all half measures. He has struck at the root of the difficulty. He has pronounced the narrative of the Acts a fiction. The author desired to pass off Paul as much more conciliatory to Judaism than he really was. The true Paul had not the slightest need of an act of positive unbelief on the part of the Jews of Rome, to think himself authorized to evangelize the Gentiles of the capital. He did not recognise that alleged *right of priority* which the Judeo-Christians claimed in favour of their nation, and which is assumed by the narrative of the Acts. This narrative therefore is fictitious.[1] The answer to this imputation is not difficult: the Paul of Acts certainly does not resemble the Paul of Baur's theory; but he is assuredly the Paul of history. It is Paul himself who proves this to us when he writes thrice with his own hand, at the beginning of the Epistle to the Romans (i. 16, ii. 9, 10), the: "to the Jews *first*," which so completely confirms the course taken by him among the Jews of Rome, and described so carefully by the author of the Acts.

All these explanations of the account, Acts xxviii., being thus untenable, it only remains to accept it in its natural meaning with the inevitable consequences. The rulers of the synagogue of Rome had undoubtedly heard of the disputes which were everywhere raised among their co-religionists by the preaching of Jesus as the Christ. But they had not yet

[1] *Paulus*, I. 367 et seq. Hilgenfeld likewise: "The narrative of the Acts is not credible."

an exact acquaintance with this new faith. Christianity had therefore not yet been preached in the Roman synagogue.

III. Without altogether denying what may have been done in an isolated way for the spread of Christianity at Rome by Jews returning from Jerusalem, we must assign the founding of the Roman church to a different origin. Rome was to the world what the heart is to the body, the centre of vital circulation. Tacitus asserts that "all things hateful or shameful were sure to flow to Rome from all parts of the empire." This law must have applied also to better things. Long before the composition of the Epistle to the Romans, the gospel had already crossed the frontier of Palestine and spread among the Gentile populations of Syria, Asia Minor, and Greece. Endowed as it was with an inherent force of expansion, could not the new religious principle easily find its way from those countries to Rome? Relations between Rome and Syria in particular were frequent and numerous. Renan himself remarks them: "Rome was the meeting-point of all the Oriental forms of worship, the point of the Mediterranean with which the Syrians had most connection. They arrived there in enormous bands. With them there landed troops of Greeks and Asiatics, all speaking Greek. . . . It is in the highest degree probable that so early as the year 50 some Jews of Syria already become Christian entered the capital of the empire."[1] In these sentences of Renan we have only a word to correct. It is the word *Jews*. For it is certain that the churches of Antioch and Syria were chiefly composed of *Greeks*. Those Christians of Gentile origin might therefore very soon make their way to Rome. And why should it have been otherwise with members of the Christian communities of Asia and Greece, who were much nearer still.

There are some facts which serve to confirm the essentially Gentile origin of the Roman church. Five times, in the salutations which close our Epistle, the apostle addresses groups of Christians scattered over the great city.[2] At least five times for once to the contrary, the names of the brethren whom he salutes are Greek and Latin, not Jewish. These

[1] *Saint Paul*, pp. 97, 98.

[2] We shall afterwards examine the question whether those salutations really form part of the Epistle to the Romans.

bear witness to the manner in which the gospel had gained a footing in the capital. This wide dissemination and those names of Gentile origin find a natural explanation in the arrival of Christians of Greece and Asia, who had preached the word each in the quarter of the city where he lived. The course of things would have been quite different had the preaching of the gospel proceeded from the synagogue. A still more significant fact is related in the first part of Acts xxviii. On hearing of St. Paul's approach, the brethren who reside at Rome haste to meet him, and receive him with an affection which raises his courage. Does not this prove that they already loved and venerated him as their spiritual father, and that consequently their Christianity proceeded directly or indirectly from the churches founded by Paul in Greece and Asia, rather than from the Judeo-Christian church of Jerusalem? Beyschlag, in his interesting work on the subject before us,[1] raises the objection that between the composition of the Epistle to the Romans, about the end of the year 57 or 58, and the founding of the churches of Greece, about 53 or 54, too little time had elapsed to allow the gospel to spread so far as Rome, and to make it possible for the *whole world* to have heard of the fact (Rom. i. 8). But the latter phrase is, of course, somewhat hyperbolical (comp. 1 Thess. i. 8; Col. i. 6). And if the founding of the churches of Syria goes back, as we have seen, to about the year 40, and so to a date eighteen or nineteen years before the Epistle to the Romans, the time thus gained for this Christian invasion is certainly not too short. Even the five or six years which intervene between the evangelization of Greece and the composition of our Epistle sufficed to explain the arrival of the gospel at Rome from the great commercial centres of Thessalonica and Corinth.

It may be asked, no doubt, how came it, if it did so happen, that the representatives of the Christian faith in the capital had not yet raised the standard of the new doctrine in the synagogue? But it must be remembered that for such a mission it was not enough to be a sincere believer; one required to feel himself in possession of scripture knowledge, and of a power of speech and argument which could not be

[1] "Das geschichtliche Problem des Römerbriefs," *Stud. und Kritik.* 1867.

expected from simple men engaged in commerce and industry. We read in Acts (xviii. 26 et seq.) that when Apollos arrived at Ephesus, and when, supported by his eminent talents and biblical erudition, *he made bold*—such is the word used—to speak in the synagogue, Aquila, the disciple and friend of Paul, did not attempt to answer him in the open assembly, but thought it enough to take him *unto him* to instruct him privately in the knowledge of the gospel. This is easily understood; it was a paradoxical proclamation which was in question, being, as St. Paul says, *to the Greeks foolishness*, and still more *to the Jews a stumbling-block*. The first-comer was not fitted to proclaim and defend it before the great Rabbins of capitals such as Antioch, Ephesus, or Rome. So true is this, that some expressions in the Epistle to the Romans would lead us to suppose that Paul himself was accused of shrinking from the task. Is it not indeed to a suspicion of this kind that he is alluding, when, after speaking of the delays which had hitherto prevented his visit to Rome, he declares (i. 16) "that *he is not ashamed* of the gospel of Christ"? Only a very small number of men exceptionally qualified could essay an attack such as would tell on the fortress of Roman Judaism, and not one of those strong men had yet appeared in the capital.

We have in the Book of Acts an account of the founding of a church entirely analogous to that which we are supposing for the church of Rome. It is that of the church of Antioch. Some Christian emigrants from Jerusalem reach this capital of Syria shortly after the persecution of Stephen; they turn *to the Greeks*, that is to say, the Gentiles of the city. A large number believe, and the distinction between this community of Gentile origin and the synagogue is brought out so pointedly that a new name is invented to designate believers, that of *Christian* (Acts xi. 19–26). Let us transfer this scene from the capital of Syria to the capital of the empire, and we have the history of the founding of the church of Rome. We understand how Greek names are in a majority, such being borne by the most distinguished of the members of the church (in the salutations of chap. xvi.); we understand the ignorance which still prevailed among the rulers of the synagogue in relation to the gospel; we understand the extraordinary

eagerness with which the Christians of Rome come to salute Paul on his arrival. All the facts find their explanation, and the narrative of the Acts is vindicated without difficulty.

II. *Composition and Tendency of the Roman Church.*

It was generally held, till the time of Baur, that the majority of the Roman church was of Gentile origin, and consequently sympathized in its tendency with the teaching of Paul; this view was inferred from a certain number of passages taken from the Epistle itself, and from the natural enough supposition that the majority of the church would take the general character of the Roman population.

But Baur, in a work of remarkable learning and sagacity,[1] maintained that on this view, which had already been combated by Rückert, it was absolutely impossible to explain the aim and construction of the Epistle to the Romans; that such a letter had no meaning except as addressed to a church of Judeo-Christian origin, and of Judaizing and particularistic tendency, whose views Paul was concerned to correct. He sought to give an entirely different meaning from the received one to the passages usually alleged in favour of the contrary opinion; and he succeeded so well in demonstrating his thesis, that he carried with him the greater number of theologians (MM. Reuss, Thiersch, Mangold, Schenkel, Sabatier, Holtzmann, Volkmar, Holsten, etc.). Even Tholuck, in the fifth edition of his *Commentary*, yielded, up to a certain point, to the weight of the reasons advanced by the Tübingen critic, and acknowledged the necessity of holding for the explanation of the Epistle the existence at Rome, if not of a majority, at least of a very strong minority of Judaizers. Philippi made a similar concession. Things had come to this three years ago, that Holtzmann could assert without exaggeration that "Baur's opinion now hardly found any opponent."[2]

Yet even in 1858 Theodore Schott, while making large concessions to Baur's view regarding the tendency and arrangement of the Epistle, had energetically maintained that there

[1] "Ueber Zweck und Veranlassung des Römerbriefs," in the *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1836 (reproduced in his *Paulus*, I. 343 et seq.).

[2] *Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie.*

was a Gentile-Christian majority in the church of Rome.[1] Several theologians have since then declared for the same view; so Riggenbach in an article of the *Zeitschrift für die Lutherische Theologie* (1866), reviewing Mangold's work; Hofmann (of Erlangen) in his *Commentary* on our Epistle (1868); Dietzsch in an interesting monograph on Rom. v. 12–21, *Adam und Christus* (1871); Meyer in the fifth edition of his *Commentary* (1872). Even Hilgenfeld in his *Introduction* (p. 305) has thought right to modify Baur's opinion, and to acknowledge the existence of a strong Gentile-Christian and Pauline element in the Roman church; finally, in the very year in which Holtzmann proclaimed the final triumph of Baur's view, two authors of well-known erudition and independence as critics, Schultz and Weizsäcker, declared in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie* (1876) for the preponderance of the Gentile-Christian element.

After all these oscillations an attempt at conciliation was to be expected. Beyschlag[2] has proposed such a solution, in a work in which the facts are grouped with a master-hand, and which concludes, on the one side, that the majority of the Roman church, in conformity with Paul's express statements, was of Gentile origin; but, on the other, that this Gentile majority shared Judaizing convictions, because it was composed of former proselytes.

According to the plan which we have adopted, and not to anticipate the exegesis of the Epistle, we shall not here discuss the passages alleged either for or against the Gentile origin of the majority of the readers;[3] either for or against the Judaizing tendency of this majority.[4]

But outside the exegesis properly so called we have some indications which may serve to throw light on the double question of the composition and tendency of the majority of the church.

1. The letter itself which we have to study. St. Paul, who would not build on the foundation laid by another, could not

[1] *Der Römerbrief, seinem Zwecke und Gedankengange nach, ausgelegt.*

[2] See the article already quoted, p. 68.

[3] *For:* i. 6, 13, xi. 13, xv. 14 et seq. *Against:* ii. 17, iv. 1, vii. 1.

[4] *Against:* i. 8, 11, 12, vi. 17, xiv. 1–xv. 13, xvi. 17–19, 25. *For:* the whole polemic against the righteousness of the law.

write a letter like this, containing a didactic exposition of the gospel, except to a church which he knew belonged to him at least indirectly in its composition and tendency as well as origin.

2. The ignorance of the rulers of the synagogue in regard to the gospel. Baur himself, in rejecting Luke's narrative as a fiction of the author of the Acts, has acknowledged the incompatibility of this fact with the preponderance of a majority in the Roman church having a Judeo-Christian tendency.

3. The persecution of Nero in 64. This bloody catastrophe smote the church of Rome without touching the synagogue. "Now," says Weizsäcker, "if Christians had not yet existed at Rome, except as a mere Jewish party, the persecution which fell on them, without even ruffling the surface of Judaism, would be an inexplicable fact both in its origin and course." [1]

4. The information given by the apostle as to the state of the church in the beginning of his Roman captivity in Phil. i. He tells how the somewhat drowsy zeal of the Christians of the capital had been reawakened by his presence. And in this connection he mentions *some* Christians (τινές) who set themselves fervently to preach, but from envy (ver. 15). Who are they? The common answer is: the Judaizers of the Roman church. Well and good. But in that case, as they form an exception to the majority of the faithful whom Paul has just mentioned (τοὺς πλείονας, *the majority*, ver. 14), and who have received a holy impulse from confidence in his bonds, the Judaizers can only have been a minority. Here, then, is an express testimony against the prevalence of Judeo-Christianity in the church of Rome. Against it is Weizsäcker, who exhibits this proof in all its force.

5. The composition of Mark's Gospel. It is generally admitted that this narrative was composed at Rome, and for the Christians of the capital. Now the detailed explanations contained in the book as to certain Jewish customs, and the almost entire absence of quotations from the Old Testament, do not sanction the view that its author contemplated a majority of readers of Jewish origin.

6. The Epistle of Clement of Rome. This writing, which

[1] Article quoted, p. 274.

is some thirty odd years posterior to the Epistle to the Romans, breathes in all respects, as Weizsäcker says, the spirit of the Gentile-Christian world. Such is also the judgment of Harnack in his introduction to the Epistle.[1] No doubt it is far from the strong spirituality of Paul, but still it is substantially his conception of Christianity. Now, the national type of this great church cannot, as Weizsäcker says, have become transformed in so short a space of time. This writing is therefore a new proof of the predominance of the Gentile element in this church from its origin.

7. The Easter controversy of the second century. Rome put herself at the head of all Christendom to root out the Paschal rite established in the churches of Asia Minor. And whence came the offence caused by the mode of celebrating Easter in those churches? From the fact that they celebrated the holy Easter supper on the evening of the 14th Nisan, at the same moment when the Jews, in obedience to the law, were celebrating their Paschal feast. Certainly, if the Roman church had been under the sway of a Judaizing tradition, it would not thus have found itself at the head of the crusade raised against them.

8. The catacombs of Rome. There are found at every step in those burying-places names belonging to the noblest families of the city, some of them even closely related to the imperial family. The fact shows the access which Christianity had found from the first to the upper classes of Roman society, who assuredly did not belong to Judaism. Another proof, the full force of which has been brought out by Weizsäcker.

To support his view, Baur has quoted the passage of Hilary, which we have already mentioned, p. 62, and particularly the following words: "It is certain that in the time of the apostles there were Jews dwelling at Rome. Those of them who had believed, taught the Romans to profess Christ, while keeping the law."[2] But the contrast which the passage establishes between *Jews* and *Romans* shows clearly that Hilary himself looked on the latter, who, according to him, formed the great

[1] In the edition of the *Apostolic Fathers*, published by Gebhardt, Harnack, and Zahn.

[2] *Constat temporibus apostolorum Judæos. . . . Roma habitasse, ex quibus hi qui crediderant, tradiderunt Romanis ut Christum profitentes legem servarent.*

body of the church, as of Gentile origin. So the fact is precisely the reverse of what Baur affects to prove from the words. And as to the legal tendency which, according to Hilary, the Judeo-Christian instructors had inculcated on the Romans, it is clear that in the third or fourth century this writer possessed no tradition on the subject; nothing positive was known at Rome in the second century regarding facts otherwise of great importance, such as Paul's journey to Spain. It was therefore a conclusion which he drew from the anti-Jewish polemic which he thought he could trace in the Epistle to the Romans.

If any one is entitled to found on this passage, it would seem to be not Baur, but Beyschlag. Yet even that would not be exact; for Hilary nowhere says that those Romans who had been converted by the believing Jews of Rome formerly belonged to Judaism as proselytes. The contrary is rather to be inferred from the words he uses. Besides, Beyschlag's solution, during the twenty years that have elapsed since it was proposed, has found only a single supporter, M. Schürer (in his review of Hilgenfeld's *Introduction*).[1] And the fact is easily understood. For either the gospel reached Rome through the synagogue,—and then how would the proselytes have been in such a majority that the church could have been, as Beyschlag admits, regarded as an essentially Gentile-Christian community? or the gospel spread to the capital from the churches of Greece and Asia Minor, in which the spiritualism of Paul was supreme,—and in that case whence came the legal character with which Beyschlag supposes it to have been impressed? The hypothesis asserts too much or too little. So Weizsäcker and Schultz have not stopped for an instant to refute it.

The result of our study is, that the Roman church was mostly of Gentile origin and Pauline tendency, even before the apostle addressed our letter to it. The formation of the church was indirectly traceable to him, because its authors proceeded for the most part from the churches of the East, whose existence was due to his apostolic labours. Besides, the recruiting of the church having taken place chiefly in the midst of the Roman, that is to say, Gentile population, Paul

[1] *Studien und Kritiken*, 1876.

was entitled to regard it as belonging to the domain of the apostle of the Gentiles. Of course this solution will not be valid until it has passed the ordeal of the texts of the Epistle itself.

The result which we have just reached renders it at once more difficult and more easy to explain the course adopted by the apostle in writing such a letter to this church.

For if it is easier to explain how he could by writing instruct a church which came within the domain assigned to him by the Lord, on the other hand it is more embarrassing to say with what view he could repeat in writing to this church all that it should already have known.

CHAPTER III.

THE EPISTLE.

TO study the composition of this Epistle, which establishes for the first time a relation between the apostle and the church, we shall have three points to consider:—(1) the author; (2) the circumstances of his life in which he composed the letter; (3) the aim which he set before him. We shall continue to avoid interrogating our Epistle except in so far as the data which it may furnish are obvious at a glance, and demand no exegetical discussion.

I. *The Author.*

The author declares himself to be Paul, the apostle of the Gentiles (i. 1–7, xi. 13, xv. 15–20). The sending of the letter pertains, in his view, to the fulfilling of the commission which he has received, "to bring all the Gentiles to the obedience of the faith" (i. 5).

The unanimous tradition of the church is in harmony with this declaration of the author.

Between the years 90 and 100 of our era, *Clement*, a presbyter of the church of Rome, reproduced in chap. xxxv. of his Epistle to the Corinthians the picture of the vices of the Gentiles, such as it is traced in Rom. i.; in chap. xxxviii. he applies to the circumstances of his time the exhortations which are addressed to the strong and the weak in chap. xiv. of our Epistle. Our letter was therefore preserved in the archives of the church of Rome, and recognised as a work of the apostle whose name it bears.

It cannot be doubted that the author of the Epistle called the *Epistle of Barnabas* (written probably in Egypt about 96), when writing his third chapter, had present to his mind Rom.

iv. 11 et seq.: "I have set thee to be a father of the nations believing in the Lord in uncircumcision."[1]

The letters of *Ignatius* again and again reproduce the antithesis in the twofold origin of Jesus as Son of David and Son of God, Rom. i. 3, 4.

In the *Dialogue with Trypho*, chap. xxvii., Justin, about the middle of the second century, repeats the enumeration of the many biblical passages whereby Paul, Rom. iii., demonstrates the natural corruption of man.

The *Epistle to Diognetus* says, chap. ix., not without allusion to Rom. v. 18, 19: "That the iniquity of many may be covered through righteousness, and that the righteousness of one may justify many sinners."

The *churches of Lyon and Vienne*, in their letter to the churches of Pontus (about 177), speak of their martyrs (Eus. v. 1): "Really proving *that the sufferings of this present time*," etc. (Rom. viii. 18).

Many features of the picture of Gentile infamies, Rom. i., reappear in the *Apologies of Athenagoras* and of *Theophilus*, shortly after the middle of the second century. The latter quotes Rom. ii. 6–9, and xiii. 7, 8 textually.

The so-called *Canon of Muratori* (between 170 and 180) places the Epistle to the Romans among the writings which the church receives, and which should be read publicly.

The quotations made by *Irenæus* (56 times), *Clement of Alexandria*, and *Tertullian*, are very numerous. It is only from this time forward that Paul is expressly named in these quotations as the author.

In the third century *Origen*, and in the fourth *Eusebius*, do not mention any doubt as expressed on the subject of the authenticity of our Epistle.

The testimony of heretics is not less unanimous than that of the Fathers. *Basilides*, *Ptolemæus*, and very particularly *Marcion*, from the first half of the second century onwards, make use of our Epistle as an undisputed apostolical document.

Throughout the whole course of the past centuries, only two theologians have contested this unanimous testimony of the church and the sects. These are the English author *Evanson*,

[1] As in Rom.: Τῶν πιστευόντων δι' ἀκροβυστίας (nothing similar in the passage of Gen. xvii. 5).

in a work on the Gospels, of the last century, and *Bruno Bauer*, in our own day, in Germany. They ask:—1. Why does the author of the Acts of the Apostles not say a word about a work of such importance? As if the Book of Acts were a biography of the Apostle Paul! 2. How are we to understand the numerous salutations of chap. xvi., addressed to a church in which Paul had never lived? As if (granting that this page of salutations really belongs to our Epistle) the apostle could not have known all these persons in Greece and the East who were now living at Rome, as we shall prove in the case, for example, of Aquila and Priscilla! 3. How can we hold the existence of a church at Rome so considerable as our Epistle supposes before the arrival of any apostle in the city? As if the founding of the church of Antioch did not furnish us with a sufficient precedent to solve the question!

Thus there is nothing to prevent us from accepting the testimony of the church, which is confirmed, besides, by the grandeur which betrays a master, and the truly apostolic power of the work itself, as well as by its complete harmony in thought and style with the other writings acknowledged to be the apostle's.

II. *The Date.*

The external circumstances in which this letter was composed are easily made out.

1. Paul had not yet visited Rome (i. 10-13); this excludes every date posterior to the spring of the year 62, when he arrived in the city.

2. The apostle is approaching the end of his ministry in the East. From Jerusalem to Illyria he has filled every place with the preaching of the gospel of Christ; now he must seek a field of labour westward, at the extremity of Europe, in Spain, xv. 18-24. Paul could not have written these words before the end of his residence at Ephesus, which lasted probably from the autumn of 54 to the Pentecost of 57.

3. At the time he wrote he was still free; for he was discussing his plans for travelling, xv. 23-25. It was therefore at a period previous to his arrest at Jerusalem (Pentecost of the year 59).

The interval which remains available is thus reduced to the short period from the year 57 to 59.

4. At the time when he wrote, he was about to start for Jerusalem, at the head of a numerous deputation charged with carrying to the mother church the fruits of a collection organized on its behalf in all the churches of the Gentile world (Rom. xv. 24–28). When he wrote his first Epistle to the Corinthians (Pentecost 57), and a year and a half later (unless I am mistaken) his second (summer 58), the collection was not yet finished, and he did not know at that time whether it would be liberal enough to warrant his going himself to present it to the church of Jerusalem (1 Cor. xvi. 1–4; 2 Cor. viii. and ix.). All is completed when he writes the Epistle to the Romans, and the question of his taking part personally in the mission is decided (xv. 28). This indication brings us to the time immediately preceding Paul's departure from Corinth for Jerusalem, which took place in March 59.

5. Finally, we are struck with the sort of anxiety which appears in the words used, xv. 30–32: "Strive together with me in your prayers to God for me, that I may be delivered from them that do not believe in Judea." We recognise in this passage the disquieting presentiments which came out in all the churches at that point in the apostle's life, when he went to face for the last time the hatred of the inhabitants and authorities of Jerusalem (comp. Acts xx. 22, 23, xxi. 4, 10–12). The Epistle to the Romans was therefore written very shortly before his departure for that city.

To fix the point exactly, it remains only to attempt to determine the *place* of its composition.

1. xvi. 1, he recommends Phebe, a deaconess of Cenchrea, the port of Corinth, on the Egean Sea. It is therefore probable that if this passage really belongs to the Epistle to the Romans, Paul wrote from Corinth or its neighbourhood.

2. He names Gaius as his host (xvi. 23). This is probably the same person as is mentioned in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (i. 14) as being one of the earliest converts of that city.

3. He sends a greeting from Erastus, treasurer of the city, xvi. 23. It is probable that this person is the same as we

find mentioned, 2 Tim. iv. 20, in these words: "Erastus abode *at Corinth.*"

These indications lead us to conclude with great probability that Corinth was the place of composition. This result agrees with the preceding one relative to the date. In fact, mention is made in Acts xx. 2 of a three months' stay made by Paul in Hellas, that is to say, in the southern part of Greece, of which Corinth was the capital. This stay immediately preceded Paul's departure for Jerusalem, and took place, consequently, in the months of December 58, and January and February 59.

So it was during this time of repose that the apostle, after so many anxieties and labours, found the calm necessary for composing such a work. The time was solemn. The first part of his apostolic task was finished. The East, wholly evangelized in a way, lay behind him; he had before him the West still enveloped in the darkness of paganism, but which belonged also to the domain assigned him by the Lord. In the midst of this darkness he discerns a luminous point, the church of Rome. On this he fixes his eye before entering on the journey to Italy in person.

We shall see if the Epistle to the Romans corresponds to the solemnity of the situation.

III. *The Aim.*

Critics differ as much in regard to *the aim* of our Epistle as they are agreed about its date and authenticity. Since Baur's time the subject has become one of the most controverted in the whole range of New Testament criticism.

The question stands thus: If we assign a special practical aim to the Epistle, we put ourselves, as it seems, in contradiction to the very general and quasi-systematic character of its contents. If, on the contrary, we ascribe to it a didactic and wholly general aim, it differs thereby from the other letters of St. Paul, all of which spring from some particular occasion, and have a definite aim. The author of the oldest critical study of the New Testament which we possess, the so-called *Fragment of Muratori*, wrote thus about the middle of the second century: "St. Paul's letters themselves reveal clearly enough, to any one who wishes to know, in what

place and *with what view* they were composed." If he had lived among the discussions of our day, he would certainly not have expressed himself thus about our Epistle. What increases the difficulty is, that the letter is not addressed to a church which Paul had himself founded, and cannot be regarded, like his other Epistles, as the continuation of his missionary work. Let us add, finally, the sort of obscurity which, as we have seen, rests on the founding of this church, and consequently on the nature of its composition and its religious tendency, and we shall understand how an almost numberless multitude of opinions should have been broached, especially in the present day, regarding the intention of the letter. It seems to us possible to distribute the proposed solutions into three principal groups.

The first starts from the fact that all the other Epistles of the apostle owe their origin to some special occasion, and ascribes to this one a practical and definite aim. In the situation of Paul's work, and at the time when he was preparing to transfer his mission to the West, it concerned him to acquire or to make sure of the sympathy of the Roman church, destined as it was to become his point of support in those new countries, as Antioch had been in the East. Our Epistle, on this view, was the means chosen to obtain this result. Its aim was thus *apologetic*.

Diametrically opposed to this first group is a second, which takes account especially of the general and systematic character of the Epistle. Such contents do not seem to be compatible with the intention of obtaining a particular practical result. The apostle, it is therefore held, simply proposed to instruct and edify the church of Rome. The aim of the letter was *didactic*.

Between these two groups stands a third, which admits, indeed, the aim of teaching, but that with a definite intention, namely, to combat the legal Judeo-Christianity which was already dominant, or at least threatening to become so, within the Roman church. Our Epistle, consequently, had a *polemic* intention.

We proceed to review these three groups, each containing numerous shades of opinion. That which we have indicated in the third place, evidently forming the transition between

the other two, we shall treat second in the following exposition.

FIRST GROUP: APOLOGETIC AIM.

The way was opened in this direction at one and the same time (1836) by Credner and Baur.[1] The apostle wishes to prepare for himself a favourable reception in the principal church of the West; such is the general viewpoint, which is variously modified by the different adherents of this conception.

I. The most precise and sharply defined situation is that supposed by Baur. The church of Rome, being in the great majority of its members Judeo-Christian by origin, and particularistic in tendency, could not look on Paul's mission to the Gentiles otherwise than with dislike. No doubt, Jewish Christianity no longer desired at Rome, as it had done formerly in Galatia, to impose circumcision on the Gentiles; it did not attack, as at Corinth, Paul's apostolic dignity and moral character. But the Christians of Rome asked if it was just and agreeable to God's promises to admit the Gentiles *en masse* into the church, as Paul was doing, before the Jewish people had taken their legitimate place in it. It was not wished to exclude the Gentiles. But it was maintained that, in virtue of the *right of priority* granted to Israel, they ought not to enter till the chosen nation had done so. Paul feels deeply that a church so minded cannot serve as the point of support for his mission in the West, that it will rather put a hindrance in his way. And hence, at the last stage of his sojourn in Greece, during the three months of rest which are allowed him at Corinth, he writes this letter to the Romans, with the view of completely rooting out the prejudice from which their repugnance to his mission springs. Not only has the right of priority, to which Israel pretends, no existence, since the righteousness of faith has now for all time replaced that of the law, but the conversion of the

[1] Credner, *Einleitung in das N. T.* 1836, § 142. Baur, *Tübinger Zeitschrift*, 3 Heft: Ueber Zweck und Veranlassung des Römerbriefs. This forms the original work which the author reproduced in his *Paulus*, 1st edition, 1845, and afterwards completed in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1857. The author gradually softened his first conception; this is most of all apparent in his last exposition: *Das Christenthum und die Christl. Kirche*, etc., 1860, p. 62 et seq.

Gentiles, for which Paul is labouring, will be the very means which God will use to bring back the hostile Jews to Himself. It will be seen that, on this view, the great outline of the ways of God, ix.–xi., far from being, as is commonly thought, a simple appendix, forms the central part of the letter, that in which its true intention is expressed. The whole preceding exposition of the righteousness of faith forms its admirable preface.[1]

The treatise of Baur produced at the time of its appearance an effect similar to that caused eight years afterwards by a like work on the Gospel of John. The learned world was as it were fascinated; men thought they were on the eve of a sort of revelation. From the dazzling effect then produced criticism is only slowly recovering at the present day. Credner's work was less developed and less striking; he only added to the idea which we have just indicated in the form presented by Baur an original feature, which has recently been revived by Holsten. We mean the relation between the composition of the Epistle to the Romans and the large amount of the collection made in behalf of the church of Jerusalem at the same period. At the very time that he was endeavouring by this work of love to influence the metropolis of Jewish Christianity in the East, his practical genius sought by means of our Epistle to acquire a point of support for his mission in the most important Jewish Christian church of the West. So understood the letter becomes an *act*, a real and serious work, as is naturally to be expected from a man like Paul composing such a treatise.

The following, however, are the reasons which have prevailed with science more and more to reconsider its verdict:—

1. It has been found impossible to accept the very forced explanations by which Baur has laboured to get rid of the passages attesting the Gentile origin and the Pauline tendency of the church of Rome.—2. An attempt at conquest, such as that which Baur ascribes to Paul, has been felt to be incom-

[1] Baur expresses himself thus: "The apostle's intention is to refute Jewish particularism so radically that it shall remain like an uprooted tree in the consciousness of the age. . . . The absolute nullity of every claim founded on particularism: such is the fundamental idea of the Epistle" (*Paulus*, 2d ed. I. p. 380).

patible with the principle professed by him in our very Epistle, not *to build on another man's foundation.* In this case Paul would be doing even worse; he would be introducing himself into a house wholly built by strange hands, and would be seeking to install himself in it with his whole staff of apostolic *aides;* this, no doubt, with a view to the work of Christ, but would the end justify the means?—3. The idea which Baur ascribes to the Christians of Rome, that of restricting the preaching of the gospel to the Jews until the whole elect people should become believers, is a strange and monstrous conception, of which there is not the slightest trace either in the New Testament or in any work of Christian antiquity. The Judaizers, on the contrary, strongly approved of the conversion of the Gentiles, insisting only on the condition of circumcision (Gal. v. 11, vi. 13). To refuse to the Gentiles the preaching of salvation till it should please the Jews to become converts, would have been an aggravation, and not at all, as Baur says, an attenuation of the old Jewish pretensions.—4. It is impossible from this point of view to account for the detailed instruction with which the Epistle opens (i.–viii.), and in particular for the description of the corruption of the Gentiles (chap. i.). If all that was only intended to provide a justification of the missionary course followed by the apostle, stated ix.–xi., was not Schwegler right in saying "that such an expenditure of means was out of proportion to the end in view"? It is not less difficult to explain from this standpoint the use of the moral part, especially of chap. xii.—5. In general, the horizon of the Epistle is too vast, its exposition too systematic, its tone too calm, to allow us to ascribe to it the intention of making a conquest, or to see in it something like a mine destined to spring the ramparts of a hostile position.—6. This explanation comes very near to compromising the moral character of Paul. What Baur did not say, his disciple Holsten frankly confesses in our day.[1] After quoting these words of Volkmar: "that the Epistle to the Romans is the maturest fruit of Paul's mind," this critic adds: "But it must, at the same time, be confessed that it is not its *purest* work. Under

[1] In his article: "Der Gedankengang des Römerbriefs," *Jahrb. f. prot. Theol.* 1879.

the *pressure of a practical want*, that of reconciling the Jewish Christians to his gospel . . ., Paul has not kept—*and he knows it well himself*—at the height of his own thought . . ; he has *blunted the edge of his gospel*." If, to bear out the exposition of Baur and his school, one must go the length of making the Epistle to the Romans a work of Jesuitism, we think that this solution is judged.

Baur has cited the testimony of Hilary (*Ambrosiaster*), who says of the Romans: "Who, having been wrongly instructed by the Judaizers, were immediately corrected (by this letter)."[1] But even on this point it has been shown that Hilary's opinion was wholly different from Baur's; since, according to the former, the Judaizers, who had led the Romans into error in regard to the law, were absolutely the same as those who had troubled Antioch and Galatia;[2] while, according to Baur, those of Rome made entirely different pretensions.

II. The difficulties which had led even Baur to modify his view have forced critics who are attached in the main to his opinion to soften it still more considerably. The critic whom we may regard as the principal representative of Baur's corrected exposition is Mangold.[3] According to this author, the church of Rome, while Judeo-Christian in its majority, and legal in its tendency, had not the strictly particularistic conception which Baur ascribes to it. It was merely imbued with certain prejudices against Paul and his work; it did not know what to think of that wide propagation of a gospel without law in the Gentile world. The general abandonment of Mosaism, which the missionary action of the apostle brought in its train, appeared to it to endanger the Lord's work, and even the morality of those multitudes of believing Gentiles. Paul, therefore, on the eve of transferring his activity to the West, felt the need of reassuring the Romans as to the spirit of his teaching, and the consequences of his work. In i.–viii. he seeks to make them understand his *doctrine;* in ix.–xi. he explains to them his *mission*. He hopes thereby to succeed in gaining a powerful auxiliary in his new field of labour.—This view has obtained a pretty

[1] *Qui, male inducti, statim correcti sunt.* . . .

[2] Philippi has quoted these words: *Hi sunt qui et Galatas subverterant.* . . .

[3] In the work already quoted, *Der Römerbrief*, etc., 1866.

general assent; it is found wholly or in part in Thiersch, Holtzmann, Ritschl, Beyschlag, Hausrath, Schenkel, Schultz, as also in Sabatier.[1] It has its best support in the anti-Judaistic tendency, which may, with some measure of probability, be ascribed to various parts of the Epistle. But it has not the perfect transparency of Baur's view; it is hard to know wherein those prejudices of the Roman church against Paul's work consist, neither springing from Judaizing legality, properly so called, nor from the exceptional point of view imagined by Baur.—Besides, as directed to a church not strictly Judaizing, what purpose would be served by the long preface of the first eight chapters, pointed against the righteousness of the law? What end, especially in the line of justifying Paul's missionary practice, would be served by the moral part, xii.–xiv., which has not the slightest connection with his work? Here, certainly, we can apply the saying of Schwegler, "that the expenditure of means is disproportioned to the end." There remain, finally, all the reasons which we have alleged against the Judeo-Christian composition of the church.

III. While acknowledging the Gentile origin of the majority of the church, and the Pauline character of its faith, Schott and Riggenbach[2] think that the object of the Epistle is simply to awaken and quicken its sympathy with Paul's work, on the eve of his passing to the West.—But in that case the extravagance of the means employed becomes still more startling. To demonstrate in the outset in eight long chapters the truth of Paul's gospel to a Pauline church, in order to obtain its missionary co-operation, would not this be idle work—labour lost?

It is true that Schott, to meet this difficulty, imagines an objection raised at Rome to Paul's future mission in the West. The East, says he, was full of Jewish communities; so that, while labouring in these countries for the Gentiles, Paul was at the same time labouring, up to a certain point, in the midst of Jews, and for their good. But it was wholly otherwise in the West, where the Jews were not so plentifully

[1] *L'apôtre Paul*, p. 159 et seq.

[2] Schott, work quoted. Riggenbach, *Zeitschrift für lutherische Theologie und Kirche* (review of Mangold's work), 1866.

scattered. Here Paul's work must necessarily be severed from action on the Jewish people. Paul, anticipating the accusations which would arise from this fact, writes the Epistle to the Romans in order to obviate them.—But the difference which Schott lays down on this head between the East and the West does not rest on any historical proof. And, as Beyschlag rightly asks, "What strange believers those Christians of Rome must have been, who, while themselves enjoying the blessings of salvation, notwithstanding their Gentile origin, imagined that those same blessings could not be offered to the other Western Gentiles till after Israel had been wholly converted!"

IV. Hofmann has given to the apologetic intention an altogether particular complexion. Our letter, he would have it, is the *personal* justification of Paul in reference to the long delays which had retarded his arrival at Rome. It was intended to prove that a gospel such as his leaves no room in the heart of its apostle for feelings of shame or lukewarmness. And thus it sought to secure a favourable reception for his person and mission. The object of his letter is consequently to be found revealed in i. 14–16.—But is it possible to conceive so broad and authoritative a scheme of doctrine as that of the Epistle to the Romans, given with a view so narrow and personal? The passage, i. 14–16, may have served as a preface for Paul to his subject; but it cannot express the *aim* of the Epistle.

In general, Paul might certainly expect, as a fruit of this letter, an increase of sympathy for his person and mission; and the great change which was about to pass over his life and work would naturally lead him to desire this result. But it must have been a more urgent reason which led him to take pen in hand, and to give a fuller and more systematic exposition of his gospel than he had bestowed on any other church.

SECOND GROUP: POLEMIC AIM.

The authors belonging to this group do not find in our Epistle the proof of any aim relating to the apostle himself and to his missionary work. The aim of the letter, in their view, is to be explained solely by the state of the church to

which it is addressed. The object to be accomplished was to destroy the legal tendency at Rome, or to render its introduction impossible; and so, according to some, to bring about union and peace between the two parties of the church.

I. Thus Hilary spoke in this direction: "The Christians of Rome had allowed Mosaic rites to be imposed on them, as if full salvation were not to be found in Christ; Paul wished to teach them the mystery of the cross of Christ, which had not yet been expounded to them." Similar words are to be found in many of the Fathers, as well as in some Reformers and modern theologians (Augustine, Melanchthon, Flatt, etc.). The opinion of Thiersch is also substantially the same: "The church of Rome having been left by Peter in a state of doctrinal inferiority, Paul sought to raise it to the full height of Christian knowledge." Volkmar, too, would seem to adhere to this opinion. He calls our Epistle "*a war and peace treatise*, intended to reconcile a strictly Judeo-Christian church to the free preaching of the gospel." This explanation suits the grave and didactic character of the fundamental part, i.–viii., as well as the express statement of the theme, i. 16, 17. Only it is not easy to understand how Paul could have congratulated his readers on the *type of doctrine* according to which they had been taught, as he does xi. 17, if his intention had been to substitute a new conception of the gospel for theirs. We have found, besides, that the majority of the church was not Judeo-Christian in tendency.

II. From early times down to our own day, many have thought that Paul's polemic against Jewish legalism was intended to bring about the union of the two parties at Rome. We shall cite in particular, in the Middle Ages, Rabanus Maurus and Abélard; in modern times, Eichhorn (partly), Flatt, Hug, Bleek, Hilgenfeld, Hodge, etc. Hug thinks that after the Jews, who had been banished from Rome by the edict of Claudius, returned, a new treaty of union became necessary between the Christians of Gentile and those of Jewish origin. This *Eirenicon* was the Epistle to the Romans, which revolves entirely round this idea: "Jews and Gentiles are equal before God; their rights and weaknesses are similar; and if any advantage existed in favour of the one body, it was abolished by Christ, who united all in one universal

religion." Hilgenfeld ascribes to Paul the intention of uniting the rich Judeo-Christian aristocracy with the numerous *plebs* of Gentile origin. Hodge, the celebrated American commentator, denies the prevalence of a Judaizing tendency in the church of Rome, but thinks, nevertheless, "that conflicts now and again arose, both regarding doctrine and discipline, between the believers of the two races," and that this was the occasion of our Epistle. The view of Baumgarten-Crusius is almost the same: "This exposition of the Pauline conception is intended to unite believing Jews and Gentiles in forwarding the common work."[1] From this point of view the passage, xiv. 1–xv. 13, must be regarded as containing the aim of the Epistle. But this piece, bearing as it does the character of a simple appendix, cannot play so decisive a part; and it would be inconceivable that, up to that point, Paul should have given neither in the preface nor in the course of the letter the least sign of this conciliatory intention; for, finally, when he demonstrates the complete parity of Gentiles and Jews, both in respect of the condemnation under which they lie and of the faith which is the one condition of salvation for all, he nowhere thinks of bringing Jews and Gentiles into union with one another, but of glorifying the greatness of salvation and the mercy of God its author.

III. Weizsäcker (see at p. 71) also holds the anti-Jewish tendency of our Epistle. But as he recognises the Gentile-Christian composition of the church, and cannot consequently admit the predominance of the legal spirit in such a community, he supposes that the time had come when the Judaizing attack which had assailed all the churches of Paul was beginning to trouble it also, "The church was not Judaizing, but it was worked by Judaizers." This situation, supposed by Weizsäcker, is perfectly similar to that described in Phil. i. Paul's aim, accordingly, was this: he does not wish to *attack*, as Baur thought, but to *defend*; he wishes to preserve,

[1] Holsten, too, has words to the same effect: "At the height of his triumph at Corinth, Paul felt for the first time the want and the necessity of a reconciliation between Gentile-Christian Christianity and that of the Judeo-Christians. The Epistle to the Romans is the first of those letters of peace and union which sought to satisfy this want of the new religion."

not to acquire. Thus the fundamental part on the righteousness of faith and the sanctification flowing from it (i.–viii.) finds an easy explanation. Thus, too, we have no difficulty in understanding the famous passage, ix.–xi., which is intended, not, as most modern critics since Baur suppose, to justify the missionary practice of Paul, but to solve this problem raised by the progress of events: How does it happen, if this gospel of Paul is the truth, that the Jews, the elect people, everywhere reject it?

One has a feeling of satisfaction and relief after reading this excellent work, so judicious and impartial; one feels as if he had reached shelter from the sweeping current, the spirit of prejudice which has swayed criticism for forty years. And yet it is impossible for us to accept this solution. How, if our Epistle was occasioned by a violent Judaizing aggression, is there no trace of the fact throughout the whole of the letter, and especially in the introductory passage, i. 8–15? St. Paul there congratulates the Romans on their faith, and yet makes not the slightest allusion to the dangers which it runs at that very moment, and which form the occasion of his writing! How could the moral part, from chap. xii. onwards, present no trace whatever of this polemical tendency? Weizsäcker confesses the fact, but explains it by saying that Jewish legalism had only just been imported into the church, and had not yet affected its moral life. This answer is not sufficient; for it is precisely by forms and observances that ritualism strives to act. In the Epistle to the Galatians, written in a similar situation to that which Weizsäcker supposes, the anti-Judaistic polemic is quite as emphatically brought out in the moral part as in the doctrinal exposition; comp. v. 6 et seq.; then ver. 14, and especially the interjected remarks, ver. 18: "If ye are led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law;" ver. 23: "The law is not against such things" (the fruits of the Spirit); comp. also Gal. vi. 12–16. We shall have to examine elsewhere in the course of exposition the passage, Rom. xvi. 17–20, where Paul puts the church on its guard against the arrival of Judaizers as a probable fact, but one yet to come. Finally, notwithstanding all the ability of this critic, we think that he has not entirely succeeded in explaining the complete differ-

ence between the Epistle to the Romans, so calm and coldly didactic, and that to the Galatians, so abrupt and vehement in its tone.

IV. There is a view which to some extent gives weight to these objections, while still maintaining the anti-Judaistic character of the Epistle. We mean the solution which was already propounded at the time of the Reformation by Erasmus, and reproduced in our day by Philippi, Tholuck (last edition), and in a measure by Beyschlag. Paul, who found himself pursued by Judaizing emissaries at Antioch, in Galatia, and at Corinth, naturally foresees their speedy arrival at Rome; and as, when a city is threatened by an enemy, its walls are fortified and it is prepared for a siege; so the apostle, by the powerful and decisive teaching contained in our Epistle, *fortifies* the Roman church, and puts it in a condition to resist the threatening attack victoriously. Nothing more natural than this situation and the *preventive* intention of our Epistle connected with it; the explanation harmonizes well with the term *strengthening*, which the apostle frequently uses to express the effect which he would like to produce by his work within the church (i. 11, xvi. 25). The only question is, whether so considerable a treatise could have been composed solely with a view to a future and contingent want. Then there is not in the whole letter more than a single allusion to the possible arrival of the Judaizers (xvi. 17–20). How could this word thrown in by the way at the close, after the salutations, reveal the intention which dictated the letter, unless we are to ascribe to the apostle the course which ladies are said to follow, of putting the real thought of their letter into the postscript?

V. An original solution, which also belongs to this group of interpretations, has been offered by Ewald.[1] According to him, Christianity had remained hitherto enveloped in the Jewish religion; but Paul began to dread the consequences of this solidarity. For he foresaw the conflict to the death which was about to take place between the Roman empire and the Jewish people, now becoming more and more fanaticized. The Epistle to the Romans is written with the view of breaking the too close and compromising bond which still united the

[1] *Die Sendschreiben des Apostels Paulus*, 1857.

synagogue and the church, and which threatened to drag the latter into foolish enterprises. The practical aim of the writing would thus appear in chap. xiii. in the exhortation addressed to Christians *to obey the higher powers ordained of God* in the political domain; and the entire Epistle would be intended to demonstrate the profound incompatibility between the Jewish and the Christian spirit, and so to establish this application. One cannot help admiring in this theory the originality of Ewald's genius, but we cannot make up our mind to attach such decisive importance to the warning of chap. xiii.; for this passage is only a subdivision of the moral instruction, which is itself only the second part of the didactic exposition. So subordinate a passage cannot express the aim of the Epistle.

We are at the end of the solutions derived from the danger which the Roman church is alleged to have been then incurring from the legal principle, whether as a present enemy or a threatening danger. And we are thus brought to the third class of explanations, composed of all those which despair of finding a local and temporary aim for Paul's Epistle.

THIRD GROUP: DIDACTIC AIM.

According to the critics who belong to this group, the Epistle to the Romans is a systematic exposition of Christian truth, and has no other aim than to enlighten and strengthen the faith of the Christians of Rome in the interest of their salvation.

Thus the author of the ancient Muratori Fragment says simply: "The apostle expounds to the Romans the plan of the Scriptures by inculcating the fact that Christ is their first principle."

The ancient Greek expositors, Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, with those of the Middle Ages, such as John of Damascus, Oecumenius, Theophylact, seek no more mysterious aim than this: to guide men to Christ. But why especially address such instruction to the church of Rome? Theophylact answers: "What does good to the head, thereby does the same to the whole body." This answer betrays a time when Rome had come to occupy the central place in the church.

Our Reformers and their successors have almost the same idea of our Epistle: "The whole of this Epistle," says Calvin, "is composed methodically."[1] Paul, says Melanchthon, has drawn up in the Epistle to the Romans "the summary of Christian doctrine,[2] though he has not philosophized in this writing either on the mysteries of the Trinity, or on the mode of the incarnation, or on creation active and passive. Is it not in reality on the law, on sin, and on grace, that the knowledge of Christ depends?"

Grotius thus expresses himself: "Though addressed strictly speaking to the Romans, this letter contained all the provisions (*munimenta*) of the Christian religion, so that it well deserved that copies of it should be sent to other churches." So he thinks he can explain the use of the Greek instead of the Latin language. He thus anticipates a recent hypothesis, of which we shall speak by and by. Tholuck in his first editions, and Olshausen in his excellent commentary, also think that Paul's aim was wholly general. He wished to show how the gospel, and the gospel only, fully answers to the need of salvation attaching to every human soul, a want which neither paganism nor Judaism can satisfy. Glöckler, Köllner, Reiche, and de Wette likewise adhere to this view; the latter at the same time establishing a connection between the evangelical universalism expounded in our Epistle, and the position of Rome as the centre of the empire of the world. Meyer also, while fully sharing this view, feels the need of showing how the teaching was rooted in actual circumstances. He thinks that Paul has here expounded the gospel as it appeared to him at the close of the great struggle with Judaism from which he had just emerged, and as he would have preached it at Rome had he been able to go thither personally.

M. Reuss in his last work (*Les épîtres pauliniennes*) escapes from Baur's view, which had previously exercised a very marked influence over him. The absence of all polemic in our Epistle indicates, he thinks, that the apostle addresses this exposition of the essence of the gospel to an *ideal public*. In reality, are not the wants of all the churches substantially the

[1] "*Epistola tota methodica est.*"

[2] "*Doctrinæ christianæ compendium*" (Introduction to the *Loci communes* of 1521).

same? Only he ascribes to the apostle the special desire of making the church of Rome "the focus of light for the West."

M. Renan explains our Epistle by the importance of the church of Rome and the apostle's desire to give it a token of his sympathy. "He took advantage of an interval of rest to write in an epistolary form a sort of *résumé* of his theological teaching, and he addressed it to this church, composed of Ebionites and Judeo-Christians, but embracing also proselytes and Gentile converts." This is not all. The careful analysis of chap. xv. and xvi. leads M. Renan to conclude that the letter was simultaneously addressed to three other churches, that of Ephesus, that of Thessalonica, and a fourth church unknown. This writer draws a picture of Paul's disciples all occupied in making copies of this manifesto intended for the different churches (*Saint Paul*, p. 481).

The force of all these explanations lies in the general and systematic tenor of the Epistle to the Romans. It is this characteristic which distinguishes it from all the others, except that to the Ephesians. But the weakness of these solutions appears—1. In the difference which they establish between this letter and Paul's other writings. "Such an Epistle," says Baur, "would be a fact without analogy in the apostle's career. It would not correspond to the true Pauline epistolary type." 2. In the fact that all these explanations utterly fail satisfactorily to answer the question: Why this systematic teaching addressed to Rome and not elsewhere? 3. In the serious omissions from the system. Melanchthon was struck with this. We instance two of them especially: the omission of the doctrines relating to the person of Christ and to *the end of all things*, Christology and Eschatology.

But these objections do not appear to us to be insoluble. What, indeed, if these two characteristics which seem to be mutually contradictory, the local destination and the generality of the contents, were exactly the explanation of one another? In the so varied course of apostolic history might there not be found a *particular* church which needed *general* teaching? And was not this precisely the case with the church of Rome?

We know that Paul did not omit, when he founded a church, to give those who were attracted by the name of Christ pro-

found and detailed instruction regarding the gospel. Thiersch has thoroughly demonstrated this fact.[1] Paul refers to it in the question so frequently repeated in his Epistles: *Know ye not that . . .* ? which often applies to points of detail on which a pastor does not even touch in our day in the instruction which he gives to his catechumens.[2] The Book of Acts relates that at Ephesus Paul gave a course of Christian instruction in the school of the rhetorician Tyrannus *every day* for *two whole years*. What could be the subject of those daily and prolonged conferences, and that in a city like Ephesus? Most certainly Paul did not speak at random; he followed some order or other. Starting from the moral nature of man, his natural powers of knowledge and his indestructible wants,[3] he showed the fall of man, the turpitude of the Gentile world,[4] and the inadequacy of Judaism to supply an efficacious remedy for human misery.[5] Thus he came to the means of salvation offered by God Himself.[6] From this point he cast a look backwards at the ancient revelation and its several aspects, the patriarchal promise and the Mosaic law.[7] He showed the essential unity and the radical difference between the law and the gospel.[8] In this retrospective glance he embraced the entire history of humanity, showing the relation between its fall in one man and its restoration in one.[9] Finally, on this basis he raised the edifice of the new creation. He revealed the mystery of the church, the body of the glorified Christ, the sanctification of the individual and of the family,[10] the relation between Christianity and the State;[11] and unfolding the aspects of the divine plan in the conversion of the nations,[12] he led up to the restitution of all things, physical nature itself included, and to the glory to come.[13]

He did what he does in his Epistles, and particularly in the most systematic of all, the Epistle to the Romans. Baur has alleged that the apostles had no time, in the midst of their missionary labours, to systematize the gospel, and to compose

[1] *Versuch zur Herstellung des histor. Standpunkts*, p. 91 et seq.

[2] The coming of Antichrist, 2 Thess. ii. 15; the judgment of angels by believers, 1 Cor. vi. 2, 3.

[3] Rom. i. 19, 20, ii. 14, 15. [4] Rom. i. 23–31. [5] Rom. ii. 1–iii. 20.

[6] Rom. iii. 21–26. [7] Gal. iii. 15–17. [8] Rom. iv., x.

[9] Rom. v. 12–21. [10] Rom. xii.; Eph. i., iv. 1–vi. 9.

[11] Rom. xiii. [12] Rom. ix.–xi. [13] Rom. viii.; 1 Cor. xv.

a Christian dogmatic. But could Baur suppose that a mind of such strength as Paul's was could have lectured for two years before an audience like the cultivated class of the Ephesian population,[1] without having at least traced an outline of Christian doctrine?

Now, this apostolic instruction which Paul gave with so much care in the churches which he founded, and which was the real basis of those spiritual edifices, he had not given at Rome. Thessalonica, Corinth, and Ephesus had enjoyed it; the church of the Capital of the world had been deprived of it. Here the message had preceded the messenger. A community of believers had been formed in this city without his assistance. No doubt he reckoned on being there himself soon; but once more he might be prevented; he knew how many dangers attended his approaching journey to Jerusalem. And besides, should he arrive at Rome safe and sound, he had too much tact to think of putting the members of such a church as it were on the catechumen's bench. In these circumstances, how natural the idea of filling up by means of writing the blank which Providence had permitted, and of giving, in an *epistolary treatise* addressed to the church, the Christian instruction which it had missed, and which was indispensable to the solidity of its faith! The apostle of the Gentiles was not able to establish the church in the metropolis of the Gentile world . . ., the work was taken out of his hands; what shall he do? He will found it anew. Under the already constructed edifice he will insinuate a powerful substruction—to wit, his apostolic doctrine systematically arranged, as he expounds it everywhere else *viva voce*.

If such is the origin of the Epistle to the Romans, we have in it nothing less than the course of religious instruction, and in a way the dogmatic and moral catechism of St. Paul. In this explanation there is no occasion for the question why this instruction was addressed to Rome rather than to any other church. Rome was the only great church of the Gentile world to which Paul felt himself burdened with such a debt. This is the prevailing thought in the preface of his Epistle, and by which he clears the way for the treatment of his subject (i. 13–16). After reminding the Romans that

[1] See Acts xix. 31.

they too, as Gentiles, belong to the domain confided to his apostleship, i. 1–6, he accounts, from ver. 8, for the involuntary delays which have retarded his arrival at Rome; and so comes at length to speak of the evangelical doctrine which he desired to impart *viva voce*, and which he now addresses to them in writing. Nothing could explain more naturally the transition from ver. 15 to ver. 16. The systematic form of the *treatise* which begins here, the expressly formulated theme which serves as its basis (i. 16, 17), the methodical development of the theme, first in a dogmatic part, i.–xi., then in a moral part, xii.–xv. 13 (which is not less systematically arranged than the former),—all these features demonstrate that the author here intends to give a didactic exposition.

No doubt there are blanks, as we have already acknowledged, in this summary of Christian truth, and we cannot in this respect compare it with our modern dogmatic systems. But the limits which Paul traced for himself are not difficult to understand. They were indicated by those of the personal revelation which he had received. The phrase: *my gospel*, which he uses twice in this Epistle (and only once again in his other letters), sufficiently indicates the domain within which he intended to confine himself. Within the general Christian revelation with which all the apostles were charged, Paul had received a special part, his lot, if one may so speak. This is what he calls, Eph. iii. 2, "the dispensation of the grace which had been committed to him." This part was neither the doctrine of the person of Christ, which belonged more particularly to the apostles who had lived with Him, nor the delineation of the *last things*, which was the common property of the apostolate. His special lot was the way of *gaining possession* of the Christian salvation. Now Paul wished to give to the church only that which he had himself received "through the teaching of Christ, without the intervention of any man" (Gal. i. 11, 12). And this is what has naturally determined the contents of the Epistle to the Romans. The limit of his divinely received gospel was that of this Epistle. This certainly did not prevent its contents from touching at all points the general teaching of the apostles, which included Paul's, as a wider circumference encloses a narrower. One sees this in the christological and eschatological elements

contained in the Epistle to the Romans, and which harmonize with the general apostolic teaching. But it is not from this source that the substance of our Epistle is derived. The apostle wishes to give to the Romans *his* gospel, and, if I may so speak, his Paul.

From this point of view we can also account for the elements of anti-Jewish polemic which have misled so many excellent critics, Mangold and Weizsäcker for example, as to the aim of his letter. Paul wished to expound the mode of individual salvation; but could he do so without taking account of the ancient revelation which seemed to teach a different way from that which he was himself expounding? Could he at this moment of transition, when the one of two covenants was taking the place of the other, say: *by faith*, without adding: *and not by the law?* The anti-legal tendency belonged inherently to his teaching, as much as the anti-papal tendency belonged to Luther's. Would a Reformer have been able, even without intending to write polemically, to compose a system of dogmatics without setting aside the merit of works? The aim of Paul's treatise was didactic and world-wide; the introduction proves this (the description of the corruption of the Gentile world); the middle confirms it (the parallel between Adam and Jesus Christ); the close completes the demonstration (the systematic exposition of morals, without any allusion to the law). But beside this way of salvation, which he was anxious to expound, he saw another which attempted to rival it, and which professed also to be divinely revealed. He could not establish the former without setting aside the latter. The anti-Judaizing pieces do not therefore oblige us to ascribe this tendency to the whole letter. They have their necessary place in the development of the subject of the Epistle.

It need hardly be said that our explanation does not exclude what truth there is in the other proposed solutions. That Paul desired by this system of instruction to secure a favourable reception at Rome; that he hoped to strengthen this church against the invasion of Judaizers, present or to come; that he had it before him to gather into his letter the whole array of biblical and logical arguments which a hot conflict and incessant meditation had led him to collect during the

years which were just closing; that this treatise was like a trophy raised on the field of battle, where he had gained such signal triumphs, since the opening of hostilities at Antioch to his complete victory at Corinth; and that, finally, no part of the world appeared to him more suitable for receiving this monument erected by him than the church of the Capital of the world,—of all this I make no doubt. But it seems to me that those various and particular aims find their full truth only when they are grouped round this principal one: to found afterhand, and, if one may so speak, morally to *refound* the church of Rome.

To set free the kingdom of God from the Jewish wrapping which had served as its cradle, such was the work of St. Paul. This task he carried out by his life in the domain of action, and by the Epistle to the Romans in the domain of thought. This letter is, as it were, the theory of his missionary preaching, and of his spiritual life, which is one with his work.

Does the course of the Epistle really correspond to the aim which we have now indicated? Has it the systematic character which we should be led to expect from a strictly didactic purpose?

CHAPTER IV.

ARRANGEMENT AND PLAN OF THE EPISTLE.

LIKE St. Paul's other letters, the Epistle to the Romans begins with a *preface* (i. 1–15), which includes the address and a thanksgiving, and which is intended to form the relation between the author and his readers. But in this letter the *address* is more elaborate than usual. This difference arises from the fact that the apostle did not yet know personally the church to which he was writing. Hence it is that he has strongly emphasized his mission to be the *Apostle of the Gentiles;* for on this rests the *official* bond which justifies the step he is taking (vv. 1–7). The *thanksgiving* which follows, and which is founded on the work already accomplished among them, leads him quite naturally to apologise for not yet having taken part in it himself, and to express the constant desire which he feels of being able soon to exercise his apostleship among them, as well for the confirmation of their faith and his own encouragement, as for the increase of their church (vv. 8–15).

After this preface of an *epistolary* character, there begins, as in the other letters, the treatment of the subject, the *body of the writing.* But here again the Epistle to the Romans differs from all the rest, in having the central part detached from the two epistolary pieces, the introduction and the conclusion, much more sharply. The Epistle to the Romans is thus, properly speaking, neither a treatise nor a letter; it is a treatise contained in a letter.

The treatise begins with ver. 16, the first words of which form the skilfully-managed transition from the introduction to the treatment. The latter extends to xv. 13, where the return to the epistolary form indicates the beginning of the conclusion.

I. 16, 17.

Before entering on the development of his subject, the apostle *expounds* it in a few lines, which are, as it were, the *theme* of the entire treatise. This summary is contained in vv. 16, 17. The apostle proposes to show that the salvation of every man, whoever he may be, rests on the *righteousness which faith procures;* he supports this proposition immediately by a scripture declaration.

With ver. 18 the development of the subject begins; it is distributed under two heads, the one relating to *principles,*—this is the doctrinal treatise; the other containing the *application,*—this forms the moral treatise. The first proceeds from i. 18 to the end of chap. xi.; the second from xii. 1 to xv. 13.

The *doctrinal treatise* is the positive and negative demonstration of the *righteousness of faith.* It comprehends three parts: the one fundamental, from i. 18 to the end of chap. v.; the other two supplementary (chap. vi.–viii. and ix.–xi.).

I. 18–V. 21.

In this first part Paul gives the *positive* demonstration of justification by faith. He developes the three following thoughts:—

1. i. 18–iii. 20. The *need* which the world has of such a righteousness. For the whole of it is under the wrath of God; this fact is obvious as to the Gentiles (chap. i.); it is not less certain in regard to the Jews (ii.), and that in spite of their theocratic advantages (iii. 1–8). The Holy Scriptures come, over and above, to shut the mouth of all mankind (vv. 9–20). Summary: Wrath is on all, even on the Jews.

2. iii. 21–v. 11. The free and universal *gift* of the righteousness of faith given by God to men. This gift has been made possible by the expiatory work of Jesus Christ (iii. 21–26). It is offered to Gentiles as well as Jews, in accordance with the principle of Jewish monotheism (vv. 27–31). This mode of justification is, besides, in keeping with the decisive example, that of Abraham (iv.). Finally, the believer is assured that, whatever may be the tribulations of the present, this righteousness of faith will never fail him. It has even been provided by the faithful mediation of Jesus Christ, that it shall

suffice in the day of final wrath (v. 1–11). Summary: the righteousness of faith is for all, even for the Gentiles.

3. v. 12–21. This universal condemnation and this universal justification (which have formed the subject of the two preceding sections) are both traced up to their historical points of departure, Adam and Christ. These two central personalities extend their opposite influences, the one of condemnation and death, the other of justification and life, over all mankind, but in such a way that the saving action of the one infinitely exceeds the destructive action of the other.

The righteousness of faith without the works of the law is thus established. But a formidable objection arises: Will it be able to found a *rule of holiness* comparable to that which followed from the law, and without having recourse to the latter? After having excluded the law as a means of justification, are we not obliged to return to it when the end in view is to lay a foundation for the moral life of believers?

The answer to this question is the subject of *the first* of the two supplementary parts (vi.–viii.).

CHAP. VI.–VIII.

This part, like the preceding, contains the development of three principal ideas:—

1. vi. 1–vii. 6. The relation to Christ on which justification by faith rests, contains in it a principle of holiness. It carries the believer into communion with that death to sin and life to God which were so perfectly realized by Jesus Christ (vi. 1–14). This new principle of sanctification asserts its sway over the soul with such force, that the flesh is disposed to regard this subjection to holiness as slavery (vv. 15–23). And the believer finds in this union with Christ, and in virtue of the law itself, the right of breaking with the law, that he may depend only on his new spouse (vii. 1–6).

2. vii. 7–25. This breaking with the law should occasion us neither fear nor regret. For the law was as powerless to *sanctify* man as it showed itself (see the first part) powerless to *justify* him. By discovering to us our inward sin, the law exasperates it, and slays us spiritually (vv. 7–13). Once it has plunged us into this state of separation from God, it is power-

less to deliver us from it. The efforts which we make to shake off the yoke of sin serve only to make us feel more its insupportable weight (vv. 14–25).

3. Chap. viii. But the Spirit of Christ is the liberating power. It is He who realizes in us the holiness demanded by the law, and who, by rescuing our bodies from the power of the flesh, consecrates them by holiness for resurrection (vv. 1–11). It is He who, by making us sons of God, makes us at the same time *heirs* of the glory which is to be revealed (vv. 12–17). For the sufferings of the present do not last always. The universal renovation, which is prayed for by the threefold sigh of creation, the children of God, and the Holy Spirit Himself, draws near; and, notwithstanding the tribulations of the present hour, this state of glory remains as the assured goal of God's eternal plans in favour of His elect (vv. 18–30).

As at the end of the preceding part the apostle, in his parallel between Adam and Christ, had cast a comprehensive glance over the domain which he had traversed; so, from the culminating point which he has just reached, he embraces once more in one view that entire salvation through the righteousness of faith which is rendered for ever indestructible by the sanctification of the Spirit; and he strikes the triumphant note of the assurance of salvation (vv. 31–39).

But now that this first objection has been solved, there rises another more formidable still: If salvation rests on the righteousness of faith, what comes of the promises made to the people of Israel, who have rejected this righteousness? What becomes of the *divine election* of which this people was the object? Is not the faithfulness of God destroyed? *The second supplementary part* (ix.–xi.) is intended to throw light on this obscure problem.

CHAP. IX.–XI.

St. Paul resolves this objection by three considerations, the details of which we cannot reproduce here even approximately.

1. The freedom of God cannot be restricted by any limit external to itself, nor in particular by any acquired right or privilege (chap. ix.).

2. The use which God has made of His liberty in this case

has a perfectly good reason: Israel obstinately refused to enter into His mind; Israel determined to maintain its own righteousness, and rejected the righteousness of faith, which it should have possessed in common with the Gentiles (chap. x.).

3. The partial and merely temporary rejection of Israel has had the most salutary consequences for the world, and shall one day have the same for Israel itself. For the unbelief of this people has opened wide the gate of salvation to the Gentiles, and their salvation will be the means to that of Israel; so that these two halves of mankind, after having both in their turn made the humiliating experience of disobedience, shall be reunited in the bosom of eternal mercy (chap. xi.).

Thus God was *free* to reject His people; in doing so He used His freedom *justly;* and this exercise of it, limited in all respects as it is, will be *salutary,* and will show forth the wisdom of God. All the aspects of the question are exhausted in this discussion, which may be called the masterpiece of the philosophy of history. In closing it, the apostle, casting his look backwards a third time from this new culminating point, and surveying the labyrinths of ways and judgments by which God realizes His plans of love, breaks out into a cry of adoration over this ocean of light (xi. 32–36).

Justification by faith, after having been positively established, has come forth triumphant from the two trials to which it has been subjected. The question was asked: Could it produce holiness? It has shown that it could, and that it was the law which, in this respect, was powerlessness itself. The question was, Could it explain history? It has proved that it could. What remains to be done? One thing only: To show the new principle grappling with the realities of existence, and to depict *the life of the believer* who by faith has obtained justification. Such is the subject of the second of the two courses of instruction contained in the body of the Epistle, that is to say, of the *moral treatise.*

XII. 1–XV. 13.

In the piece vi.–viii., St. Paul had laid the foundations of Christian sanctification. He describes it now as it is realized in everyday life.

Two grave errors prevail in the estimate ordinarily formed of this portion of the Epistle. Most people regard it as a simple appendix, foreign to the real subject of the work. But, on the contrary, it rests, not less than the doctrinal exposition, on the theme formulated i. 17. For it completes the development of the word *shall live*, begun in the part, chap. vi.–viii. The other error which is fallen into not less frequently, is to see in these chapters only a series of practical exhortations, without any logical concatenation. But Calvin's epithet on our Epistle: *Methodica est*, applies not less to the practical than to the doctrinal instruction, as we shall immediately see. The moral treatise embraces a *general* part (xii. 1–xiii. 14) and a *special* part (xiv. 1–xv. 13).

XII. 1–XIII. 14.

In this passage four principal ideas are expounded.

1. xii. 1, 2. The apostle lays down, as the *basis* and point of departure for the redeemed life, the living *sacrifice* which the believer, touched by the mercies of God, makes of his body, in order to do His perfect will, which is revealed more and more to his renewed understanding.

2. xii. 3–21. This gift of himself the believer accomplishes, in the first place, as a *member of the church*, the body of Christ, by *humility* and *love*.

3. xiii. 1–10. He carries it out, in the second place, as a *member of the state*, the social body instituted by God; and he does so in the two forms of *submission* to the authorities, and *justice* to all.

4. xiii. 11–14. What sustains and animates him in this double task, as a Christian and a citizen, is the *point of view* which he has unceasingly before him, Christ coming again, and with Him the day of salvation breaking,—a day which shall be such only for those who are found *clothed with Christ*.

This moral teaching thus forms a complete whole. It sets forth clearly, though briefly, the *starting-point*, the *way*, and the *goal* of the life of the redeemed.

To this general teaching the apostle adds a supplementary part, which is a sort of example side by side with precept. It is an application of the great duty of self-sacrifice, in the

forms of humility and love, to the existing circumstances of the church of Rome (xiv. 1–xv. 13).

XIV. 1–XV. 13.

A divergence of views was manifested at Rome between the majority, who were heartily spiritual and Pauline, and the minority, who were timorous and Judaizing. Paul points out to each party what its conduct should be according to the law of love, of which Christ has left us the model (xiv. 1–xv. 7); then, contemplating in spirit the sublime unity of the church realized in this way of love, he once more sounds the note of adoration (vv. 8–13).

This local application, while closing the practical treatise, restores the author and his readers to the midst of the church of Rome; it thus forms the transition to the *epistolary conclusion*, which corresponds to the introduction (i. 1–15). From ver. 14, indeed, the style again becomes that of a letter.

XV. 14–XVI. 25.

This conclusion treats of five subjects.

1. xv. 14–33. After having anew justified the very considerable didactic work which he had written them by the commission which he has received for the Gentiles, the apostle reminds the Romans that his apostolic work is now finished in the East. He hopes, therefore, soon to arrive at Rome, on his way to Spain. This piece corresponds exactly to the passage, i. 8–15, of the preface.

2. xvi. 1–16. He recommends to his readers the bearer of his letter, and charges them with greetings for all the members of the church known to him. To these personal salutations he adds, for the whole church, those with which he has been charged by the numerous churches which he has recently passed through.

3. Vv. 17–20. He invites them in passing, and in a sort of postscript, to be on their guard against the Judaizing emissaries, who will be sure to make their appearance as soon as they hear of a work of the Lord at Rome.

4. Vv. 21–24. He transmits the greetings of those who

surround him, and even lets his secretary Tertius have the word, if one may so speak, to greet them in his own person.

5. Vv. 25–27. He closes with a prayer, which corresponds to the desire with which he had opened his letter, when he said, i. 11, how much he longed to be able to labour for their *strengthening*. He did what he could with this view by sending them such a letter. But he knows well that his work will not produce its fruit except in so far as God Himself will do His part in working by it: "Now to Him that is of power to stablish you according to my gospel." . . .

PLAN OF THE EPISTLE.

EPISTOLARY INTRODUCTION (I. 1–15).
THE BODY OF THE WORK (I. 16–XV. 13).

SUMMARY: i. 16, 17.

I. THE DOCTRINAL TREATISE (i. 18–xi. 36).
Salvation by the righteousness of faith.

FUNDAMENTAL PART: i. 18–v. 21.
The righteousness of faith without the works of the law.
FIRST SUPPLEMENTARY PART: vi.–viii.
Sanctification without the law.
SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY PART: ix.–xi.
The rejection of Israel.

II. THE PRACTICAL TREATISE (xii. 1–xv. 13).
The life of the justified believer.

GENERAL PART: xii. 1–xiii. 14.
Exposition of Christian holiness.
SPECIAL PART: xiv. 1–xv. 13.
Divergences among Christians.

EPISTOLARY CONCLUSION (XV. 14–XVI. 27).

Such is the plan or scheme which the apostle seems to me to have had steadily before him in dictating this letter.

If such is the method of the work, it could not correspond better to the object which, on our supposition, its author had in view.

CHAPTER V.

PRESERVATION OF THE TEXT.

CAN we flatter ourselves that we have the text of our Epistle as it proceeded from the apostle's hands?

1. A preliminary question has been raised on this head: Is not our Greek text the translation of a Latin original? This view is given forth so early as by a Syrian scholiast on the margin of a manuscript of the Peschito (Syrian translation), and it has been received by some Catholic theologians. But this is a mere inference, founded on the erroneous idea that in writing to Romans it was necessary to use the Latin language. The literary language at Rome was Greek. This is established by the numerous Greek inscriptions in the catacombs, by the use of the Greek language in the letter of Ignatius to the church of Rome, in the writings of Justin Martyr composed at Rome, and in those of Irenæus composed in Gaul. The Christians of Rome knew the Old Testament (Rom. vii. 1); now they could not have acquired this knowledge except through the Greek version of the LXX. Besides, it shows the utter want of philological discernment to call in question the original character of the Greek of our Epistle, and to suppose that such a style is that of a translation.

2. A second question is this: Have there not been introduced into the text of our Epistle passages which are foreign to the work, or even composed by another hand than Paul's? No doubt the exposition which we have just given of the method of the work seems to exclude such a suspicion by showing the intimate connection of all its parts, and the perfectly organic character of the entire letter. Nevertheless, doubts have been raised from the earliest times in regard to some passages of the last parts of the Epistle; and these suspicions have been so aggravated in the most recent times,

that from chap. xii., where the moral part begins, all at the present day is matter of dispute.

It is often alleged that Marcion, about 140, in the edition of ten of Paul's Epistles, which he published for the use of his churches, rejected from the Epistle to the Romans the whole conclusion (our chaps. xv. and xvi.). Origen says of him as follows (*ad* xvi. 24): "Marcion entirely rejected (*penitus abstulit*) this piece; and not only that, but he also lacerated (*dissecuit*) the whole passage from the words: *Whatsoever is not of faith is sin* (xiv. 23), to the end." But was not F. Nitzsch justified[1] in bringing out the difference between the words *lacerate* (*dissecuit*) *and wholly reject* (*penitus abstulit*)? It is quite possible, therefore, that Marcion only rejected the doxology which closes the Epistle, xvi. 25–27, and that in xv. and xvi. he had only made some excisions to accommodate them to his system. Such was his course in regard to the biblical books which he used. An expression of Tertullian's has also been advanced (*adv. Marcion*, v. 14), which speaks of the passage, xiv. 10, as belonging to the *clausula* (the conclusion of the Epistle). But it is not to be supposed that Tertullian himself agreed with his adversary in rejecting the last two chapters, and xiv. is so near the end of the Epistle that nothing whatever can be proved from this phrase.[2] What appears certain is—(1) that Marcion rejected the final doxology, xvi. 25–27, for it seemed in contradiction to his system from the way in which it mentions the *prophetical writings*; (2) that he cut and carved freely on the same principle in chaps. xv. and xvi.

Yet the many conclusions which are found at the close of our Epistle,—no less than five are reckoned (xv. 13, 33, xvi. 16, 20, 24–27), — the textual displacements in the manuscripts, the greetings so difficult to explain, have awakened the doubts of criticism, and till now have not been satisfactorily settled.

Semler, at the end of the last century, supposed that the Epistle closed at xiv. 23, which explains, he thinks, why the final doxology, xvi. 25–27, is found here in several manuscripts.

[1] *Zeitschr. f. histor. Theol.* 1860. Comp. also the excellent work of E. Lacheret, *Revue théologique*, Juillet 1878, p. 66.

[2] See another solution in Meyer, Intr. to chap. xv.

The passage containing the salutations, xvi. 3–16, he holds to have been a special leaf committed to the bearers of the letter, to indicate the persons whom they were to greet in the different churches through which their journey led them. Hence the phrase: "*Salute* N. N." . . . And what more was contained in those two chapters was addressed to the persons saluted, and was intended to be transmitted to them with a copy of the letter.

Paulus saw in chaps. xv. and xvi. a supplement intended solely for the leaders and the most enlightened of the members of the Roman church.

Eichhorn and a great number of theologians in his train have held that the whole of chap. xvi., or at least the passage xvi. 1–20 or 3–20 (Reuss, Ewald, Mangold, Laurent), could not have been addressed to Rome by the apostle. It is impossible to explain these numerous greetings in a letter to a church where he never lived. Thus we have here a fragment which has strayed from an Epistle addressed to some other church, either Corinth (Eichhorn) or Ephesus. But there remained a difficulty: How had this strange leaf been introduced from Asia or Greece into the copies of a letter addressed to the church of Rome?

Baur boldly cut the knot. Founding on the alleged example of Marcion, he declared xv. and xvi. wholly unauthentic. "They present," he said, "several ideas or phrases incompatible with the apostle's anti-Judaistic standpoint." One cannot help asking, however, how the Epistle to the Romans could have closed with the passage xiv. 23. A conclusion corresponding to the preface is absolutely indispensable.

Schenkel (*Bibellexikon*, t. v.) thinks he finds this conclusion in the doxology, xvi. 25–27, which he transposes (with some documents) to the end of xiv., and the authenticity of which he defends. Chap. xv. is, according to him, a letter of recommendation given to Phœbe for the churches through which she was to pass on her way from Corinth to Ephesus, and from Ephesus to Rome.

Scholten holds as authentic only the recommendation of Phœbe (xvi. 1, 2) and the greetings of Paul's companions, with the prayer of the apostle himself (vv. 21–24).

Lucht[1] adheres to Baur's view, while modifying it a little.

[1] *Ueber die beiden letzten Capitel des Rœmerbr.* 1871.

The Epistle could not close with xiv. 23. Our chaps. xv. and xvi. must therefore contain something authentic. The true conclusion was so severe on the ascetic minority combated in xiv., that the presbyters judged it prudent to suppress it; but it remained in the archives, where it was found by a later editor, who amalgamated it by mistake with a short letter to the Ephesians, thus forming the two last chapters.

Of this theory of Lucht, Hilgenfeld accepts only the unauthentic character of the doxology, xvi. 25–27. For his part, with the exception of this passage, he admits the entire authenticity of xv. and xvi.

M. Renan has given forth an ingenious hypothesis, which revives an idea of Grotius (p. 93). Starting from the numerous conclusions which these two chapters seemingly contain, he supposes that the apostle composed this Epistle from the first with a view to *several churches*, four at least. The common matter, intended for all, fills the first eleven chapters. Then come the different conclusions, intended for each of the four churches. For the first, the church of Rome, chap. xv.; for the second, that of Ephesus, xii.–xiv., and the passage, xvi. 1–20; for the third, that of Thessalonica, xii.–xiv., and the greeting, xvi. 21–24; and for the fourth, unknown, xii.–xiv., with the doxology, xvi. 25–27. Thus, indeed, all is Paul's; and the incoherence of the two last chapters arises only from the amalgamation of the various conclusions.[1]

Volkmar presents a hypothesis which differs little from that of Scholten. The Epistle properly so called (composed of a didactic and hortatory part) closed at xiv. 23. Here came the conclusion which must be discovered among the unauthentic conglomerates of xv. and xvi. And Volkmar's sagacity is at no loss. The three verses, xv. 33–xvi. 2, and the four verses, xvi. 21–24, were the real conclusion of the Epistle. All the rest was added, about 120, when the exhortation of xiv. was carried forward by that of xv. 1–32, and when the passage xvi. 3–16 was added. Later still, between 150 and 160, there was added the warning against heresy, xvi. 17–20.

Finally, Schultz has just proposed a very complicated hypothesis.[2] He ably maintains that all the particular pas-

[1] *Saint Paul*, pp. 63–74.

[2] *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1877.

sages are composed by the apostle, starting in his argument from xvi. 17–20, passing therefrom to vv. 3–16, to vv. 21–24, to vv. 1, 2, and, finally, to xv. 14–33. But it is to demonstrate immediately afterwards that xvi. 17–20 can only have been addressed to a church instructed and founded by Paul, which was not the case with that of Rome. Hence he passes to the numerous salutations of chap. xvi., which can only have been addressed to a church known by the apostle, probably Ephesus. Thus there existed a letter of Paul to the Ephesians which closed with these many greetings (xvi. 3–20). But they could not be more than the conclusion of a fuller letter. Where was this letter? In chap. xii., xiii., xiv., xv. 1–6, and in the conclusion, xvi. 3–20, of our Epistle. This letter was written from Rome by the apostle during his captivity. A copy, left in the archives of the church, was joined, after the persecution of Nero, with our Epistle to the Romans. Hence the form of our present text. The probability attaching to this hypothesis at the first glance is so slight, that we can hardly suppose its author to have propounded it with much assurance.

Let us sum up our account. Opinions on chaps. xv. and xvi. fall into four classes:—1. All is Paul's, and all in its right place (Tholuck, Meyer, Hofmann, etc.). 2. All is Paul's, but with a mixture of elements belonging to other letters (Semler, Eichhorn, Reuss, Renan, Schultz). 3. Some passages are Paul's, the rest is interpolated (Schenkel, Scholten, Lucht, Volkmar). 4. All is unauthentic (Baur).

We shall have to examine all those opinions, and weigh the facts which have given rise to them (see on xv. and xvi.). Meanwhile, we may be allowed to refer to the account we have given of the general course of the Epistle, and to ask if the entire work does not produce the effect of a living and healthful organism, in which all the parts hold to and dovetail into one another, and from which no member can possibly be detached without arbitrary violence.

3. The reader of a commentary is entitled to know the origin of the text which is about to be explained to him.

The text from which our oldest editions and our versions in modern tongues have been made (since the Reformation) is that which has been preserved, with very little divergency, in

the 250 copies of Paul's Epistles in cursive or minuscular writing, later consequently than the tenth century, which are found scattered among the different libraries of Europe. It was from one of these manuscripts, found at Basle, that Erasmus published the first edition of the Greek text; and it is his edition which has formed for centuries the groundwork of subsequent editions. It is obvious that the origin of what has so long borne the name of the *Received text* is purely accidental.

The real state of things is this. Three classes of documents furnish us with the text of our Epistle: the ancient *manuscripts*, the ancient *versions*, and the quotations which we find in the works of *ecclesiastical writers*.

1. *Manuscripts.*—These are of two kinds: those written in majuscular letters, and which are anterior to the tenth century; and those which have the cursive and minuscular writing, used since that date.

The *majuscules* in which Paul's Epistles have been preserved are eleven in number:—

Two of the fourth century: the *Sinaïticus* (ℵ) and the *Vaticanus* (B);

Two of the fifth century: the *Alexandrinus* (A) and the *Cod. of Ephrem* (C);

One of the sixth century: the *Claromontanus* (D);

Three of the ninth century: the *Sangermanensis* (E), a simple copy of the preceding; the *Augiensis* (F); the *Bœrnerianus* (G);

Three of the ninth to the tenth century: the *Mosquensis* (K), the *Angelicus* (L), and the *Porfirianus* (P).

We do not mention a number of *fragments* in majuscular writing. We have already spoken of the documents in *minuscular* characters. As soon as men began to study these documents a little more attentively, they found three pretty well marked sets of texts, which appear also, though less prominently, in the Gospels: 1. The *Alexandrine* set, represented by the four oldest majuscules (ℵ A B C), and so called because this text was probably the form used in the churches of Egypt and Alexandria; 2. The *Greco-Latin* set, represented by the four manuscripts which follow in order of date (D E F G), so designated because it was the text circulating in the churches of the West, and because in the manuscripts which have preserved it it is accompanied with a Latin

translation; and, 3. The *Byzantine* set, to which belong the three most recent majuscules (K L P), and almost the whole of the minuscules; so named because it was the text which had fixed and, so to speak, stereotyped itself in the churches of the Greek empire.

In case of variation these three sets are either found, each having its own separate reading, or combining two against one; sometimes even the ordinary representatives of one differ from one another and unite with those, or some of those, of another set. And it is not easy to decide to which of those forms of the text the preference should be given.

Moreover, as the oldest majuscules go back no farther than the fourth century, there remains an interval of 300 years between them and the apostolic autograph. And the question arises whether, during this long interval, the text did not undergo alterations more or less important. Fortunately, in the two other classes of documents we have the means of filling up this considerable blank.

2. *The Versions.*—There are two translations of the New Testament which go back to the end of the second century, and by which we ascertain the state of the text at a period much nearer to that when the autographs were still extant. These are the ancient Latin version known as the *Itala*, of which the Vulgate or version received in the Catholic Church is a revision, and the Syriac version, called *Peschito*. Not only do these two ancient documents agree as to the substance of the text, but their general agreement with the text of our Greek manuscripts proves on the whole the purity of the latter. Of these two versions, the Itala represents rather the Greco-Latin type, the Peschito the Byzantine type. A third and somewhat more recent version, the *Coptic* (Egyptian), exactly reproduces the Alexandrine form.

But we are in a position to go back even further, and to bridge over a good part of the interval which still divides us from the apostolic text. The means at our command are—

3. The quotations from the New Testament in the *writers of the second century.*—In 185, Irenæus frequently quotes the New Testament in his great work. In particular, he reproduces numerous passages from our Epistle (about eighty-four verses). —About 150, Justin reproduces textually a long passage from

the Epistle to the Romans (iii. 11–17).—About 140, Marcion published his edition of Paul's Epistles. Tertullian, in his work against this heretic, has reproduced a host of passages from Marcion's text, and especially from that of the Epistle to the Romans. He obviously quoted them as he read them in Marcion's edition.[1] In this continuous series of quotations (L. V. cc. 13 and 14), embracing about thirty-eight verses, we have the oldest known evidence to a considerable part of the text of our Epistle. Tertullian himself (190–210) has in his works more than a hundred quotations from this letter.

One writer carries us back, at least for a few verses, to the very age of the apostle. I mean Clement of Rome, who, about the year 96, addresses an Epistle to the Corinthians in which he reproduces textually (c. 35) the entire passage, Rom. i. 28–32. The general integrity of our text is thus firmly established.

As to variations, I do not think it possible to give an *a priori* preference to any of the three texts mentioned above And in supporting the Alexandrine text *as a rule*, Tischendorf, I fear, has made one of his great mistakes. When publishing his seventh edition he had to a certain extent recognised the error of this method, which had gradually become prevalent since the time of Griesbach. But the discovery of the *Sinaïticus* threw him into it again more than ever. This fascination exercised by the old Alexandrine documents arises from several causes: their antiquity, the real superiority of their text in a multitude of cases, and, above all, the reaction against the groundless supremacy of the Byzantine text in the old *Textus receptus*.

Any one who has had long experience in the exegesis of the New Testament will, I think, own three things:—1. That all preference given *a priori* to any one of the three texts is a prejudice; 2. That the sole *external* reason, having some probability in favour of a particular reading, is the agreement of a certain number of documents of *opposite* types; 3. That the only means of reaching a well-founded decision, is the profound study of the context.

In conclusion, it must be said the variations are as insigni-

[1] He says himself: "Whatever the omissions which Marcion has contrived to make even in this, the most considerable of the Epistles, suppressing what he liked, the things which he has left are enough for me."—*Adv. Marc.* v. 13.

ficant as they are numerous. I know only one in the Epistle to the Romans—a work so eminently dogmatic—which could exercise any influence on Christian doctrine, that of viii. 11. And the point to which it refers (to wit, whether the body is raised *by* or *on account of* the Spirit who dwells in us) is a subject which probably no pastor ever treated, either in his catechetical instruction or in his preaching.

PRINCIPAL COMMENTATORS.

Ancient church: Origen (third century), in Latin translation. Chrysostom (fourth century), thirty-two homilies. Theodoret (fifth century). Ambrosiaster, probably the Roman deacon Hilary (third or fourth century). Œcumenius (tenth century). Theophylact, bishop of Bulgaria (eleventh century). Erasmus (sixteenth century), *Annotationes in N. T.*

After the Reformation: Calvin and Theodore Beza. Luther (his celebrated *Preface*). Melanchthon, *Annotationes* (1522) and *Commentarii* (1532). Bucer, *Enarrationes* (1536). Grotius, *Annotationes* (1645). Calov, *Biblia illustrata* (1672). Bengel, *Gnomon* (1742).

Modern times: Tholuck (1824, 5th ed. 1856). Rückert (1831, 2d ed. 1839). Stuart, American theologian (1832). Olshausen (1835). De Wette (1835, 4th ed. 1847). Hodge, of Princeton (1835, published in French 1840). Fritzsche (1836). Meyer (1836, 5th ed. 1872). Oltramare, chaps. i.–v. 11 (1843). Philippi (1848). Nielsen, Dane (1856). Umbreit (1856). Ewald, *die Sendschreiben des apostels Paulus* (1857). Theod. Schott (1858). Lange and Fay in the *Bibelwerk* (1865, 3d ed. 1868). Hofmann (1868). Ph. Schaff, work published in English after Lange's *Commentary* (1873). Volkmar (1875). Bonnet, *le Nouveau Testament*, 2d ed. *Epîtres de Paul* (1875). Reuss, *La Bible, Epîtres pauliniennes* (1878).

Here we mention in addition three remarkable monographs, two of them on the passage, v. 12–21. Rothe, *Neuer Versuch einer Ausl. der paul. Stelle*, v. 11–21 (1836), and Dietzsch, *Adam und Christus* (1871). The third is the work of Morison, of Glasgow, *Critical Exposition of the Third Chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans* (1866).

The ancient *Commentaries* are well known; to attempt to characterize them would be superfluous. I shall say a word on the most important of the moderns. *Tholuck* was the first, after the blighting epoch of rationalism, who reopened to the church the living fountains of evangelical truth which spring up in our Epistle. *Olshausen*, continuing his friend's work, expounded still more copiously the treasures of salvation by faith, which had been brought to light again by Tholuck. *De Wette* has traced the links of the apostle's reasoning with admirable sagacity. *Meyer* has brought to the study of our Epistle all the resources of that learned and vigorous philology, the application of which *Fritzsche* had demanded in the study of our sacred books; to these he has added a sound exegetical sense and an understanding of Christian truth which makes his work *the indispensable Commentary*. *Oltramare* has a great wealth of exegetical materials; but he has not elaborated them sufficiently before composing his book. *Ewald*, a paraphrase in which the original spirit of the author lives again. *Theod. Schott;* his whole work turns on a preconceived and unfortunately false point of view. *Lange;* every one knows his characteristics, at once brilliant and arbitrary. *Hofmann* brings a mind of the most penetrating order to the analysis of the apostle's thought, he does not overlook the slightest detail of the text; his stores of philological knowledge are not inferior to those of Meyer. But he too often lacks accuracy; he dwells complacently on exegetical discoveries in which it is hard to think that he himself believes, and to appreciate the intrinsic clearness of the style requires a fourth or fifth reading. *Schaff* happily remedies Lange's defects, and completes him in an original way. *Volkmar's* treatise is an analysis rather than an interpretation. The best part of it consists of criticism of the text, and of a beautiful reprint of the Vatican text. *Bonnet*, on the basis of very thoroughgoing exegetical studies, has, with considerable self-denial, composed a simple *Commentary* for the use of laymen.[1] *Reuss* explains the essential idea of each passage, but his plan does not admit of a detailed exegesis. *Morison's* monograph, as it seems to

[1] We call the attention of non-theological readers to the interesting and thoroughgoing work of M. Walther: *Paraphrase de l'épître aux Romains* (1871).

me, is a *unique* specimen of learning and sound exegetical judgment.

TITLE OF THE EPISTLE.

The authentic title is certainly that which has been preserved in its simplest form in the seven oldest Mjj., the four Alex., and the three Greco-Latin: *Πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, to the Romans.* In later documents there is a gradual increase of epithets, till we have the title of L: *Τοῦ ἁγίου καὶ πανευφήμου ἀποστόλου Παύλου ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους (Epistle of the holy and everywhere blessed Apostle Paul to the Romans).*

COMMENTARY.

THE framework of the Epistle to the Romans is, as we have seen, the same as that of the most of Paul's other Epistles: 1. An epistolary preface; 2. The body of the letter; 3. An epistolary conclusion.

PREFACE.

I. 1–15.

This introduction is intended to establish a relation between the apostle and his readers which does not yet exist, inasmuch as he did not found the church, and had not yet visited it. It embraces: 1. The address; 2. A thanksgiving for the work of the Lord at Rome.

FIRST PASSAGE (I. 1–7).

The Address.

The form of address usual among the ancients contained three terms: "N. to N. *greeting.*" Comp. Acts xxiii. 26: "Claudius Lysias unto the most excellent governor Felix greeting." Such is the type we have here, but modified in execution to suit the particular intention of the apostle. The subject, *Paul,* is developed in the first six verses; the regimen, *to the Christians in Rome,* in the first half of ver. 7, and the object, *greeting,* in the second.

One is surprised at the altogether extraordinary extension bestowed on the development of the first term. It is very much the same in the Epistle to the Galatians. The fact is

accounted for in the latter writing by the need which Paul felt to give the lie at once to the calumnies of his Judaizing adversaries, who denied his divine call to the apostleship. His object in our Epistle is wholly different. His concern is to justify the exceptional step he is taking at the moment, in addressing a letter of instruction like that which follows, to a church on which he seemed to have no claim.

In these six verses, 1–6, Paul introduces himself; first, as an *apostle* in the general sense of the word, as called directly by God to the task of publishing the message of salvation, vv. 1, 2; then he indulges in an apparent digression regarding the *object* of his message, the person of Jesus Christ, who had appeared as the Messiah of Israel, but was raised by His resurrection to the state of the Son of God, vv. 3, 4; finally, from the person of the Lord he returns to the apostleship, which he has received from this glorified Lord, and which he describes as a *special* apostleship to the *Gentile* world, vv. 5, 6.

Vv. 1, 2. "*Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ,*[1] *an apostle by* [His] *call, separated unto the gospel of God, which He had promised afore by His prophets in the Holy Scriptures.*"—Paul introduces himself in this ver. 1 with the utmost solemnity; he puts his whole letter under the authority of his apostleship, and the latter under that of God Himself. On the name *Paul*, see Introd. p. 26. After having thus presented his personality, he effaces it, as it were, immediately by the modest title of δοῦλος, *servant*. We need not translate this term by the word *slave*, which in our modern languages suggests a more painful idea than the Greek term. The latter contains the two ideas of *property* and of *obligatory service*. It may consequently be applied to the relation which *every Christian* bears to the Lord (1 Cor. vii. 22). If we take it here in this sense, the name would imply the bond of *equality* in the faith which unites Paul to his brethren at Rome. Yet as this letter is not a simple fraternal communication, but an apostolic message of the highest importance, it is more natural to take the word *servant* in a graver sense, the same as it certainly has in the address of the Epistle to the Philippians i. 1: "Paul and

[1] B, Vulg. Aug. read Χριστου Ιησου instead of Ιησου Χριστου, which the other documents read.

Timotheus, the *servants of Jesus Christ*, to all the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi." The term *servant*, thus contrasted with the term *saints*, evidently denotes a special ministry. In point of fact, there are men who are called to exemplify the general submission which all believers owe to the Lord, in the form of a particular office; they are *servants* in the limited sense of the word. The Received reading: *of Jesus Christ*, sets first in relief the historical person (*Jesus*), then His office of Messiah (*Christ*). This form was the one which corresponded best to the feeling of those who had first known Jesus personally, and afterwards discovered Him to be the Messiah. And so it is the usual and almost technical phrase which prevailed in apostolic language.' But the *Vat.* and the *Vulg.* read: *Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, of Christ Jesus;* first the office, then the person. This form seems preferable here as the less usual. It corresponded to the personal development of Paul, who had beheld the glorified Messiah before knowing that He was Jesus. The title *servant* was very general, embracing all the ministries established by Christ; the title *apostle* denotes the *special* ministry conferred on Paul. It is the most elevated of all. While Christ's other servants build up the church, either by extending it (*evangelists*) or perfecting it (*pastors* and *teachers*), the apostles, with the *prophets* (Christian prophets), have the task of founding it; comp. Eph. iv. 12. Paul was made a partaker of this supreme charge. And he was so, he adds, by way of *call*. The relation between the two words *called* and *apostle* is not that which would be indicated by the paraphrase: "Called *to be* an apostle." This meaning would rather have been expressed by the participle (*κλητὸς εἶναι*). In ver. 7, the corresponding phrase: *called saints*, has quite another meaning from: called *to be* saints (which would assume that they *are* not so). The meaning is: saints *by way of call*, which implies that they are so in reality. Similarly, Paul means that he is an apostle, and that he is so in virtue of the divine vocation which alone confers such an office. There is here no polemic against the Judaizers; it is the simple affirmation of that supreme dignity which authorizes him to address the church as he is now doing; comp. Eph. i. 1; Col. i. 1. These two ideas, *apostle* and *call*, naturally carry our minds back to the time of his conversion. But

Paul knows that his consecration to this ministry goes farther back still; and this is the view which is expressed in the following phrase: ἀφωρισμένος, *set apart.* This word, in such a context, cannot apply to any human consecration, such as that which he received along with Barnabas at Antioch, with a view to their first mission, though the same Greek term is used, Acts xiii. 2. Neither does it express the notion of an eternal election, which would have been denoted by the compound προωρισμένος, "destined *beforehand*," as in the other cases where a decree anterior to time is meant. The expression seems to me to be explained by the sentence, Gal. i. 15, which is closely related to this: "But when it pleased God, who *had separated me* (ἀφορίσας με) from my mother's womb, and *called* me (καλέσας με) by His grace." In this passage of the Galatians he comes down from the *selection* to the *call*, while here he ascends from the call to the selection. Let the reader recall what we have said, Introd. pp. 5 and 6, as to the providential character of all the previous circumstances of Saul's life. The apostle might well recognise in that whole chain the signs of an original destination to the task with which he saw himself invested. This task is expressed in the words: *unto the gospel of God*, εἰς εὐαγγέλιον Θεοῦ. If by the word *gospel* we understand, as is usually done, *the contents* of the divine message, then we must place the notion of preaching in the preposition εἰς, *in order to*, and paraphrase it thus: "*in order to proclaim* the gospel." This meaning of the word *gospel* is hardly in keeping with the living character of primitive Christian language. The word rather denotes in the New Testament the *act* of gospel preaching; so a few lines below, ver. 9, and particularly 1 Thess. i. 5, where Paul says: "Our gospel came not unto you in word only, but also in power, and in the Holy Ghost, and in much assurance; as ye know what manner of men we were among you." These words have no sense unless by *our gospel*, Paul means, our preaching of the gospel. In this case the preposition *for* preserves its simple meaning. The absence of the article before the words *gospel* and *God*, give to the words a sort of descriptive sense: *a message of divine origin.* The genitive Θεοῦ, *of God*, here denotes the author of the message, not its *subject*; for the subject is Christ, as is mentioned afterwards. Paul thus bears

within him the unspeakably elevated conviction of having been set apart, from the beginning of his existence, to be the herald of a message of grace (εὐ ἀγγέλλειν, *to announce good news*) from God to mankind. And it is as the bearer of this message that he addresses the church of Rome. If the apostle does not add to his name that of any fellow-labourer, as he does elsewhere, it is because he is doing this act in his official character as the apostle of the Gentiles, a dignity which he shares with no other. So it is Eph. i. 1 (in similar circumstances).

But this preaching of salvation by the apostles has not dropped suddenly from heaven. It has been prepared or announced long before; this fact is the proof of its decisive importance in the history of humanity. This is what is expressed in ver. 2.

Several commentators think that the words: *which He had promised afore*, had no meaning, unless the word gospel, ver. 1, be taken as referring to *salvation* itself, not as we have taken it, to the act of preaching. But why could not Paul say that the act of evangelical preaching had been announced beforehand? "Who hath believed *our preaching?*" exclaims Isaiah (liii. 1), "and to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed?" And lii. 7: "How beautiful are the feet of him who bringeth good tidings, and who publisheth peace!" Finally, xl. 1, 2: "Comfort ye my people, your God will say . . . Cry unto Jerusalem, that her set time is accomplished." The apostle himself quotes these passages, x. 15, 16. The preaching of the gospel to Jews and Gentiles appears to him a solemn act marking a new era, the hour of universal salvation long expected; so he characterizes it also, Acts xvii. 30; Eph. iii. 5–7; Tit. *i.* 3. It is not wonderful that his feelings rise at the thought of being the principal instrument of a work thus predicted! He thereby becomes himself a predicted person, continuing as he does the work of the prophets by fulfilling the future they announced. The πρό, *beforehand*, added to the word *promise*, is not a pleonasm; it brings out forcibly the greatness of the fact announced. The pronoun αὐτοῦ, "*His* prophets," denotes the close relation which unites a prophet to God, whose instrument he is. The epithet *holy*, by which their writings are characterized, is related to this pronoun. Holiness is the

seal of their divine origin. The absence of the article before γραφαί, *scriptures*, has a descriptive bearing: "in scriptures which have this character, that they are holy."

Baur and his school[1] find in this mention of the prophetic promises a proof of the Judeo-Christian origin of the majority of the church, and of the desire which the apostle had to please it. But the Old Testament was read and known in the churches of the Gentiles; and the object with which the apostle refers to the long theocratic preparation which had paved the way for the proclamation of salvation, is clear enough without our ascribing to him any so particular intention. — This mention of prophecy forms the transition to ver. 3, where Jesus is introduced in the first place as the Jewish Messiah, and then as the Son of God.

Vv. 3, 4. "*Concerning His Son, born of the race of David according to the flesh; established as the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by His resurrection from the dead: Jesus Christ our Lord.*" — The apostle first designates the subject of gospel preaching in a summary way: it is Jesus Christ viewed as the Son of God. The preposition περί, *concerning*, might indeed depend on the substantive εὐαγγέλιον (*gospel*), ver. 1, in virtue of the verbal meaning of the word; but we should require in that case to take ver. 2 as a parenthesis, which is by no means necessary. Why not make this regimen dependent on the immediately preceding verb: *which He had promised afore?* This promise of the preaching of the gospel related to His Son, since it was He who was to be the subject of the preaching. — Here begins a long period, first expressing this subject in a general way, then analyzing it in parallel propositions, which, point by point, form an antithesis to one another. They are not connected by any of the numerous particles in which the Greek language abounds; their simple juxtaposition makes the contrast the more striking. — It has been sought to explain the title *Son of God* merely as an official name: the *theocratic King* by way of eminence, the Messiah. The passages quoted in favour of this meaning would suffice, if they were needed to refute it: John i. 50, for example, where the juxtaposition of the two titles, Son of God and King of Israel, so far from demonstrat-

[1] *Paulus*, I. 372; Hilgenfeld, *Einl.* 311, etc.

ing them to be synonymous, refutes the view, and where the repetition of the verb *thou art* gives of itself the proof of the contrary; and Ps. ii. 7, where Jehovah says to the Messiah: "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten Thee." This last expression is applied to the installation of the Messiah in His kingly office. But *to beget* never signifies to establish as king; the word denotes a communication of life.

Some explain the title by the exceptional *moral perfection* of Jesus, and the unbroken communion in which He lived with God. Thus the name would include nothing transcending the limits of a simple human existence. But can this explanation account for the passage, viii. 3: "God *sending His own Son* in the likeness of sinful flesh" ...? It is obvious from this phrase that Paul ascribes an existence to the Son anterior to His coming in the flesh.

The title *Son* is also explained by our Lord's *miraculous birth*. So, for example, M. Bonnet: "In consequence of His generation by the Holy Spirit, He is really the Son of God." Such, indeed, is the meaning of the term in the message of the angel to Mary: "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee ... *wherefore* that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." But the passage, viii. 3, just quoted shows that the apostle used the name in a more elevated sense still, though the notion of the miraculous birth has obviously a very close connection with that of pre-existence.

Several theologians of our day think that the title Son of God applies to Jesus only on account of *His elevation* to divine glory, as the sequel of His earthly existence. But our passage itself proves that, in the apostle's view, the divine state which followed His resurrection is a *recovered*, and not an *acquired* state. His personal dignity as Son of God, proceeded on from ver. 3, is anterior to the two phases of His existence, the earthly and the heavenly, which are afterwards described.

The idea of Christ's *divine pre-existence* is one familiar to St. Paul's mind, and alone explains the meaning which he attached to the term *Son of God*. Comp. (besides viii. 3) 1 Cor. viii. 6: "One Lord Jesus Christ, *by whom* are *all things*, and we by Him;" Paul thus ascribes to Him the

double creation, the physical and the spiritual; 1 Cor. x. 4: "For they drank of that spiritual Rock that followed them: and that Rock was Christ;" Paul thus regards Christ as the Divine Being who accompanied the Israelites in the desert, and who, from the midst of the cloud, wrought all their deliverances; Phil. ii. 6: "Who, *being in the form of God*, . . . emptied Himself, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men." Add 2 Cor. viii. 9: "Who, though He was rich, yet for your sakes became poor, that ye through His poverty might be rich." The *riches* of which He stripped Himself, according to the last of these passages, are, according to the preceding, the *form of God* belonging to Him, His divine mode of being anterior to His incarnation; and the *poverty* to which He descended is nothing else than His *servant form*, or the human condition which He put on. It is through His participation in our state of dependence that we can be raised to His state of glory and sovereignty. There remains, finally, the crowning passage on this subject, Col. i. 15–17. — Son of God essentially, Christ passed through two phases, briefly described in the two following propositions. The two participles with which they both open serve as points of support to all the subsequent determining clauses. The fundamental antithesis is that between the two participles γενομένου and ὁρισθέντος; to this there are attached two others; the first: *of the race of David* and *Son of God;* the second: *according to the flesh* and *according to the Spirit of holiness.* Two phrases follow in the second proposition, *with power* and *through His resurrection from the dead*, which seem to have no counterpart in the first. But the attentive reader will have no difficulty in discovering the two ideas corresponding to them. They are those of *weakness*, a natural attribute of the *flesh* and of *birth;* for His *resurrection* is to Jesus, as it were, a second birth. Let us first study the former proposition by itself. The word γενομένου may bear the meaning either of *born* or *become.* In the second case, the word relates to the act of incarnation, that mysterious change wrought in His person when He passed from the divine to the human state. But the participle γενομένου being here construed with the preposition ἐκ, *out of, from*, it is simpler to take the verb in the sense of *being born*, as in

Gal. iv. 4: "*born of a woman*" (γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός). The regimen κατὰ σάρκα, *according to the flesh*, serves, as Hofmann says, "to restrict this affirmation to that side of His origin whereby He inherited human nature." For the notion of a different origin was previously implied in the phrase Son of God. — What are we to understand here by the term *flesh?* The word has three very distinct meanings in the Old and the New Testaments.[1] 1. It denotes the muscular and soft parts of the body, in opposition both to the hard parts, *the bones*, and to the liquid parts, *the blood*; so Gen. ii. 23: "This is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh;" and John vi. 56: "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood." 2. The word often denotes the entire human (or animal) *body*, in opposition to the *soul*; for example, 1 Cor. xv. 39: "There is one flesh of men, another flesh of beasts," a saying in which the word *flesh*, according to the context, denotes the entire organism. In this second sense the part is simply taken for the whole. 3. By the same sort of figure, only still more extended, the word *flesh* sometimes denotes the whole of *man*, body and soul, in opposition to God the Creator and His omnipotence. So Ps. lxv. 2: "Unto *Thee* shall all *flesh* (every creature) come;" Rom. iii. 20: "No *flesh* (no man) shall be justified in *His* sight." The first of these three meanings is inapplicable in our passage, for it would imply that Jesus received from His ancestor David only the fleshy parts of His body, not the bones and blood! The second is no less so; for it would follow from it that Jesus inherited from David only His bodily life, and not the psychical, the higher powers of human life, feeling, understanding, and will. This opinion is incompatible with the affirmation of the full humanity of Jesus, as we find in the writings of Paul (comp. v. 15; 1 Tim. ii. 5) and of John. For the latter, as well as Paul, ascribes to Jesus a human *soul*, a human *spirit*; comp. xii. 27: "My *soul* is troubled;" xi. 33: "He groaned in His *spirit*." There remains, therefore, only the third meaning, which suits the passage perfectly. As a *human creature*, Jesus derives His origin from David. All that is human in Him, *spirit*, *soul*, and *body* (1 Thess. v. 23), so far

[1] Comp. Wendt's remarkable dissertation: *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch* (1878).

as these elements are hereditary in mankind in general, this whole part of His being is marked by the Davidic, and consequently Jewish character. This royal and national seal is impressed not only on His physical nature and temperament, but also on His moral tendencies and aspirations; and this hereditary life could alone form the basis of His Messianic calling, without, however, obliging us to forget that in the Jew there is always the man, under the national, the human element. This meaning which we give to the word *flesh* is absolutely the same as that in the passage of John which forms, as it were, the text of his Gospel: "The Word was made flesh (*σὰρξ ἐγένετο*)," John i. 14.

Relation of this saying to the miraculous birth.—In expressing himself as he does here, does St. Paul think of Jesus' Davidic descent through Joseph or through Mary? In the former case the miraculous birth would be excluded (Meyer and Reuss). But would this supposition be consistent, on the one hand, with the idea which the apostle forms of Jesus' *absolute* holiness; on the other, with his doctrine of the transmission of sin to the whole human race? He says of Jesus, viii. 3: "Sent in the *likeness of sinful flesh;*" 2 Cor. v. 21: "He who *knew no sin;*" he ascribes to Him the part of an *expiatory victim* (*ἱλαστήριον*), which excludes the barest idea of a *minimum* of sin. And yet, according to him, all Adam's descendants participate in the heritage of sin (v. 12, 19, iii. 9). How reconcile these propositions, if his view is that Jesus descends from David and from Adam absolutely in the same sense as the other descendants of Adam or David? Paul thus necessarily held the miraculous birth;[1] and that so much the more, as the fact is conspicuously related in the Gospel of Luke, his companion in work. A contradiction between these two fellow-labourers on this point is inadmissible. It is therefore through the intervention of Mary, and of Mary alone, that Jesus, according to Paul's view, descended from David. And such is also the meaning of the genealogy of Jesus in Luke's Gospel (iii. 23).[2] Thus there is nothing to prevent us from placing the *beginning* of the operation of the Holy Spirit on the person of Jesus (to which the words: *according to the Spirit of holiness*, ver. 4, refer) at His very *birth.*

Yet this mode of hereditary existence does not exhaust His

[1] See this proof beautifully developed in Gess: *Christi Person und Werk*, 2d ed. t. II. p. 210 et seq.

[2] See the explanation of the passage in my *Commentary.*

whole being. The title *Son of God*, placed foremost, contains a wealth which transcends the contents of this first assertion, ver. 3, and becomes the subject of the second proposition, ver. 4. Many are the interpretations given of the participle ὁρισθέντος. The verb ὁρίζειν (from ὅρος, *boundary*) signifies: *to draw a limit*, to separate a domain from all that surrounds it, to distinguish a person or a thing. The marking off may be only in thought; the verb then signifies: *to destine to, decree, decide.* So Luke xxii. 22, and perhaps Acts x. 42 and xvii. 31. Or the limitation may be traced in words; the verb then signifies: *to declare.* Or, finally, it may be manifested in an external act, a fact obvious to the senses, which leads to the meaning: *to install, establish,* or *demonstrate* by a sign. The first meaning: *to destine to,* has been here attempted by Hofmann. But this sense is incompatible with the regimen: *by the resurrection,* and it would certainly have been expressed by the word προορισθέντος, *destined beforehand* (comp. viii. 29, 30; 1 Pet. i. 20), it being impossible that the divine decree relative to the glorification of Jesus should be posterior to His mission to the world. Founding on the second meaning, many (Osterv., Oltram.) translate: "*declared* to be the Son of God." But the notion of *declaration,* and even the stronger one of *demonstration,* are insufficient in the context. For the resurrection of Jesus not only manifested or demonstrated what He was; it wrought a real transformation in His mode of being. Jesus required to pass from His state as son of David to that of Son of God, if He was to accomplish the work described in ver. 5, and which the apostle has in view, that of the calling of the Gentiles. And it was His resurrection which introduced Him into this new state. The only meaning, therefore, which suits the context is the third, that of *establishing.* Peter says similarly, Acts ii. 36: "God *hath made* (ἐποίησε) that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ." Hofmann has disputed the use of the verb ὁρίζειν in this sense. But Meyer, with good ground, adduces the following saying of a poet: σὲ Θεὸν ὥρισε δαίμων, "destiny made thee God." Not that the apostle means, as Pfleiderer would have it, that Jesus *became* the Son of God by His resurrection. He was restored, and restored wholly,—that is to say, with His human nature,—to the position

of Son of God which He had renounced on becoming incarnate. The thought of Paul is identical with that of the prayer of Jesus on the eve of His death, as we have it in John's Gospel (xvii. 5): "Father, glorify Thou me with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was." Jesus always *was* the Son; at His baptism, through the manifestation of the Father, He recovered His *consciousness* of Sonship. At His resurrection He was re-established, and that as man, in His state of Sonship. The antithesis of the two terms, *born* and *established*, so finely chosen, seems thus perfectly correct.

Three regimens serve to determine the participle *established*. The first indicates the manner: *ἐν δυνάμει, with power;* the second, the moral cause: *κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης, according to the spirit of holiness;* the third, the efficient cause: *ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν, by His resurrection from the dead. With power*, signifies: in a striking, triumphant manner. Some have thought to take this regimen as descriptive of the substantive *Son of God;* "the Son of God in the glory of His power," in opposition to the weakness of His earthly state. But the antithesis of the two propositions is that between the Son of God and the son of David, and not that between the Son of God in power and the Son of God in weakness. The regimen: *with power*, refers therefore to the participle *established:* established by an act in which the power of God is strikingly manifested (the resurrection, wrought by the *glory of the Father*, Rom. vi. 4). The second regimen: *according to the spirit of holiness*, has been explained in a multitude of ways. Some have regarded it as indicating the *divine nature* of Jesus in contrast to His humanity, the spirit of holiness being thus the second person of the Trinity; so Melanchthon and Bengel. But, in this case, what term would be left to indicate the third? The second divine person is designated by the names Son or Word, not Spirit. According to Theodoret, what is meant is the *miraculous power* which Jesus possessed on the earth; but how are we to explain the complement *of holiness?* and what relation is there between the virtue of working miracles, possessed by so many prophets, and the installation of Jesus in His place as Son of God? Luther understood by it the effusion of the Holy Spirit on the church, effected by Christ glorified. Then it would be necessary to translate:

"*demonstrated* to be the Son of God by the spirit of holiness, whom He poured out." But this meaning does not suit the third regimen, whereby the resurrection is indicated as the means of the ὁρίζειν, not Pentecost. No doubt one might, in this case, translate: "*since* the resurrection." But Pentecost did not begin *from* that time. Meyer and others regard the spirit of holiness as meaning, in opposition to the flesh: the *inner man* in Jesus, the *spirit* as an element of His human nature, in opposition to the outer man, the body. But, as we have seen, the human nature, body and soul, was already embraced completely in the word *flesh*, ver. 3. How, then, could the *spirit*, taken as an element of human nature, be contrasted with this nature itself? Is, then, the meaning of the words so difficult to apprehend? The term spirit (or breath) *of holiness* shows clearly enough that the matter here in question is the action displayed on Christ by the Holy Spirit during His earthly existence. In proportion as Jesus was open to this influence, His whole human nature received the seal of consecration to the service of God—that is to say, of holiness. Such is the moral fact indicated Heb. ix. 14: "*Who through the eternal Spirit* offered Himself without spot to God." The result of this penetration of His entire being by the breath of the Holy Spirit was this: at the time of His death there could be fully realized in Him the law expressed by the Psalmist: "Thou wilt not suffer Thy Holy One to see corruption" (Ps. xvi. 10). Perfect holiness excludes physical dissolution. The necessary corollary of such a life and state was therefore the resurrection. This is the relation expressed by the preposition κατά, *according to, agreeably to.* He was established as the Son of God in a striking manner by His resurrection from the dead, *agreeably to the spirit of holiness,* which had reigned in Him and in His very body. In the passage, viii. 11, the apostle applies the same law to the resurrection of believers, when he says "that their bodies shall rise again, in virtue of the Holy Spirit who dwells in them." Paul is not therefore seeking, as has been thought, to establish a contrast between inward (πνεῦμα, *spirit*) and *outward* (σάρξ, *flesh*), nor between *divine* (the *Holy Spirit*) and human (the *flesh*), in the person of Jesus, which would be a needless digression in the context. What he contrasts is, on

the one hand, the naturally Jewish and Davidic form of His earthly appearance; and, on the other, the higher form of being on which He entered at the close of this Jewish phase of His existence, in virtue of the principle of holy consecration which had marked all His activity here below. For this new form of existence is the condition on which alone He could accomplish the work described in the verse immediately following. The thought of the apostle does not diverge for an instant, but goes straight to its aim.—The third regimen literally signifies: *by a resurrection from the dead* (ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν). He entered upon His human life by a simple *birth;* but in this state as a son of David He let the spirit of holiness reign over Him. And therefore He was admitted by a *resurrection* into the glorious life of Sonship. The preposition ἐξ, *out of,* may here signify either *since* or *in consequence of.* The first meaning is now almost abandoned, and undoubtedly with reason; for the idea of a simple succession in time does not suit the gravity of the thought. Paul wishes to describe the immense transformation which the facts of His death and resurrection produced in the person of Jesus. He has left in the tomb His particular relation to the Jewish nation and the family of David, and has appeared through His resurrection freed from those wrappings which He had humbly worn during His earthly life; comp. the remarkable expression: *minister of the circumcision,* xv. 8. Thus it is that, in virtue of His resurrection and as the Son of God, He was able henceforth to enter into connection with all mankind, which He could not do so long as He was acting only as the son of David; comp. Matt. xv. 24: "I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel." The absence of the article before the word *resurrection* and before the plural *dead* is somewhat strange, and must be explained in the way indicated by Hofmann: "By an event such as that which takes place when the dead rise again." There needed a death and resurrection, if He was to pass from the state of son of David to that of Son and Christ of humanity. It is therefore on the *character* of the event that the apostle insists, rather than on the fact itself.

Before passing to the subject of the calling of the Gentiles, which is the direct consequence of this transformation in the

person of the Messiah wrought by the resurrection, Paul sums up in three terms the analysis of His person which he has just given: *Jesus;* this name denotes the historical person, the common subject of those different forms of existence; the title *Christ* or Messiah, which sums up ver. 3 (Son of David), and that of *Lord,*—that is to say, the representative of the divine sovereignty,—which follows from His elevation to the position of *Son* (ver. 4). On the title of *Lord,* see 1 Cor. viii. 6; Phil. ii. 9-11. When he says *our,* Paul thinks of all those who by faith have accepted the sovereignty of Jesus.

The intention of the passage, vv. 3, 4, has been strangely misunderstood. Some say: it is a summary of the gospel doctrine which the apostle means to expound in this treatise. But a summary is not stated in an address. The true summary of the Epistle, besides, is found i. 17. Finally, *christological* doctrine is precisely one of the heads, the absence of which is remarkable in our Epistle. Gess says: "One must suppose that the apostle was concerned to sum up in this introduction the most elevated sentiments which filled his heart regarding the Mediator of salvation." But why put these reflections on the person of Christ in the address, and between what Paul says of his apostleship in general (vv. 1, 2), and what he afterwards adds regarding his apostleship to the Gentiles in particular (vv. 5, 6)? Hofmann thinks that Paul, in referring to the relation between Jesus and the old covenant, wishes to indicate all that God gives us new in Christ. But this observation would suit any other place rather than the address. The most singular explanation is Mangold's: "A Judeo-Christian church like that of Rome might be astonished at Paul's addressing it as if it had been of Gentile origin; and the apostle has endeavoured to weaken this impression by reminding it (ver. 2) that his apostleship had been predicted in the Old Testament, and (ver. 3) that the object of his preaching is above all the Messiah, the Son of David." So artificial an explanation refutes itself. The apostle started (vv. 1, 2) from the idea of his apostleship, but in order to come to that of his apostleship to the Gentiles, which alone serves to explain the step he is now taking in writing to the Christians of Rome (vv. 5, 6). To pass from

the first of these ideas to the second, he rises to the author of his apostleship, and describes Him as the Jewish Messiah, called to gather together the lost sheep of the house of Israel (ver. 5); then as the Son of God raised from the dead, able to put Himself henceforth in direct communication with the Gentiles through an apostolate instituted on their behalf (ver. 4). In reality, to accomplish this wholly new work, Jesus required to be set free from the form of Jewish nationality and the bond of theocratic obligations. He must be placed in one uniform relation to the whole race. This was the effect of the transformation wrought in His person by His death and resurrection. Thus there is no difficulty in understanding the transition from ver. 4 to ver. 5.

Vv. 5, 6: "*By whom we have received grace and apostleship, for the obedience of faith among all the Gentiles, for the glory of His name: among whom are ye also the called of Jesus Christ.*" The words δι' οὗ, *by whom*, exactly express the transition which we have just indicated. It is from His heavenly glory and from His state as Son of God that Christ has founded the new apostolate, and called him whom He has invested with it (comp. Gal. i. 1).—The plural ἐλάβομεν, *we have received*, is explained by some: *I and the other apostles;* by Hofmann: *I and my apostolical assistants* (Barnabas, Silas, Timothy, etc.). But the first meaning is inadmissible, because the matter in question here is exclusively the apostleship *to the Gentiles;* and the second is equally so, because Paul, speaking here in his *official* character, can associate no one with him in the dignity which the Lord has conferred on him personally. What we have here is therefore the *plural of category*, which the Greeks readily use when they wish to put the person out of view, and to present only the principle which he represents, or the work with which he is charged. The words: χάριν καὶ ἀποστολήν, *grace and apostleship*, are regarded by some (Chrys., Philippi) as equivalent to: *the grace of apostleship.* But if this had been Paul's meaning, it would have been easy for him to express it so. Hofmann applies the two terms to the *ministry* of the apostle, as presenting it, the former, in connection with his own person—it is a *grace* conferred on him; the latter, in its relation to others—it is his *mission* to them. But if the term *grace* be referred to Paul's person, it seems to us much

simpler to apply it to the gift of *salvation* which was bestowed on himself; the second term, *apostleship*, comes thus quite naturally to designate his mission for the salvation of the world. We have seen (Introd. p. 20) how these two gifts, personal salvation and apostleship, were, in Paul's case, one and the same event. The object of Christ in according him grace and calling him to the apostleship, was to spread the *obedience of faith*. It is impossible to understand by this *obedience* the *holiness* produced by faith. For, before speaking of the effects of faith, faith must exist; and the matter in question is precisely the calling of the apostle destined to lay the foundation of it. Meyer's meaning is still more inadmissible, submission *to the faith*. In that case, we should require to give to the term *faith* the meaning of: *Christian truth* (objectively speaking), a meaning the word never has in the New Testament, as Meyer acknowledges. So he understands obedience to the inward sentiment of faith! This is a form of speech of which it would be still more difficult to find examples. The only possible meaning is: the obedience *which consists of* faith itself. By faith man performs an act of obedience to the divine manifestation which demands of him submission and co-operation. The refusal of faith is therefore called, x. 3, a *disobedience* (*οὐχ ὑπετάγησαν*). The regimen following: *among all the Gentiles*, might be connected with the word *apostleship*, but it is simpler to connect it directly with the preceding regimen, the obedience of faith: "an obedience *to be realized* among all Gentiles." The term *ἔθνη*, which we translate by *Gentiles*, has been taken here by almost all critics who hold the Jewish origin of the Christians of Rome, in a wider acceptation. They give it the general meaning of *nations*, in order to include under it the Jews, who are also *a nation*, and consequently the Christians of Rome. This interpretation has been defended chiefly by Rückert and Baur. But it is easy to see that it is invented to serve an *a priori* thesis. The word *ἔθνη* undoubtedly signifies strictly: *nations*. But it has taken, like the word *gojim* in the Old Testament (Gen. xii. 3; Isa. xlii. 6, etc.), a definite, restricted, and quasi-technical sense: *the nations*, in opposition *to the* chosen *people* (*ὁ λαός*, *the people*). This signification occurs from beginning to end of the New Testament (Acts ix. 15, xi. 1, 18,

xxviii. 28; Gal. i. 16, ii. 7–9, iii. 14; Eph. ii. 11, iii. 6).[1] It is applied in the most uniform manner in our Epistle (ii. 14, 15, iii. 29, xi. 13, xv. 9, 11). Besides, the context imperatively demands this limited sense. Paul has just been explaining the institution of a special apostleship to the Gentiles, by a transformation in the Lord's mode of existence; the whole demonstration would be useless if his aim were to prove that the believers of Rome, *though Judeo-Christians*, belong also to the domain of his mission. Mangold feels the difficulty; for, in order to remain faithful to Baur's view as to the composition of the Roman church, without falling into his false interpretation of the word ἔθνη, he tries to take it in a purely geographical sense. He thinks that by *the nations*, Paul means to contrast the inhabitants of the world in general, whether Jews or Gentiles, with the Jews strictly so called *dwelling in Palestine*. The apostle means to say: "The church of Rome, though composed of Judeo-Christians, belongs *geographically* to the world of the Gentiles, and consequently comes within my domain as the apostle of the Gentiles." But what in this case becomes of the partition of domains marked out in Gal. ii.? It must signify that Peter reserved for himself to preach *in* Palestine, and Paul *out of* Palestine! Who can give this meaning to the famous passage, Gal. ii.? Besides, as Beyschlag well says, this partition between the apostles rested on a difference of *gifts*, which had nothing to do with geography, and evidently referred to the religious and moral character of those two great divisions of mankind, Jews and Gentiles. It must therefore be allowed that the words: *among all nations*, refer to Gentiles, and to Gentiles as such. Baur has sought to turn the word *all* to account in favour of his interpretation; but Paul uses it precisely to introduce what he is going to say, ver. 6, that the Romans, though so remote, yet formed part of his domain, since it embraces *all* Gentiles without exception. It matters little, therefore, that they are still personally unknown to him, he is their apostle nevertheless.—The third regimen: ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀνόματος, *for, in behalf*, or *for the glory of His name*, depends on the whole verse from the verb *we have received*. Paul does not forget that this is the highest end of his apostleship: to exalt the glory of that

[1] I mention only some thoroughly characteristic passages.

name by extending the sphere of his action, and increasing the number of those who invoke it as the name of their Lord. The words sound like an echo of the message of Jesus to Paul by Ananias: "He is a chosen vessel *to carry my name to the Gentiles;*" comp. 3 John 7. By this word Paul reveals to us at once the aim of his mission, and the inward motive of all his work. And what a work was that! As Christ in His own person broke the external covering of Israelitish form, so He purposed to break the national wrapping within which the kingdom of God had till then been enclosed; and to spread the glory of His name to the very ends of the earth, He called Paul.

Ver. 6 may be construed in two ways: either the κλητοὶ Ἰ. Χ. may be taken as a predicate: "in the midst of whom (Gentiles) *ye are the called of Jesus Christ,*" or the last words may be taken in apposition to the subject: "of the number of whom ye are, *ye who are called of Jesus Christ.*" The former construction does not give a simple meaning; for the verb *ye are* has then two predicates which conflict with one another: "ye are in the midst of them," and: "ye are the called of Jesus Christ." Besides, is it necessary to inform the Christians of Rome that they live in the midst of the Gentiles, and that they are called by Jesus Christ? Add the καί, *also,* which would signify: like all the other Christians in the world, and you have an addition wholly superfluous, and, besides, far from clear. What has led commentators like De Wette, Meyer, etc., to hold this first construction is, that it seemed to them useless to make Paul say: "ye are among, or ye are of the number of the Gentiles." But, on the contrary, this idea is very essential. It is the minor premiss of the syllogism within which Paul, so to speak, encloses the Romans. The major: Christ has made me the Apostle of the Gentiles; the minor: ye are of the number of the Gentiles; conclusion: therefore, in virtue of the authority of that Christ who has called you as He has called me, ye are the sheep of my fold. The καί, *also,* from this point of view is easily explained: "of the number of whom (Gentiles) ye *also* are, ye Romans, falling consequently like the other Gentiles called by me personally to my apostolical domain." The title κλητοὶ Ἰ. Χ., *called of Jesus Christ,* corresponds to the title which

Paul gave himself, ver. 1: κλητὸς ἀπόστολος, "*an apostle by calling.*" They are bound to hear him in virtue of the same authority under which he writes to them, that of Jesus Christ. The complement: "*called of Jesus Christ,*" may be taken as a genitive of possession: "called ones *belonging to* Jesus Christ." But it is better to regard it as a genitive of cause: "called ones, whose calling *comes from* Jesus Christ." For the important thing in the context is not the commonplace idea that they belong to the Lord; it is the notion of the act by which the Lord Himself acted on them to make them believers, as on Paul to make him their apostle. The idea of *calling* (of God or Christ), according to Paul's usage, includes two thoughts, an outward solicitation by preaching, and an inward and simultaneous drawing by the Holy Spirit. It need not be said that neither the one nor the other of these influences is irresistible, nor that the adhesion of faith remains an act of freedom. This adhesion is here implied in the fact that the Romans are members of the church and readers of these lines.

If we needed a confirmation of the Gentile origin of the majority of this church, it would be found in overwhelming force in vv. 5 and 6, especially when taken in connection with ver. 4; and really it needs far more than common audacity to attempt to get out of them the opposite idea, and to paraphrase them, as Volkmar does, in the following way: "I seem to you no doubt to be only the apostle of the Hellenes; but, nevertheless, I am called by Jesus Christ to preach the gospel to all nations, even to the non-Hellenes such as you, believers of Jewish origin!"

We come now to the second and third parts of the address, the indication of the readers and the expression of the writer's prayer.

Ver. 7. "*To all the well-beloved of God who are at Rome,*[1] *saints by way of call: Grace to you and peace from God our Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ.*"—The dative: *to all those,* might be dependent on a verb understood: *I write,* or *I address myself;* but it is simpler to connect it with the verb implied in the statement of the prayer which immediately follows: "To you all *may there be given.*" The adjective *all*

[1] The words ἐν Ῥώμῃ are wanting in G g.

would be quite superfluous here if Paul had not the intention of widening the circle of persons spoken of in ver. 6 as being *of the number of the Gentiles.* Paul certainly has no doubt that there are also among the Christians of Rome some brethren of *Jewish* origin, and by his *to all* he now embraces them in the circle of those to whom he addresses his letter. We need not separate the two datives: *to all those who are at Rome* and *to the well-beloved of God,* as if they were two different regimens; the dative: *well-beloved of God,* is taken substantively: *to all the well-beloved of God who are at Rome.* The words denote the entire number of Roman believers, Jews and Gentiles. All men are in a sense *loved of God* (John iii. 16); but apart from faith, this love of God can only be that of compassion. It becomes an intimate love, like that of father and child, only through the reconciliation granted to faith. Here is the first bond between the apostle and his readers: the common love of which they are the objects. This bond is strengthened by another: the internal work which has flowed from it, consecration to God, holiness: κλητοῖς ἁγίοις, *saints by way of call.* We need not translate either: *called to be* saints, which would imply that holiness is in their case no more as yet than a destination, or *called and holy* (Ostervald), which would give to the notion of calling too independent a force. Paul means that they *are* really saints, and that if they possess this title of nobility before God, it is because Christ has honoured them with His call, by drawing some from the defilements of paganism, and raising others from the external consecration of God's ancient people to the spiritual consecration of the new. Under the old covenant, consecration to God was hereditary, and attached to the external rite of circumcision. Under the new economy, consecration is that of the will first of all, and so of the entire life. It passes from within outwards, and not from without inwards; it is real holiness. The words ἐν Ῥώμῃ, *at Rome,* are omitted in the Greek text of the Cod. *de Bœrner.* (G), as well as in the Latin translation accompanying it (*g*). This might be regarded as an accidental omission, if it were not repeated in ver. 15. Rückert and Renan think that it arises from manuscripts intended for other churches, and in which, accordingly, the indication of the readers had been left blank

But in this case would it not occur in a larger number of documents? Meyer supposes that some church or other, having the letter copied for its own special use, had intentionally suppressed the words. But it needs to be explained why the same thing did not take place with other Epistles. Perhaps the cause of the omission in this case was the contrast between the general character of the contents of the letter and the local destination indicated in the suppressed words, the second fact appearing contradictory to the first (see ver. 15).

Why does the apostle not salute this community of believers, as he does those of Thessalonica, Galatia, and Corinth, with the name of *church?* The different Christian groups which existed at Rome, and several of which are mentioned in chap. xvi., were perhaps not yet connected with one another by a common presbyterial organization.

The end of ver. 7 contains the development of the third part of the address, *the prayer.* For the usual term χαίρειν, *joy and prosperity,* Paul substitutes the blessings which form the Christian's wealth and happiness. *Grace,* χάρις, denotes the love of God manifested in the form of pardon towards sinful man; *peace,* εἰρήνη, the feeling of profound calm or inward quiet which is communicated to the heart by the possession of reconciliation. It may seem that the title: *well-beloved of God,* given above, included these gifts; but the Christian possesses nothing which does not require to be ever received anew, and daily increased by new acts of faith and prayer. The Apocalypse says that "salvation flows from the throne of God and of the Lamb;" it is *from God* and *from Jesus Christ* that Paul likewise derives the two blessings which he wishes for the believers of Rome; from God as *Father,* and from Jesus Christ as *Lord* or Head of the church. We need not explain these two regimens as if they meant "*from* God *through* Christ." The two substantives depend on a common preposition: *on the part of.* The apostle therefore has in view not a source and a channel, but two sources. The love of God and the love of Christ are two distinct loves; the one is a father's, the other a brother's. Christ loves with *His own* love, Rom. v. 15. Comp. John v. 21 (*those whom He will*) and 26 (*He hath life in Himself*). Erasmus was unhappy in taking the words: *Jesus Christ our Lord,* as a second comple-

ment to the word *Father*: "our Father *and that of Jesus Christ*." But in this case the complement *Jesus Christ* would have required to be placed first, and the notion of God's fatherhood in relation to Christ would be without purpose in the context. The conviction of Christ's divine nature can alone explain this construction, according to which His person and that of the Father are made alike dependent on one and the same proposition.

It is impossible not to admire the prudence and delicacy which St. Paul shows in the discharge of his task towards this church. To justify his procedure, he goes back on his apostleship; to justify his apostleship to them, Gentiles, he goes back to the transformation which the resurrection wrought in Christ's person, when from being Jewish Messiah it made Him *Lord* in the absolute sense of the word. Like a true pastor, instead of lording it over the conscience of his flock, he seeks to associate it with his own.

SECOND PASSAGE (I. 8–15).

The Interest long taken by the Apostle in the Christians of Rome.

The address had drawn a sort of *official* bond between the apostle and the church. But Paul feels the need of converting it into a *heart* relation; and to this end the following piece is devoted. The apostle here assures his readers of the profound interest which he has long felt in them, though he has not yet been able to show it by visiting them. He begins, as usual, by thanking God for the work already wrought in them, ver. 8; then he expresses his lively and long cherished desire to labour for its growth, either in the way of strengthening themselves spiritually, vv. 9–12, or in the way of increasing the number of believers in the city of Rome, vv. 13–15.

Ver. 8. "*First, I thank my God through Jesus Christ for*[1] *you all, that your faith is spoken of throughout the whole world.*" —The apostle knows that there is no more genuine proof of sincere affection than intercession; hence he puts his prayer for them first. The word πρῶτον, *in the first place* (especially

[1] The T. R. reads ὑπέρ, with E G L P and the Mnn. Περί is found in ℵ A B C D K and 10 Mnn.

with the particle μέν), leads us to expect a *secondly* (ἔπειτα δέ). As this word does not occur in the sequel, some have thought it necessary to give to πρῶτον the meaning of *above all.* This is unnecessary. The second idea the apostle had in view is really found in ver. 10, in the prayer which he offers to God that he may be allowed soon to go to Rome. This prayer is the natural supplement of the thanksgiving. Only the construction has led the apostle not to express it in the strictly logical form: *in the second place.*—In the words "*my God,*" he sums up all his *personal* experiences of God's fatherly help, in the various circumstances of his life, and particularly in those of his apostleship. Herein there is a particular revelation which every believer receives for himself alone, and which he sums up when he calls God *his* God; comp. the phrase *God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob,* and more especially the words Gen. xxviii. 20, 21. Paul's thanksgiving is presented through the mediation of *Jesus Christ;* he conveys it through Christ as head of the church, and more immediately his own. Meyer thinks that Christ is rather mentioned here as the *author* of the work for which Paul gives thanks; but this is not the natural meaning of the phrase: I thank *through;* comp. besides, viii. 34. The propagation of the gospel at Rome appears to Paul a service rendered to him personally, as apostle of the Gentiles.—The phrase: *on account of you all,* seems a little exaggerated, since he does not know them all personally. But would there be a human being at Rome gained for Christ, known or unknown, whose faith was not a subject of joy to Paul! The preposition ὑπέρ, *in behalf of,* which is found in the T. R. (with the latest Mjj.), would express more affection than περί, *about;* but the latter is more simple, and occurs in some Mjj. of the three families. What increases Paul's joy is, that not only do they believe themselves, but their faith, the report of which is spread everywhere, opens a way for the gospel to other countries; comp. a similar passage addressed to the Thessalonians (1 Thess. i. 8). The ὅτι, *because,* serves to bring into relief a special feature in the cause of joy already indicated; comp. 1 Cor. i. 5 (the ὅτι in its relation to ver. 4). The phrase: *throughout the whole world,* is hyperbolical; it alludes to the position of Rome as the capital of the world; comp. Col. i. 6.

Vv. 9, 10. "*For God is my witness, whom I serve with my spirit in the gospel of His Son, how without ceasing I make mention of you, making request in all my prayers, if by any means now at length I might have a prosperous journey by the will of God to come unto you.*"—This thanksgiving of the apostle was an inward action of which none but God could have knowledge; and as the words, ver. 8, might seem chargeable with exaggeration, he appeals to the one witness of his inner life. Paul thinks of those times of intimate intercourse which he has daily with his God in the exercise of his ministry; for it is at His feet, as it were, that he discharges this task. He says: *in my spirit*, that is to say, in the most intimate part of his being, where is the organ by which his soul communicates with the divine world. The *spirit* is therefore here one of the elements of his human nature (1 Thess. v. 23); only it is evidently thought of as penetrated with the Divine Spirit. When Paul says: *in the gospel of His Son*, it is clear that he is not thinking of the *matter*, but of the *act* of evangelical preaching. This is for him a continual act of worship which he performs only on his knees. The words: *of His Son*, bring out the supreme gravity of the act. How, in fact, can one take part in a work which concerns *the Son*, otherwise than in concert with God Himself! The ὡς need be translated neither by *that* (the *fact*), which expresses too little, nor by *how much* (the *degree*), which is too strong, but by *how*. The word refers to the *mode* of this inward worship, as it is developed in what follows. The expression: *without ceasing*, explains the: "I give thanks *for you all*," which had preceded (ver. 8). Hence the *for* at the beginning of the verse.

Ver. 10. With the thanksgiving there is connected, as a second matter which he has to communicate to them, his not less unwearied *prayer* that he might be able soon to visit them. The words: *always in my prayers*, refer certainly to the following participle: *making request*, and not to what precedes, a sense which would lead to a pleonasm. Not one of the intimate dealings of the apostle with his God, in which this subject does not find a place.—Ἐπί, strictly speaking, *on occasion of*. The conjunction εἴπως, *if perhaps*, indicates the calculation of chances; and the adverbs *once, at length*, the sort

of impatience which he puts into his calculation. The term εὐοδοῦν strictly signifies: *to cause one to journey prosperously*, whence in general: *to make one succeed* in a business; comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 2. As in this context the subject in question is precisely the success of a *journey*, it is difficult not to see in the choice of the term an allusion to its strict meaning: "if at length I shall not be *guided prosperously in my journey* to you." By whom? The words: *by the will of God*, tell us; favourable circumstances are the work of that all-powerful hand. Vv. 11, 12 indicate the most immediate motive of this ardent desire.

Vv. 11, 12. "*For I long to see you, that I may impart unto you some spiritual gift, to the end that ye may be established; or to speak more properly, that I may be comforted together with you by the mutual action of our faith, yours and mine.*"— Enriched with the gifts of God as he was, could the apostle help feeling the need of imparting some of them to a church so important as that of Rome? There is in the verb ἐπιποθῶ, along with the expression of the *desire* which goes out toward them, one of *regret* at not having been able to come sooner. A χάρισμα, gift, is a concrete manifestation of grace (χάρις). The epithet *spiritual* shows the *nature* and *source* of the gift which he hopes to impart to his readers (the spirit, the πνεῦμα). The word ὑμῖν, *to you*, is inserted between the substantive and the adjective to bring out the latter more forcibly. The apostle hopes that by this communication they will receive an increase of divine *strength* within them. He puts the verb in the passive: *that ye may be strengthened.* We need not translate: *to confirm you* (Oltram.); on the contrary, Paul uses the passive form to put out of view the part he takes personally, and to exhibit only the result; it is God who will strengthen. There would be a degree of charlatanism in the choice of the word *strengthen, confirm*, if, as Baur, and following him, Mangold, Sabatier, etc., think, the apostle's object in this letter was to bring about a radical change in the existing conception of the gospel at Rome. To strengthen, is not to turn one into another way, it is to make him walk firmly on that on which he is already. But Paul was too sincerely humble, and at the same time too delicate in his feelings, to allow it to be supposed that the spiritual advantage

resulting from his stay among them would all be on one side. He hastens to add that he hopes himself to have his share, ver. 12. The first words of this verse have generally been misunderstood; there has been given to them the meaning of the phrase τοῦτ' ἔστι, *that is to say* (Ostervald, Oltram.). It is forgotten that the δέ which is added here (τοῦτο δέ ἐστι) indicates not a simple explanatory repetition, but a certain modification and progress in the idea. The meaning, therefore, is: *or to speak more properly.* In point of fact, Paul had yet to add to the idea of the good which he reckoned on doing, that of the good which he hoped himself to receive. This is precisely what he has in view in the strange construction of the words which immediately follow. There is no doubt that the preposition σύν, *with,* in the compound verb συμπαρακληθῆναι, *to be encouraged with,* signifies: "I *with you,* Christians of Rome." For the subject of the verb can be no other than the apostle, on account of the words which follow: *in the midst of you.* Fritzsche attempts to give it a *you* for its subject, ὑμᾶς understood; Meyer and Hofmann would make this infinitive directly dependent on the word *I desire,* ver. 11: "I desire to see you, and to be encouraged in the midst of you." But this is to mistake the evident relation between the two passive infinitives, so closely connected with one another. "To the end that *ye* may be strengthened; and, to speak more correctly, that *with you* I may be encouraged among you." The "*with* (you)" brings out the notion of *their* strengthening, to add to it immediately, and that in the same word (in Greek) the notion of the encouragement derived by *Paul* himself, as being one with theirs; for is not the strengthening of others the means of encouraging himself? One shares in the strength which he imparts. The apostle seems to say that there is in his desire as much holy selfishness as holy zeal. The substitution of the word *encourage* (in speaking of Paul) for that of *strengthen* (in speaking of them) is significant. In Paul's case, the only thing in question is his subjective feeling, which might be a little depressed, and which would receive a new impulse from the success of his work among them; comp. Acts xxviii. 15 (*he took courage,* ἔλαβε θάρσος). This same delicacy of expression is kept up in the words which follow. By the *among you,* the apostle says that their mere presence

will of itself be strengthening to him. This appears literally in what follows: "*by my faith and yours one upon another.*" These last words express a *reciprocity* in virtue of which his faith will act on theirs and theirs on his; and how so? In virtue of their having that faith *in common* (by the faith *of you and of me*). It is because they live in this common atmosphere of one and the same faith that they can act and react spiritually, he on them, and they on him. What dignity, tact, and grace in these words, by which the apostle at once transforms the active part which he is obliged to ascribe to himself in the first place into a receptive part, and so to terminate with the notion which unites these two points of view, that of reciprocity in the possession of a common moral life! Erasmus has classed all this in the category of *pia vafrities* and *sancta adulatio.*[1] He did not understand the sincerity of Paul's humility. But what Paul wishes is not merely to impart new strength to the Christians of Rome while reinforcing his own, it is also to aid in the increase of their church. He comes as an apostle, not only as a Christian visitor; such is the meaning of the words which follow (vv. 13–15).

Vv. 13, 14. "*Now I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that oftentimes I purposed to come unto you (but was hindered hitherto), that I might have some fruit*[2] *among you also, even as among other Gentiles. I am debtor both to the Greeks, and to the Barbarians; both to the wise, and to the unwise.*"—His readers might ask with some reason how it happened that Paul, having been an apostle for more than twenty years, had not yet found time to come and preach the good news in the Capital of the world. The phrase: *I would not have you ignorant,* has something slightly mysterious about it, which will be explained presently. The δέ, *now,* expresses a gradation, but not one from the simple *desire* (ver. 11) to the *formed purpose* (ver. 13). The right connection in this sense would have been: *for indeed,* and not *now.* Paul rather passes here from the *spiritual* good, which he has always desired to do among the believers of Rome, to the *extension* of their church, to which he hopes he may contribute. Let his work at Corinth and Ephesus be remembered; why should he not accomplish a

[1] *Pious fraud and holy flattery.*

[2] The T. R. reads καρπον τινα, with some Mnn. All the Mjj. : τινα καρπον.

similar work at Rome? He means, therefore: "*I shall confess to you my whole mind;* my ambition aims at making some new conquests even in your city (at Rome)." This is what he calls *gathering some fruit.* The phrase is as modest as possible. At Corinth and Ephesus he gathered full harvests; at Rome, where the church already exists, he will merely add *some handfuls* of ears to the sheaves already reaped by others. *Καρπὸν ἔχειν*, literally, *to have fruit*, does not here signify: *to bear* fruit, as if Paul were comparing himself to a tree. The N. T. has other and more common terms for this idea: *καρπὸν φέρειν, ποιεῖν, διδόναι.* The meaning is rather to secure fruit, like a husbandman who garners a harvest. The two *καί, also*, of the Greek text, "*also* among you, as *also* among the other Gentiles," signify respectively: "among you quite as much as among them;" and "among them quite as much as among you." St. Paul remembers what he has succeeded in doing elsewhere. No reader free from prepossession will fail to see here the evident proof of the *Gentile* origin of the great majority of the Christians of Rome. To understand by *ἔθνη, nations* in general, including the Jews as well, is not only contrary to the uniform sense of the word (see ver. 5), but also to the subdivision into *Greeks* and *Barbarians* given in the following verse: for the Jews, according to Paul's judgment, evidently did not belong to either of these two classes. If he had thought of the Jews in this place, he must have used the classification of ver. 16: *to the Jews and Greeks.*

Ver. 14. No connecting particle. Such is always the indication of a feeling which as it rises is under the necessity of reaffirming itself with increasing energy: "*Yea*, I feel that I owe myself to all that is called Gentile." The first division, into *Greeks* and *Barbarians*, bears on the *language*, and thereby on the *nationality;* the second, into *wise* and *unwise*, on the degree of *culture.* It may be asked in what category did Paul place the Romans themselves. As to the first of these two classifications, it is obvious that he cannot help ranking among the Greeks those to whom he is writing at the very time in the Greek language. The Romans, from the most ancient times, had received their culture from the Greek colonies established in Italy. So Cicero, in a well-known passage of the *De finibus* (ii. 15), conjoins *Græcia* and *Italia*, and contrasts them with

Barbaria. As to the second contrast, it is possible that Paul regards the immense population of Rome, composed of elements so various, as falling into the two classes mentioned. What matters? All those individuals, of whatever category, Paul regards as *his creditors.* He owes them his life, his person, in virtue of the grace bestowed on him and of the office which he has received (ver. 5). The emotion excited by this thought is what has caused the asyndeton[1] between vv. 13 and 14.

Ver. 15. "*So, as much as in me is, I am ready to preach the gospel to you that are at Rome*[2] *also.*"—Of the three explanations by which it has been sought to account for the grammatical construction of this verse, the simplest seems to me to be that which gives a restricting sense to the words κατ' ἐμέ: *for my part,* that is to say: "*so far as depends on me,* so far as external circumstances shall not thwart my desire," and which takes τὸ πρόθυμον as a paraphrase of the substantive προθυμία; the meaning is: "So far as I am concerned, the liveliest desire prevails in me to" . . . Such is the explanation of Fritzsche, Reiche, Philippi. De Wette and Meyer prefer to join τό with κατ' ἐμέ in the same sense as we have just given to κατ' ἐμέ alone, and to take πρόθυμον as the subject: "As far as I am concerned, there is an eagerness to" . . . Some have made τὸ κατ' ἐμέ a periphrasis for ἐγώ, as the subject of the proposition, and taken πρόθυμον as a predicate: "My personal disposition is eagerness to announce to you" . . . The meaning is nearly the same whichever of the three explanations be adopted. The οὕτω, *thus,* very obviously stands as a concluding particle. This eagerness to preach at Rome no less than elsewhere is the *consequence* of that debt to *all* which he feels lying upon him. The meaning: *likewise,* would not be so suitable. The word to *evangelize,* literally, to proclaim good *news,* seems to be inapplicable to a church already founded. But we have just seen that the apostle has here in view the *extension* of the church by preaching to the unbelieving population around it. Hence the use of the word. We must therefore take the words: *you that are at Rome,* in a wider sense. It is not merely the members of the church who are denoted by it, but the whole population of the great city

[1] The absence of any logical particle. [2] G g omit τοις εν Ρωμη.

represented in the eyes of Paul by his readers. As Hofmann says: "He is here considering the members of the church as Romans, not as Christians." The words *at Rome* are omitted by Codex G, as in ver. 7. Volkmar explains their rejection by the fact that some *evangelistarium* (a collection of the pericopes intended for public reading) suppressed them to preserve the universal character of our Epistle. This explanation comes to the same as that which we have given on ver. 7.

Here for the present the *letter* closes and the *treatise* begins. The first proposition of ver. 16: *I am not ashamed of the gospel*, is the transition from the one to the other. For the words: *I am not ashamed*, are intended to remove a suspicion which might be raised against the profession Paul has just made of eagerness to preach at Rome; they thus belong to the *letter*. And, on the other hand, the word *gospel* sums up the whole contents of the didactic *treatise* which immediately opens. It is impossible to see in this first proposition of ver. 16 anything else than a transition, or to bring out of it, as Hofmann attempts, the statement of the object of the whole Epistle.

THE TREATISE.

I. 16–XV. 13.

THIRD PASSAGE (I. 16, 17).

The Statement of the Subject.

VER. 16. "*For I am not ashamed of the gospel:*[1] *for it is a power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first,*[2] *and also to the Greek.*"—The long delays which had prevented the apostle's visit to Rome did not arise, as might have been thought, from some secret anxiety or fear that he might not be able to sustain honourably the part of preacher of the word on this stage. In the very contents of the gospel there are a grandeur and a power which lift the man who is charged with it above feelings of this kind. He may indeed be filled with fear and trembling when he is delivering such a message, 1 Cor. ii. 3; but the very nature of the message restores him, and gives him entire boldness wherever he presents himself. In what follows the apostle seems to say: "And I now proceed to prove this to you by expounding in writing that gospel which I would have wished to proclaim with the living voice in the midst of you." When he says: *I am not ashamed,* Paul does not seem to have in view the opprobrium attached to the preaching of the Crucified One; he would have brought out this particular more distinctly. Comp. 1 Cor. i. 18, 23. The complement τοῦ Χριστοῦ, *of Christ,* which is found in the T. R. along with the Byz. MSS., is certainly unauthentic; for it is wanting in the

[1] The T. R. here reads the words του Χριστου (*of Christ*), with K L P and the Mnn. The words are wanting in all the other Mjj., in *Ital.* and *Pesch.* and in some Mnn.

[2] The word πρωτον is omitted in B G g; according to Tertullian, it was wanting in Marcion.

documents of the other two families, in the ancient Latin and Syriac Vss., and even in a large number of Mnn. The word *gospel* denotes here, as in vv. 1 and 9, not the matter, but the *act* of preaching; Calvin himself says: *De vocali prædicatione hic loquitur.* And why is the apostle not ashamed of such a proclamation? Because it is the mighty arm of God rescuing the world from perdition, and bringing it salvation. Mankind are, as it were, at the bottom of an abyss; the preaching of the gospel is the power from above which raises out of it. No one need blush at being the instrument of such a force. The omission of the article before the word δύναμις, *power*, serves to bring out *the character* of the action rather than the action itself. Hofmann says: "*Power*, for the gospel can do something; power *of God*, for it can do all it promises." The word σωτηρία, *salvation*, contains two ideas: on the one side, deliverance from an evil, perdition; on the other, communication of a blessing, eternal life in communion with God. The possession of these two privileges is man's health (σωτηρία, from the adjective σῶς, *safe and sound*). The life of God in the soul of man, such is the normal state of the latter. The preposition εἰς, *to*, or *in* (salvation), denotes not only the *purpose* of the divine work, but its immediate and certain result, wherever the human condition is fulfilled. This condition is faith *to every one that believeth.* The word *every one* expresses the universal efficacy of the remedy, and the word *believeth*, its entire *freeness.* Such are the two fundamental characteristics of the Christian salvation, especially as preached by Paul; and they are so closely connected that, strictly speaking, they form only one. Salvation would not be for *all*, if it demanded from man anything else than *faith.* To make work or merit a condition in the least degree, would be to exclude certain individuals. Its universal destination thus rests on its entire freeness at the time when man is called to enter into it. The apostle adds to the word *believing* the article τῷ, *the*, which cannot be rendered in French by the *tout* (all); the word means *each* individual, provided he believes. As the offer is universal, so the act of faith by which man accepts is individual; comp. John iii. 16. The *faith* of which the apostle speaks is nothing else than the simple acceptance of the salvation offered in preaching.

It is premature to put in this moral act all that will afterwards flow from it when faith shall be in possession of its object. This is what is done by Reuss and Sabatier, when they define it respectively: "A personal, inward, mystical union between man and Christ the Saviour" (*Ep. paulin.* II. p. 43); and: "the destruction of sin in us, the inward creation of the divine life" (*L'ap. Paul*, p. 265). This is to make the effect the cause. Faith, in Paul's sense, is something extremely simple, such that it does not in the least impair the *freeness* of salvation. God says: I give thee; the heart answers: I accept; such is faith. The act is thus a receptivity, but an active receptivity. It brings nothing, but it takes what God gives; as was admirably said by a poor Bechuana: "It is the hand of the heart." In this act the entire human personality takes part: the understanding discerning the blessing offered in the divine promise, the will aspiring after it, and the confidence of the heart giving itself up to the promise, and so securing the promised blessing. The preaching of free salvation is the act by which God lays hold of man, faith is the act by which man lets himself be laid hold of. Thus, instead of God's ancient people who were recruited by birth and Abrahamic descent, Paul sees a new people arising, formed of all the individuals who perform the personal act of faith, whatever the nation to which they belong. To give pointed expression to this last feature, he recalls the ancient distinction which had till then divided mankind into two rival religious societies, Jews and Gentiles, and declares this distinction abolished. He says: *to the Jew first, and to the Greek.* In this context the word Greek has a wider sense than in ver. 14; for there it was opposed to *Barbarian.* It therefore designated only a *part* of Gentile humanity. Here, where it is used in opposition to *Jew,* it includes the whole Gentile world. Greeks were indeed the *élite* of the Gentiles, and might be regarded as representing the Gentiles in general; comp. 1 Cor. i. 22–24. This difference in the extension of the name *Greeks* arises from the fact that in ver. 14 the only matter in question was *Paul's* ministry, the domain of which was subdivided into civilised *Gentiles* (Greeks) and *barbarian* Gentiles; while here the matter in question is the gospel's sphere of action in general, a sphere to which the whole of mankind belong (*Jews*

and *Gentiles*). The word πρῶτον, *first*, should not be interpreted, as some think, in the sense of *principally*. It would be false to say that salvation is intended for the Jews *in preference* to the Greeks. Paul has in view the right of *priority in time* which belonged to Israel as the result of its whole history. As to this right, God had recognised it by making Jesus to be born in the midst of this people; Jesus had respected it by confining Himself during His earthly life to gathering together *the lost sheep of the house of Israel*, and by commanding His apostles to begin the evangelization of the world with Jerusalem and Judea, Acts i. 8; Peter and the Twelve remained strictly faithful to it, as is proved by the first part of the Acts, chaps. ii.–xii.; and Paul himself had uniformly done homage to it by beginning the preaching of the gospel, in every Gentile city to which he came as an apostle, in the synagogue. And, indeed, this right of priority rested on the destination of Israel to become itself the apostle of the Gentiles in the midst of whom they lived. It was for Jewish believers to convert the world. For this end they must needs be the first to be evangelized. The word πρῶτον (*first*) is wanting in the *Vat.* and the *Bœrner* Cod. (Greek and Latin). We know from Tertullian that it was wanting also in Marcion. The omission of the word in the latter is easily explained; he rejected it simply because it overturned his system. Its rejection in the two MSS. B and G is more difficult to explain. Volkmar holds that Paul might ascribe a priority to the Jews in relation to *judgment*, as he does ii. 9, but not in connection with *salvation;* the πρῶτον of ii. 10 he therefore holds to be an interpolation from ii. 9, and that of our ver. 16, a second interpolation from ii. 10. An ingenious combination, intended to make the apostle the relentless enemy of Judaism, agreeably to Baur's system, but belied by the missionary practice of Paul, which is perfectly in keeping with our *first* and with that of ii. 10. The omission must be due to the carelessness of the copyist, the simple form: *to the Jew and to the Greek* (without the word *first*), naturally suggesting itself. While paying homage to the *historical* right of the Jewish people, Paul did not, however, intend to restore particularism. By the τε καί, *as well as*, he forcibly maintains the radical religious

equality already proclaimed in the words: *to every one that believeth.*

It concerns the apostle now to explain how the gospel can really be the *salvation of the world* offered to all believers. Such is the object of ver. 17. The gospel is salvation, because it offers *the righteousness of God.*

Ver. 17. "*For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith: as it is written, But the just shall live by faith.*"—The first part of this verse is a repetition of ver. 16, in more precise language. Paul explains how *this power unto salvation,* which should save the believer, acts: it *justifies* him. Such is the fundamental idea of the Epistle.

The term *righteousness of God* cannot here mean, as it sometimes does, for example, iii. 5 and 25, an *attribute* of God, whether His perfect moral purity, or His retributive justice. Before the gospel this perfection was already distinctly revealed by the law; and the prophetic words which Paul immediately quotes: "*The just* shall live by faith," prove that in his view this justice of God is a condition of man, not a divine attribute.

In what does this state consist? The term δικαιοσύνη, *justice,* strictly designates the moral position of a man who has fully met all his obligations (comp. vi. 13, 16; Eph. v. 9; Matt. v. 17, etc.). Only here the complement: *of God,* and the expression: *is revealed by the gospel,* lead us to give the term a more particular sense: the relation to God in which a man would naturally be placed by his righteousness, if he were righteous, and which God bestows on him of grace on account of his faith. Two explanations of this notion meet us. They are well stated by Calvin: "Some think that *righteousness* consists not merely in the *free pardon* of sins, but *partly* also in the grace of *regeneration.*" "For my part," he adds, "I take the meaning to be that we are restored to life, because God *freely reconciles* us to Himself." On the one hand, therefore, an inward regeneration on the ground of which God pardons; on the other, a free reconciliation on the ground of which God regenerates. In the former case: God acting first *as Spirit* to deposit in the soul the germ of the new life (*to render* man effectually *just,* at least virtually), and afterwards as *judge* to pardon; in the latter, God acting first as

judge to pardon (*to declare* man *just*), and afterwards as *Spirit* to quicken and sanctify.

The first of these views is that of the Catholic Church, formulated by the Council of Trent,[1] and professed by a number of Protestant theologians (among the earlier, Osiander; Beck, in our day). It is the point of view defended by Reuss and Sabatier. The latter defines justification: "the creation of spiritual life."[2] The second notion is that round which the Protestant churches in general have rallied. It was the soul of Luther's religious life; and it is still the centre of doctrinal teaching in the church which claims the name of this Reformer. We have not here to treat the subject from a dogmatical or moral point of view. We ask ourselves this one thing: Which of the two views was the apostle's, and best explains his words?

In our verse the verb *reveals itself*, or *is revealed*, applies more naturally to a righteousness which is *offered*, and which God attributes to man in consequence of a *declaration*, than to a righteousness which is *communicated* internally by the gift of the Spirit. The instrument of appropriation constantly insisted on by the apostle, *faith*, also corresponds better to the acceptance of a *promise* than to the acceptance of a real communication. The contrast between the two evidently parallel phrases: "*The righteousness of God is revealed*," ver. 17, and: "*The wrath of God is revealed*," ver. 18, leads us equally to regard the *righteousness of God* as a state of things which He founds in His capacity of *judge*, rather than a new life conveyed by His Spirit. The opposite of the new life is not the *wrath* of the judge, but the *sin* of man. — In iv. 3, Paul justifies his doctrine of the *righteousness of God* by the words of Moses: "Now Abraham believed God, and it was *counted* to him *for righteousness*" (counted as the equivalent of a righteous and irreproachable life). The idea of *counting* or *imputing* applies better to a sentence which ascribes than to an act of real communication. — In the same chapter, vv. 7, 8,

[1] Sess. vi. c. 7: [Justificatio] non est sola peccatorum remissio, *sed et sanctificatio et renovatio* interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiæ.

[2] *L'apôtre Paul*, p. 261. Let it be remembered that the author whom we are quoting defined faith (p. 265) "the inward creation of the divine life." Does Paul's language allow us to give a definition identically the same of faith and justification?

the notion of the *righteousness of God* is explained by the terms *pardon* and *non-imputation* of sin. There is evidently no question there of positive communication, of a gift of spiritual life. — In chap. v. 9, 10, Paul contrasts with *justification* by the *blood* of Christ and with *reconciliation* by His *death*, as the foundation of salvation, *deliverance* from wrath (in the day of judgment), by the communication of His *life*, as the consummation of salvation. Unless we are to convert the copestone into the basis, we must put justification by the blood first, and the communication of life by the Spirit second; the one, as the condition of entrance into the state of salvation here below; the other, as the condition of entrance into the state of glory above. — The very structure of the Epistle to the Romans forbids us to entertain a doubt as to the apostle's view. If the communication of spiritual life were, in his judgment, the condition of pardon, he must have begun his Epistle with chaps. vi.–viii., which treat of the destruction of sin and of the gift of the new life, and not with the long passage, i. 18–v. 21, which refers wholly to the removal of *condemnation*, and to the conditions, objective and subjective, of *reconciliation*. — Finally, it is contrary to the fundamental principle of Paul's gospel, *entire freeness* of salvation, to put regeneration in any degree whatever as the basis of reconciliation and pardon. It is to make the effect the cause, and the cause the effect. According to St. Paul, God does not *declare* man righteous after having *made* him righteous; He does not *make* him righteous till He has first *declared* him righteous. The whole Epistle to the Romans excludes the first of these two principles (which is no other than the Judaizing principle ever throwing man back *on himself*), and goes to establish the second (the evangelical principle which detaches man radically from himself and throws him *on God*).[1] See on the transition from chap. v. to chap. vi. — We add here, as a necessary supplement, a study on the meaning of the word δικαιοῦν, *to justify*.

[1] It is clear what we must think of M. Sabatier's vehement attack on the doctrine of *imputed* (or, as he calls it, *forensic*) righteousness: "Paul would not have had words severe enough to blast so gross an interpretation of his meaning" (p. 260)! — Holsten himself cannot avoid doing homage to exegetical truth. He says: "Righteousness is an *objective* state, in which man is placed by a divine act."

Excursus on the use of the word δικαιοῦν, *to justify.*[1] — The question is this: Are we to understand the word δικαιοῦν, *to justify*, in the sense of *making* just or *declaring* just?

Verbs in ω have sometimes the meaning of *making*: δηλόω, *to make clear*; δουλόω, *to make a slave*; τυφλόω, *to make blind.* But this use of the termination ω does not form the rule; this is seen in the verbs ζημιόω, *to punish*; μισθόω, *to hire*; λουτρόω, *to bathe*; μαστιγόω, *to scourge.*

As to δικαιόω, there is not an example in the whole of classic literature where it signifies: *to make just.* With accusative of things it signifies: *to think right.* The following are examples: Thucyd. ii. 6: "*Thinking it right* (δικαιοῦντες) to return to the Lacedemonians what these had done them." iv. 26: "He will not *form a just idea* of the thing (οὐκ ὀρθῶς δικαιώσει)." Herod. i. 133: "*They think it good* (δικαιεῦσι) to load the table." Justin, *Cohort. ad Gentil.* (ii. 46, ed. Otto): "When *he thought good* (ἐδικαίωσε) to bring the Jews out of Egypt." Finally, in ecclesiastical language: "It has been *found good* (δεδικαίωται) by the holy Council."

With accusative of persons this verb signifies: *to treat justly*, and most frequently *sensu malo, to condemn, punish.* Aristotle, in *Nicom.* v. 9, contrasts ἀδικεῖσθαι, *to be treated unjustly*, with δικαιοῦσθαι, *to be treated according to justice.* Eschylus, *Agam.* 391–393, says of Paris, that he has no right to complain if he is *judged unfavourably* (δικαιωθείς); let him reap what is his due. Thucyd. iii. 40: "You *will condemn* your own selves (δικαιώσεσθε)." Herod. i. 100: "When any one had committed a crime, Dejoces sent for him and *punished* him (ἐδικαίευ)." On occasion of the vengeance which Cambyses wreaked on the Egyptian priests, Herodotus says (iii. 29): "And the priests *were punished* (ἐδικαιεῦντο)." So we find in Dion Cassius: δικαιοῦν; and in Elian: δικαιοῦν τῷ θανάτῳ, in the sense of *punishing with death.*

Thus profane usage is obvious: *to think just*, or *treat justly* (most frequently by *condemning* or *punishing*); in both cases establishing the right by a sentence, *never* by communicating justice. Hence it follows that, of the two meanings of the word we are examining, that which comes nearest classical usage is undoubtedly *to declare*, and not to *make* just.

But the meaning of the verb δικαιοῦν, *to justify*, in the New Testament, depends less on profane Greek than on the use of the Old Testament, both in the original Hebrew and in the

[1] To avoid endless quotations, I refer once for all to Morison's dissertation in his *Commentary* on Rom. iii. in connection with the word δικαιωθήσεται, ver. 20 (pp. 161–200). I do not think that, in all theology has produced on this subject, there is anything better thought out or more complete. The following study is little more than an extract from it.

version of the LXX. This, therefore, is what we have, above all, to examine. To the term *justify* there correspond in Hebrew the Piel and Hiphil of *tsadak, to be just.* The Piel *tsiddek*, in the five cases where it is used, signifies not *to make just* inwardly, but *to show* or *declare* just.[1] The Hiphil *hits'dik* appears twelve times;[2] in eleven cases the meaning to justify *judicially* is indisputable; for example, Ex. xxiii. 7: "For I *will* not *justify* the wicked," certainly means: I *will not declare* the wicked *just;* and not: I will not make him just inwardly; Prov. xvii. 15: "He that *justifieth* the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, are abomination to the Lord." Any other meaning than that of *declaring* just is absurd. So with the others. In the twelfth passage only, Dan. xii. 3, the word *may* be understood either in the sense of *making just*, or of *presenting as just.* (The LXX. translate differently altogether, and without using the word δικαιοῦν.)

It is on this almost uniform meaning of the verb *tsadak* in the Piel and Hiphil that Paul and the other writers of the New Testament founded their use of the word δικαιοῦν, *to justify.* For this word δικαιοῦν is that by which the Hebrew word was constantly rendered by the LXX.[3]

The use of the word δικαιοῦν, *to justify*, in the New Testament, appears chiefly from the following passages:—Rom. ii. 13: the subject is the last judgment; then, one is not *made*, but *recognised* and *declared just;* iii. 4: God is the subject; God is not *made*, but *recognised* or *declared* just by man; iii. 20: to be justified *before God* cannot signify: to be *made* just *by* God; the phrase *before God* implies the judicial sense; iv. 2: to be justified *by works;* this phrase has no meaning except in the judicial sense of the word *justify;* 1 Cor. iv. 4: Paul is not conscious of any unfaithfulness; but for all that *he is not* yet *justified;* a case where it is impossible to apply any other meaning than the judicial. The reader will do well to consult also Matt. xi. 19 and Luke vii. 35 ("wisdom [God's] is *justified* of her children"); Luke vii. 29 (the publicans *justified* God); Matt. xii. 37 ("by thy words thou shalt be *justified*, and by thy

[1] Job xxxii. 2, xxxiii. 32; Jer. iii. 11; Ezek. xvi. 51, 52.

[2] Ex. xxiii. 7; Deut. xxv. 1; 2 Sam. xv. 4; 1 Kings viii. 32; 2 Chron. vi. 23; Job xxvii. 5; Ps. lxxxii. 3; Prov. xvii. 15; Isa. i. 8, v. 23, liii. 11; Dan. xii. 3.

[3] The LXX. sometimes use δικαιοῦν where some other Hebrew verb occurs, and in these cases eight times in the strictly judicial sense; seven times, as Morison says, in a semi-judicial sense. Once they use it in the sense of *purifying.* Ps. lxxiii. 13: "I have cleansed (*ziqqiti*) my heart (ἐδικαίωσα τὴν καρδίαν μου)." This is the only case where δικαιοῦν has this meaning throughout the whole version of the LXX.

words thou shalt be *condemned*"); Luke x. 29 ("he, wishing *to justify himself*"), xvi. 15 ("ye are they *who justify yourselves*"), xviii. 14 ("the *justified* publican"); Acts xiii. 39 ("to be *justified from the things* from which they could not have been *justified* by the law"); Jas. ii. 21, 24, 25 ("to be *justified by works*").[1]

There is not a single one of these passages where the idea of an *inward communication* of righteousness would be suitable. In favour of this meaning the words, 1 Cor. vi. 11, have sometimes been quoted. If the passage be carefully examined in its context, vi. 1–10, it will clearly appear that it forms no exception to the constant usage of the New Testament, as it has been established by the collective showing of the passages just quoted.

That from a dogmatic point of view this notion of justification should be rejected as too external and forensic, we can understand,[2] though we are convinced that thereby the very sinews of the gospel are destroyed. But that, exegetically speaking, there can possibly be two ways of explaining the apostle's view, is what surprises us.

The notion of the *righteousness of God*, according to Paul, embraces two bestowals of grace: man treated—(1) as if he had never committed any evil; (2) as if he had always accomplished all the good God could expect from him. The sentence of justification which puts man in this privileged state in relation to God is the δικαίωσις, the *act of justification*. In virtue of this act "man has henceforth," as Hofmann says, "the righteousness of God for him, and not against him."

What is the meaning of the genitive Θεοῦ, *of God*, in the phrase: *righteousness of God?* Luther's interpretation, maintained by Philippi, is well known: a righteousness *valid before* God (iii. 20; Gal. iii. 11). But this meaning of the complement is very forced. Baur makes it a genitive of *quality*: a righteousness agreeable to the *nature* of God. Is it not simpler to take it as a genitive of *origin*: a justice which has God Himself for its author? We are led to this sense also

[1] To complete the list we have only to quote Rom. vi. 7, viii. 30, 33; Gal. ii. 16, 17, iii. 8, 11, 24, v. 4. The only case where discussion could arise is Rom. vi. 7, where δικαιοῦν, in any case, cannot signify *to make just* inwardly (see on the passage).

[2] On the *judicial* point of view in general, and the notion of *right* as applied to God, see on iii. 25.

by the parallel expressions: "The righteousness that *cometh from God*" (ἡ ἐκ Θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη), Phil. iii. 9; "*the righteousness of God*" (ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη) opposed to our *own* righteousness, Rom. x. 3. Of course a righteousness of which God is the author must correspond to His essence (Baur), and be accepted by Him (Luther).

The word ἀποκαλύπτεται, *is revealed* or *reveals itself*, denotes the act whereby a thing hitherto veiled now bursts into the light; compare the parallel but different expression, πεφανέρωται, *has been manifested*, iii. 21. The present, *is being revealed*, is explained here by the regimen *in it*, ἐν αὐτῷ—that is to say, in the gospel. This substantive should still be taken in the active sense which we have given it: the *act* of evangelical preaching. It is by this proclamation that the righteousness of God *is* daily *revealed* to the world. — The expression ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, *from faith to faith*, has been interpreted very variously. Most frequently it has been thought to signify the idea of the *progress* which takes place in faith itself, and in this sense it has been translated: *from faith on to faith*. This progress has been applied by some Fathers (Tert., Origen, Chrysost.) to the transition from faith in the Old Testament to faith as it exists in the New. But there is nothing here to indicate a comparison between the old and new dispensations. The Reformers have taken the progress of faith to be in the heart of the individual believer. His faith, weak at first, grows stronger and stronger. Calvin: *Quotidianum in singulis fidelibus progressum notat.* So also thought Luther and Melanchthon; Schaff: "Assimilation by faith should be continually renewed." But the phrase thus understood does not in the least correspond with the verb *is revealed;* and, what is graver still, this idea is utterly out of place in the context. A notion so special and secondary as that of the progress which takes place in faith is inappropriate in a summary which admits only of the fundamental ideas being indicated. It would even be opposed to the apostle's aim to connect the attainment of righteousness with this objective progress of the believer in faith. It is merely as a curiosity of exposition that we mention the view of those who understand the words thus: by faith *in faith*—that is to say, in the faithfulness of God (iii. 3). Paul's real view is certainly

this: the righteousness of God is revealed by means of the preaching of the gospel as *arising from faith* (ἐκ πίστεως), in this sense, that it is nothing else than faith itself reckoned to man as righteousness. The ἐκ, strictly speaking, *out of*, which we can only render by means of the preposition *by*, expresses *origin*. This regimen is joined to the verb *is revealed* by the phrase understood: *as being*. This righteousness *of* faith is revealed at the same time as being *for faith*, εἰς πίστιν. This second regimen signifies that the *instrument* by which each individual must personally appropriate such a righteousness is likewise *faith*. To make this form of expression clear, we have only to state the opposite one: *Our own righteousness* is a righteousness of *works* and *for works*—that is to say, a righteousness arising from works done and revealed with a view to works to be done. Our formula is the direct opposite of that which described legal righteousness. To be exact, we need not say that *to faith* here is equivalent to: *to the believer*. Paul is not concerned with the person appropriating, but solely with the instrument of appropriation, and his view in conjoining these two qualifying clauses was simply to say: that in this righteousness faith is everything, absolutely everything; in essence it is faith itself; and each one appropriates it by faith. These two qualifying clauses meet us in a somewhat different form in other passages; iii. 22: "The righteousness of God *through* faith in Christ *unto* (*and upon*) all them that believe;" Gal. iii. 22: "That the promise *by* faith of Jesus may be given *to* them that believe;" Phil. iii. 9: "Having the righteousness which is *by* faith in Christ, the righteousness of God *unto* faith." We need not, however, paraphrase the words *unto faith*, with some commentators, in the sense: *to produce* faith. The εἰς, *unto*, seems to us to indicate merely the *destination*. It is a righteousness of faith offered to faith. All it has to do is to take possession of it. Of course we must not make a merit of faith. What gives it its justifying value is its object, without which it would remain a barren aspiration. But the object laid hold of could have no effect on man without the active apprehension, which is faith.

The apostle is so convinced of the unity which prevails between the old and new covenants, that he cannot assert one

of the great truths of the gospel without quoting a passage from the Old Testament in its support. He has just stated *the theme* of his Epistle; now comes what we may call the *text:* it is a passage from Habakkuk (ii. 4), which had evidently played an important part in his inner life, as it did decisively in the life of Luther. He quotes it also Gal. iii. 11 (comp. x. 37). With all that prides itself on its own strength, whether in the case of foreign conquerors or in Israel itself, the prophet contrasts the humble Israelite who puts his *confidence* in God alone. The former will perish; the latter, who alone is *righteous* in the eyes of God, *shall live.* The Hebrew word which we translate by *faith, emounah,* comes from the verb *aman, to be firm;* whence in the Hiphil: *to rest on, to be confident in.* In the Hebrew it is: *his* faith (*emounatho*); but the LXX. have translated as if they had found *emounathi, my* faith (that of God), which might signify either my *faithfulness,* or faith *in me.* What the translators thought is of small importance. Paul evidently goes back to the original text, and quotes exactly when he says: "*his* faith," the faith of the believer in his God. In the Hebrew text it is agreed by all that the words *by his faith* are dependent on the verb *shall live,* and not on the word *the just.* But from Theodore Beza onwards, very many commentators think that Paul makes this subordinate clause dependent on the word *the just:* "*The just by faith* shall live." This meaning really seems to suit the context more exactly, the general idea being that righteousness (not life) comes by faith. This correspondence is, however, only apparent; for Paul's saying, thus understood, would, as Oltramare acutely observes, put in contrast the *just by faith,* who shall live, and the *just by works,* who shall not live. But such a thought would be inadmissible in Paul's view. For he holds that, if one should succeed in being righteous by his works, *he would certainly live by them* (x. 5). We must therefore translate as in the Hebrew: The just *shall live by faith;* and the meaning is this: "the just shall live by faith" (by which he has been made just). Paul might have said: *the sinner* shall be saved by faith. But the sinner, in this case, he calls *just* by anticipation, viewing him in the state of righteousness into which his faith shall bring him. If he lives by his faith, it is

obviously because he has been made just by it, since no one is saved except as being just. The word ζήσεται, shall live, embraced in the prophet's view: 1. *Deliverance* from present evils (those of the Chaldean invasion), and, in the case of posterity, deliverance from evils to come; 2. The *possession* of divine grace in the enjoyment of the blessings of the Promised Land. These two notions are, of course, spiritualized by Paul. They become: deliverance from perdition and the possession of eternal life. It is the idea of σωτηρία, *salvation*, ver. 16, reproduced. The word *shall live* will also have its part to play in the didactic exposition which now begins, and which will develope the contents of this text. In fact, to the end of chap. v. the apostle analyzes the idea of the *righteousness of faith;* the word *shall live* serves as a theme to the whole part from chaps. vi.–viii., and afterwards, for the practical development, chaps. xii.–xiv.

The exposition of the *righteousness of faith*, which begins in the following verse, comprises three great developments: the description of universal condemnation, i. 18–iii. 20; that of universal justification, iii. 21–v. 11; and, following up this great contrast as its consummation, parallel between Adam and Christ (v. 12–21). The idea of this entire part, i.–v., taken *as a whole*, is therefore: *the demonstration of justification by faith.*

FUNDAMENTAL PART.

I. 18–V. 21.

The principal subdivision of this part is indicated by the somewhat amplified repetition of ver. 17, which we shall find iii. 21, 22. There we again meet with the phrase *righteousness of God;* the verb *was manifested* evidently corresponds to the word *is revealed;* and the two secondary clauses: *by faith of Jesus Christ*, and: *unto and upon all them that believe*, are the development of the phrase *from faith to faith.* It follows from this parallel that the apostle did not mean immediately to study this great truth of justification by faith; but he felt the need of preparing the way for this exposition by laying bare

in human life the reasons for this so extraordinary and apparently abnormal mode of salvation. Such, indeed, is the subject of the first section, i. 18–iii. 20: If the gospel reveals the righteousness of God, it is because there is another revelation, that of the *wrath of God*, and because this latter, unless mankind be destined to perish, requires the former.

FIRST SECTION (I. 18–III. 20).

THE WRATH OF GOD RESTING ON THE WHOLE WORLD.

In chap. i., from ver. 18, St. Paul is undoubtedly describing the miserable state of the *Gentile world*. From the beginning of chap. ii. he addresses a personage who very severely judges the Gentile abominations just described by Paul, and who evidently represents a wholly different portion of mankind. At ver. 17 he apostrophizes this personage by his name: it is *the Jew;* and he demonstrates to him that he also is under the burden of wrath. Hence it follows that the first piece of this section goes to the end of chap. i., and has for its subject: the need of salvation demonstrated by the state of the contemporary Gentile world.

FOURTH PASSAGE (I. 18–32).

The Wrath of God on the Gentiles.

According to Paul's usual style, the first verse contains summarily all the ideas developed in the following piece. The study of the verse will thus be an analysis by anticipation of the whole passage.

Ver. 18. "*For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who repress the truth unrighteously.*"—The transition from ver. 17 to ver. 18, indicated by *for*, can only be this: There is a *revelation of righteousness* by the gospel, because there is a revelation of *wrath* on the whole world. The former is necessary *to save the world* (comp. σωτηρία, *salvation*, ver. 16) from the consequences of the latter.—From the notion of *wrath*, when it is

applied to God, we must of course remove all that pollutes human wrath, personal resentment, the moral perturbation which gives to the manifestations of indignation the character of revenge. In God, who is the living *Good*, wrath appears as the holy disapprobation of evil, and the firm resolve to destroy it. But it is false to say, as is often done, that this divine emotion applies only to the evil and not to the evil-doer. In measure as the latter ceases to oppose the evil and voluntarily identifies himself with it, he himself becomes the object of wrath and all its consequences.[1] The absence of the article before the word ὀργή, *wrath*, brings into prominence the category rather than the thing itself: manifestation there is, whose character is that of wrath, not of love.—This manifestation proceeds *from heaven*. *Heaven* here does not denote the atmospheric or stellar heaven; the term is the emblematical expression for the invisible residence of God, the seat of perfect order, whence emanates every manifestation of righteousness on the earth, every victorious struggle of good against evil. The visible heavens, the regularity of the motion of the stars, the life-like and pure lustre of their fires, this whole great spectacle has always been to the consciousness of man the sensible representation of *divine order*. It is from this feeling that the prodigal son exclaims: "Father, I have sinned *against heaven* and in thy sight." Heaven in this sense is thus the avenger of all sacred feelings that are outraged; it is as such that it is mentioned here.—By ἀσέβεια, *ungodliness*, Paul denotes all failures in the religious sphere; and by ἀδικία, *unrighteousness*, all that belong to the moral domain. Volkmar very well defines the two terms: "Every denial either of the *essence* or of the *will* of God." We shall again find these two kinds of failures distinguished and developed in the sequel; the first, in the refusal of adoration and thanksgiving, ver. 21 et seq.; the second, in the refusal of the knowledge of moral good proceeding from God, ver. 28*a*.—Ἐπί, *upon, against*, has here a very hostile sense.—The apostle does not say: *of men*, but literally: *of men who repress*. As Hofmann says: "The notion *men* is first presented indefinitely, then it is defined by the special charac-

[1] We refer to an appendix placed at the end of this verse for an examination of Ritschl's theory respecting the wrath of God.

teristic: *who repress*" . . . We may already conclude, from this absence of the article τῶν (*the*) before the substantive, that Paul is not here thinking of all humanity. And, indeed, he could not have charged the Jews with *holding captive* the truth which had been revealed to them, comp. ii. 19–21, while he proceeds to charge this sin directly on the Gentiles. We must therefore regard ver. 18 as the theme of chap. i. only, not that of i. and ii. Besides, the wrath of God was not yet *revealed* against the Jewish world; it was only accumulating (ii. 5).—Certainly the apostle, in expressing himself as he does, does not overlook the varieties in the conduct of the Gentiles, as will appear in the sequel (ii. 14, 15). He refers only to the general character of their life.—*The truth held captive* is, as vv. 19 and 20 prove, the *knowledge of God* as communicated to the human conscience. *To hold it captive*, is to prevent it from diffusing itself in the understanding as a light, and in the conduct as a holy authority and just rule. The verb κατέχειν, *to hold back, detain*, cannot here have the meaning which some interpreters would give it, *to keep, possess*, which the word sometimes has; for example, 1 Cor. xv. 2; 1 Thess. v. 21. In that case we should require to place the charge brought against the Gentiles not in this verb, but in the regimen ἐν ἀδικίᾳ: "who possess the truth *in unrighteousness*" (that is, while practising unrighteousness). But the sequel proves, on the contrary, that the Gentiles had not *kept* the deposit of truth which had been confided to them; and the simple regimen: *in unrighteousness*, would not suffice to characterize the sin charged against them, and which is the reason of the divine wrath. We must therefore take the word κατέχειν, *to detain*, in the sense in which we find it 2 Thess. ii. 6, 7, and Luke iv. 42: *to keep from moving, to repress.* Oltramare: "They hindered it *from breaking forth.*" —Some translate the words ἐν ἀδικίᾳ: *by unrighteousness;* they paralyze the truth in them by the love and practice of evil. But why in this case not again add the notion of ungodliness to that of unrighteousness? The literal meaning is, not *by unrighteousness*, but *by way of unrighteousness;* this regimen is therefore taken in the adverbial sense: *unrighteously, ill and wickedly.* In reality, is there not perversity in paralyzing the influence of the truth on one's heart and life?

To what manifestations does the apostle allude when he says that wrath *is revealed from heaven?* Does he mean simply the judgment of *conscience,* as Ambrose and others, with Hodge most lately, think? But here there would be no patent fact which could be taken as a parallel to the preaching of the gospel (ver. 17). Bellarmine, Grotius, etc., think that Paul means *this preaching* itself, and that the words *from heaven* are synonymous with the ἐν αὐτῷ, *in it* (the gospel), ver. 17. But there is, on the contrary, an obvious antithesis between these two clauses, and consequently a *contrast* between the revelation of righteousness and that of wrath.—The Greek Fathers, as also Philippi, Ewald, and Ritschl in our own day, regard this manifestation as that which shall take place at the *last judgment.* This meaning is incompatible with the verb in the present: *is revealed;* not that a present may not, in certain cases, denote *the idea* of the action, independently of the time of its realization; so the very verb which Paul here uses is employed by him 1 Cor. iii. 13. But there the future (or ideal) sense of the present is plainly enough shown by all the futures surrounding the verb (γενήσεται, δηλώσει, δοκιμάσει), and the context makes it sufficiently clear. But in our passage the present *is revealed,* ver. 18, corresponds to the similar present of ver. 17, which is incontrovertibly the *actual* present. It is not possible, in such a context, to apply the present of ver. 18 otherwise than to a present fact. Hofmann takes the word *is revealed* as referring to that whole multitude of *ills* which constantly oppress sinful humanity; and Pelagius, taking the word *from heaven* literally, found here a special indication of the *storms* and tempests which desolate nature. But what is there in the developments which follow fitted to establish this explanation? The word *is revealed,* placed emphatically at the head of the piece, should propound the theme; and its meaning is therefore determined by the whole explanation which follows.—We are thus brought to the natural explanation. At ver. 24 mention is made of a divine chastisement, that by which men have been given over to the power of their impure lusts. This idea is repeated in ver. 26, and a third time in ver. 28: "God *gave* them *over* to a reprobate mind." Each time this chastisement, a terrible manifestation of God's

wrath, is explained by a corresponding sin committed by the Gentiles. How can we help seeing here, with Meyer, the explanation, given by Paul himself, of his meaning in our verse? Thereby the purport of the following description and its relation to ver. 18 become perfectly clear; *the truth* is explained in vv. 19, 20; it is God's revelation to the conscience of the Gentiles, the notion: *to repress* the truth, is explained in vv. 21–23 (and 25); these are the voluntary errors of paganism; finally, the idea of the *revelation of divine wrath* is developed in vv. 24–27; these are the unnatural enormities to which God has given the Gentiles up, and by which He has avenged His outraged honour. All the notions of ver. 18 are thus resumed and developed in their logical order, vv. 19–27: such is the first cycle (the *ἀσέβεια, ungodliness*). They are resumed and developed a second time in the same order, but under another aspect (the *ἀδικία, unrighteousness*), vv. 28–32. The meaning of the words *is revealed from heaven,* is not therefore doubtful. It has been objected that the term *to reveal* always refers to a *supernatural* manifestation. We do not deny it; and we think that Paul regards the monstrous degradation of pagan populations, which he is about to describe (vv. 24–27 and 29–32), not as a purely natural consequence of their sin, but as a solemn intervention of God's justice in the history of mankind, an intervention which he designates by the term *παραδιδόναι, to give over.*—If ver. 18 contains, as we have said, three principal ideas: 1. The Gentiles knew the truth; 2. They repelled it; 3. For this sin the wrath of God is displayed against them,—the first of these ideas is manifestly that which will form the subject of vv. 19 and 20.

The Wrath of God, according to Ritschl.

In his work, *Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung* (II. 123–138) (The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation), Ritschl ascribes to Pharisaism the invention of the idea of *retributive justice,* and denies its existence in Holy Scripture. Thus obliged to seek a new meaning for the notion of the *wrath of God,* he finds the following: In the Old Testament the wrath of God has only one aim: to preserve the divine covenant; the *wrath of God* therefore only denotes the sudden and violent chastisements with which God smites either the enemies of the covenant, or those of its members who openly

violate its fundamental conditions,—in both cases not with the view of punishing, but of maintaining here below His work of grace. In the New Testament the idea is substantially the same, but modified in its application. The wrath of God cannot have any other than an *eschatological* application; it refers to the last judgment, in which God will cut off the enemies of salvation (not to punish them) but to prevent them from hindering the realization of His kingdom (1 Thess. i. 10; Rom. v. 9). As to our passage, which seems irreconcilable with this notion, this critic deals with it as follows:—We must wait till ii. 4, 5 to find the development of the idea of the *wrath of God*, enunciated in ver. 18. The whole passage, ver. 19–ii. 3, is devoted to setting forth the *sin* of the Gentiles, the fact of their κατέχειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, *holding the truth captive*. The description of *chastisement* (*the revelation of wrath*) is not developed till after ii. 5; now this passage evidently refers to the last judgment. Thus it is that the ingenious theologian succeeds in harmonizing our passage with his system. But I am afraid there is more ability than truth in the mode he follows:—1. Ritschl will not recognise an inward *feeling* in the wrath of God, but merely an outward *act*, a *judgment*. But why in this case does Paul use the word *wrath*, to which he even adds, ii. 8, the term θυμός, *indignation*, which denotes the *feeling* at its deepest? 2. We have seen that the present *is revealed*, forming an antithesis to the tense of ver. 17, and giving the reason of it (γάρ, *for*), can only denote a time *actually* present. 3. Is it not obvious at a glance that the phrase thrice repeated: *wherefore He gave them over* (vv. 24, 26, 28), describes not the *sin* of the Gentiles, but their *chastisement*? That appears from the term *give over*: to give over is the act of the *judge*; *to be given over*, the punishment of the culprit. The same follows also from the *wherefores*; by this word Paul evidently passes each time from the description of the sin to that of the punishment, that is to say, to the *revelation of wrath*. 4. As to ii. 4, 5, these verses do not begin with a *wherefore*, as would be necessary if the apostle were passing at this part of the text from the description of sin to that of chastisement. These verses, on the contrary, are strictly connected with ver. 3, as continuing the refutation of Jewish security in relation to the last judgment, a refutation begun at ver. 3 with the words: "*Thinkest thou . . .?*" and carried on to ver. 4 with these: "*Or* [*indeed*] *despisest thou . . .?*" How can we regard this as the beginning of a new idea, that of chastisement succeeding that of sin? For the examination of the explanation of ver. 32 given by Ritschl, by which he seeks to justify all the violence he does to the text of the apostle, we refer to the verse itself.

With the term *ὀργή, wrath,* before us, applied to the Gentiles first, ver. 18, and afterwards to the Jews, ii. 5, we are justified in holding to the notion of that divine feeling as explained by us, pp. 164, 165.

Vv. 19, 20. "*Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of Him are spiritually seen in His works, even His eternal power and Godhead; that they may be without excuse.*"—The truth of which Paul wished to speak in ver. 18, was that revelation of God's person and character which He had given to men. The *διότι, because* (for *διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι, for the reason that*), carries the thought to that which follows as the reason of what precedes, in contrast to *διό, on account of which* (ver. 24), which points to what precedes as the reason for what follows.—The meaning of this *διότι, seeing that,* is as follows: they quenched the truth, *seeing that* the truth had been revealed to them (vv. 19, 20), and they changed it into a lie (vv. 21–23) (25).—The term *γνωστόν*, strictly, *what can be known,* usually signifies in the New Testament *what is really known* (*γνωστός*); this is its probable meaning in Luke ii. 44; John xviii. 15; Acts i. 19, xvii. 23. Yet it is not quite certain that the first meaning may not also be given to the word in some of the passages quoted; and in classic Greek it is the most usual sense (see the numerous examples quoted by Oltramare). What decides in its favour in our passage is the startling tautology which there would be in saying: "*what is known* of the being of God *is manifested.*" There is therefore ground for preferring here the grammatical and received meaning in the classics. Paul means: "*What can be known* of God without the help of an extraordinary revelation is clearly manifested within them." A light was given in their conscience and understanding, and this light bore on the existence and character of the Divine Being. This present fact: *is manifested,* is afterwards traced to its cause, which is stated by the verb in the aorist: "for God *manifested* it to them;" this *state* of knowledge was due to *a* divine *act* of revelation. God is not known like an ordinary object; when He is known, it is He who gives Himself to be known. The knowledge which beings have of Him is a free act on His part. Ver. 20 explains the external means by which

He wrought this revelation of Himself in the conscience of men.

Ver. 20. He did so by *His works* in nature. By the term *τὰ ἀόρατα, the invisible things*, the apostle designates the essence of God, and the manifold attributes which distinguish it. He sums them up afterwards in these two: *eternal power and Godhead.* Power is that which immediately arrests man, when the spectacle of nature presents itself to his view. In virtue of the principle of causality innate in his understanding, he forthwith sees in this immense effect the revelation of a great cause; and the *Almighty* is revealed to him. But this power appears to his heart clothed with certain moral characteristics, and in particular, wisdom and goodness. He recognises in the works of this power, in the infinite series of means and ends which are revealed in them, the undeniable traces of benevolence and intelligence; and in virtue of the *principle of finality*, or the notion of *end*, not less essentially inherent in his mind, he invests the supreme cause with the moral attributes which constitute what Paul here calls *Godhead, θειότης*, the sum total of qualities in virtue of which the creative power can have organized such a world.—The epithet *ἀΐδιος, eternal* (from *ἀεί, always*), is joined by some with both substantives; but power alone needed to be so defined, in order to contrast it with that host of second causes which are observed in nature. The latter are the result of anterior causes. But the first cause, on which this whole series of causes and effects depends, is *eternal*, that is to say, self-causing. The adjective is therefore to be joined only with the first of the two substantives; the second required no such qualification. These *invisible things*, belonging to the essence of God, have been made visible, since by the creation of the universe they have been externally manifested. *Τοῖς ποιήμασι* is the dative of instrument: *by the works* of God in nature; *ἀπό, since*, indicates that the time of creation was the point of departure for this revelation which lasts still. The complex phrase *νοούμενα καθορᾶται, are spiritually seen*, contains two intimately connected ideas: on the one hand, a viewing with the outward *sense;* on the other, an act of *intellectual* perception, whereby that which presents itself to the eye becomes at the same time a revelation to our consciousness. The

animal *secs* as man does; but it lacks the *νοῦς*, *understanding* (whence the verb *νοεῖν*, *νοούμενα*), whereby man ascends from the contemplation of the work to that of the worker. These two simultaneous sights, the one sensible, the other rational, constitute in man a single act, admirably characterized by the expression *spiritual contemplation*, used by the apostle.

We have here a proof of Paul's breadth of mind and heart. He does not disparage, as the Jews did, and as Christian science has sometimes done, the value of what has been called *natural theology*. And it is certainly not without reason that Baur (*Paulus*, II. p. 260) has regarded this passage as laying the first basis of the apostle's universalism. This same idea of a universal revelation appears again in Paul's discourses at Lystra and Athens (Acts xiv. 17, xvii. 27, 28); so also in 1 Cor. i. 21, and in our own Epistle iii. 29: "Is God not also the God of the Gentiles?" a question which finds its full explanation in the idea of a primordial revelation addressed to all men.

The last words of the verse point out the *aim* of this universal revelation: *that they may be without excuse*. The words are startling: Could God have revealed Himself to the Gentiles only to have a reason for the condemnation with which He visits them? This idea has seemed so revolting, that it has been thought necessary to soften the sense of the phrase *εἰς τὸ* . . . and to translate *so that* (Osterv.), or: "they are *therefore* inexcusable" (Oltram.). It is one great merit of Meyer's commentaries that he has vigorously withstood this method of explanation, which arbitrarily weakens the meaning of certain prepositions and particles used by Paul. Had he wished to say *so that*, he had at command the regular expression *ὥστε εἶναι*. And the truth, if his thought is rightly understood, has nothing so very repulsive about it: in order that, he means, if after having been thus enlightened, they should fall into error as to God's existence and character, they may be without excuse. The first aim of the Creator was to make Himself known to His creature. But if, through his own fault, man came to turn away from this light, he should not be able to accuse God of the darkness into which he had plunged himself. One might translate somewhat coarsely: that in case of going astray, they might not be able to plead ignorance as a pretext. In these circumstances there is nothing

to prevent the *in order that* from preserving its natural meaning.

Vv. 19 and 20 have explained the word ἀλήθεια, *the truth*, of ver. 18. Vv. 21–23 develope the phrase: κατέχειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, *to hold this truth captive.*

Ver. 21. "*Because that, when they knew God, they glorified Him, not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened.*"—The *because that* bears on the idea of *inexcusableness*, which closes ver. 20, and reproduces the feeling of indignation which had dictated the ἐν ἀδικίᾳ, *hurtfully and maliciously*, of ver. 18: "*Yes*, inexcusable, because of the fact that" . . . How can the apostle say of the Gentiles that they *knew* God? Is it a simple possibility to which he is referring! The words do not allow this idea. Ver. 19 declared that the light was really put within them. Paganism itself is the proof that the human mind had really conceived the notion of God; for this notion appears at the root of all the varied forms of paganism. Only this is what happened: the revelation did not pass from the passive to the active form. Man confined himself to receiving it. He did not set himself to grasp it and to develope it spontaneously. He would have been thus raised from light to light; it would have been that way of knowing God *by wisdom* of which Paul speaks, 1 Cor. i. 21. Instead of opening himself to the action of the light, man withdrew from it his heart and will; instead of developing the truth, he quenched it. No doubt acts of worship and thanksgiving addressed to the gods were not wanting in paganism; but it is not without meaning that the apostle takes care to put the words in front: *as God.* The task of the heart and understanding would have been to draw from the contemplation of the work the distinct view of the divine worker, then, in the way of adoration, to invest this sublime being with all the perfections which He displayed in His creation. Such a course would have been to glorify God *as God.* For the highest task of the understanding is to assert God freely, as He asserts Himself in His revelation. But if this act of reason failed, the heart at least had another task to fulfil: *to give thanks.* Does not a child even say thanks to its benefactor? This homage failed like the other. The word

ἤ, *or*, must be understood here, as it often is, in the sense of: *or at least:* The words *as God* also depend logically on *were thankful*, which we have not been able to express in French[1] [nor in English].—Now man could not remain stationary. Not walking forwards in the way of *active religion*, he could only stray into a false path, that of impiety, spoken of ver. 18. Having neglected to set God before it as the supreme object of its activity, the understanding was reduced to work *in vacuo;* it rendered itself in a way *futile* (ἐματαιώθησαν); it peopled the universe with fictions and chimeras. So Paul designates the vain creations of mythology. The term ἐματαιώθησαν, *were struck with vanity*, evidently alludes to μάταια, *vain things*, which was the name given by the Jews to idols (comp. Acts xiv. 15; Lev. xvii. 7; Jer. ii. 5; 2 Kings xvii. 15). The term διαλογισμοί, *reasonings*, is always taken by the writers of the New Testament in an unfavourable sense; it denotes the unregulated activity of the νοῦς, *understanding*, in the service of a corrupt heart. The corruption of the heart is mentioned in the following words: it went side by side with the errors of reason, of which it is at once the cause and the effect. The *heart*, καρδία, is in the New Testament as in the Old (*leb*), the central seat of personal life, what we call *feeling* (*sentiment*), that inner power which determines at once the activity of the understanding and the direction of the will. Destitute of its true object, through its refusal *to be thankful* to God *as God*, the heart of man is filled with inspirations of *darkness;* these are the guilty lusts inspired by the egoistic love of the creature and self. The epithet ἀσύνετος, *without understanding*, is often explained as anticipating what the heart was *to become* in this course: "in such a way as to become foolish." But was there not already something senseless in the ingratitude described in ver. 21? Thus the want of understanding existed from the beginning. In the form of the first aorist passive ἐσκοτίσθη, *was darkened* (as well as in the preceding aorist ἐματαιώθησαν), there is expressed the conviction of a divine dispensation, though still under the form of a natural law, whose penal application has fallen on them.

To this first stage, which is rather of an inward kind, there has succeeded a second and more external one.

[1] M. Oltramare: "They neither glorified nor blessed Him as God."

Vv. 22, 23. "*Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and of birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things.*" Futility of *thought* has reached the character of *folly*. What, in fact, is Polytheism, except a sort of permanent hallucination, a collective delirium, or as is so well said by M. Nicolas, *a possession on a great scale?* And this mental disorder rose to a kind of perfection among the very peoples who, more than others, laid claim to the glory of wisdom. When he says: *professing to be wise*, Paul does not mean to stigmatize ancient philosophy absolutely; he only means that all that labour of the sages did not prevent the most civilised nations, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, from being at the same time the most idolatrous of antiquity. The popular imagination, agreeably served by priests and poets, did not allow the efforts of the wise to dissipate this delirium.

When good is omitted, there always comes in its place an evil committed. As, in respect of the understanding, the refusal of adoration (*they did not glorify*) became a vain labouring of the mind (*they became vain*), and, finally, complete estrangement from truth, folly (*they became fools*); so in respect of the *heart*, ingratitude was first transformed into *darkness;* and, finally,—such is the last term described ver. 23,—into monstrous and debasing fetishism. The ungrateful heart did not stop short at not thanking God, it degraded and dishonoured Him, by changing Him into His opposite.

The *glory* of God is the splendour which His manifested perfections cast into the heart of His intelligent creatures; hence, a bright image which is to man the ideal of all that is good. This image had been produced within them. What did they make of it? The sequel tells. While holding the divine person, they wrapped it up, as it were, in *the likeness* of its opposite; it would have been almost better to leave it in silence, it would not have been so great an affront. The preposition ἐν (which corresponds here to the Hebrew ב) exactly describes this imprisonment of the divine glory *in a form* ignoble and grotesque. This meaning seems to us preferable to that of commentators who, like Meyer, translate ἐν, *by*, which is less natural with a verb such as *change*. It is

simpler to say "change *into*," than "change *by*." The epithet *incorruptible* is, as it were, a protest beforehand against this degradation; we need not then translate, with Oltramare, *immortal*. Paul means to say that the glory of God is not reached by this treatment which it has had to undergo. In the phrase: *the likeness of the image*, we should certainly apply the first term to the material likeness, and the second to the image present to the artist's mind when he conceives the type of God which he is going to represent. The worship of *man* especially characterizes Greek and Roman Polytheism; that of the different classes of animals, Egyptian and Barbarian paganism. We need only refer to the worship of the bull Apis, the ibis, the cat, the crocodile, etc., among the Egyptians.

Thus idolatry, according to Paul, is not a progressive stage reached in the religious thought of mankind, starting from primeval fetishism. Far from being a first step towards the goal of Monotheism, Polytheism is on the contrary the result of degeneracy, an apostasy from the original Monotheism, a darkening of the understanding and heart, which has terminated in the grossest fetishism. The history of religions, thoroughly studied as it is now-a-days, fully justifies Paul's view. It shows that the present heathen peoples of India and Africa, far from rising of themselves to a higher religious state, have only sunk, age after age, and become more and more degraded. It proves that at the root of all pagan religions and mythologies, there lies an original Monotheism, which is the historical starting-point in religion for all mankind.[1]

This statement of the apostle has been regarded as a reflection of that contained in the Book of Wisdom (comp. for example, the passages, Wisd. xiii. 1–8 and xiv. 11–20). But what a difference between the tame and superficial explanation of idolatry, which the Alexandrian author gives to his readers, and the profound psychological analysis contained in the preceding verses of St. Paul! The comparison brings out exactly the difference between the penetration of the author enlightened from above, and that of the ordinary Jew seeking to reconstruct the great historic fact of idolatry by his own powers.

The apostle has developed the two terms of ver. 18: *truth*,

[1] See the complete demonstration of this fact in the treatise of Pfleiderer, *Jahrbücher f. prot. Theol.* 1867.

and repressing the truth. After thus presenting, on the one hand, the divine revelation, and, on the other, the sin of man in quenching it, it remains to him only to expound the third idea of his text: the terrible manifestation of *God's wrath* on that sin, in which the whole of human *impiety* was concentrated.

Vv. 24, 25. "*Wherefore God also*[1] *gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves:*[2] *who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature instead of the Creator, who is blessed for ever. Amen.*"—In these words there is expressed the feeling of indignation raised in the heart of the apostle by the thought and view of the treatment to which God has been subjected by the creature to whom He revealed Himself so magnificently. The verses have something of that παροξυσμός, that *exasperation of heart*, of which the author of the Acts speaks (xvii. 16) when describing Paul's impressions during his stay at Athens. This feeling is expressed forcibly by the two conjunctions διὸ καί, *wherefore also.* Διό, literally, *on account of which*, that is to say, of the sin just described; this first conjunction refers to the justice of punishment in general; the second, καί, *also*, brings out more especially the relation of *congruity* between the nature of the punishment and that of the offence. They sinned, *wherefore* God punished them; they sinned by degrading God, wherefore *also* God degraded them. This καί has been omitted by the Alex.; a mistake, as is plain, for it expresses the profoundest idea of the whole piece. No one would have thought of adding it. The word *gave over* does not signify that God *impelled* them to evil, to punish the evil which they had already committed. The holiness of God is opposed to such a sense, and *to give over* is not *to impel.* On the other hand, it is impossible to stop short at the idea of a simple *permission:* "God *let* them give themselves over to evil." God was not purely passive in the terrible development of Gentile corruption. Wherein did His action consist? He positively withdrew His hand; He ceased to hold the boat as it was dragged by the current of the river. This is the

[1] ℵ A B C omit the καί after διό, which is found in the T. R., with D E G K L P and the most of the Mnn.

[2] ℵ A B C D: ἐν αὐτοῖς; T. R., with E G K L P, the Mnn.: ἐν ἑαυτοῖς.

meaning of the term used by the apostle, Acts xiv. 16: "He *suffered* the Gentiles *to walk* in their own ways," by not doing for them what He never ceased to do for His own people. It is not a case of simple abstention, it is the positive withdrawal of a force. Such also is the meaning of the saying, Gen. vi. 3: "My Spirit shall not always strive with man." As Meyer says: "The law of history, in virtue of which the forsaking of God is followed among men by a parallel growth of immorality, is not a purely natural order of things; the power of God is active in the execution of this law." If it is asked how such a mode of action harmonizes with the moral perfection of God, the answer undoubtedly is, that when man has reached a certain degree of corruption, he can only be cured by the very excess of his own corruption; it is the only means left of producing what all preceding appeals and punishments failed to effect, the salutary action of repentance. So it is that at a given moment the father of the prodigal son lets him go, giving him even his share of goods. The monstrous and unnatural character of the excesses about to be described confirms this view.

The two prepositions, *ἐν, through,* and *εἰς, to,* differ from one another as the current which bears the barque along, once it has been detached from the shore, differs from the abyss into which it is about to be precipitated. Lusts exist in the heart; God abandons it to their power, and then begins that fall which must end in the most degrading impurities. The infinitive *τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι* might be translated: to the impurity *which consists* in dishonouring. But as the whole passage is dominated by the idea of the "manifestation of divine wrath," it is more natural to give this infinitive the notion of end or aim: *in order to* dishonour. It is a condemnation: "You have dishonoured me; I give you up to impurity, that you may dishonour your own selves." Observe the *καί, also,* at the beginning of the verse. The verb *ἀτιμάζεσθαι* is found in the classics only in the passive sense: *to be dishonoured.* This meaning would not suit here, unless we translate, as Meyer does: "that their bodies *might be dishonoured* among them" (the one by the other). But this meaning does not correspond with the force of the apostolic thought. The punishment consists not merely in being dishonoured, but

especially in dishonouring *oneself*. Ἀτιμάζεσθαι must therefore be taken as the middle, and in the active sense: "to dishonour their bodies in themselves." If this middle sense is not common in the classics, it is accidental, for it is perfectly regular. The regimen *in themselves* looks superfluous at first sight; but Paul wishes to describe this blight as henceforth inherent in their very personality: it is a seal of infamy which they carry for the future on their forehead. The meaning of the two readings ἐν αὐτοῖς and ἐν ἑαυτοῖς does not differ; the first is written from the writer's point of view, the second from the viewpoint of the authors of the deed.

The punishment is so severe that Paul interrupts himself, as if he felt the need of recalling how much it was deserved. With the οἵτινες, *those who*, ver. 25, he once more passes from the punishment to the sin which had provoked it. God has dealt so with them, as *people who* had dealt so with Him. Such is the meaning of the pronoun ὅστις, which does not only *designate*, but *describe*. The verb μετήλλαξαν, *travestied*, through the addition of the preposition μετά, enhances the force of the simple ἤλλαξαν, *changed*, of ver. 23: the sin appears ever more odious to the apostle, the more he thinks of it.—The *truth of God* certainly means here: the true notion of His being, the idea which alone corresponds to so sublime a reality, and which ought to be produced by the revelation of Himself which He had given; comp. 1 Thess. i. 9, where the *true God* is opposed to idols. As the abstract term is used to denote the true God, so the abstract word *lie* here denotes idols, that ignoble mask in which the heathen expose the figure of the All-perfect. And here comes the height of insult. After travestying God by an image unworthy of Him, they make this the object of their veneration (ἐσεβάσθησαν). To this term, which embraces all heathen life in general, Paul adds ἐλάτρευσαν, *they served*, which refers to positive acts of *worship*.—Παρά, *by the side of*, signifies with the accusative: *passing beyond*, leaving aside with contempt (to go and adore something else).—The doxology which closes this verse: *who is blessed for ever*, is a homage intended to wash off, as it were, the opprobrium inflicted on God by heathenism. On account of its termination, εὐλογητός may either signify: who *ought to be* blessed, or: *who is* blessed. The second meaning is simpler

and more usual: just because He ought to be so, He is and will be so, whatever the heathen may do in the matter. The term εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, *for ever*, contrasts God's eternal glory with the ephemeral honour paid to idols, or the temporary affronts given to God.—Ἀμήν, *amen*, comes from the Hebrew *aman, to be firm.* It is an exclamation intended to scatter by anticipation all the mists which still exist in the consciousness of man, and darken the truth proclaimed.

Ver. 25 was an interruption extorted from Paul by the need which his outraged heart felt to justify once more the severity of such a punishment. He now resumes his exposition of the punishment, begun in ver. 24; and this time he proceeds to the end. He does not shrink from any detail fitted to bring out the vengeance which God has taken on the offence offered to His outraged majesty.

Vv. 26, 27. "*For this cause God gave them up unto vile affections: for even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature: and likewise*[1] *also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves*[2] *the well-merited recompense of their error.*"—Ver. 26 resumes the description begun in ver. 24, and which Paul had interrupted to ascend, ver. 25, from the punishment to its cause. The διὰ τοῦτο, *for this cause*, relates to ver. 25, and has the same logical bearing as the διό, *wherefore*, in ver. 24, which referred to ver. 23 (reproduced in ver. 25). It is therefore perfectly natural that the verb of the two propositions, vv. 24 and 26, should be one and the same (παρέδωκεν, *He gave over*). — The complement ἀτιμίας, *of dishonour*, is a genitive of quality (*dishonouring, vile*). This word goes back on the end of ver. 24: to *dishonour* their bodies among themselves. The term πάθη, *passions*, has something still more ignoble in it than ἐπιθυμίαι, *lusts*, in ver. 24; for it contains a more pronounced idea of moral passivity, of shameful bondage.—The picture which follows of the unnatural vices then prevalent in Gentile society is confirmed in all points by the frightful details contained in the works of Greek and Latin writers. But it is

[1] A D G P read ὁμοίως δέ instead of ὁμοίως τε, which all the others read.
[2] Instead of ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, B K read ἐν αὐτοῖς.

asked, How can Paul give himself up, with a sort of complacency, to such a delineation? The answer lies in the aim of the whole passage to show the divine wrath displayed on the Gentile world; comp. the term *ἀντιμισθία, meet recompense,* ver. 27. A law broods over human existence, a law which is at the same time a divine act: Such as thou makest thy God, such wilt thou make thyself.—The expressions *ἄῤῥενες, θήλειαι,* literally, *males, females,* are chosen to suit the spirit of the context.—The whole is calculated to show that there is here a just *recompense* on the part of God. The *μετήλλαξαν, they changed, travestied,* corresponds to the same verb, ver. 25, and the *παρὰ φύσιν, contrary to nature,* to the *παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα* of the same verse.—There is in the *ὁμοίως τε* an idea of equality: *and equally so,* while the reading *ὁμοίως δέ* of four Mjj. contains further an idea of progress, as if the dishonouring of man by man were an intensification of that of woman.—In the *ἣν ἔδει,* which we have translated by "*well-merited* recompense" (literally, the recompense *which was meet*), one feels, as it were, the indignant breathing of God's holy wrath. Justice could not let it be otherwise! The *error, πλάνη,* is not that of having sought satisfaction in such infamies; it is the voluntary lie of *idolatry,* the lie (*ψεῦδος*) of ver. 25, the quenching of the truth, ver. 18; for this is what explains the *ἀντιμισθία,* the withering *retribution* just described. Once again the clause *in themselves* brings out the depth of this blight; they bear it in themselves, it is visible to the eyes of all.

The moral sentiment in man is based on the conception of the holy God. To abandon the latter, is to paralyze the former. By honouring God we ennoble ourselves; by rejecting Him we infallibly ruin ourselves. Such, according to the apostle, is the relation between heathenism and moral corruption. Independent morality is not that of St. Paul.

He has described the *ungodliness* of the Gentile world, idolatry, and its punishment, unnatural *impurities.* He now describes the other aspect of the world's sin, *unrighteousness,* and its punishment, the overflowing of monstrous *iniquities* committed by men against one another, and threatening to overwhelm society.

Ver. 28. "*And even as they did not think good to retain God*

in their knowledge, God[1] *gave them over to a mind void of discernment, to do those things which are not convenient.*"—The ungodliness of the Gentiles was accompanied by a depth of iniquity: the refusal to let the thought of the perfect God rule human life. *To retain God as an object of distinct knowledge* (the literal sense of Paul's words), is to keep alive within the mind the view of that holy Being, so that His will shall give law to our whole conduct. This is what the Gentiles refused to do. Ceasing to contemplate God and His will, they were given over to all unrighteousness.—*Καθώς, even as* (literally, *agreeably to which*), indicates anew the exact correlation between this unrighteousness and the punishment about to be described.—*Νοῦς ἀδόκιμος*, which we translate: *a mind void of discernment*, corresponds to the *οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν, they did not think good;* having refused to appreciate God, they lost the true sense of moral appreciation, and this loss with all its consequences is a judgment, as well as the unnatural passions described above. Such is the force of the *παρέδωκεν, gave over*, corresponding to the same verb in vv. 24 and 26. —The phrase: *those things which are not convenient*, to express *evil*, is well suited to the notion *of appreciation* which is included in the verb *δοκιμάζειν, to judge good*, and the adjective *ἀδόκιμος*. Evil is here characterized as moral *incongruity*, calculated to revolt the *νοῦς, reason*, if it were not deprived of its natural discernment. The infinitive *ποιεῖν, to do*, is almost equivalent to a Latin gerund "*in doing.*" The subjective negation *μή* with the participle signifies: *all that is ranked* in the class designated by the participle.—Remark, finally, the intentional repetition of the substantive *ὁ Θεός, God:* "As thou treatest *God, God* treateth thee." It is by mistake that this second *God* is omitted in the *Sinaït.* and *Alex.*—Volkmar makes ver. 28 the beginning of a new section. He would have it that the subject begun here is Jewish, in opposition to Gentile guiltiness (vv. 18–27). But nothing, either in the text or in the thought, indicates such a transition; the *καί, also*, is opposed to it, and the charge raised by the apostle in the following verses, and especially ver. 32, is exactly the opposite of the description which he gives of the Jews, chap. ii. The latter appear as the *judges* of Gentile corruption,

[1] ℵ A here omit ὁ Θεός.

while the men characterized in ver. 32 *give it* their *applause.*

Ver. 29*a*. "*Being filled with all sort of unrighteousness,*[1] *perverseness, maliciousness, covetousness.*"[2]—In the following enumeration we need not seek a rigorously systematic order. Paul evidently lets his pen run on as if he thought that, of all the bad terms which should present themselves, none would be out of place or exaggerated. But in this apparent disorder one can detect a certain grouping, a connection through the association of ideas.—The first group which we have detached in our translation embraces four terms; according to the T. R., five. But the word πορνεία, *uncleanness,* should evidently be rejected; for it is wanting in many Mjj.; it is displaced in some others; finally, the subject has been exhausted in what precedes. — The phrase: "all sort of *unrightcousness,*" embraces collectively the whole following enumeration: πονηρία, *perverseness,* denotes the bad instinct of the heart; κακία, *maliciousness,* the deliberate wickedness which takes pleasure in doing harm; πλεονεξία, *covetousness* (the desire of having more πλέον ἔχειν), the passion for money, which does not scruple to lay hold of the possessions of its neighbour to augment its own. The participle πεπληρωμένους, *filled,* at the head of this first group, is in apposition to the understood subject of ποιεῖν.

The four terms of this first group thus refer to injustices committed against the well-being and *property* of our neighbour.

Ver. 29*b*. "*Full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, bitterness.*"—These five terms form again a natural group, which embraces all the injustices whereby the *person* of our neighbour is injured. The adjective μεστούς, *full of* (properly, *stuffed*), on which this group depends, indicates a change of idea from the preceding. As an adjective, it denotes solely the present attribute, while the preceding participle implied the *process of growth* which had led to the state described. The similarity of sound in the two Greek words: φθόνου, *envy,* and φόνου,

[1] After ἀδικία (*unrighteousness*) the T. R. reads πορνεία (*uncleanness*), with L only; D F G place πορνεία after κακία (*maliciousness*); ℵ A B C K reject it entirely.

[2] These three last terms are transposed in the MSS. (ℵ A: πονηρία κακία πλεονεξία; B L: πον., πλεον., κακ.; C: κακ., πον., πλεον.).

murder, has led to their being often combined also in the classics; besides, envy leads to murder, as is shown by the example of Cain. If envy does not go the length of making away with him whose advantages give us umbrage, it seeks at least to trouble him with deception in the enjoyment of his wealth; this is expressed by ἔρις, *debate*, quarrelling; finally, in this course one seeks to injure his neighbour by deceiving him (δόλος, *deceit*), or to render his life miserable by bitterness of temper (κακοήθεια).

Ver. 30*a*. "*Whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters.*"—The dispositions expressed in the six terms of this group are those of which pride is the centre. There is no reason for reducing them to four, as Hofmann would, by making the second term the epithet of the first, and the fourth that of the third; this does not suit the rapidity of the enumeration and the need of accumulating terms.—Ψιθυριστής, *whisperer*, the man who pours his poison against his neighbour by whispering into the ear; καταλαλός, the man who blackens publicly; θεοστυγής signifies, in the two classical passages where it is found (Euripides), *hated of God*, and Meyer therefore contends that the passive sense ought to be preserved here, while generalizing it; the name would thus signify all hardened malefactors. But this general meaning is impossible in an enumeration in which the sense of each term is limited by that of all the rest. The active signification: *hating God*, is therefore the only suitable one; it is the highest manifestation of pride, which cannot brook the thought of this superior and judge; one might say: the most monstrous form of calumny (the malediction of Providence); Suidas and Œcumenius, two writers nearer the living language than we, thought they could give to this word the active signification, a fact which justifies it sufficiently. To insolence toward God (the sin of ὕβρις among the Greeks) there is naturally joined *insult* offered to men: ὑβριστής, *insolent, despiteful*. The term ὑπερήφανος (from ὑπέρ, φαίνομαι), *proud*, designates the man who, from a feeling of his own superiority, regards others with haughtiness; while ἀλαζών, *boaster*, denotes the man who seeks to attract admiration by claiming advantages he does not really possess.

Vv. 30*b*, 31. "*Inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents,*

without understanding, covenant-breakers, without natural affection,[1] *unmerciful.*"—The last group refers to the extinction of all the natural feelings of humanity, filial affection, loyalty, tenderness, and pity. It includes six terms. The first, *inventors of evil things,* denotes those who pass their lives meditating on the evil to be done to others; so Antiochus Epiphanes is called by the author of 2 Macc. (vii. 31), πάσης κακίας εὑρετής, and Sejanus by Tacitus, *facinorum repertor.* People of this stamp have usually begun to betray their bad character in the bosom of their families—they have been *disobedient to their parents.*—Ἀσύνετος, *without understanding,* denotes the man who is incapable of lending an ear to wise counsel; thus understood, it has a natural connection with the previous term; Hofmann cites Ps. xxxii. 8, 9.—Ἀσύνθετος, which many translate *irreconcilable,* can hardly have this meaning, for the verb from which it comes does not signify *to reconcile,* but *to decide in common,* and hence *to make a treaty.* The adjective therefore describes *the man who without scruple violates the contracts he has signed,* the faithless man.—Ἄστοργος, *without natural affection,* from στέργειν, to cherish, caress, foster; this word denotes the destruction even of the feelings of natural tenderness, as is seen in a mother who exposes or kills her child, a father who abandons his family, or children who neglect their aged parents. If the following word in the T. R., ἀσπόνδους, *truce-breakers,* were authentic, its meaning would be confounded with that of ἀσυνθέτους, rightly understood.—Ἀνελεήμων, *unmerciful,* is closely connected with the preceding ἀστόργους, *without tenderness;* but its meaning is more general. It refers not only to tender feelings within the family circle; here it calls up before the mind the entire population of the great cities flocking to the circus to behold the fights of gladiators, frantically applauding the effusion of human blood, and gloating over the dying agonies of the vanquished combatant. Such is an example of the unspeakable hardness of heart to which the whole society of the Gentile world descended. What would it have come to if a regenerating breath had not at this supreme moment passed over it? It is in this last group that the fact which the

[1] The T. R. here adds, with C K L P, ασπονδους (*without good faith*); but the word is omitted by ℵ A B D E G.

apostle is concerned to bring out is most forcibly emphasized, that of a divine judgment manifesting itself in this state of things. In fact, we have no more before us iniquities which can be explained by a simple natural egoism. They are enormities which are as unnatural as the infamies described above as the punishment of heathenism. Thus is proved the abandonment of men to a *reprobate* mind (the ἀδόκιμος νοῦς of ver. 28).

Ver. 32. "*Who, knowing*[1] *the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but applaud*[2] *those who do them.*"—The relation of this verse to what precedes has been very generally misunderstood, hence probably the corrections of the text attempted in some MSS.—The most serious misunderstanding is that of Ritschl. This theologian regards the men to whom this verse and the four following (ii. 1–4) refer as forming a class by themselves, and wholly different from the sinners described from ver. 19 onwards. The men *who repress the truth*, ver. 18, are according to him divided into two classes: "those who through heathenism have quenched the feeling of divine revelation (vv. 19–31)," and "those who, while judging the immoralities produced by paganism, nevertheless take part in them by their conduct (ver. 32-ii. 4)." But it is easy to see that this construction is devised solely with the view of finding the development of the idea of *divine wrath*, ver. 18, in the passage ii. 5 et seq., and not in the παραδιδόναι, *giving over*, of vv. 24, 26, and 28 (see p. 168). This construction, proposed by Ritschl, is impossible. 1. Because judging with a view to *approve*, ver. 32, is not the same thing as judging to *condemn*, ii. 1, 2. 2. On account of the obvious relation between the terms of ver. 32: *though knowing the judgment of God*, and those of ver. 28: *they did not keep God in their knowledge.* 3. The uniform sense of the pronoun οἵτινες, *as people who*, forces us to seek in the description of ver. 32 *the justification* of the judgment described from ver. 28. Far, then, from indicating a change of persons, this pronoun expresses the *moral qualification* by which the

[1] Instead of επιγνοντες, B reads επιγινωσκοντες.—To the participle επιγνοντες, D E add the verb ουκ ενοησαν, and G: ουκ εγνωσαν. Further on D adds γαρ after ου μονον.

[2] In place of the two verbs ποιουσιν, συνευδοκουσιν, B reads ποιουντες, συνευδοκουντες.

individuals just described have drawn on them so severe a punishment. It is an exact parallel to the οἵτινες of ver. 25. The latter justified the judgment of idolaters by recalling to mind the greatness of their offence. The former in the same way justifies the punishment which has overtaken the resistance of man to the revelation of moral good (ver. 28*a*): "They had well deserved to be given over to this deluge of iniquities, *they who* had acted thus toward God when He revealed His will to them." The terms which follow and explain the pronoun *they who*, set forth this radical iniquity through which men quenched the sentiment of moral truth revealed in them; comp. ver. 28*a*. Τὸ δικαίωμα, strictly, *what God establishes as just;* here: *His just sentence;* ἐπιγνόντες denotes the clear discernment which men had of it. The word recalls the γνόντες τὸν Θεόν, *knowing God*, of ver. 21: *moral* light was produced in them as well as *religious* light. The words following indicate the contents of that sentence which God had taken care to engrave on their heart. What appeals to God's justice do we not find in the writings of Gentile historians and philosophers! What a description in their poets of the punishment inflicted on malefactors in Tartarus! The phrase *worthy of death* has been applied by some, and recently again by Hofmann, to the *punishment of death* as executed by human judges. But this penalty would suit only one term in the whole preceding enumeration, viz. φόνος, *murder;* and the τὰ τοιαῦτα, *such things*, does not allow so restricted an application. *Death* therefore here denotes death as God only can inflict it, the pains of Hades, which the Gentiles also recognised, and which Paul, designating things from his own point of view, calls *death*. The second part of the verse leads from the offence to the punishment. It is *the mind deprived of discernment*, to which God has given up men, in its most monstrous manifestation; not only doing evil, but applauding those who do it! This is true to fact. Had not the Caligulas and Neros found advocates, admirers, multitudes always ready to offer them incense? The *not only, but even*, rightly assumes that there is more guilt in approving in cold blood of the evil committed by others, than in committing it oneself under the force and blindness of passion. Such a mode of acting is therefore the last stage in the corruption of the moral sense.

The reading of the *Cantab.* would signify: "They who, knowing the sentence of God, *did not understand* that those who do such things are worthy of death; *for* not only do they do them, etc." . . . This meaning would be admissible, but the contents of the sentence of God would remain absolutely unexplained, which is far from natural. The reading of the *Vatic.* would give the following translation: "They who, knowing the sentence of God, that those who do such things are worthy of death, not only *doing* those things, but *approving* those who do them." The construction in this case demands the doubling of the verb εἰσίν, *are* (first, as verb of the proposition ὅτι, *that those who;* then as verb of the proposition οἵτινες, *they who*). This construction is very forced; it is very probable, as has been supposed, that the reading of B is only an importation into the apostolic text of a form of quotation found in the Epistle of Clemens Romanus. This Father, quoting our passage, says: "They who practise these things are abominable in the sight of God; and not only they who do them (οἱ πράσσοντες), but those also who approve them (οἱ συνευδοκοῦντες)." The "*did not understand,*" and the *for* added by the *Cantab.*, appear to be mere attempts to correct the reading of the *Vaticanus.* In the whole of this chapter the apostle evidently distinguishes two degrees in the sin of the Gentile world; the one active and internal, the other passive and external; the one a natural result of depraved instinct, the other having the character of unnatural monstrosity. The first is chargeable on man, it is his guilt; the second is sin as a punishment, the manifest sign of God's wrath. This great historical fact is developed in two aspects. First, from the *religious* point of view: man quenches his intuition of the Divine Being, and clothes God in the form of an idol; his punishment in this connection is self-degradation by monstrous impurities. Then in the *moral* point of view: man quenches the light of conscience, and as a punishment his moral discernment is so perverted that he puts the seal of his approbation on all the iniquities which he should have condemned and prevented. This is the worst of corruptions, that of the conscience. Thus is fully justified the great thought of ver. 18: The wrath of God displayed on the Gentile world to punish the voluntary darkening of the religious sense

(*ungodliness*) and of the moral sense (*unrighteousness*), which had been awakened in man by the primeval revelation of God.

FIFTH PASSAGE (II. 1–29).

The Wrath of God suspended over the Jewish People.

In the midst of this flood of pollutions and iniquities which Gentile society presents to view, the apostle sees one who like a judge from the height of his tribunal sends a stern look over the corrupt mass, condemning the evil which reigns in it, and applauding the wrath of God which punishes it. It is this new personage whom he apostrophizes in the following words:—

Ver. 1. "*Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest: for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself; for thou that judgest doest the same things.*"— Whom is the apostle addressing? Gentile magistrates, say the old Greek commentators. But a magistrate is appointed to judge crimes; he could not be reproached for filling his office. The best of the Gentiles, say the Reformers, and Hofmann in our own day. But what purpose would be served, in this vast survey of the general state of mankind, by such a slight moral warning given to the best and wisest of the Gentiles not to set themselves to judge others? Besides, this precept could not be more than a parenthesis, while it is easy to see that ver. 1 is exactly like ver. 18 of chap. i., the theme of all the development which immediately follows chap. ii. Evidently the person apostrophized in these terms: *O man* . . ., forms an exception among *those men* (ἄνθρωποι, i. 18) who hurtfully and wickedly reject the truth. He does not repress, on the contrary he proclaims it; but he contents himself with applying it to others. The true name of this collective personage, whose portrait Paul proceeds to draw without yet naming him, will be pronounced in ver. 17: "Now if thou *Jew*." The apostle knows how delicate the task is which he is approaching, that of proving to the elect people that divine wrath, now displayed against the Gentiles, is likewise suspended over them. He is about to drag to God's tribunal the nation which thinks itself at liberty to cite all

others to its bar. It is a bold enterprise. The apostle proceeds cautiously. He first expresses his thought abstractly: *thou who judgest, whosoever thou art,* to unveil it fully afterwards. Chap. ii. is thus the parallel of the passage i. 18–32; it is the trial of the Jewish after that of the Gentile world. And the first two verses are its theme.

The course followed by the apostle is this:—In the first part, vv. 1–16, he lays down the principle of God's *true* (impartial) *judgment.* In the second, vv. 17–29, he applies it directly to the Jew.—The first part contains the development of three ideas. 1. Favours received, far from forming a ground for exemption from judgment, aggravate the responsibility of the receiver, vv. 1–5. 2. The divine sentence rests on the *works,* vv. 6–12. 3. Not on *knowledge,* vv. 13–16.

The διό, *wherefore,* which connects this passage with the preceding, presents a certain difficulty which Hofmann and Ritschl have used to justify their far from natural explanations of the preceding. Meyer takes this connecting particle as referring to the whole preceding description from ver. 18. For if a man is guilty, if he commits such things without judging them, it follows that he is still more guilty if he commit them while judging them. Ver. 1 might, however, be connected more particularly with ver. 32. In point of fact, if sinning while applauding the sin of others is criminal, would not men be more inexcusable still if they condemned the sin of others while joining in it? In the former case there is at least agreement between thought and action,—the man *does* what he expressly *approves,*—while in the second there is an internal contradiction and a flagrant hypocrisy. In the act of judging, the judge condemns his own *doing.*—The word *inexcusable,* here applied to the Jews, is the counterpart of the same epithet already applied to the Gentiles, i. 20.—*Whosoever thou art* (πᾶς): whatever name thou bearest, were it even the glorious name of Jew. Paul does not say this, but it is his meaning.—It is enough that thou judgest, that I may condemn thee in this character of judge; for thy judgment recoils on thyself. The Jews, as we know, liked to call the Gentiles ἁμαρτωλοί, *sinners,* Gal. ii. 15.—Ἐν ᾧ, *wherein,* signifies: "Thou doest two things at once; thou condemnest thy neighbour, and by condemning him for things which thou doest, thou takest

away all excuse for thyself." This meaning is much more pungent than Meyer's: *in the same things which*—that is to say, in the things which thou doest, and which at the same time thou condemnest. There was undoubtedly a difference between the moral state of the Jews and that of other nations, but the passage vv. 17–24 will show that this difference was only relative. The repetition of the words: *thou who judgest*, at the end of the sentence, brings out strongly the exceptional character in virtue of which this personage is brought on the scene. The apostle confronts the falsehood under which the man shelters himself with a simple luminous truth, to which no conscience can refuse its assent.

Ver. 2. "*Now*[1] *we are sure that the judgment of God is according to truth against them which commit such things.*"—We might give the δέ an adversative sense: "*But* God does not let Himself be deceived by this judgment which thou passest on others." It is more natural, however, to translate this δέ by *now*, and to take this verse as the major of a syllogism. The minor, ver. 1: thy judgment on others condemns thee; the major, ver. 2: now the judgment of God is always true; the conclusion understood (between vv. 2 and 3): therefore thy hypocritical judgment cannot shelter thee from that of God. The connecting particle γάρ, *for*, in two Alex. is inadmissible. This *for*, to be logical, must bear on the proposition: *thou condemnest thyself*, which is unnatural, as a new idea has intervened since then.—What is the subject in *we know?* According to some: we, *Christians*. But what would the knowledge of Christians prove against the Jewish point of view which Paul is here combating? Others: we, *Jews*. But it was precisely the Jewish conscience which Paul was anxious to bring back to truth on this point. The matter in question is a truth inscribed, according to the apostle, on the human conscience as such, and which plain common sense, free from prejudices, compels us to own: "But every one knows."—The term κρῖμα does not denote, like κρίσις, the *act* of judging, but its *contents*, the sentence. The sentence which God pronounces on every man is agreeable *to truth*. There would be no more truth in the universe if there were none in the judgment of God; and there would be none in

[1] ℵ C read γαρ instead of δε.

the judgment of God if, to be absolved ourselves, it were enough to condemn others.—The words *κατὰ ἀλήθειαν* have sometimes been explained in the sense of *really:* "that there is *really* a judgment of God against those who" . . . But what the Jews disputed was not *the fact* of judgment; it was its impartiality—that is to say, its *truth.* They could not get rid of the idea that in that day they would enjoy certain immunities due to their purer creed, and the greatly higher position which they held than that of other nations.—*Such things,* that is to say, those referred to by the same word, ver. 32.—But the apostle is not unaware that in the Jewish conscience there is an obstacle to the full application of this principle; it is this obstacle which he now labours to remove. Vv. 3–5 develope the words: *they who do such things* (whoever they are, should they even be Jews); vv. 6–16 will explain what is meant by *a judgment according to truth.*

Ver. 3. "*But thou thinkest this, O man, that judgest them which do such things, and doest the same, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God?*"—We might, with Hofmann, take the verbs *λογίζῃ* and *καταφρονεῖς* (*thou countest, thou despisest*) in an affirmative sense. But the *ἤ, or indeed,* at the beginning of ver. 4 would rather incline us, following Paul's ordinary usage, to interpret these words in the interrogative sense; not, however, that we need translate the former in the sense of: *thinkest thou?* The interrogation is less abrupt: "thou thinkest no doubt?" The word *λογίζεσθαι, to reason,* well describes the false calculations whereby the Jews persuaded themselves that they would escape the judgment with which God would visit the Gentiles. Observe the *σύ, thou:* "that *thou wilt escape, thou,*" a being by thyself, a privileged person! It was a Jewish axiom, that "every one circumcised has part in the kingdom to come." A false calculation. Such, then, is the first supposition serving to explain the security of the Jew; but there is a graver still. Perhaps this false calculation proceeds from a moral fact hidden in the depths of the heart. Paul drags it to the light in what follows.

Vv. 4, 5. "*Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness and forbearance and long-suffering; not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? But, after thy hardness and impenitent heart, treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the*

day of wrath and revelation[1] *of the righteous judgment of God.*" —Ἢ, *or even.* The meaning is: is there something even worse than an illusion; is there contempt? The case then would be more than foolish, it would be impious! The *riches of goodness,* of which the apostle speaks, embrace all God's benefits to Israel in the past: that special election, those consecutive revelations, that constant care, finally, the sending of the Messiah, all that constituted the privileged position which Israel had enjoyed for so many ages. The second term, ἀνοχή, *patience* (from ἀνέχεσθαι, *to restrain oneself*), denotes the feeling awakened in the benefactor when his goodness is put to the proof by ingratitude. Paul has in view no doubt the murder of the Messiah, which divine justice might have met with the immediate destruction of the nation. The third term, μακροθυμία, *long-suffering,* refers to the incomprehensible prolongation of Israel's existence, in spite of the thirty consecutive years of resistance to the appeals of God, and to the preaching of the apostles which had elapsed, and in spite of such crimes as the murder of Stephen and James (Acts vii. and xii.). The three words form an admirable climax. The last (*long-suffering*) characterizes this treasure of grace as exhausted, and that of wrath as ready to discharge itself. The notion of *contempt* is explained by the fact that the more God shows Himself good, patient, and meek, the more does the pride of Israel seem to grow, and the more does the nation show itself hostile to the gospel.—Ἀγνοῶν may be translated: *not knowing,* or *mistaking;* the first meaning is simpler and may suffice, for there is a voluntary ignorance, the result of bad faith, in consequence of which we do not see what we do not care to see; it is this ignorance which is referred to here. —The phrase τὸ χρηστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ is touching: *what is good,* sweet, gentle in God (χρηστός, strictly: *that may be handled, what one may make use of,* from χράομαι). The form: "what good there is" . . . leaves it to be inferred that there is something else in God, and that He will not let Himself be always treated thus with impunity. The time will come when He will act with rigour.—The word ἄγειν, *to bring to,* implies the power possessed by man of yielding to or resisting the attraction exercised over him. If he could not resist it, how could the

[1] The correctors of ℵ and D, and the Mjj. K L P, insert a καί after ἀποκαλύψεως.

Jews be accused of committing this offence at this very time? *Μετάνοια, repentance,* is the act whereby man goes back on his former views, and changes his standpoint and feeling.

Ver. 5. The *δέ, but,* contrasts the result of so many favours received with the divinely desired effect. The contrast indicated arises from the fact that the Jews in their conduct are guided by a wholly different *rule* from that to which the mercy of God sought to draw them. This idea of *rule* is indeed what explains the preposition *κατά, according to,* which is usually made into a *by.* The word denotes a line of conduct long followed, the old Jewish habit of meeting the calls of God with a hard and impenitent heart; what Stephen so forcibly upbraided them with, Acts vii. 51: "Ye stiffnecked (*σκληροτράχηλοι*) and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost; as your fathers did, so do ye." —*Hardness* relates to insensibility of heart to divine favours; *impenitence,* to the absence of that change of views which the feeling of such goodness should have produced.—But it must not be thought that these favours are purely and simply lost. Instead of the good which they should have produced, evil results from them. Every favour trampled under foot adds to the *treasure of wrath* which is already suspended over the heads of the impenitent people. There is an evident correlation between the phrase *riches of goodness,* ver. 4, and the Greek word *θησαυρίζειν, to treasure up.* The latter word, as well as the dative (of favour!) *σεαυτῷ, for thyself,* have certainly a tinge of irony. What an enriching is that! *Wrath* is here denounced on the Jews, as it had been, i. 18, on the Gentiles. The two passages are parallel; there is only this difference between them, that among the Gentiles the thunderbolt has already fallen, while the storm is still gathering for the Jews. The time when it will burst on them is called *the day of wrath.* In this phrase two ideas are combined: that of the great national catastrophe which had been predicted by John the Baptist and by Jesus (Matt. iii. 10; Luke xi. 50, 51), and that of the final judgment of the guilty taken individually at the last day. The preposition *ἐν* ("*in* the day") may be made dependent on the substantive *wrath:* "the wrath *which will have its full course* in the day when" . . . But it is more natural to connect this regimen with the verb: "thou art

heaping up a treasure which shall be paid to thee in the day when" . . . The writer transports himself in thought to the day itself; he is present then: hence the ἐν instead of εἰς.—The three Byz. Mjj. and the correctors of the *Sinaït.* and of the *Cantab.* read a καί, *and*, between the two words *revelation* and *just judgment*, and thus give the word "day" *three* complements: day of *wrath*, of *revelation*, and of *just judgment*. These three names would correspond well with the three of ver. 4: *goodness, patience, long-suffering;* and the term *revelation*, without complement, would have in it something mysterious and threatening quite in keeping with the context. This reading is, however, improbable. The καί (*and*) is omitted not only in the Mjj. of the two other families, but also in the ancient versions (Syriac and Latin); besides, the word *revelation* can hardly be destitute of all qualification. The apostle therefore says: *the revelation of the righteous judgment;* thus indicating that wrath (righteous judgment) is still veiled so far as the Jews are concerned (in contrast to the ἀποκαλύπτεται, *is revealed*, i. 18), but that then it will be fully unveiled in relation to them also.—Only two passages are quoted where the word δικαιοκρισία, *just judgment*, is used: in a Greek translation of Hos. iv. 5, and in the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.* The word recalls the phrase of ver. 2: "The judgment of God *according to truth*." It dissipates beforehand the illusions cherished by the Jews as to the immunity which they hoped to enjoy in that day in virtue of their theocratic privileges. It contains the theme of the development which immediately follows. The *just judgment* of God (the judgment *according to truth*, ver. 2) will bear solely on the *moral life* of each individual, vv. 6–12, not on the external fact of being *the hearer* of a law, vv. 13–16. These are the positive and negative characteristics of a judgment according to righteousness.—It would be unaccountable how Ritschl could have mistaken the obvious relation between vv. 5 and 4 so far as to connect ii. 5 with the notion of *wrath*, i. 18, had not a preconceived idea imposed on him this exegetical violence.

Ver. 6. "*Who will render to every one according to his deeds.*" —No account will be taken of any external circumstance, but solely of the aim which has governed the man's moral action. It has been asked how this maxim can be reconciled with the

doctrine of justification by faith. Fritzsche finds in them two different theories presenting an insoluble contradiction. Others think that in the judgment the moral imperfections of believers will be covered by their faith; which would convert faith into a means of sinning with impunity. What a *just judgment* that would be! Melanchthon, Tholuck, and others hold that this standard is purely hypothetical; it *would be* the standard which God would have applied if redemption had not intervened. But the future, "*will render*," is not a conditional (*would render*). Besides, *judgment according to the deeds done*, is attested by many other passages, both from Paul (Rom. xiv. 12; 2 Cor. v. 10; Gal. vi. 6), from Jesus Himself (John v. 28, 29; Matt. xii. 36, 37, etc.), and from other writings of the New Testament (Rev. xx. 13). Ritschl thinks that throughout this passage it is a Pharisee whom Paul introduces as speaking, and who starts from a narrow idea of divine justice—the idea, viz., of retributive justice. But what trace is there in the text of such an accommodation on the apostle's part to a standpoint foreign to his own? The logical tissue of the piece, and its relation to what precedes and follows, present no breach of continuity. There is only one answer to the question raised, unless we admit a flagrant contradiction in the apostle's teaching: that justification by faith alone applies to the time of *entrance* into salvation through the free pardon of sin, but not to the time of judgment. When God of free grace receives the sinner at the time of his conversion, He asks nothing of him except faith; but from that moment the believer enters on a wholly new responsibility; God demands from him, as the recipient of grace, the fruits of grace. This is obvious from the parable of the talents. The Lord commits His gifts to His servants freely; but from the moment when that extraordinary grace has been shown, He expects something from their labour. Comp. also the parable of the wicked debtor, where the pardoned sinner who refuses to pardon his brother is himself replaced under the rule of justice, and consequently under the burden of his debt. The reason is that faith is not the dismal prerogative of being able to sin with impunity; it is, on the contrary, the means of overcoming sin and acting holily; and if this life-fruit is not produced, it is dead, and will be declared vain.

"*Every* barren tree will be hewn down and cast into the fire" (Matt. iii. 10). Comp. the terrible warnings, 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10, Gal. vi. 7, which are addressed to believers.—The two following verses develope the idea of the verb *ἀποδώσει, will render.*

Vv. 7, 8. "*To them who, by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory and honour and immortality,* [to such] *eternal life: but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness,* [for such] *wrath and indignation!*"[1]

The Jews divided men into circumcised, and consequently saved, and uncircumcised, and consequently damned. Here is a new classification, which Paul substitutes, founded solely on the moral aim.—There are two principal ways of construing ver. 7. Sometimes the three words: *glory, honour, immortality,* are made the objects of the verb: *will render* (ver. 6), understood. The phrase: *patient continuance in well-doing,* is thus taken to qualify the pronoun *τοῖς μέν, to them,* and the last words: *ζητοῦσιν κ.τ.λ.*, become merely an explanatory appendix: "to wit, to them who seek eternal life." The meaning of the verse thus taken is: "to them who live in patient continuance in well-doing [He will render] glory and honour and immortality, [to wit, to those] who seek eternal life." But this construction is very forced. 1. The subordinate clause: "in continuance," is rather the qualification of a verb than of a pronoun like *τοῖς μέν.* 2. The participle *ζητοῦσι* would require the article *τοῖς*, and would make a clumsy and superfluous appendix. The construction, as given in our translation, is much more simple and significant. The regimen *καθ' ὑπομονήν*, literally, *according to the standard of patient continuance in well-doing,* corresponds with the *seek,* on which it depends; seeking must be in a certain line. And the weighty word *eternal life,* at the close of this long sentence, depicts, as it were, the final and glorious issue of this long and laborious practice of goodness. This accusative is the object of the verb: *will render,* understood (ver. 6).—The notion of *patient continuance* is emphasized here, not only in opposition to the idea of intermittent moral efforts, but to indicate that there are great moral obstacles to be met on this path, and that a persistent love of goodness is needed to surmount them.

[1] T. R., with K L P, places *ὀργὴ* after *θυμός.*

The apostle says literally: perseverance in *good work*. In ver. 6 he had used the plural *works*. He now comprehends this multiplicity of works in the profound principle which constitutes their unity, the permanent determination to realize goodness. What supports a man in this course is the goal which he has constantly before him: *glory*, an existence without defilement or weakness, resplendent throughout with the divine brightness of holiness and power; *honour*, the approbation of God, which forms the eternal honour of its object; *immortality* (*incorruptibility*), the absolute impossibility of any wound or interruption or end to this state of being. The *ands*, καί, before the last two substantives, show a certain degree of emotion; the accumulation of terms arises from the same cause. In all human conditions there are souls which contemplate the ideal here described, and which, ravished with its beauty, are elevated by it above every earthly ambition and the pursuit of sensual gratifications. These are the men who are represented under the figure of the merchant seeking *goodly pearls*. For such is the pearl of great price, *life eternal!* This last word, laden as it were with all divine riches, denotes the realization of the ideal just described; it worthily closes this magnificent proposition.

But is it asked again, where, in this description of a normal human life, are faith and salvation by the gospel to be found? Does Paul then preach salvation by the work of man? The apostle has not to do here with the means whereby we can really attain to *well-doing;* he merely affirms that no one will be saved apart from the doing of good, and he assumes that the man who is animated with this persistent desire will not fail, some time or other, in the journey of life, to meet with the means of attaining an end so holy and glorious. This means is faith in the gospel,—a truth which Paul reserves for proof at a later stage. "*He that doeth truth*," said Jesus to the same effect, "*cometh to the light*," as soon as it is presented to him (John iii. 21; comp. vii. 17). The love of goodness, which is the spring of his life, will then lead him to embrace Christ, the ideal of goodness; and, having embraced Him, he will find in Him the triumphant power for well-doing of which he was in quest. The desire of goodness is the acceptance of the gospel by anticipation. The natural corollary of these

premisses is the thought expressed by Peter: the preaching of the gospel before the judgment to every human soul, either in this life or in the next (1 Pet. iii. 19, 20, iv. 6). Comp. Matt. xii. 31, 32. And if the apostle has spoken of patient continuance in this pursuit, it is because he is well aware of that power of self-mastery which is needed, especially in a Jew, to break with his nation, and family, and all his past, and to remain faithful to the end to the supreme love of goodness.

The other class of men is described ver. 8. The regimen ἐξ ἐριθείας can without difficulty serve to qualify the pronoun τοῖς δέ; comp. the construction ὁ or οἱ ἐκ πίστεως, iii. 26; Gal. iii. 7. The meaning is: "but for those who are under the dominion of the spirit of contention."—The word ἐριθεία, *contention*, does not come, as has been often thought, from ἔρις, *disputation*, but, as Fritzsche has proved, from ἔριθος, *mercenary;* whence the verb ἐριθεύειν, "to work for wages," then, "to put oneself at the service of a party." The substantive ἐριθεία therefore denotes the spirit which seeks the victory of the party which one has espoused from self-interest, in contrast to the spirit which seeks the possession of the truth. Paul knew well from experience the tendency of Rabbinical discussions, and he characterizes it by a single word. The term *truth* is here used abstractly; but Paul has, nevertheless, in view the concrete realization of this notion in the gospel revelation. *Unrighteousness*, which he contrasts with *truth* (exactly as Jesus does, John vii. 18), denotes the selfish passions, vain ambitions, and unrighteous prejudices, which lead a man to close his eyes to the light when it presents itself, and thus produce unbelief. Unrighteousness leads to this result as certainly as moral integrity leads to faith. Jesus developes precisely the same thought, John iii. 19, 20. The words *wrath and indignation*, which express the wages earned by such conduct, are in the nominative in Greek, not in the accusative, like the word *eternal life* (ver. 7). They are not, therefore, the object of the verb *will render*, which is too remote. We must make them either the subject of a verb understood (ἔσται, *will be, there will be*), or, better still, an exclamation: "for them, wrath!" The three Byz. Mjj. follow the psychological order, "*indignation and wrath!*" First the internal emotion (*indignation*), then the external manifestation

(*wrath*); but the other two families present the inverse order, and rightly so. For what is first perceived is the manifestation; then we pass upwards to the feeling which inspires it, and which gives it all its gravity. Θυμός is the emotion of the soul; ὀργή comprehends look, sentence, chastisement.—Why does the apostle once again repeat this contrast of vv. 7 and 8 in vv. 9 and 10? Obviously with the view of now adding to each term of the contrast the words: *to the Jew first, and also to the Greek,* which expressly efface the false line of demarcation drawn by Jewish theology.

Vv. 9, 10. "*Tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Greek; but glory and honour and peace to every man that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek!*"—The asyndeton indicates, as it always does, the more emphatic reassertion of the previous idea: "*Yes,* tribulation and anguish!"—The antithesis of vv. 7, 8 is reproduced in inverse order, not only to avoid the monotony of a too exact parallelism, but chiefly because, following up ver. 8 (*wrath and indignation*), the idea of ver. 9 (*tribulation and anguish*) presented itself more naturally than that of ver 10 (*glory and honour and peace*); comp. the same arrangement, Luke i. 51–53. The terms *tribulation* and *anguish* describe the moral and external state of the man on whom *the indignation* and *wrath* of the judge fall (ver. 8). Tribulation is the punishment itself (corresponding to *wrath*); anguish is the wringing of the heart which the punishment produces; it corresponds to the judge's *indignation.* The *soul* is mentioned as the seat of feeling. The phrase, *every soul of man,* expresses the equality and universality of the treatment dealt out. Yet within this equality there is traced a sort of preference both as to judgment and salvation respectively (ver. 10), to the detriment and advantage of the Jew. When he says *first,* the apostle has no doubt in view (as in i. 16) a priority in time; comp. 1 Pet. iv. 17. Must we not, however, apply at the same time the principle laid down by Jesus, Luke xii. 41–48, according to which he who receives most benefits is also the man who has the heaviest responsibility? In any case, therefore, whoever escapes judgment, it will not be the Jew; if there were but one judged, it would be he. Such is the

apostle's answer to the claim alleged, ver. 3: ὅτι σὺ ἐκφεύξῃ, *that thou, thou alone, shalt escape.*

Ver. 10. The third term: *peace,* describes the subjective feeling of the saved man at the time when glory and honour are conferred on him by the judge. It is the profound peace which is produced by deliverance from wrath, and the possession of unchangeable blessedness. The simple ἐργάζεσθαι, *to do,* is substituted for the compound κατεργάζεσθαι, *to perpetrate* (ver. 9), which implies something ruder and more violent, as is suited to evil; comp. the analogous though not identical difference between ποιεῖν and πράσσειν, John iii. 20, 21.—On the word *first,* comp. the remarks made i. 16, ii. 9.

Here again the apostle indicates the result finally reached, whether evil or good, without expressly mentioning the means by which it may be produced; on the one hand, the rejection of the gospel (ver. 9), as the supreme sin, at once the effect and the cause of evil-doing; on the other, its acceptance (ver. 10), as effect and cause of the determination to follow goodness and of its practice. But what is the foundation of such a judgment? One of God's perfections, which the Jew could not deny without setting himself in contradiction to the whole Old Testament, *the impartiality* of God, whose judgment descends on evil wherever it is found, *with* or *without law* (vv. 11, 12).

Vv. 11, 12. "*For there is no respect of persons with God. For as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law: and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law.*"—The principle stated in ver. 11 is one of those most frequently asserted in the Old Testament; comp. Deut. x. 17; 1 Sam. xvi. 7; 2 Chron. xix. 7; Job xxxiv. 19. Accordingly, no Jew could dispute it.—The phrase πρόσωπον λαμβάνειν, literally: *to accept the countenance,* to pay regard to the external appearance, belongs exclusively to Hellenistic Greek (in the LXX.); it is a pure Hebraism; it forcibly expresses the opposite idea to that of *just judgment,* which takes account only of the *moral* worth of persons and acts. *With God* signifies, in that luminous sphere whence only just sentences emanate. But is not the fact of the law being given to some, and refused to others, incompatible with this divine impartiality?

No, answers ver. 12; for if the Gentile perishes, he will not perish for not having *possessed* the law, for no judgment will cause him to be sifted by the Decalogue and the Mosaic ordinances; and if the Jew should sin, the law will not exempt him from punishment, for the code will be the very standard which judgment will apply to all his acts. Thus the want of the law no more destroys the one than its possession saves the other. The aorist *ἥμαρτον, sinned,* transports us to the point of time when the result of human life appears as a completed fact, the hour of judgment. The *καί, also* ("will *also* perish without law"), brings out the congruity between the mode of the sin and that of the perdition. In the second proposition, this *also* is not repeated, for it is a matter of course that where there is a law, men should be judged by it. The absence of the article in Greek before the word *law,* makes this word a categorical term, "A mode of living over which a law presides;" as applied: the Mosaic law.—*Διὰ νόμου, by law,* that is to say, by the application of a positive code (the Mosaic code). We must beware of regarding the difference between the two verbs: *ἀπολοῦνται, shall perish,* and *κριθήσονται, shall be judged,* as accidental (Meyer). The very thing the apostle wishes is by this antithesis to emphasize the idea that the Jews *alone* shall be, strictly speaking, subjected to a judgment, a detailed inquiry, such as arises from applying the particular articles of a code. The Gentiles shall perish simply in consequence of their moral corruption; as, for example, ruin overtakes the soul of the vicious, the drunken, or the impure, under the deleterious action of their vice. The rigorous application of the principle of divine impartiality thus brings the apostle to this strange conclusion: the Jews, far from being exempted from judgment by their possession of the law, shall, on the contrary, be the *only people judged* (in the strict sense of the word). It was the antipodes of their claim, and we here see how the pitiless logic of the apostle brings things to such a point, that not only is the thesis of his adversary refuted, but its opposite is demonstrated to be the only true one.—Thus all who shall be found in the day of judgment *to have sinned* shall perish, each in his providential place, a result which establishes the divine impartiality.

It is evident that in the two propositions of this verse there is the idea understood: unless the amnesty offered by the gospel has been accepted, and has produced its proper fruits, the fruits of holiness (in which case the word ἥμαρτον, *sinned,* would cease to be the summing up and last word of the earthly life).—And why cannot the possession of the law preserve the Jews from condemnation, as they imagine? The explanation is given in ver. 13, and the demonstration in vv. 14–16.

Ver. 13. "*For not the hearers of the*[1] *law are just before God; but the doers of the*[2] *law, they shall be justified.*"—Why *hearers* rather than possessors or readers? To describe the position of the Jews who *heard* the reading of the law in the synagogue every Sabbath, and who for the most part knew it only in this way (Luke iv. 16 et seq.; Acts xiii. 15, xv. 21). —*Before God,* says Paul; for before men it was otherwise, the Jews ascribing righteousness to one another on account of their common possession of the law. If such a claim were well founded, the impartiality of God would be destroyed, for the fact of knowing the law is a hereditary advantage, and not the fruit of moral action. The judicial force of the term δικαιωθῆναι, *to be justified,* in Paul's writings, comes out forcibly in this passage, since in the day of judgment no one is *made* righteous morally speaking, and can only be *recognised* and *declared* such. This declarative sense appears likewise in the use of the preposition παρά (*before* God), which necessarily refers to an act of God as *judge* (see on i. 17). The article τοῦ before νόμου, *law,* in the two propositions, is found only in the Byz. Mjj.; it ought to be expunged: the *hearers,* the *doers of a law.* No doubt it is the Mosaic law which is referred to, but as law, and not as Mosaic. Some think that this idea of justification by the fulfilment of the law is enunciated here in a purely hypothetical manner, and can never be realized (iii. 19, 20). Paul, it is said, is indicating the *abstract* standard of judgment, which, in consequence of man's sin, will never admit of rigorous application. But how in this case explain the future "*shall be* justified"? Comp. also the phrase of ver. 27: "uncircumcision when it *fulfils*

[1] Του before νομου is found in T. R. with K L P; the others omit it.
[2] T. R., with E K L, reads του before νομου.

the law," words which certainly refer to concrete cases, and the passage viii. 4, in which the apostle asserts that the δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου, what the law declares righteous, is *fulfilled* in the believer's life. It will certainly, therefore, be required of us that we *be* righteous in the day of judgment if God is to *recognise* and *declare* us to be such[1]; *imputed* righteousness is the beginning of the work of salvation, the means of entrance into the state of grace. But this initial justification, by restoring communion between God and man, should guide the latter to the *actual* possession of righteousness—that is to say, to the fulfilment of the law; otherwise, this first justification would not stand in the judgment (see on ver. 6). And hence it is in keeping with Paul's views, whatever may be said by an antinomian and unsound tendency, to distinguish two justifications, the one initial, founded exclusively on faith, the other final, founded on faith *and its fruits.* Divine imputation beforehand, in order *to be* true, must necessarily *become* true—that is to say, be converted into the *recognition* of a real righteousness. But if the maxim of ver. 13 is the rule of the divine judgment, this rule threatens again to overturn the principle of divine impartiality; for how can the Gentiles fulfil the law which they do not possess? Vv. 14 and 15 contain the answer to this objection.

Vv. 14, 15. "*For when Gentiles, which have not the law, do*[1] *by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: for they show thereby the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness to it, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another.*"—There are four principal ways of connecting ver. 14 with what precedes.

1. Calvin goes back to ver. 12*a*: "The Gentiles *will perish justly,* though they have not the law (ver. 12); for they have a law in their hearts which they knowingly violate" (ver. 14). The explanations of Neander, de Wette, Hodge, etc., are to the same effect. But the number of important intermediate propositions and ideas intervening between this and ver. 12*a* renders it unnatural to connect the "*for*" of ver. 14 with this declaration. Besides, was it necessary to

[1] T. R., with E K L P, reads ποιῇ; but ℵ A B read ποιωσιν, and D G ποιουσιν.

prove to the Jews the righteousness of the punishment which would be inflicted on the Gentiles!

2. Meyer connects the *for* with the immediately preceding proposition, 13*b*: "It is only doers of the law who can be justified, for this rule can be applied even to the Gentiles, since they too have a law engraved on their hearts." The connection is simple and logical. But can the apostle really mean to say that a Gentile can obtain justification by observing the law of nature? That is impossible. We should require in that case to revert to the purely abstract explanation of ver. 13*b*, to regard it as a hypothetical maxim, and consequently to take vv. 14, 15 as an abstract proof of an impracticable maxim. These are too many abstractions.

3. Tholuck, Lange, Schaff likewise join the *for* with 13*b*; but they hold at the same time that this *for* will be veritably realized: "The doers of the law shall be justified, for God will graciously take account of the *relative* observance of the law rendered by the Gentiles" (here might be compared Matt. xxv. 40, x. 41, 42); so Tholuck. Or: "Those Gentiles, partial doers of the law, will certainly come one day to the faith of the gospel, by which they will be fully justified;" so Lange, Schaff. But these are expedients; for there is nothing in the text to countenance such ideas. In ver. 15, Paul takes pains to prove that the Gentiles *have* the law, but not that they *observe it*; and about faith in the gospel there is not a word. This could not possibly be the case if the thought were an essential link in the argument.

4. The real connection seems to me to have been explained by Philippi. The *for* refers to the general idea of ver. 13: "It is not having heard the law, as the Jews think, but having observed it, which will justify; for if the hearing of it were enough, the Gentiles also could claim this advantage, since positive features in their moral life testified to the existence of a law engraved on their hearts, and the very definite application of it which they are able to make." This connection leaves nothing to be desired; and Meyer's objection, that it is necessary in this case to pass over 13*b* in order to connect the *for* with 13*a*, is false; for the idea of 13*b* is purely restrictive: "The doers of the law shall *alone* be justified," while the real affirmation is that of 13*a*: "Those

who have been only hearers shall not be justified." It is on this essential idea of ver. 13 that the *for* of ver. 14 bears.—"Οταν, *when it happens that.* These are sporadic cases, happy eventualities.—The word ἔθνη, *Gentiles,* has no article: "people belonging to the category of the Gentiles."—The logical relation included in the subjective negative μή is that which we should express by: "*without having* the law," or: "*though* they have it not."—Τὰ τοῦ νόμου, literally: *the things which are of the law,* agreeable to its prescriptions. They do not observe the precept as such, for they have it not; but they fulfil its contents; for example, Neoptolemus in Philoctetes, when he refuses to save Greece at the expense of a lie; or Antigone, when she does not hesitate to violate the temporary law of the city to fulfil the eternal law of fraternal love; or Socrates, when he rejects the opportunity of saving his life by escaping from prison, in order to remain subject to the magistrates. Sophocles himself speaks of these *eternal laws* (οἱ ἀεὶ νόμοι), and contrasts this internal and divine legislation with the ever changing laws of man.—Φύσει, *by nature,* spontaneously, by an innate moral instinct. This dative cannot be joined with the preceding participle (ἔχοντα); it qualifies the verb ποιῇ, *do;* the whole force of the thought is in this idea: do instinctively what the Jew does in obedience to precepts. The readings ποιῶσιν and ποιοῦσιν may be corrections of ποιῇ with the view of conforming the verb to the following pronoun οὗτοι; the Byz. reading ποιῇ may also, however, be a correction to make the verb agree with the rule of neuter plurals. In this case the plural of the verb is preferable, since Paul is speaking not of the Gentiles *en masse,* but of certain individuals among them. Hence also the following οὗτοι, *these Gentiles.* This pronoun includes and repeats all the qualifications which have just been mentioned in the first part of the verse; comp. the οὗτος, John i. 2.—The logical relation of the participle μὴ ἔχοντες, "*not having law,*" and of the verb εἰσίν, "*are law,*" should be expressed by *for;* not having law, they therefore serve as a law to themselves. The negative μή, placed above *before* the participle and the object (τὸν νόμον), is here placed *between* the two. This separation is intended to throw the object into relief: "*This law* (τὸν νόμον), for the very reason that they have it not (μὴ ἔχοντες), they prove that they have

it in another way." This delicate form of style shows with what painstaking care Paul composed. But so fine a shade can hardly be felt except in the original language. The phrase: *to be a law to oneself*, is explained in ver. 15.

The descriptive pronoun οἵτινες, "as people who," is meant to introduce this explanation; it is in consequence of what is about to follow that Paul can affirm what he has just said of them, ver. 14. The relation of the verb ἐνδείκνυνται, *show*, and its object ἔργον, *the work* of the law, may be thus paraphrased: "show the work of the law (*as being*) written;" which would amount to: prove that it is written. But it is not even necessary to assume an ellipsis (ὡς ὄν). What the Gentile shows in such cases is the law itself written (as to its contents) within his heart. Paul calls these contents *the work of the law*, because all the law commanded was meant to become *work;* and he qualifies νόμου by the article (*the* law), because he wishes to establish the identity of the Gentile's moral instinct with the contents of the *Mosaic law* strictly so called. But this phrase: *the work of the law*, does not merely designate, like that of ver. 14, τὰ τοῦ νόμου (*the things agreeable to the law*), certain isolated acts. It embraces the whole contents of the law; for ver. 15 does not refer to the accidental fulfilment of some good actions; it denotes the totality of the moral law written in the heart. The figure of a *written law* is evidently borrowed from the Sinaitic law graven on the tables of stone. The *heart* is always in Scripture the source of the instinctive feelings from which those impulses go forth which govern the exercise of the understanding and will. It is in this form of lofty inspiration that the law of nature makes its appearance in man. The plural: *their heart*, makes each individual the seat of this sublime legislation. The last propositions of the verse have embarrassed commentators not a little. They have not sufficiently taken account of the starting-point of this whole argument. St. Paul, according to the connection of ver. 14 with ver. 13, does not wish merely to prove that the Gentile *possesses* the law; he means to demonstrate that he *hears* it, just as the Jew heard it at Sinai, or still hears it every Sabbath in the synagogue (ἀκροατής, *hearer* of the law, ver. 13*a*). And to this idea the appendix refers which closes

ver. 15. That the Gentile *has* the law (is a law to himself), is already demonstrated. But does he hear this law distinctly? Does be give account of it to himself? If it were not so, he would certainly remain inferior to the Jew who brings so much sagacity to bear on the discussion of the sense and various applications of the legal statute. But no; the Gentile is quite as clever as the Jew in this respect. He also discusses the data of the moral instinct which serves as his guide. His conscience joins its approving testimony afterhand to that of the moral instinct which has dictated a good action; pleaders make themselves heard within, for and against, before this tribunal of conscience, and these discussions are worth all the subtleties of Rabbinical casuistry.—*Συνείδησις, the conscience* (from *συνειδέναι*, to know with or within oneself). This word, frequently used in the New Testament, denotes the understanding (the *νοῦς*, for it is a *knowing, εἰδέναι*, which is in question), applied to the distinction of good and evil, as reason (the *διάνοια*) is the same *νοῦς* applied to the discernment of truth and falsehood. It is precisely because this word denotes an act of knowledge that it describes a new fact different from that of the moral instinct described above. What natural impulse dictated without reflection, conscience, studying it afterwards, recognises as a good thing. Thus is explained the *σύν, with*, in the compound verb *συμμαρτυρεῖν, to bear witness with another.* Conscience joins its testimony to that of the heart which dictated the virtuous action by commending it, and proves thereby, as a *second* witness, the existence of the moral law in the Gentile. Volkmar: "Their conscience bears testimony besides the moral act itself which already demonstrated the presence of the divine law." Most really, therefore, the Gentile has a law,—law not only published and *written*, but *heard* and understood. It seems to me that in the way in which the apostle expresses this assent of the conscience to the law implanted within, it is impossible not to see an allusion to the *amen* uttered aloud by the people after hearing the law of Sinai, and which was repeated in every meeting of the synagogue after the reading of the law.—But there is not only *hearing*, there is even *judging.* The Rabbins debated in opposite senses every kind of acts, real or imaginary. The

apostle follows up the comparison to the end. The soul of the Gentile is also an arena of discussions. The λογισμοί denote the *judgments* of a moral nature which are passed by the Gentiles on their own acts, either (as is most usually the case) acknowledging them guilty (κατηγορεῖν, *accusing*), or *also* sometimes (such is the meaning of ἢ καί; comp. ver. 14: *when it happens that* . . .) pronouncing them innocent. Most commonly the voice within says: That was bad! Sometimes also this voice becomes that of defence, and says: No, it was good! Thus, before this inner code, the different thoughts accuse or justify, make replies and rejoinders, exactly as advocates before a seat of judgment handle the text of the law. And all this forensic debating proves to a demonstration not only that the code is there, but that it is read and understood, since its application is thus discussed.—The μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων, *between them* (*among themselves*). Some, like Meyer, join this pronoun with αὐτῶν, *the Gentiles;* he would refer it to the debates carried on *between Gentiles and Gentiles* as to the moral worth of an action. But it is grammatically more natural, and suits the context better, to connect the pronoun *between themselves* with λογισμῶν, *judgments.* For this internal scene of discussion proves still more clearly than a debate of man with man the fact of the law *written in the heart.* Holsten proposes to understand the participle συμμαρτυρούντων (borrowed from συμμαρτυρούσης) with λογισμῶν: "their conscience bearing witness, and the judgments which they pass on one another's acts in their mutual relations also bearing witness." This construction is very forced, and it seems plain to us that the two participles *accusing or else excusing* refer to the *thoughts,* just as the participle *bearing witness* referred to *their conscience.*

How can one help admiring here, on the one hand, the subtle analysis whereby the apostle discloses in the Gentile heart a real judgment-hall where witnesses are heard for and against, then the sentence of the judge; and, on the other hand, that largeness of heart with which, after drawing so revolting a picture of the moral deformities of Gentile life (chap. i.), he brings into view in as striking a way the indestructible moral elements, the evidences of which are sometimes irresistibly presented even by this so deeply sunken life?

Ver. 16. "*In the day when*[1] *God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gospel.*"—In this final proposition there is expressed and summed up the idea of the whole preceding passage (from ver. 6), that of the *final judgment.* But what is the grammatical and logical connection of this dependent proposition? It would seem natural to connect it with what immediately precedes (ver. 15), as Calvin does: "Their inward thoughts condemn or approve them in the day when" . . . for: "till the day when" . . . But this sense would have required ἕως τῆς ἡμέρας. Tholuck and Philippi employ another expedient; they understand: "and that *especially* in the day when" . . .; or: "and that *more completely still* in the day when" . . . Others: "*as will be seen clearly* in the day when" . . . But if Paul had meant to say all that, he would have said it. Hofmann and Lange, also connecting this proposition with ver. 15 (Hofmann especially with ἐνδείκνυνται, *manifest*), regard the judgment of ver. 16 as being only the internal and purely moral judgment which is produced in the human conscience every time the gospel is preached to man. They read κρίνει, *judges*, and not κρινεῖ, *will judge.* The phrase: *in the day when*, would therefore denote, not the last judgment, but every day that a man hears the gospel for the first time. There is a context in which this explanation would be possible; but here, where the dominant idea from ver. 6 has been the final judgment, it is inadmissible. Besides, the phrase: *by Jesus Christ*, is not exactly suitable to any but the last judgment; comp. the words, Acts x. 42, xvii. 31; Matt. xxv. 31 et seq.; and especially the very similar phrases in 1 Cor. iv. 5. Moreover, ver. 29 can leave no doubt as to the apostle's meaning. The only tolerable explanation, if it were wished to connect ver. 16 with ver. 15, would be to take the verbs of ver. 15 as expressing the permanent present of the idea: "The manifestation of the presence of the law, written within their hearts, *takes place*, for: *will certainly take place*, in the day when" . . .; but this meaning of the verbs in the present in ver. 15 could not be guessed till after reading ver. 16. The time of the manifestation would have required to be indicated

[1] T. R., with almost all the MSS., reads ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὅτε; B: ἐν ᾗ ἡμέρᾳ; ℵ: ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ.

immediately to prevent a misunderstanding. The only natural connection of the words: in the day when, is to join them to the end of ver. 13: "The doers of the law shall be justified . . . *in the day when*" . . . No doubt vv. 14, 15 thus become a sort of parenthesis. But, notwithstanding, Paul has not deviated for a moment from his principal thought. These two verses contained an explanatory remark, such as we now-a-days would put in a note; it was intended to show that the Gentiles also would be entitled to believe themselves justified, if all that was necessary for this end were to possess and hear a law without doing it. This false idea set aside, Paul resumes the thread of his discourse at ver. 16. To explain this verse, there is clearly no need of the two expedients proposed, the one by Ewald, to join it with ver. 4, the other by Laurent, to regard it as an interpolation.—The phrase: *hidden things* (*secrets*), is only to be explained by the understood contrast to external works, legal or ceremonial, in which the Jews put their confidence. None of those fine externals of piety or morality will deceive the eye of God in that day of truth. He will demand holiness of heart; comp. the expression, ver. 29: ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖος, *the Jew who is one inwardly*, and: *the circumcision of the heart*; comp. also, in the Sermon on the Mount, Matt. v. 20–48, and vi. 1–18. This idea was indispensable to complete what had been said of judgment *according to deeds*.—The word *men* sets the whole body of the judged face to face with the Judge, and reminds the Jews that they also will be there, and will form no exception.—At the first glance the phrase: *according to my gospel*, is surprising, for the expectation of the final judgment by Jesus Christ belongs to the apostolic teaching in general, and not to *Paul's gospel* in particular. Nevertheless, it is this apostle who, in consequence of his personal experience, and of the revelation which had been made to him, has brought out most powerfully the contrast between the ἔργα νόμου, legal and purely external *works*, wanting the truly moral principle of love, and *good* works, the fruits of faith working by love (Eph. ii. 9, 10; Gal. v. 6). This antithesis was one of the foundations of Paul's preaching.—The last words: *by Jesus Christ*, recall all the sayings in which Jesus announced His advent as judge. If it is really He who is

to preside in the great act of final judgment, it is plain that, being such as He has made Himself known to us, He will not be satisfied with a parade of external righteousness, and that He will demand a holiness like that which He realized Himself, which, taking its origin in consecration of heart, extends over the whole life.

The *second part* of the chapter, vv. 17–29, contains *the application* of the principles laid down in the first. After expressing himself in a general and more or less abstract way, Paul addresses himself directly to the person whom he had in view from ver. 1, and finally designates him by name. Yet he still proceeds with the utmost caution; for he knows that he is giving a shock to inveterate prejudices, prejudices which he long shared himself. The way is slowly paved for the conclusion which he wishes to reach; hence the length of the following sentence, which contains as it were the preamble of the judgment to be pronounced.

Vv. 17–20. "*Now if*[1] *thou art called a Jew, and restest in the law, and makest thy boast of God, and knowest His will, and canst discern the things that differ, being instructed out of the law; and art confident that thou thyself art a guide of the blind, a light of them which are in darkness, an instructor of the foolish, a teacher of babes, because thou hast the form of knowledge and of the truth in the law*" . . .—Instead of ἰδέ, *behold*, which the T. R. reads, with a single Mj., we must certainly read εἰ δέ, *now if;* this is the natural form of transition from principles to their application; the other reading seems to be a consequence of *itacism* (pronouncing ει as ι).—Where are we to find the principal clause to which this *now if* is subordinate? Some, Winer for example, think that the same construction continues as far as the beginning of ver. 21, where it is abandoned on account of the length of the sentence, and where an entirely new proposition begins. But we must at least meet again somewhere in the sequel with the idea which was in the apostle's mind when he began with the words *now if*. Meyer regards ver. 21 itself as the principal clause; he understands the οὖν, *therefore*, as a particle of recapitulation. But, in an argument like this (*now if*, ver.

[1] T. R. reads, with L: ἰδε (*behold*); the other authorities: ει δε (*now if*).

17), this meaning of *therefore* is unnatural. It is better than, with Hofmann, to hold that the series of propositions dependent on *now if* is prolonged to the end of ver. 24, where the principal proposition resulting from all these considerations is understood as a self-evident consequence: what good *in this case* (that of such *sins*, vv. 21–24) will accrue to thee from *all those advantages* (vv. 17–20)? It is to this understood conclusion, which we would replace with lacuna-points (. . .), that the *for* of ver. 25 very naturally refers. By this figure of rhetoric (aposiopesis) the apostle dispenses with expressing a conclusion himself, which must escape spontaneously from the conscience of every reader.

The propositions dependent on "*now if*," taken together, embrace two series of four verses each; the one, that from vv. 17–20, is intended to enumerate all the *advantages* of which the Jew boasts; the other, from vv. 21–24, contrasts the *iniquities* of his conduct with those advantages.

The advantages are distributed into three categories. 1. *The gifts* of God, ver. 17. 2. The superior *capabilities* which these gifts confer on the Jews, ver. 18. 3. *The part* which he somewhat pretentiously thinks himself thereby called to play towards other nations, vv. 19, 20. There is something slightly ironical in this accumulation of titles on which the Jew bases the satisfaction which he feels as he surveys himself.

Ver. 17. The name *Jew*, Ἰουδαῖος, is probably not used without allusion to its etymological meaning: *Jehoudah, the praised one.* The preposition ἐπί, which enters into the composition of the verb, converts this name into a real *title.* But Israel possesses more than a glorious name; it has in its hands a real *gift: the law.* Here is a manifest sign of the divine favour on which it may consequently *rest.* Finally, this token of special favour makes God *its God*, to the exclusion of all other nations. It has therefore whereof *to glory* in God. To the gradation of the three substantives: *Jew, law, God*, that of the three verbs perfectly corresponds: *to call oneself, to rest, to glory.*

Hence there result (ver. 18) two capabilities which distinguished the Jew from every other man. He *knows* God's will, and so succeeds in *discerning* what to others is confused. One is always entitled to be proud of *knowing;* but when

that knowing is of *the will*, that is to say, the absolute and perfect will which ordains all, and judges of all sovereignly, such a knowledge is an incomparable advantage. By this knowledge of the divine will the Jew can *discern* and *appreciate* (δοκιμάζειν) the most delicate shades of the moral life.—*Τὰ διαφέροντα* might signify the things that are *better* (*meliora probare*), from the meaning of *surpass*, which is often that of the verb διαφέρειν. But here it is better to translate: the things that *differ* (from the sense of *differing*, which is also that of διαφέρειν); for the apostle seems to be alluding to those discussions of legal casuistry in which the Jewish schools excelled, as when the two eminent doctors Hillel and Schammai gravely debated the question, whether it was lawful to eat an egg laid by a hen on the Sabbath day.—The last words of the verse: *instructed out of the law*, indicate the source of that higher faculty of appreciation. The term κατηχούμενος, from κατηχεῖσθαι, *to be penetrated by a sound*, makes each Jew law personified.

From this knowledge and faculty of appreciation flows the part which the Jew claims in regard to other men, and which is described in vv. 19, 20 with a slight touch of ridicule. The first four terms set forth the moral treatment to which the Jew, as the born physician of mankind, subjects his patients, the Gentiles, to their complete cure. The term πέποιθας, *thou art confident*, describes his pretentious assurance. And first, he takes the poor Gentile by the hand as one does *a blind man*, offering to *guide* him; then he opens his eyes, dissipating his *darkness* by the *light* of revelation; then he *rears* him, as one would bring up a being yet *without reason*; finally, when through all this care he has come to the stage of the *little child*, νήπιος (*who cannot speak*; this was the term used by the Jews to designate proselytes; see Tholuck), he initiates him into the full knowledge of the truth, by becoming his *teacher*.—The end of the verse serves to explain the reason of this ministry to the Gentile world which the Jew exercises. He possesses in the law the precise *sketch* (μόρφωσις), the exact outline, the rigorous formula of the *knowledge* of things which men should have (the idea which every one should form of them), and of *the truth*, that is to say, the moral reality or substance of goodness. *Know-*

ledge is the subjective possession of *truth* in itself. The Jew possesses in the law not only the truth itself, but its exact formula besides, by means of which he can convey this truth to others. We need not then, with Oltramare, make these last words an appendix, intended to disparage the teaching of the Jew: "though thou hast but the shadow of knowledge." The drift of the passage demands the opposite sense: "as possessing the truth in its precise formula."

Vv. 21–24. "*And if, then, thou who teachest another, teachest not thyself? if preaching a man should not steal, thou stealest? if, while saying a man should not commit adultery, thou committest adultery? if, abhorring idols, thou committest sacrilege? if thou that makest thy boast of the law, dishonourest God through breaking the law? for the name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles through you, as it is written*" . . .—On the one side, then, the Jews are proud of the possession of their law; but, on the other, how do they put it in practice? It is to set forth this contradiction that the second series of propositions is devoted, vv. 21–24. The *οὖν, then,* ironically contrasts the *real* practical *fruit* produced in the Jews by their knowledge of the law, and that which such an advantage should have produced. The term *teach* includes all the honourable functions toward the rest of the world which the Jew has just been arrogating. Ὁ διδάσκων: Thou, the so great teacher!—The apostle chooses two examples in the second table of the law, theft and adultery; and two in the first, sacrilege and dishonour done to God. Theft comprehends all the injustices and deceptions which the Jews allowed themselves in commercial affairs. Adultery is a crime which the Talmud brings home to the three most illustrious Rabbins, Akiba, Mehir, and Eleazar. Sensuality is one of the prominent features of the Semitic character. The pillage of sacred objects cannot refer to anything connected with the worship celebrated at Jerusalem; such, for example, as refusal to pay the temple tribute, or the offering of maimed victims. The subject of the proposition: *thou who abhorrest idols,* proves clearly that the apostle has in view the pillage of *idol* temples. The meaning is: "Thy horror of idolatry does not go the length of preventing thee from hailing as a good prize the precious objects which have been used in idolatrous worship,

when thou canst make them thine own." The Jews probably did not pillage the Gentile temples themselves; but they filled the place of resetters; comp. besides, Acts xix. 37. The dishonour done to God arises from their greed of gain, their deceits and hypocrisy, which were thoroughly known to the Gentile populations among whom they lived. Paul weaves the prophetic rebuke into the tissue of his own language, but by the *as it is written* he reminds his readers that he is borrowing it from the inspired Scriptures. His allusion is to Isa. lii. 5 (which resembles our verse more in the letter than the sense), and to Ezek. xxxvi. 18–24 (which resembles it more in the sense than in the letter).

We have regarded the whole passage, vv. 17–24, as dependent on the conjunction εἰ δέ, *now if*, ver. 17: "Now if thou callest thyself . . . (vv. 17–20); and if teaching so and so, thou . . . (vv. 21–24)." Thereafter, the principal clause is easily expressed as a proposition to be understood between vv. 24, 25: "What advantage will this law be to thee, of which thou makest thy boast before others, and which thou dost violate thyself with such effrontery?" For, in fine, according to the principle laid down, ver. 13, it is not those who *know* the law, but those who *do* it, who shall be pronounced righteous by the judgment of God. The idea understood, which we have just expressed, is that to which the *for* of ver. 25 refers: "For it is wholly in vain for thee, if thou art disobedient, to reckon on circumcision to exculpate thee. A disobedient Jew is no better before God than a Gentile, and an obedient Gentile becomes in God's sight a true Jew." Such is the meaning of the following passage, vv. 25–29.

Vv. 25–27. "*For circumcision verily profiteth, if thou keep the law: but if thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumcision is made uncircumcision. Therefore if the uncircumcision keep the righteous ordinances of the law, shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision? And shall not uncircumcision which is by nature, if it fulfil the law, judge thee, who with the letter and circumcision dost transgress the law?*"—Paul knocks from under the Jew the support which he thought he had in his theocratic position, with its sign circumcision. We have seen it; the adage of the Rabbins was: "All the circumcised have part in the world to come," as if it were really

enough to be a Jew to be assured of salvation. Now, circumcision had been given to Israel as a consecration to circumcision *of heart*, an engagement to holiness, and not as a shelter from judgment in favour of disobedience and pollution. Taken then in this sense, and according to the mind of God, it had its use; but employed in the Rabbinical sense, it formed only an external wall of separation requiring to be overturned. The prophets never ceased to work in this direction; comp. Isa. i. 10–15 and lxvi. 1 et seq.—*Γέγονε*, strictly: "*has become, and remains* henceforth uncircumcision," in the eyes of God the righteous judge.

Vv. 26, 27 describe the opposite case: the transformation of the obedient Gentile into a Jew, according to the judgment of God. This transformation, being the logical consequence of the preceding, is connected by *οὖν, therefore*, with ver. 25. —The apostle is not now speaking, as in vv. 14, 15, of a simple sporadic observance of legal duties. The phrase is more solemn: *keeping the just ordinances of the law* (*δικαίωμα, all that the law declares righteous*). In viii. 4, the apostle uses a similar expression to denote the observance of the law by the Christian filled with the Holy Spirit. How can he here ascribe such an obedience to a Gentile? Philippi thinks he has in view those many proselytes whom Judaism was making at this time among the Gentiles. Meyer and others seek to reduce the meaning of the phrase to that of ver. 14. This second explanation is impossible, as we have just seen; and that of Philippi falls to the ground before the preceding expressions of the apostle, which certainly contain more than can be expected of a proselyte (*keep, fulfil* the law, *φυλάσσειν, τελεῖν τὸν νόμον*, vv. 26, 27). The comparison of viii. 4 shows the apostle's meaning. He refers to those many Gentiles converted to the gospel who, all uncircumcised as they are, nevertheless fulfil the law in virtue of the spirit of Christ, and thus become the *true* Israel, *the Israel of God*, Gal. vi. 16. Paul expresses himself in abstract terms, because here he has to do only with the principle, and not with the means by which it is realized; compare what we have said on vv. 7, 10. The future *λογισθήσεται, will be counted*, transports us to the hour of judgment, when God, in order to *declare* a man righteous, will demand that he *be* so in reality.

We might begin ver. 27 as an affirmative proposition: *and so He will judge thee.* But perhaps it is more in keeping with the lively tone of the piece to continue in ver. 27 the interrogation of ver. 26, as we have done in our translation: "And so (in virtue of this imputation) will not He judge thee" . . . ? The thought is analogous to Luke xi. 31, 32, and Matt. xii. 41, 42, though the case is different. For there it is Gentiles who condemn the Jews by the example of their repentance and their love of truth; here, it is the case of Christians of Gentile origin condemning the Jews by their fulfilment of the law.—Ostervald and Oltramare substitute for *judge,* used by the apostle, the term *condemn.* This is wrong; for the claim of the Jews is to escape, not only from condemnation, but from judgment; and it is bitter for them to hear, not only that they shall be judged *like* the Gentiles, but that they shall be judged *by* them.—*Τὸν νόμον τελεῖν, to fulfil the law,* is a phrase expressing real and persevering fulfilment. The love which the gospel puts into the believer's heart is in fact the *fulfilment of the law,* Rom. xiii. 10.—The preposition *διά,* strictly (*across the length of*): *through,* here denotes, as it often does, the *state,* the circumstances in which an act is accomplished; comp. 2 Cor. ii. 4; 1 Tim. ii. 15; Heb. ii. 15. So: "in full possession of the letter and circumcision."

This double transformation of the disobedient Jew into a Gentile, and of the obedient Gentile into a Jew, in the judgment of God, is explained and justified by vv. 28 and 29.

Vv. 28, 29. "*For he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision, which is outward in the flesh: but he is a Jew, which is one inwardly; and circumcision is of the heart, by the spirit, and not by the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God.*"—The double principle laid down here by Paul was the sum of prophetic theology; comp. Lev. xxvi. 41; Deut. x. 16; Jer. iv. 14; Ezek. xliv. 9. And hence it is that the apostle can make it the basis of his argument. Ver. 28 justifies the degradation of the Jew to the state of a Gentile, proclaimed in ver. 25; and ver. 29 the elevation of the Gentile to the rank of a Jew, proclaimed in vv. 26 and 27. The two words which justify this double transformation are *ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ, in secret, inwardly,* and *καρδίας, ἐν πνεύματι, of the heart, by the spirit.* For if there is a principle to

be derived from the whole of the Old Testament, it is that God has regard *to the heart* (1 Sam. xvi. 7). Paul himself referred in ver. 16 to the fact that in the day of judgment by Jesus Christ, it would be the *hidden things* of men which would form the essential ground of His sentence. There is only one way of explaining naturally the grammatical construction of these two verses. In ver. 28, we must borrow the two subjects Ἰουδαῖος and περιτομή from the predicate; and in ver. 29, the two predicates Ἰουδαῖός (ἐστι) and περιτομή (ἐστι) from the subject.—The complement καρδίας, *of the heart,* is the *gen. object.:* the circumcision which cleanses the heart; the clause ἐν πνεύματι, *in spirit,* denotes the means: by the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is the superior force which, by transforming the feelings of the heart, produces true inward purification. *The letter,* on the contrary, is an outward rule which does not change either the heart or the will; comp. vii. 6. Meyer thinks we should take οὗ, *of which,* as a neuter, referring to *Judaism* in general. But to what purpose would it be to say that the praise of Judaism comes not from men, but from God? That was sufficiently obvious of itself, since it was God who had established it, and all the nations detested it; we must therefore connect this pronoun with *the Jew* which precedes, and even with the feminine term *circumcision,* which is used throughout this whole piece for *the person circumcised.*—The word *praise* is again an allusion to the etymological meaning of the word Ἰουδαῖος, *Jew* (see on ver. 17); comp. Gen. xlix. 8. God, who reads the heart, is alone able to allot with certainty the title *Jew* in the true sense of the word—that is to say, *one praised.* The idea of praise coming from God is opposed to that whole Jewish vainglory which is detailed vv. 17–20.—What a remarkable parallelism is there between this whole passage and the declaration of Jesus, Matt. viii. 11, 12: "Many shall come from the east and from the west, and shall sit down in the kingdom of heaven," etc. . . . And yet there is nothing to indicate imitation on Paul's part. The same truth creates an original form for itself in the two cases.

Yet the apostle anticipates an objection to the truth which he has just developed. If the sinful Jew finds himself in the same situation in regard to the wrath of God as the sinful

Gentile, what remains of the prerogative which divine election seemed to assure to him? Before going further, and drawing the general conclusion following from the two preceding passages, i. 18–32 and ii. 1–29, Paul feels the need of obviating this objection; and such is the aim of the following passage.

SIXTH PASSAGE (III. 1–8).

Jewish Prerogative does not imply Exemption from Judgment.

The order of thought in this piece, one of the most difficult, perhaps, in the Epistle, is as follows:—

1. If the Jew is judged absolutely, as the Gentiles are, what advantage has he over them? Answer: The possession of the divine oracles (vv. 1, 2).

2. But if this possession has not realized the end which it was intended to serve (the faith of Israel in the Messiah), is not the faithfulness of God toward this people annulled? Answer: By no means; it will rather be glorified thereby (vv. 3, 4).

3. But if God makes use of human sin to glorify Himself, how can He yet make sinners the objects of His wrath? Answer: If the advantage which God derives from the sin of man prevented Him from punishing sinners, the final judgment would become impossible (vv. 5–8).

It is obvious that the reasoning is consecutive, even very compact, and that there is no need of expressly introducing an opponent, as many commentators have done. Paul does not here make use of the formula: *But some one will say.* The objections arise of themselves from the affirmations, and Paul puts them in a manner to his own account.

Vv. 1, 2. "*What then is the advantage of the Jew? or what is the profit of circumcision? Much every way: foremost,*[1] *in that unto them were committed the oracles of God.*"—It was a thing generally granted, that the elect people must have an advantage over the Gentiles; hence the article τό, *the,* before the word *advantage.* The Greek term περισσόν literally denotes what the Jews have *more than others.* If they are judged in the same category as these, as the apostle in

[1] B D E G Syr^{sch} It^{alla} omit the γαρ, which the T. R., with the other documents, reads after μεν.

chap. ii., and particularly in vv. 25–29, had just shown, what have they then *more* than they? The οὖν, *then*, precisely expresses this relation. One might infer from what precedes that every advantage of the Jew was denied.—The second question bears on the material symbol of Israel's election: circumcision. "Will the people whom God has *elected* and marked with the *seal* of this election be treated exactly like the rest of the world?" This objection is of the same nature as that which would be made in our day by a nominal Christian, if, when put face to face with God's sentence, he were to ask what advantage there accrues to him from his creed and baptism, if they are not to save him from condemnation?

Ver. 2. Though the advantage of the Jew does not consist in exemption from judgment, he has an advantage, nevertheless, and it is very great.—The adjective πολύ, which we have translated by *much*, properly signifies *numerous*. As neuter, it is connected with the subject of the first proposition of ver. 1: *the advantage;* the second question was in reality only an appendix calculated to strengthen the first.—By adding *every way*, Paul means that the advantage is not only considerable, but very varied, "extending to all the relations of life" (Morison).—Of these numerous and varied advantages he quotes only one, which seems to him, if one may so speak, central. Commentators like Tholuck, Philippi, Meyer, suppose that when the apostle wrote the word πρῶτον, *firstly*, he purposed to enumerate all the other advantages, but that he was diverted from fully expressing his thought. To exemplify this style there are quoted, besides i. 8 et seq., which we have had already before us, 1 Cor. vi. 12, 13, and xi. 18 et seq. But the apostle has too logical a mind, and his writings bear the mark of too earnest elaboration, to allow us to admit such breaches of continuity in their texture. In the view of a sound exegesis, the passages quoted prove absolutely nothing of the kind. Others think that we may here give to *firstly* the meaning of *chiefly;* but the Greek has words for this idea. The preceding words: *every way*, suggest the translation; they signify: "I might mention many things under this head; but I shall confine myself to one which is in the front rank." This form of expression, far from indicating that he purposes to mention others, shows, on

the contrary, why he will not mention them. They all flow from that which he proceeds to indicate. Neither has the particle μέν (from μένειν, *to remain*) its ordinary counterpart (δέ) in the sequel. It therefore means: "Though this advantage were the only one, it nevertheless remains perfectly real." The γάρ, *for*, is omitted by several Mjj. of both families, and by the old Vss. If it were kept, the ὅτι which follows would require to take the meaning of *because*, which is unnatural.—It is better, therefore, to reject it, and to translate ὅτι by *in that*.—This advantage, which takes the lead of all the others, so that after it, it is useless to announce them also, is the dignity granted to the Jews of being the *depositaries* of the divine oracles. The subject of ἐπιστεύθησαν is οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι understood, according to a well-known Greek construction; comp. 1 Cor. ix. 17. The meaning of the verb in the passive is strictly: "to be esteemed faithful, so that men will confide to you a deposit."—The deposit here is *the divine oracles*. The term λόγιον, *oracle*, has a graver meaning than λόγος, *word*, of which it is not at all a diminutive (Philippi); for it comes from the adjective λόγιος, *eloquent*. It always denotes, even in the classics, a *divine* saying; so Acts vii. 38, the law of Moses; Heb. v. 12, the gospel revelation; 1 Pet. iv. 11, the immediate divine communications with which the church was then favoured. In our passage, where the subject in question is the privilege granted to the Jews over the Gentiles, the word must be taken as referring to the whole Old Testament; but it is nevertheless true that the apostle thinks specially of the *Messianic promises* (Volkmar).—If Paul had intended to set forth the beneficial religious and moral influence exercised by these divine revelations on the national, domestic, and individual life of the Israelites, it is evident that he would have had a multitude of things to say. But it is equally clear that he would have been thus diverted from the object of this discussion. And hence he confines himself to establishing the point from which all the rest flows. This is the first phase of the discussion.—But an objection immediately rises: Has not this advantage, the possession of the Messianic promises, been rendered void by Israel's unbelief? Here begins the second phase.

Vv. 3, 4. "*For what shall we say? If some did not believe,*

shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect? Let it not be: yea, let God be found true, and every man a liar; as it[1] *is written: That Thou mightest be justified in Thy sayings, and mightest overcome*[2] *when Thou art judged.*" — Here again Paul is not introducing any opponent; the objection which he states springs logically from the fact he has just affirmed.— It would be possible to put the point of interrogation after the word τινές, *some:* "For what are we to think, if some did not believe?" But we think it preferable to put the point after γάρ, *for:* "For *what is the fact?*" and to connect the proposition: "If some did not believe," with the following question (see the translation). Paul likes these short questions in the course of discussion: *for what? but what?* fitted as they are to rouse attention. If he here uses the particle *for* instead of *but*, it is because he wishes from the first to represent the objection as no longer subsisting, but already resolved. —What is the unbelief of the Jews which the apostle has here in view? According to some, Philippi for example, it is their old unbelief in respect of the ancient revelations. But the aorist ἠπίστησαν, *did not believe*, refers to a particular historical fact rather than a permanent state of things, such as Jewish unbelief had been under the old covenant. Besides, the faithfulness of God toward Israel, when formerly unbelieving and disobedient, was a fact which could not be called in question, since God by sending them the Messiah had nevertheless fulfilled all His promises to them in a way so striking. Finally, the future *will it make void?* does not suit this sense; Paul would rather have said: *did it make void?* The subject in question, therefore, is a positive fact, and one which has just come to pass, and it is in relation to the consequences of this fact that the question of God's faithfulness arises. What is this fact? We find it, with the majority of commentators, in Israel's rejection of Jesus, its Messiah; and we might even add: in the persevering rejection of apostolic preaching. The hostile attitude of Israel in relation to the gospel was now a decided matter.—The pronoun τινές, *some*, may seem rather weak to denote the mass of the people who

[1] ℵ B read καθάπερ instead of καθώς.

[2] T. R., with B G K L, reads νικήσῃς; ℵ A D E; νικήσεις (the same variation is found in the LXX.).

had rejected the Messiah; but this pronoun denotes a part of the whole irrespectively of the proportion. In chap. xi. 17, the unbelieving Jews are called "*some* of the branches;" in Heb. iii. 16, the whole people, Caleb and Joshua only excepted, are described by this same pronoun; comp. 1 Cor. x. 7. The phrase of Plato is also cited: τινὲς καὶ πολλοί γε. Morison rightly says: "Many are only some, when they are not the whole."—Questions introduced by a μή always imply an answer more or less negative; so it is in this case: "This unbelief will not, however, make void" . . . ? Answer understood: "Certainly not." Hence the *for* at the beginning of the verse, which referred to this foreseen negative answer.—The verb καταργεῖν, which we have translated by *make void*, signifies literally: *to deprive of action*, or *efficacy;* and the phrase πίστις τοῦ θεοῦ, in contrast to ἀπιστία, *unbelief*, can only designate *the faithfulness* of God Himself, in a manner His good faith. This perfection consists in the harmony between God's words and deeds, or between His past acts and His future conduct; it is his adherence to order in the line of conduct followed by Him. The question thus signifies: "Can Jewish unbelief in regard to the Messiah invalidate God's faithfulness to His people?" The question might be asked in this sense: "If the Jews have not taken advantage of the salvation which the Messiah brought to them, will it follow that God has not really granted them all He had promised? Will any one be able to accuse Him of having failed in His promises?" The sense may also be: "Will He not remain faithful to His word in the future, even though after such an act on their part He should reject them?" For, in fine, His word does not contain promises only, but threatenings; comp. 2 Tim. ii. 13: "If we believe not, He abideth faithful" (by punishing unbelief, as He has said).—The first of these meanings does not agree naturally with the future καταργήσει, *will make void*, which points us not to the past, but to the future. The second might find some countenance in ver. 4, where the example of David's sin and punishment is referred to, as well as in the term *righteousness* (taken in the sense of *retributive* justice) and in the term *wrath*, ver. 5. Yet the very severe meaning which in this case must be given to the phrase *God's faithfulness*, would not be sufficiently indicated. We are led

to another and more natural meaning: "From the fact that Israel has rejected the Messianic salvation, does it follow that God will not fulfil all His promises to them in the future? By no means; His faithfulness will find a means in the very unbelief of His people of magnifying itself." The apostle has before him the perspective, which he will follow to its termination in chap. xi., that of the final salvation of the Jews, after their partial and temporary rejection shall have been instrumental in the salvation of the Gentiles.

The negative answer to this question, as we have seen, was already anticipated by the interrogative *μή*. When expressing it (ver. 4), the apostle enhances the simple negative. He exclaims: "*Let that not be* (the faithfulness of God made void)!" And to this forcible negation he adds the counter affirmation: "May the contrary be what shall happen: truth, nothing but truth, on God's side! All the lying, if there is any, on man's side!"—There is an antithesis between *μὴ γένοιτο, that be far removed* (the *chalilah* of the Hebrews), and the *γινέσθω δέ, but let this come to pass!* The imperative *γίνεσθω, may he or it become,* is usually understood in the sense: "May God be *recognised* as true" . . .! But the term *γίνεσθαι, to become,* refers more naturally to the fact in itself than to the recognition of it by man. The veracity of God *becomes,* is revealed more and more in history by the new effects it produces. But this growing realization of the true God runs parallel with another realization, that of human falsehood, which more and more displays man's perversity. *Falsehood* denotes in Scripture that inward bad faith wherewith the human heart resists known and understood moral good. The apostle seems to allude to the words of Ps. cxvi. 11: "I said in my haste: All men are liars." Only what the Psalmist uttered with a feeling of bitterness, arising from painful personal experiences, Paul affirms with a feeling of composure and profound humiliation in view of the sin of his people. He says even *all men,* and not only all Israelites; all men rather than God. If the principle of falsehood is realized in history, let all that bears the name of man be found capable of falseness, rather than that a tittle of this pollution should attach to the divine character. For the idea of *faithfulness* (ver. 3) there is substituted that of *veracity,* as for the idea of *unbelief* that of *falsehood.* In

both cases the second is wider than the first, and includes it. —The conflict between the promises of God and His veracity, raised by the present fact of Israel's unbelief, must issue in the glory of the divine faithfulness. This necessary result is expressed by the apostle by means of a saying of David, uttered on the occasion of one of his gravest infidelities, Ps. li. 6: "*That according as it is written . . .*" Alarm has been taken at the *that;* it has been sought to make it a simple *so that* (Osterv., Oltram.), as if what was spoken of were an effect, not an end. The wish was to avoid making David say he had sinned *in order that* God might be glorified. It cannot really be supposed that David means to ascribe to God responsibility for his trespass in any degree whatever, and that in a passage where he expressly affirms that the purity of the divine character must appear with new brightness on occasion of it. Hengstenberg and after him Philippi, have recourse to the distinction between the sinful *will* of David, which belongs wholly to him, and the *form* in which his sin was outwardly realized, a form which falls under the direction of Providence. But this distinction, which the theologian can make, could not present itself to the mind of David at the time, and in the disposition in which he composed his psalm. To explain the *that*, we have simply to take into account the manner in which David expresses himself in the foregoing words. He had said not only: "I have sinned," but: "I have sinned *against Thee;*" not only: "I have done the evil," but: "I have done that which *is displeasing in Thy sight.*" It is with the two ideas *against Thee* and *what is displeasing in Thy sight*, which aggravate the confession: *I have sinned*, that the *that* is connected. David means: "I was clear as to what I was doing; Thou hadst not left me ignorant that when sinning I was sinning against Thy person, which is outraged by such misdeeds, and that I was doing what Thou hatest,—*that* if, in spite of this knowledge, I nevertheless did it, Thou mightest be pure in the matter, and that the guiltiness might belong to me only." This idea of the knowledge of the divine will possessed by David, is that which is anew forcibly expressed in ver. 6: "Thou didst teach me wisdom in the hidden part." God had instructed and warned David *that* if he sinned, he might be the only guilty

one, and might not be able to accuse God. The *that* has therefore nearly the same meaning as the: "to the end they might be without excuse," i. 20. We thus recognise the analogy of situation between David and Israel, which leads the apostle to quote these words here. Israel, the depositary of the divine oracles, had been faithfully instructed and warned, *that* if later, in spite of these exceptional revelations, giving themselves up to the falsehood (voluntary blindness) of their own hearts, they came to miss recognising the Messiah, they should not be able to accuse God for their rejection, but should be declared, to the honour of the divine holiness, the one party guilty of the catastrophe which might follow.—The words: "that Thou mayest be justified *in* or *by* Thy words," signify: "that Thou mayest be *acknowledged righteous*, both in respect of the warnings which Thou hast given, and in the sentences which Thou wilt pronounce (on David by the mouth of Nathan, on Israel by their rejection)." In the Hebrew, the second proposition refers exclusively to those sentences which God pronounces; for it is said: "and that Thou mayest be found pure *when Thou judgest*." But the LXX. have translated: "that Thou mayest be victor (gain Thy case) when Thou art judged," or: "when Thou hast a case at law." It is probably this last meaning to which the apostle adapts his words, giving the verb κρίνεσθαι the middle sense, which it has in so many passages; for example, Matt. v. 40; 1 Cor. vi. 1, 6: "that Thou mayest gain Thy case if Thou hast one to plead." Paul has obviously in view the accusation against God's faithfulness which might be raised from the fact of the unbelief and rejection of the chosen people.

But this very thought, that the veracity of God will come forth magnified from Israel's unbelief, raises a new objection, the examination of which forms the third phase of this discussion.

Vv. 5, 6. "*But if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of God, what shall we say? Is not God unrighteous when He inflicts wrath? I speak as a man. That be far: for then how shall God judge the world?*"—From the *that*, ver. 4 it seemed to follow that God wills the sin of man for His own glory. But in that case, has He the right to condemn an act from which He reaps advantage, and to be

angry with him who commits it? This objection might be put in the mouth of a Jew, who, placing himself at Paul's view-point, and hearing him say that Israel's rejection of the Messiah will glorify God's faithfulness, and conduce to the accomplishment of His plans, judged God highly unjust for being angry with Israel on account of such conduct. *Our unbelief* would then signify the unbelief of us Jews. But the contrast which prevailed in ver. 4 was that between *God* and *every man*, and not between Jew and Gentile. It is therefore more natural to apply the term *our* unrighteousness to *human* unrighteousness in general, undoubtedly with special application to the Jewish unrighteousness which gives rise to the objection. It is from the depths of the human conscience that the apostle fetches his question. Is it righteous on God's part to judge an act which He turns to His own advantage? As Paul had previously substituted the idea of *truth* for that of (God's) *faithfulness*, he here substitutes *righteousness* for *truth*. This term in its most general sense denotes the perfection in virtue of which God cannot become guilty of any wrong toward any being whatever. Now this is what He seems to do to the sinner, when He at once condemns and makes use of him. It is from the word: that Thou mayest be acknowledged *righteous*, ver. 4, that Paul derives the term *righteousness*, ver. 5.—Συνιστάναι, strictly: *to cause to stand together*, whence: *to confirm, to establish*. The question τί ἐροῦμεν, *what shall we say?* does not occur in any other letter of the apostle's; but it is frequent in this (iv. 1, vi. 1, vii. 1, viii. 31, ix. 14, 30). It serves to fix the mind of the reader on the state of the question, at the point which the discussion has reached. If it had been in the interest of a certain school of criticism to deny the authenticity of the Epistle to the Romans, it is easy to see what advantage it would have taken of this form so exclusively characteristic of this treatise.—The interrogative form with μή assumes, as it always does, that the answer will be negative: "God is not, however, unjust in" . . .? It is certainly the apostle who is speaking, and not an opponent; for the objection is thus expressed in the outset as one resolved in the negative. The phrase: *to inflict wrath*, alludes to ii. 4, 5, where the apostle threatened Israel with divine *wrath* against the *day of wrath;* but the question

is nevertheless put in a perfectly general sense.—There is always something revolting to a conscience enlightened from above, in joining the epithet *unrighteous* with the word *God*, even hypothetically. This is why Paul adds: *I speak as a man.* By *man* he here understands man left to himself and his own reason, speaking with lightness and presumption of the ways of God. Some commentators would join this explanatory remark with what follows. But the following exclamation (*μὴ γένοιτο, let it not be so*), is absolutely opposed to this.

The argument of ver. 6, according to Meyer, is this: How would God be disposed to judge the world, if there was no righteousness in Him? For the troublesome consequences of sin could not impel Him to it, since He can turn them to good. It must be confessed that this would be a singularly wiredrawn argument. To go to prove God's righteousness by the fact of the judgment, while it is the fact of the judgment which rests on divine righteousness! If the apostle had reasoned thus, Rückert would have been right in declaring that the argument was insufficient. But the reasoning is quite different. Meyer might have found it clearly stated by Olshausen: "If God's drawing a good result from a bad deed were enough to destroy His right to judge him who committed it, the final judgment would evidently become impossible; for as God is always turning to good the evil which men have devised, every sinner could plead in his defence: My sin has after all served some good end."—One might be tempted to apply the word *the world* exclusively to the Gentile world, which would lead us to the explanation whereby ver. 5 is put into a Jewish mouth. To this Jewish interlocutor, excusing the sin of his nation by the good fruits which God will one day reap from it, Paul would then answer: But at this rate God could as little judge the Gentiles (*the world*). For He brings good fruits from their sins also. This meaning is very plausible in itself. But yet it does not correspond with the apostle's thought. For the word *τὸν κόσμον, the world*, would then have such an emphasis (as forming an antithesis to the Jews), that it would necessarily require to be placed before the verb. The idea is therefore more general: No final judgment is any longer possible if the beneficial consequences of sin, human or

Jewish, justify the sinner. This idea is exactly that which is expounded in the two following verses.

Vv. 7, 8. "*For*[1] *if the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto His glory; why yet am I also judged as a sinner? And not (as we are accused of doing, and as some falsely affirm that we teach), Let us do evil, that good may come? whose damnation is just.*" — Many commentators (Calvin, Grotius, Philippi) have fallen into a strange error in regard to ver. 7. They imagine that this verse reproduces once more the objection of ver. 5. The *for* serves, they say, to justify the question: "Is not God unrighteous?" In reality the apostle is made to add: after the advantage which He has derived from my lie for His glory, how does He still judge me? But for what reason should the *for* relate to ver. 5 rather than ver. 6, which immediately precedes? This would be to forget the answer given in ver. 6, and so to confess its weakness! In this case we should require rather to adopt the reading εἰ δέ, *but if*, of the *Sinaït.* and *Vatic.*, and to make ver. 7 an objection to the answer given in ver. 6. But this reading is inadmissible, because this new objection raised would remain without answer in the sequel. This same reason tells also against the explanation which makes ver. 7 a simple reaffirmation of the objection of ver. 5. How could an objection, reproduced so forcibly, possibly be left without any other answer than the relegating of those who dare to raise it to the judgment of God (ver. 8)? For a mind like Paul's this would be a strange mode of arguing! Ver. 7 is simply, as the *for* indicates, the confirmation of the answer given in ver. 6: "How would God judge the world? In reality (*for*) every sinner might come before the judge and say to Him, on his own behalf: And I too by my lie, I have contributed to Thy glory. And he must be acquitted."—By the phrase *truth of God* Paul returns to the beginning of the discussion (vv. 3 and 4). What is in question is the moral uprightness of God; in like manner the term *lie* brings us back to the *every man a liar* (ver. 4). *This* lie consists in voluntary ignorance of goodness, to escape the obligation of doing it. The verb ἐπερίσσευσεν, *has abounded*, strictly: *flowed over*, denotes the surplus of glory which God's moral

[1] ℵ and B read εἰ δὲ instead of εἰ γὰρ.

perfection extracts from human wickedness in each case. Ἔτι, *yet*, signifies: even after so profitable a result has accrued from my sin. Κἀγώ, *I also*: "I who, as well as all the rest, have contributed to Thy glory." It is as if one saw the whole multitude of sinners appearing before the judgment-seat one after the other, and throwing this identical answer in God's face; the judgment is therefore brought to nothing. Thus is confirmed the answer of ver. 6 to the objection of ver. 5.—This so suitable meaning appears to us preferable to a more special sense which might present itself to the mind, especially if one were tempted to apply the term *the world* (ver. 6) to the *Gentile*, in opposition to the *Jewish* world (ver. 5). The sense would be: "For the judgment comes to nought for me Gentile, as well as for thee Jew, since I can plead the same excuse as thou, my Gentilehood contributing to glorify God's truth as much as thy unbelief to exalt His righteousness." For the application to the Gentiles of the two expressions: *God's truth*, and *lie*, see i. 25. But to make this meaning probable, Paul would require to have brought out in chap. i. the idea that idolatry had contributed to God's glory; and as to the restricted meaning of τὸν κόσμον, *the world*, see at p. 229.

The apostle pushes his refutation to the utmost (ver. 8): Why even not go further? Why, after annihilating the judgment, not say further, to be thoroughly consequent: "And even let us furnish God, by sinning more freely, with richer opportunities of doing good! Will not every sin be a material which He will transform into the pure gold of His glory?" The words καὶ μή, *and not*, should probably be followed by the verb: *let us do evil?* ποιήσωμεν τὰ κακά, as we have translated it. But in Greek the sentence is interrupted by the insertion of a parenthesis, intended to remind the reader that such is precisely the odious principle which Paul and his brethren are accused by their calumniators of practising and teaching. And when, after this parenthesis, he returns in ver. 8 to his principal idea: ποιήσωμεν, *let us do*, instead of connecting it with the conjunction, *and (that) not*, he makes it depend directly on the last verb of the parenthesis, *teach*: "As we are accused of teaching, *let us do evil*." The ὅτι, *that*, is the ὅτι recitative so

common in Greek (transition from the indirect to the direct form of discourse). The construction which we have just indicated is a form of anacolouthon, of which numerous examples are found in classic authors.—The verb *we are accused* has for its object the understood clause: *of doing so*, of practising this principle. If we understood: "Accused *of teaching*," the following words would be a mere superfluous repetition. The term *βλασφημεῖσθαι* seems deliberately chosen to suggest the idea that the principle calumniously imputed to him is itself blasphemous in its nature. The second part of the parenthesis adds the idea of *professing* (*λάλειν*) to that of *practising*. The words form a climax, for it is graver to lay down a blasphemous maxim as a principle than to put it into practice in a few isolated cases. Hofmann has proposed another construction; he understands *ἐστιν* after *καὶ μή*, and makes the following *καθώς* dependent on it: "And *it is* not the case with me, as we are accused of practising and teaching, that it only remains to do evil that" . . . But it is harsh to make the *καθώς* depend on *ἐστί*; and Meyer rightly observes that Paul would have required to say *καὶ οὐ*, and not *καὶ μή*; comp. the interrogations, 1 Cor. vi. 7; Luke xix. 23, etc.—The sort of malediction which closes the verse is applied by most commentators to those who really practise and teach the maxim which is falsely applied to Paul. But the apostle would not have confined himself in that case to the use of the simple relative pronoun *ὧν, whose;* he would necessarily have required to indicate, and even characterize, the antecedent of the pronoun, which cannot refer to any substantive expressed or understood in the preceding proposition. It must have for its antecedent the preceding *τινές, some*, and we must apply this severe denunciation to the calumniators of the apostle's life and teaching. Those who raise such accusations wrongly and maliciously against his person and doctrine themselves deserve the condemnation which they call down on the head of Paul. But it should be well observed that the apostle does not express himself thus till he has satisfied all the demands of logical discussion.

Observations on the passage, iii. 1–8.—Notwithstanding its temporary application to the Jewish people, this passage, which will find its complete explanation in chap. xi., has a

real permanent value. It has always been sought to justify the greatest crimes in history by representing the advantages in which they have resulted to the cause of humanity. There is not a Robespierre who has not been transformed into a saint in the name of utilitarianism. But to make such a canonization valid, one would require to begin by proving that the useful result sprang from the evil committed as its principle. Such is the teaching of Pantheism. Living Theism, on the contrary, teaches that this transformation of the bad deed into a means of progress, is the miracle of God's wisdom and power continually laying hold of human sin to derive from it a result contrary to its nature. On the first view, all human responsibility is at an end, and the judgment becomes a nullity. On the second, man remains fully responsible to God for the bad deed as an expression of the evil will of its author, and despite the good which God is pleased to extract from it. Such is scriptural optimism, which alone reconciles man's moral responsibility with the doctrine of providential progress. The apostle has laid the foundations of this true *theodicée* in the remarkable piece which we have just been studying.—It is curious to see how Holsten seeks to explain this passage, the meaning of which has, as we think, been made so clear by a polemical intention against the alleged Judeo-Christianity of the Christians of Rome. We do not waste time in giving a refutation which seems to us to arise of itself from the preceding.

The apostle has drawn in two great pictures the reign of God's wrath—(1) over the Gentile world (chap. i.); (2) over the Jewish people (chap. ii.); and by way of appendix he has added a passage to this second picture, intended to sweep away the objections which, from the ordinary Jewish point of view, seemed opposed to the statement that this elect people could possibly become, notwithstanding their unbelief, the object of divine animadversion. Now, to the judgment which follows from the preceding context with respect to the whole of *mankind*, he affixes the seal of *Scripture sanction*, without which he regards no proof as finally valid.

SEVENTH PASSAGE (III. 9–20).

Scripture proclaims the fact of Universal Condemnation.

After a general declaration, repeating the already demonstrated fact of the condemnation of Jews and Greeks (ver. 9),

the apostle quotes a series of Scripture sayings which confirm this truth (vv. 10–18); then he formally states the conclusion (vv. 19 and 20).

Ver. 9. "*What then? are we sheltered?*[1] *No, in no wise:*[2] *for we have before proved*[3] *all men, both Jews and Greeks, that they are under sin.*"—If the words τί οὖν, *what then,* be taken as an independent question, the meaning will be: "*What, then, is the state of things?* To what result are we thus brought?" But many commentators connect these two words with the following sentence, so as to form a single question. The meaning in that case is, according to the different acceptations of the verb προέχεσθαι: *What have we to allege as an excuse?* or: *In what, then, are we superior?* But neither of these meanings agrees with the answer following. Indeed, instead of *in no wise,* it would require to be *none whatever,* or *in nothing.* There are therefore two questions, and not merely one.—What is the sense of the verb προεχόμεθά, which by itself forms the second question? We should first testify to the correctness of the Received reading. All the MSS. are at one on this point except A L, which read the subjunctive instead of the indicative, obviously to convert the word into an exhortation, and D G, which read προκατέχομεν while adding the object περισσόν; these last, at the same time, reject the words οὐ πάντως. This is the text which Chrysostom and Theodoret seem to have followed, as well as the Itala and Peschito. The meaning would be: *What superiority do we possess?* It is simply an attempt to escape from the difficulty of the Received reading.—The verb προέχειν has two principal meanings in the active: *to hold before* (in order to protect), and *to hold the first place.* In the passive, the first meaning changes into *to be protected;* the second meaning, as being intransitive, has no passive. In the middle, the verb signifies, according to the first meaning: *to protect oneself, to shelter oneself, to hold out a pretext;* according to the second: *to place oneself at the head, to surpass.* It is logically impossible to apply here the idea of *superiority,* either in the passive form: *Are we preferred?* or in the

[1] Instead of προεχόμεθα, A L read προεχώμεθα; D G: προκατεχόμεν περισσον.
[2] D G P omit ου παντως.
[3] D G read ητιασαμεθα instead of προητιασαμεθα.

middle form: *Do we surpass?* Undoubtedly these two interpretations have both found their defenders; Osterv., for example: *Are we preferable?* Oltram.: *Have we some superiority?* But the question of ascribing a superiority to the Jews had been put at ver. 1; the apostle had resolved it affirmatively from the *theocratic* standpoint. If, then, he now resolves it negatively, as he does in the following answer, it can only be from the *moral* point of view. But in this case he could not fail to indicate this distinction. The only appropriate meaning, therefore, is that of *sheltering*, which is also the most frequent in classic Greek: "Have we a shelter under which we can regard ourselves as delivered from wrath?" This meaning seems to us to be perfectly suitable. The apostle has demonstrated that the Jewish people, as well as the Gentile world, are under God's wrath. He has put to himself the objection: But what in this case becomes of the Jew's advantage? And he has proved that this advantage, perfectly real though it be, cannot hinder the rejection and judgment of this people. "What then?" he now asks as a consequence from what precedes, "can we flatter ourselves that we have a refuge?" "In no wise," such is his answer. All is closely bound together in the reasoning thus understood.—The phrase *οὐ πάντως* strictly signifies: *not altogether;* comp. 1 Cor. v. 10. When Paul means: *not at all*, he uses, in conformity with Greek custom, the form *πάντως οὐ*; comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 12. But the first meaning is evidently too weak after the preceding argument, and in consequence of that which follows. Meyer even finds himself obliged here to abandon his philological rigorism, and to take the second meaning. And, in reality, this meaning is not incorrect. It is enough, as Morison says, to make a pause in reading after *οὐ*, *not*, adding *πάντως*, *absolutely*, as a descriptive: *no, absolutely;* or better: *no, certainly.* This meaning is that of the entirely similar phrase *οὐ πάνυ* in Xenophon, Demosthenes, Lucian, and even that of *οὐ πάντως* in two passages quoted by Morison, the one taken from classic Greek, the other from patristic.[1]

[1] Theognis, 305: "The wicked are *certainly not* born wicked (*οὐ πάντως*)." The translation: *not altogether*, is inadmissible.—Ep. to Diogn. c. 9: "*Certainly not* taking pleasure in our sins (*οὐ πάντως*), but bearing them." The meaning *not altogether* would be absurd.

The apostle demonstrates this negation, which refers specially to the Jews, by summing up in the following proposition the result of the long preceding indictment against the two divisions of mankind. The term *αἰτιᾶσθαι, to accuse, incriminate,* belongs to the language of the bar. The *προ, before, previously,* which enters into the composition of the verb, reminds the reader of the two great pictures which Paul had just drawn.—The phrase: *to be under sin,* does not merely signify: to be under the *responsibility* (the guilt) of sins committed, but also to be under the *power* of sin itself, which like a perpetual fountain constantly reproduces and increases this guilt. These two meanings, sin as a *trespass,* and sin as a *power,* are both demanded by the context, the first by the preceding, and the second by the succeeding context. In point of fact, God's wrath is not based solely on trespasses committed, which have something external and accidental in their character; it is founded, above all, on the permanent state of human nature as it is about to be described by Scripture. So long as the Scriptures had not spoken, Paul might be regarded as a simple accuser. But as soon as the voice of this judge shall be heard, the case will be determined, and the sentence pronounced. Vv. 10–18 enumerate, if one may so speak, the grounds of judgment; vv. 19 and 20 give the sentence.

Paul first reminds his readers, in scriptural terms, of *the most general characteristics* of human corruption, vv. 10–12. Then he presents two particular classes of the *manifestations* of this corruption, vv. 13–17. Finally, he closes this description by a decisive feature which goes back to the very *fountain* of evil, ver. 18.

Vv. 10–12. "*As it is written, There is none righteous, no, not one: there is none*[1] *that understandeth, there is none that seeketh*[2] *after God. They are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth*[3] *good, no, not one.*"—These six sentences are taken from Ps. xiv. 1–3. At the first glance, this psalm seems to be depicting the wickedness of the *Gentiles* only; comp. ver. 4: "They eat up

[1] A B G omit the ὁ before συνιων.
[2] B G omit ὁ before ἐκζητων (B: ζητων).
[3] ℵ D E read the article ὁ before ποιων.

my people, as if they were eating bread." But on looking at it more closely, it is clear that the term *my people* denotes the true people of Jehovah, "the afflicted" (ver. 6), in opposition to the proud and violent as well within as without the theocracy. This delineation therefore applies to the moral character of man, so long as he remains beyond the influence of divine action.—Ver. 10 contains the most general statement. Instead of the word *righteous*, there is in the Hebrew: the man *that doeth good*, which comes to the same thing.—The two terms which follow in ver. 11 have a more particular sense. The first is related to the understanding: the knowledge of the Creator in His works; the second to the will: the aspiration after union with this perfect being. The Sinaït., like most of the Mjj., reads the article ὁ before the two participles. This article is in keeping with the meaning of the psalm. God is represented as seeking *that* one *man* and not finding him. We may accentuate συνιῶν as an unusual participle of συνιέω or συνίων, from the verb συνίω, which sometimes takes the place of the verb συνίημι.—In the case where positive good is not produced (seeking after God), the heart immediately falls under the dominion of evil; this state is described in general terms, ver. 12.

Ἐκκλίνειν, *to deviate*, to go in a bad way, because one has voluntarily fled from the good (ver. 11). Ἀχρειοῦσθαι, *to become useless*, unfit for good, corresponds to the Hebrew *alach*, *to become sour*, to be spoiled.—The sixth proposition reproduces, by way of *resumé*, the idea of the first. Mankind resembles a caravan which has strayed, and is moving in the direction opposite to the right one, and whose members can do nothing to help one another in their common misery (*do good*).

Here begins a second and more particular description, that of human wickedness manifesting itself in the form of *speech*.

Vv. 13, 14. "*Their throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues they have used deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips: whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness.*"—These four propositions refer to the different *organs* of speech, and show them all exercising their power to hurt, under the dominion of sin. The *throat* (*larynx*) is compared to a sepulchre; this refers to the language of the gross and brutal man, of whom it is said in common parlance: it seems

as if he would like to eat you. The characteristic which follows contrasts with the former; it is the sugared *tongue*, which charms you like a melodious instrument. The imperfect ἐδολιοῦσαν (Alex. form) denotes the action as continually repeated. These two features are borrowed from Ps. v. 9, where they describe the behaviour of David's enemies. The third proposition is taken from Ps. cxl. 3, which treats of the same subject; what is meant is that calumny and falsehood which malignant *lips* give forth, as the serpent infuses its poison. The fourth (ver. 14) describes the wickedness which is cast in your face by a *mouth* full of hatred or bitterness; it is borrowed from Ps. x. 7, where the contrast is between the weak godly man and the powerful wicked man within the theocracy itself.

This picture of human depravity manifesting itself in word is completed by the description of the same wickedness shown in *deeds*.

Vv. 15–18. "*Their feet are swift to shed blood: oppression and misery are in their ways: the way of peace they have not known: there is no fear of God before their eyes.*"—Of these four propositions the first three are borrowed from Isa. lix. 7, 8, in which chapter the prophet confesses the corruption of Israel. The *feet*, as the emblem of walking, symbolize the whole conduct. Man acts without regard to his neighbour, without fear of compromising his welfare and even his life; a saying taken from Prov. i. 16. He oppresses (σύντριμμα) his brother, and fills his life with misery (ταλαιπωρία), so that the way marked out by such a course is watered with the tears of others.—No *peace* can exist either in the heart of such men, or in their neighbourhood (ver. 17). And this overflow of depravity and suffering arises from a void: the absence of that feeling which should have filled the heart, *the fear of God* (ver. 18). This term is the normal expression for piety in the Old Testament; it is that disposition in man which has always God present in the heart, His will and judgment. The words: *before their eyes*, show that it belongs to man freely to evoke or suppress this inward view of God, on which his moral conduct depends. This final characteristic is borrowed from Ps. xxxvi. 1, which marks the contrast between the faithful and the wicked even in Israel.

The apostle in drawing this picture, which is only a grouping together of strokes of the pencil, made by the hands of psalmists and prophets, does not certainly mean that each of those characteristics is found equally developed in every man. Some, even the most of them, may remain latent in many men; but they all exist in germ in the selfishness and natural pride of the *ego*, and the least circumstance may cause them to pass into the active state, when the fear of God does not govern the heart. Such is the *cause* of the divine condemnation which is suspended over the human race.

This is the conclusion which the apostle reaches; but he limits the express statement of it, in vv. 19, 20, to the Jews; for they only could attempt to protest against it, and put themselves outside this delineation of human corruption. They could object in particular, that many of the sayings quoted referred not to them, but to the Gentiles. Paul foresees this objection, and takes care to set it aside, so that nothing may impair the sweep of the sentence which God pronounces on the state of mankind.

Vv. 19, 20. "*Now we know that what things soever the law saith,*[1] *it speaks*[2] *for them who are under the law: that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God. For that by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in His sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin.*" —By his *we know*, Paul appeals to the common sense of his readers. It is obvious, indeed, that the Old Testament, while depicting to the Jews the wickedness of the Gentiles, did not at all mean to embitter them against the latter, but to put them on their guard against the same sins, and preserve them from the same judgments; a proof that God saw in their hearts the same germs of corruption, and foresaw their inevitable development if the Jews did not remain faithful to Him. Thus, while none of the sayings quoted might refer *to them*, they were nevertheless all uttered *for them*.—The *law* here denotes the whole Old Testament, as being throughout the rule for Israelitish life; comp. John x. 34; 1 Cor. xiv. 21, etc.—The difference of meaning between the words λέγειν, *to say*, and λαλεῖν, *to speak*, comes out clearly in this passage,—the first referring to the *contents* of the saying, the second to the fact

[1] ℵ Or.: λαλει for λεγει. [2] D F G L: λεγει for λαλει.

of its *utterance.*—There is no reason for weakening the sense of the conjunction ἵνα, *in order that,* and making it signify *so that.* The *object* of all those declarations given forth by Scripture regarding the wickedness of the natural man, was really to close his mouth against all vainglory, as that to which a man filled with self-satisfaction gives himself up. *Every mouth,* even the Jews'. *Καί: and that thus. All the world:* all mankind, Jew and Gentile; ὑπόδικος, *placed under the stroke of justice,* like one whom the judge has declared guilty, and who owes satisfaction to the law he has violated. The word is frequently used in this sense in the classics; it is a judicial term, corresponding to the word Paul had used to denote the accusation (αἰτιᾶσθαι, ver. 9). The last word: *to God,* is full of solemnity; it is into the hands of His justice that the whole guilty world falls.

The *all the* is so true that the only possible exception, that of the Jewish people, is excluded (ver. 20). This people, indeed, could have alleged a host of ritualistic and moral works performed daily in obedience to the divine law. Did not such works establish in their case special merit and right to God's favour? The apostle sets aside such a claim. Διότι: *for that. No flesh:* no human creature (see on i. 3).—Here for the first time we meet with the expression ἔργα νόμου, *works of the law,* one of the important terms in the apostle's vocabulary. It is found, however, only in the Epistles to the Romans (iii. 28, ix. 32) and to the Galatians (ii. 16, iii. 2, 5, 10). But, nevertheless, it expresses one of the ideas which lie at the root of his experience and of his view of Christian truth. It sums up the first part of his life. It may be understood in two ways. A *work of law* may mean: a work exactly conformed to the law, corresponding to all the law prescribes (Hodge, Morison, etc.); or it may mean: such a work as man can accomplish under the dispensation of the law, and with such means only as are available under this dispensation. In the first sense it is certainly unnecessary to explain the impossibility of man's finding his righteousness in those works by an imperfection inherent in the moral ideal traced by the law. For Paul himself says, vii. 14, that "*the law is spiritual;*" vii. 12, that "*the law is holy,* and the commandment is *holy, just, and good;*" viii. 4, that "the work

of the Holy Spirit in the believer consists in fulfilling what the law has determined to be righteous." Much more, he goes the length of affirming positively, with Moses himself (Lev. xviii. 5), that if any one exactly fulfilled the law he would live by his obedience (Rom. x. 5; Gal. iii. 12). Taking this meaning, then, why cannot *the works of the law* justify? It can only be man's powerlessness to do them. St. Paul would then say: "No man will be justified by the works of the law, because works really conformed to the spirit of the law are beyond his power to realize." Thus the kind of works referred to in the declaration: "not being justified by the works of the law," would be ideal and not real. This meaning is far from natural. From Paul's way of speaking of the works of the law, we cannot help thinking that he has a fact in view,—that he is reckoning with a real and not a fictitious value. We must therefore come to the second meaning: works such as man can do when he has no other help than the law,—that is to say, in fact, in his own strength. The law is perfect in itself. But it does not provide fallen man with the means of meeting its demands. Paul explains himself clearly enough on this head, Gal. iii. 21: "If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law." In other words, the law does not communicate the Spirit of God, and through Him the life of love, which is the fulfilling of the law (Rom. xiii. 10). Works wrought in this state, notwithstanding their external conformity to the letter of the law, are not therefore its real fulfilment. Though agreeable to the legal statute, they are destitute of the moral disposition which would give them value in the eyes of God. Paul himself had groaned till the time of his conversion over the grievous contrast in his works which he constantly discerned between the appearance and the reality; comp. the opposition between the state which he calls, vii. 6, *oldness of the letter* and *newness of spirit*. He gives his estimate of the works of the law when, after saying of himself before his conversion, Phil. iii. 6: "As to the righteousness which is under the law, blameless," he adds, ver. 7: "But what things were gain to me (all this from the human point of view blameless righteousness), these I counted loss for Christ's sake."—There remains one question to be examined.

Is it true, as Theodoret,[1] Pelagius, and many modern critics have thought, that Paul is speaking here only of *ceremonial* works imposed by the law, and not of works implying moral obedience? The meaning of the verse would then be this: "The whole world is condemned; for the Jews themselves cannot be justified by the observance of the ceremonies which their law prescribes." But such a distinction between two kinds of works is opposed to the context; for the apostle does not contrast work with work—he contrasts work with faith. Then how could he add immediately, that by the law is the knowledge of sin? From vii. 7, 8, it appears that this saying applies above all to the moral law. For it was the tenth commandment which led the apostle to discern covetousness in his heart, and it was this discovery of covetousness which convinced him of sin. Hence it appears that the last words of our verse refer to the moral, and not the ceremonial law, which decides the meaning of the term: *the works of the law.* Besides, the expression *all flesh,* which evidently embraces the Gentiles, could not be applied to them if the law were here taken as the ceremonial law, for in this sense they have never had it. In general, the distinction between the ritual and the moral elements of the law is foreign to the Jewish conscience, which takes the law as a divine unity.—It follows from this saying of the apostle, that man ought never to attempt to put any work whatever between God and himself as establishing a right to salvation, whether a work wrought before his conversion proceeding from his natural ability, for it will lack the spirit of love which alone would render it *good* in God's sight; or even a work posterior to regeneration and truly good (ἔργον ἀγαθόν, Eph. ii. 10), for as such it is the fruit of the Spirit, and cannot be transformed into a merit of man.—The declarative meaning of the verb δικαιοῦν, *to justify,* appears clearly here from the two subordinate clauses: *by the works of the law,* and *before Him* (see on i. 17).

By a short proposition (20*b*) the apostle justifies the principle affirmed 20*a*. Far from having been given to sinful man to furnish him with a means of justification, the law was rather given to help him in discerning the sin which reigns over

[1] Not Origen and Chrysostom, as Calvin erroneously says. (See the rectification in Morison.)

him; ἐπίγνωσις, *discernment,* proof.—This thought is only indicated here; it will be developed afterwards. Indeed, Paul throughout the whole of this piece is treating of sin as *guilt,* forming the ground of condemnation. Not till chap. vii. will he consider sin as a *power,* in its relation to the law, and in this new connection; then will be the time for examining the idea with which he closes this whole passage.

Judaism was living under a great illusion, which holds it to this very hour, to wit, that it is called to save the Gentile world by communicating to it the legal dispensation which it received through Moses. "Propagate the law," says the apostle, "and you will have given to the world not the means of purifying itself, but the means of seeing better its real corruption." These for us are commonplaces, but they are become so through our Epistle itself. At the time when it was written, these commonplaces were rising on the horizon like divine beams which were to make a new day dawn on the world.

On the order of ideas in this first section, according to Hofmann and Volkmar.—Hofmann finds the principal division of this section between vv. 4 and 5 of chap. iii. Up to ver. 4, the apostle is proving that God's wrath rests on mankind, whether Gentile (i. 18–ii. 8) or Jewish (ii. 9–iii. 4); but from that point all the apostle says applies specially to Christians, thus: "As we are not ignorant, *we Christians* (iii. 5), that man's sin, even when God is glorified by it, can be justly judged (vv. 5–7), and as we do not teach, as we are accused of doing, that the good which God extracts from evil excuses it (ver. 8), we bow, with all other men, before the Scripture declarations which attest the common sin, and we apply to ourselves the sentence of condemnation which the law pronounces on the whole world. Only (iii. 21 et seq.) we do not rest there; for we have the happiness of knowing that there is a righteousness of faith through which we escape from wrath."—This construction is refuted, we think, by three principal facts—1. The man who judges, ii. 1, is necessarily the Jew (see the exegesis). 2. The objection, iii. 5, is closely connected with the quotation from Ps. li., and cannot be the beginning of a wholly new development. 3. The question: "What then? have we a shelter?" (ver. 9), is too plainly a reference to that of ver. 1 ("what then is the advantage of the Jew?") to be applied otherwise than specially to the Jew. This is confirmed by the end of ver. 9, in which the apostle gives the reason for the first proposition

in this general sentence: "*For* we have proved *both Jews and Greeks.*" It is clear, therefore, that as chap. i. from ver. 18 describes the wrath of God displayed on the Gentiles, chap. ii. describes and demonstrates the wrath of God as accumulating over the Jewish world, and that the passage iii. 1–8 is simply intended to set aside the objection which the Jew might draw from his exceptional superiority. Vv. 9–20 are the scriptural *resumé* and demonstration of this double condemnation of Jews and Gentiles.—According to Volkmar, chap. i. from ver. 18 describes the wrath of God against *all sin*, and chap. ii. that same wrath against *all sinners*, even against the Jew, notwithstanding his excuses (ii. 1–16) and his advantages, which he is unable to turn to moral account (vv. 17–29), and finally, notwithstanding the greatest of his privileges, the possession of the Messianic promises (iii. 1–8). Here, iii. 9, Volkmar places the beginning of the new section, that of the righteousness of faith. "Since the whole world is perishing, vv. 9–20, God saves the world by the righteousness of faith, which is confirmed by the example both of Abraham and Adam, the type of Christ." This construction differs from ours only in two points, which are not to its advantage, as it appears to me—(1) The antithesis between *all sins* (chap. i.) and *all sinners* (chap. ii.), which is too artificial to be apostolical; (2) The line of demarcation between the preceding and the new section fixed at iii. 9 (instead of iii. 21), a division which awkwardly separates the section on *wrath* in its entirety (i. 18–iii. 8) from its scriptural summary (vv. 9–20).

SECOND SECTION.

III. 21–V. 11.—JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ACQUIRED FOR THE WHOLE WORLD.

In this section, which forms the counterpart of the preceding, three principal ideas are developed.

1. The *historical fact* by which justification by faith is acquired for the world, iii. 21–26.

2. The *harmony* of this mode of justification with the revelation of the Old Testament, iii. 27–iv. 25.

3. The certainty of justification, not for the present only, but for all the *future*, embracing the last judgment, v. 1–11.

Thus the sentence of condemnation is effaced by that of absolution.

EIGHTH PASSAGE (III. 21–26).

The Fact by which Justification by Faith is acquired for us.

We have already proved that ver. 21 is directly connected in sense with i. 17 (see pp. 163, 164). In the interval from i. 18 to iii. 20, the apostle has shown that the wrath of God rests on mankind, whence it follows that if the world is not to perish, a divine manifestation of an opposite kind, and able to overcome the first, is indispensable. It is this new revelation which forms the subject of the following passage. Vv. 21 and 22 contain the theme of the first piece, and at the same time of the whole section. Ver. 23 once more sums up the thought of the preceding section; and vv. 24–26 are the development of the subject, the exposition of the new way of justification.

Vv. 21, 22*a*. "*But now the righteousness of God is manifested without the law, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; even the righteousness of God by faith in Jesus Christ*[1] *for and upon all them*[2] *that believe.*"—The δέ, *but*, is strongly adversative; it contrasts the revelation of righteousness with that of wrath. The former is presented as a new fact in the history of mankind; so that one might be led to give the word *now* a *temporal* sense; comp. the *at this time*, ver. 26, and Acts xvii. 30. This, however, is only apparent. The contrast with the preceding is *moral* rather than temporal; it is the contrast between the condemnation pronounced by the law (ver. 20) and the new righteousness acquired without the law (ver. 21). It is therefore better to give the word *now* the *logical* meaning which it has so frequently in the New Testament (vii. 17; 1 Cor. xiii. 12, xiv. 6, etc.) and in the classics: "The situation being such." The words: *without the law*, stand foremost, as having the emphasis. They evidently depend on the verb *is manifested*, and not on the word *righteousness* (*a righteousness without law*, Aug.). The absence of the article before the word *law* does not prove that the

[1] Marcion omitted the word Ιησου, which is also rejected by B.

[2] The words και επι παντας are omitted by ℵ A B C P, Copt., but are read in D E F G K L, Syr. Vulg. and the Fathers.

apostle does not mean the term to denote the *Mosaic* law; only the law is excluded from co-operating in the new righteousness not because it is *Mosaic*, but because it is *law*. Under the old dispensation, righteousness came to man through the thousand channels of legalism; in the new, righteousness is given him without the least co-operation of what can be called a law.—We know what Paul calls the *righteousness of God:* it is the state of reconciliation with God in which man is placed by the sentence which declares him just (see on i. 17).—The verb *φανεροῦν, to put in the light*, differs from the verb *ἀποκαλύπτειν, to reveal*, used i. 17, in the figure, not in the sense. The second applies to an object which was hidden by a veil, and which is made known by withdrawing the veil; the former, to an object placed in the shade, and on which rays of light are let fall. The only real difference from i. 17 is therefore this: there, the verb was in the *present*, for it denoted the permanent revelation of the gospel by means of evangelical preaching; while here, the verb is in the *perfect*, because it refers, as Morison says, "to the fact itself, which that preaching proclaims." That fact now finished is the subject expounded in vv. 25 and 26; it is through it that the righteousness of God is set in the light for all times.

But if legal observances are excluded from all co-operation in this righteousness, it does not follow that the latter is in contradiction to the Old Testament revelation in its double form of law and prophecy. These two manifestations of the divine will, commandment, and promise, understood in their true sense, contain, on the contrary, the confirmation of the righteousness of faith, as the apostle will prove in the sequel of this section, ver. 27–iv. 25. The law by unveiling sin opens up the void in the heart, which is filled by the righteousness of faith; prophecy completes the work of preparation by promising this righteousness. Thus there is no objection to be drawn from the old revelation against the new. As the new fulfils the old, the latter confirms the former.

Ver. 22. The new righteousness, then, being given without any legal work, what is the means by which it is conferred? Ver. 22 answers: *faith in Jesus Christ.* Such is the *true* means opposed to the false. The δέ, *now*, which the translation cannot render, is explanatory, as ix. 30; Gal. ii. 2; Phil.

ii. 8, etc. It takes the place of a *scilicet, to wit.* Osterv. and Oltram. have well rendered it by: *say I:* "The righteousness, *I say,* of God." Here, again, the absence of the article serves to indicate the category: *a* righteousness of divine origin, in opposition to the legal dispensation, in which righteousness proceeds from human works.—This righteousness is granted *to faith,* not assuredly because of any merit inherent in it,—for this would be to fall back on *works,* the very thing which the new dispensation wishes to exclude,—but because of the *object* of faith. Therefore it is that this object is expressly mentioned: *Jesus Christ.* The omission of the word *Jesus* by Marcion is perhaps to be explained by the fact that this heretic denied the humanity of Jesus, and attached importance only to His Christship. The omission of this word in the one Mj. B, cannot bring it into suspicion. It has been attempted to make this complement: *Jesus Christ,* a *gen. subjecti:* the faith *which Jesus Christ Himself had,* whether His faith *in God* (Benecke: His *fidelity* to God) or His *fidelity to us* (Lange). The parallel, i. 17, suffices to refute such interpretations. The only possible sense is this: *faith in Jesus Christ;* comp. Mark xi. 22; Gal. ii. 16; Jas. ii. 1, etc. —This clause: *by faith in Jesus Christ,* is the reproduction and development of the first clause: ἐκ πίστεως, *by faith,* i. 17. The following: *for and upon all them that believe,* is the development of the second clause in the same verse: εἰς πίστιν, *for faith.* Faith, indeed, as we have seen, plays a double part in justification. It is the disposition which God accepts, and which He imputes as righteousness; and it is at the same time the instrument whereby every one may appropriate for his own personal advantage this *righteousness of faith.* The first office is expressed here by the clause: *by faith;* the second by the clause: *for and upon all them that believe.*— The words καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας, *and upon all them,* are wanting in the four Alex., but they are found in the Mjj. of the other two families (except P), and in the ancient Vss. Meyer and Morison justly remark that it would be impossible to account for their interpolation, as there was nothing in the clause: *for all them,* to demand this explanatory addition. It is easy to understand, on the contaary, how these words were omitted, either through a confusion of the two πάντας by the copyists,

—the *Sinaït.*, in particular, abounds in such omissions,[1]—or because this clause seemed to be a pleonasm after the preceding. It is quite in keeping with Paul's manner thus to accumulate subordinate clauses to express by a change of prepositions the different aspects of the moral fact which he means to describe. These two aspects in this case are those of general *destination* (εἰς, *for*) and personal *application* (ἐπί, *upon*): "As to this righteousness, God sends it *for* thee that thou mayest believe in it; and it will rest *on* thee from the moment thou believest." Comp. Phil. iii. 9. Theodoret, Bengel, etc., have thought that the clause: *for all them*, applied to the Jews, and the clause: *upon all them*, to the Gentiles. But the very object the apostle has here in view is to efface every other distinction save that of believing. This same reason prevents us also from allowing the explanation of Morison, who, after Wetstein, Flatt, Stuart, puts a comma after εἰς πάντας, *for all*, that is to say, for *all men*, absolutely speaking, inasmuch as this righteousness is really universal in *destination*, and who applies the participle: *them that believe*, only to the second clause: *upon all*, inasmuch as *real participation* in this righteousness is granted to believers only. But in this case the second πάντας, *all*, should of course have been omitted. Then we shall see in ver. 25 that the condition of faith is included from the beginning in the very decree of redemption. Finally, these two clauses: *for all them*, and *upon all them that believe*, are plainly the unfolding of the contents of the words εἰς πίστιν, *for faith*, i. 17; whence it follows that the words *who believe* belong equally to the two pronouns *all*.—To pronounce one righteous, God does not then any more ask: Hast thou kept the law? but: Believest thou, thou, whoever thou art? The first clause: *for all*, contrasts this believer, Jew or Gentile, with the Jews, who alone could attain to the righteousness of the law. The second clause: *upon all*, contrasts this righteousness as a gift of God fully made, with that of the law of which *man* himself must be the maker.

These two verses are, as we shall see, the theme which

[1] How Tischendorf, in his 8th edition, could yield to the authority of this MS. to the extent of rejecting these words, which he had preserved in the text of the 7th, is incomprehensible.

will be developed in the whole following section. But, first, ver. 23 sums up the preceding section by re-stating the ground on which every human being needs the righteousness of faith.

Vv. 22*b*, 23. "*For there is no difference: for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God.*"—By denying *all difference,* the apostle means here that there are not two ways by which men can be justified, the one that of works, the other of faith. The first is closed against all, even the Jews, by the fact of universal condemnation, which has just been demonstrated. The second, therefore, alone remains open. The old Genevan version, Ostervald, and Martin put all ver. 23 into ver. 22, and thus reckon only thirty verses instead of thirty-one in the chapter. The object of this change was to make ver. 23 a simple parenthesis, that the participle *being justified* might be directly connected with ver. 22. But this grammatical connection is certainly incorrect, and we should preserve the reckoning of the verses as it stands in the Greek text.

Ver. 23. This absence of difference in the mode of justification rests on the equality of all in respect of the fact of sin. In the aorist ἥμαρτον, *have committed sin,* no account is taken of the question whether they have done so once or a hundred times. Once suffices to deprive us of the title of righteous, and thereby of the *glory of God.*—Καί, *and in consequence.*—The verb ὑστερεῖσθαι, *to lack,* expresses in general the idea of a *deficit,* which consists either in remaining below the normal level, or in being behind others. Paul therefore means that they all want more or less a normal state, which he calls the *glory of God.* By this term some have understood the favourable *opinion* which God has of the just man, His approbation or favour (Grot. Turret. Fritzsche). This meaning is far from natural; John xii. 43 does not suffice to justify it. Others understand by this expression: *glory in God's sight,* that which we should possess if we were righteous (Mel. Calv. Philippi). This meaning is not much more natural than that which appears sometimes in Luther: the act of *glorying in God;* or than that of Œcumenius and Chalmers: the destination of every man to *glorify God.* There are really only two senses possible. The first is that of the many commentators

who understand the *glory of God* as the future and eternal glory (Beza, Morison, Reuss, etc.). But in this case we must give to the verb ὑστερεῖσθαι a very forced meaning: *to lack the necessary qualifications for obtaining* this glory. The second meaning, and the only one which we think admissible, is this: the divine splendour which shines forth from God Himself, and which He communicates to all that live in union with Him (see Hofmann, Meyer). This meaning includes that of Rückert and Olshausen, who understand it too specially, no doubt, to mean the original image of God in man. The complement Θεοῦ, *of God,* is at once a *gen. possess.* and a *gen. auctor.* God can communicate this glory, because He possesses it Himself, and it belongs to His nature. He had communicated a ray of it to man when He created him pure and happy; it was intended to shine more and more brightly in him as he rose from innocence to holiness. By sinning, man lost both what he had received of it and what he was yet to obtain. A dispossessed king, the crown has fallen from his head.—The consequence of this state of things is indicated, in close connection with the context, in ver. 24.

Ver. 24. "*Being justified freely by His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.*"—The participle δικαιούμενοι, *being justified,* takes us by surprise. Why give this idea, which is the principal one in the context, a subordinate place, by using a participle to express it? To explain this unexpected form, it must be remembered that the idea of justification had already been solemnly introduced, vv. 21, 22. Ver. 23 had afterwards explained it by the fact of the fall; and now it can reappear as a simple corollary from this great fact. We might paraphrase: "being *consequently* justified, *as we have just declared,* freely" . . . The *present* participle (δικαιούμενοι) refers to every moment in the history of mankind when a sinner comes to believe. There is no need therefore to add, as Ostervald and others do, a new conjunction: "and *that* they are justified." Neither is it necessary to take this participle, with Beza and Morison, as the *demonstration* of the fact of sin, ver. 23. It is impossible that the essential idea of the whole passage should be given in proof of a secondary idea. The most erroneous explanation seems to us to be that of Oltramare, who here

begins a wholly new period, the principal verb of which must be sought in ver. 27: "Since we are justified freely . . . is there here, then, any cause for boasting?" The most important passage in the whole Epistle, vv. 24–26, would thus be degraded to the rank of a simple incident. And, moreover, *the asyndeton* between vv. 23, 24 would be without the slightest justification.

This notion: *being justified,* is qualified in three directions: those of the *mode,* the *origin,* and the *means.* The mode is expressed by the adverb δωρεάν, *freely.* It is not a matter of wages, it is a free gift.—The origin of this gift is: *His grace,* God's free goodwill inclining Him to sinful man to bestow on him a favour. There is no blind necessity here; we are face to face with a generous inspiration of divine love. The means is the *deliverance* wrought *in Jesus Christ.* The Greek term ἀπολύτρωσις denotes etymologically, a deliverance obtained by way of *purchase* (λύτρον, *ransom*). No doubt the New Testament writers often use it in the general sense of *deliverance,* apart from all reference to a price paid; so viii. 23; Luke xxi. 28; 1 Cor. i. 30. But in these passages, as Morison observes, the matter in question is only one of the particular *consequences* of the fundamental deliverance obtained by Christ. The idea of the latter is usually connected with that of the ransom paid to obtain it; comp. Matt. xx. 28, where it is said that Jesus gives His life a ransom (λύτρον), in the room and stead (ἀντί) of many; 1 Tim. ii. 6, where the term signifying *ransom* forms one word with the preposition ἀντί, *in the place of* (ἀντίλυτρον); 1 Pet. i. 18: "Ye were *ransomed* as by the precious blood of the Lamb, without spot." This notion of *purchase,* in speaking of the work of Christ, appears also in 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23; Gal. iii. 13. It is obvious that this figure was most familiar to the apostle's mind; it is impossible to get rid of it in the present passage. —The title *Christ* is placed before the name *Jesus,* the main subject here being His mediatorial office (see on i. 1).—After thus giving the general idea of the work, the apostle expounds it more in detail by defining exactly the ideas he has just stated. That of divine *grace* reappears in the words: *whom He had set forth beforehand,* ver. 25; that of deliverance, in the words: *to be a propitiation through faith;* that of *Christ*

Jesus, in the words: *in His blood;* and, finally, the principal term: *being justified,* in the last words of ver. 26: *the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus.* This conclusion thus brings us back to the starting-point of the passage.

Vv. 25, 26. "*Whom He had established beforehand as the means of propitiation through faith*[1] *by His blood, for the demonstration of His righteousness on account of the tolerance shown toward sins that were past, during the forbearance of God, for the demonstration*[2] *of His righteousness at the present time; that He might be just, and the justifier of him who is of the faith in Jesus.*"[3]—It is not without reason that these two verses have been called "the marrow of theology." Calvin declares "that there is not probably in the whole Bible a passage which sets forth more profoundly the righteousness of God in Christ." And yet it is so short that the statement seems scarcely to have begun when all is said, within so few lines are the most decisive thoughts concentrated! It is really, as Vitringa has said, "the brief summary of divine wisdom."[4]

It is God Himself who, according to this passage, is to be regarded as the *author* of the whole work of redemption. The salvation of the world is not therefore wrested from Him, as is sometimes represented by the mediation of Christ. The

[1] ℵ C D E F G omit της before πιστεως.

[2] ℵ A B C D P read την before ενδειξιν.

[3] D E L read Ιησουν instead of Ιησου.—Ιησου is omitted in F G Ital[iq].

[4] We may be allowed here to borrow from Morison the account of an experience of the illustrious poet Cowper, calculated to give an impression of the wealth of this passage. It was a time when Cowper was brought to the very verge of despair. He had walked up and down in his room a long while profoundly agitated. At last he seated himself near his window, and seeing a Bible there he opened it, to find if possible some consolation and strength. "The passage which met my eye," says he, "was the twenty-fifth verse of the third chapter of Romans. On reading it I immediately received power to believe. The rays of the Sun of Righteousness fell on me in all their fulness; I saw the complete sufficiency of the expiation which Christ had wrought for my pardon and entire justification. In an instant I believed and received the peace of the gospel." "If," adds he, "the arm of the Almighty had not supported me, I believe I should have been overwhelmed with gratitude and joy; my eyes filled with tears; transports choked my utterance. I could only look to heaven in silent fear, overflowing with love and wonder." But it is better to describe the work of the Holy Spirit in his own words: "it was *the joy* which is *unspeakable and full of glory*" (1 Pet. i. 8).—*Life of Cowper,* by Taylor.

same thought is expressed elsewhere; for example, 2 Cor. v. 18: "All *is of God*, who hath reconciled us to Himself by Jesus Christ;" and John iii. 16: "God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son." This point should never be forgotten in the idea which we form of expiation.— The verb προτιθέναι, *to put before*, may signify in the middle, either: *to exhibit*, present *publicly* (in view of oneself), or *to set before oneself* in the innermost shrine of the spirit; to decide, to design *beforehand* within oneself. For the preposition πρό may have the local meaning *in front of*, or the temporal meaning *before*. Both significations of the verb have been used here, and in favour of both numerous examples may be quoted in classic Greek. The second sense is obviously the prevailing one in the New Testament; comp. Rom. i. 13, Eph. i. 9, etc., as well as the common use of the word πρόθεσις to denote God's *eternal plan* (viii. 28; Eph. iii. 11); see also Acts xxvii. 13. In favour of the first meaning, there may be quoted, indeed, the phrase ἄρτοι τῆς προθέσεως, *the shewbread*, in the LXX. If we use it here, it would make the apostle say: "whom God set forth publicly as a propitiatory victim." This act of public showing forth would refer either to the exhibition of Jesus on the cross, or to the proclamation of His death by the apostolic preaching. The middle form (to set forth *for oneself*) would find its explanation in the clause following: "for the demonstration of *His righteousness*." This meaning is not impossible. It is adopted by the Vulgate, Luth., Beng., Thol., de Wette, Philip., Meyer, Hofm., Morison. But this idea of a public exhibition of the person of Jesus appears to us to have about it something at once theatrical and superfluous. Independently of what we have just been saying of the ordinary meaning of the words προτιθέναι, πρόθεσις, in the New Testament, the context speaks strongly in favour of the other meaning. The fundamental idea of the passage is the contrast between the time of God's forbearance in regard to sin, and the decisive moment when at once He carried out the universal expiation. It is natural in this order of ideas to emphasize the fact that God had *foreseen* this final moment, and had provided Himself *beforehand* with the victim by means of which the expiation was to be accomplished. Thus the phrase: *to set forth before-*

hand, already gives a hint of the contrast: *at the present time,* ver. 26. Placed as it is at the head of the whole passage, it brings out forcibly, at the same time, the incomparable gravity of the work about to be described. The middle of the verb refers to the *inward* resolution of God. In adopting this meaning, we find ourselves at one with the ancient Greek interpreters, Chrys., Œcum., Theoph.; see, among the moderns, Fritzsche. The word ἱλαστήριον, *propitiatory,* belongs to that host of Greek adjectives whose termination (ηριος) signifies *what serves to.* The meaning therefore is: "what serves to render propitious, favourable." The verb ἱλάσκεσθαι corresponds in the LXX. to *kipper,* the Piel of *kaphar, to cover.* Applied to the notion of *sin,* this Piel has a double sense: either to *pardon*—the subject is then the *offended one* himself, who, as it were, covers the sin that he may see it no more, for example, Ps. lxv. 4—or to *expiate,*—the subject is then the victim which covers (*effaces*) the sin with its blood, that the judge may see it no more, for example, Ex. xxix. 36. In the New Testament this verb occurs twice, Luke xviii. 13, where the publican says to God: ἱλάσθητι, *show Thyself propitious* to me, which is equivalent to: forgive me; and Heb. ii. 17: εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας, *to expiate the sins of the people.* We find in these same two passages the two meanings of the term in the Old Testament. The etymology of this verb ἱλάσκεσθαι is the adjective ἵλαος, *favourable, propitious* (probably connected with ἔλεος, *merciful*). To explain the word ἱλαστήριον in our text, very many commentators, Orig., Theoph., Er., Luth., Calv., Grot., Vitringa, and among the moderns, Olsh., Thol., Philip., etc., have had recourse to the technical meaning which it has in the LXX., where it denotes the *propitiatory,* or lid of the ark of the covenant. With this meaning the substantive understood would be ἐπίθεμα, *lid,* which is sometimes joined to the adjective, for example, Ex. xxv. 17. As is well known, the high priest, on the day of atonement, sprinkled this lid with the blood of the victim (Lev. xvi. 14 et seq.). On this account these commentators hold that it was here regarded by Paul as the type of Christ, whose shed blood covers the sin of the world. The term is found in this sense, Heb. ix. 5. We do not, however, think this interpretation admissible. 1. If the matter in

question were a well-known definite object, the only one of its kind, the article τό could not be omitted. 2. The Epistle to the Romans is not a book which moves, like the Epistle to the Hebrews, in the sphere of Levitical symbolism; there is nothing here to indicate that the term is applied to an object belonging to the Israelitish cultus. 3. Gess justly observes that if this type had been familiar to St. Paul, it would have been found elsewhere in his letters; and if it were not so, the term would have been unintelligible to his readers. 4. In all respects the figure would be a strange one. What a comparison to make of Jesus Christ crucified with a lid sprinkled with blood! 5. Give to the verb προέθετο which-ever of the two meanings you choose, the figure of the propitiatory remains unsuitable. In the sense of *exhibiting publicly*, there is a contradiction between this idea of publicity and the part assigned to the propitiatory in the Jewish cultus; for this object remained concealed in the sanctuary, the high priest alone could see it, and that only once a year, and through a cloud of smoke. And if the verb be explained in the sense which we have adopted, that of *establishing beforehand*, it is still more impossible to apply this idea of an eternal purpose, either to a material object like the propitiatory itself, or to its typical connection with Jesus Christ. We must therefore understand the word ἱλαστήριον in a very wide sense: *a means of propitiation*. After reading Morison, we cannot venture to define more strictly, and to translate: *a victim of propitiation*, as if there were to be understood the substantive θῦμα (*victim*). For this meaning of the term used here does not seem to be sufficiently proved by the passages alleged (see the examples quoted by Thol., de Wette, Meyer, with Morison's criticism). The English commentator himself takes the word ἱλαστήριον as a *masculine* adjective, agreeing with the relative ὅν: "Jesus Christ, whom God set forth as *making propitiation*." Such is the explanation of the Peschito, Thomas Aquinas, Er., Mel., etc. It is certainly allowable. But in this sense would not Paul rather have used the masculine substantive ἱλαστής? The word ἱλαστήρια is indeed found, not ἱλαστήριοι (Hofm.). We therefore hold by the generally received interpretation, which makes the term ἱλαστήριον a neuter substantive (originally the neuter of the

adjective; comp. *σωτήριον, χαριστήριον*, etc.). As to the idea of sacrifice, if it is not in the word itself, it follows from its connection with the following clause: *by His blood* (see below). For what is a *means of propitiation by blood*, if it is not a sacrifice? A question may here be raised: if it is God Himself who, as we have just said, has established this means of pardon *of His free grace*, what purpose then was this means to serve? For it cannot obtain for us anything else than we possessed already, the Divine love. This objection rests on the false idea that expiation is intended to originate a sentiment which did not exist in God before. What it produces is such a change in the relation between God and the creature, that God can henceforth display toward sinful man one of the elements of His nature rather than another. The feeling of the divine mind shows itself in the foundation of the expiatory work as *compassion*. But the propitiation once effected, it can display itself in the new and higher form of *intimate communion*. As Gess says: "Divine love manifests itself in the gift of the Son, that it may be able afterwards to diffuse itself in the heart by the gift of the Spirit." There are therefore — 1. The love which precedes the propitiation, and which determines to effect it; and 2. Love such that it can display itself, once the propitiation is effected.

The clause *διὰ* [*τῆς*] *πίστεως*, *by faith*, is wanting in the *Alex.*, which, however, is not enough to render it suspicious. Five Mjj. (Alex. and Greco-Lat.) omit the article *τῆς* (*the*, before *faith*). It would be impossible to explain why this word had been rejected if it existed originally in the text. It has therefore been added to give the notion of *faith* a more definite sense: *the* well-known faith in Jesus. But it was not on this or that particular faith the apostle wished here to insist; it was on *faith* in its very idea, in opposition to works. — On what does the clause depend: *διὰ πίστεως*, *by faith*? According to some ancients and Philippi: on *προέθετο* (*He set forth*, or *established beforehand*). But it is difficult to conceive what logical relation there can be between the ideas of *setting forth*, or *establishing*, and a clause such as *by faith*. The only natural connection of this clause is with the word *ἱλαστήριον* (*means of propitiation*): "God has established Jesus beforehand as the means of propitiation through faith," which

signifies that the efficacy of this means was from the first bound by the divine decree to the condition of faith. God eternally determined within Himself the means of pardon, but as eternally He stipulated with Himself that the condition on which this means should become available for each individual should be faith, neither more nor less. This idea is important; the subjective condition of faith entered as an integral element into the very decree of amnesty (the *πρόθεσις*). This is what we shall find afterwards expressed in the words *οὓς προέγνω*, *whom He foreknew* (as His own by faith), viii. 29. The clause following: *in* or *by His blood*, is connected by most commentators (Luth., Calv., Olsh., Thol., Morison) with the word *faith*: "by *faith in His blood*." Grammatically this connection is possible; comp. Eph. i. 15. And it is the interpretation, perhaps, which has led to the article *τῆς* being added before *πίστεως*. But it should certainly be rejected. The idea requiring a determining clause is not *faith*, which is clear of itself, but the *means of propitiation*. In a passage entirely devoted to the expounding of the fact of expiation, Paul could not possibly fail to indicate the manner in which the means operated. We therefore find the notion of *propitiation* qualified by two parallel and mutually completing clauses: the first, *by faith*, indicating the subjective condition; and the second, *by His blood*, setting forth the historical and objective condition of the efficacy of the means. Propitiation does not take place except through faith on the part of the saved, and through blood on the part of the Saviour. The attempt of Meyer, Hofmann, etc., to make this clause dependent on *προέθετο* ("He set Him forth or established Him beforehand . . . *through His blood*") is unnatural. To present or establish a person through or in his blood, would not only be an obscure form of speech, but even offensively harsh. — According to Lev. xvii. 11, the soul of man, the principle of life, is in the blood. The blood flowing forth is the life exhaling. Now the wilful sinner has deserved death. Having used the gift of life to revolt against Him from whom he holds it, it is just that this gift should be withdrawn from him. Hence the sentence: "In the day thou sinnest, thou shalt die." Every act of sin should thus, in strict justice, be followed by death, the violent and instant death of its author. The sinner, it is

true, no longer understands this; for sin stupifies the conscience at the same time that it corrupts the heart and perverts the will. Such, then, is the law which must be set in the light of day before pardon is granted, and that it may be granted. Otherwise the sovereign majesty of God on the one side, and the criminal character of the sinner on the other, would remain shrouded in the conscience of the pardoned sinner; and such a pardon, instead of laying a foundation for his restoration, would consummate his degradation and entail his eternal ruin. Thus are justified the two qualifications of the means of propitiation indicated here by the apostle: *in blood* and *by faith;* in other terms—1. The judgment of God on sin by the shedding of *blood;* 2. The adherence of the guilty to this judgment by *faith.* The apostolic utterance may consequently be paraphrased thus: "Jesus Christ, whom God settled beforehand as the means of propitiation on the condition of faith, through the shedding of His blood."

Blood does not certainly denote the holy consecration of life in general. It is purely arbitrary to seek any other meaning in the word than it naturally expresses, the fact of a violent and bloody death. This signification is specially obvious in a passage where the word is found in such direct connection with ἱλαστήριον (*propitiation*), in which there is concentrated the whole symbolism of the Jewish sacrifices.

The relation commonly maintained between *propitiation* (the act which renders God favourable) and *blood* is this: the blood of the Messiah, shed as an equivalent for that of sinners, is the indemnity offered to God's justice to purchase the pardon granted by love. But it must be observed that this relation is not stated by the apostle himself, and that the term ἱλάσκεσθαι, *to render propitious,* does not necessarily contain the idea of an indemnity paid in the form of a quantitative equivalent. The word denotes in general the act, whatever it be, in consequence of which God, who was displaying His wrath, is led to display His grace, and to pardon. This propitiatory act is, Luke xviii. 13, 14, the cry of the penitent publican; Ps. li. 17, the sacrifice of a broken and contrite heart. In the supreme and final redemption which we have in Christ, the way of propitiation is more painful and decisive. The apostle has just told us in what it consists; he

proceeds in the words which follow to explain to us its object: *for the demonstration of His righteousness.*

The term *demonstration* is remarkable. If the apostle had in view a *payment* offered to justice in *compensation* for the death which sinful men have merited, he would rather have said: "for the *satisfaction* of His righteousness." The word *manifestation* seems to belong to a somewhat different order of ideas. But let us begin with fixing the meaning of the principal expression: *the righteousness of God.* Luther has connected it with *justification.* But in this case the contrast with the time of God's *long-suffering,* ver. 26, becomes unintelligible, and the two last terms of the same verse: "that He might be *just* and the *justifier,*" could not be distinguished from one another. So all interpreters agree to take the word as indicating a divine attribute which, long veiled, was put in the light of day by the cross. Which attribute is it? *Righteousness* sometimes denoting *moral perfection* in general, each commentator has taken the term used by Paul as expressing the special attribute which agreed best with his system in regard to the work of redemption. It has been taken to express — (1) *Goodness* (Theodor., Abel., Grot., Seml., etc.); (2) *Veracity* or *fidelity* (Ambr., Beza, Turret.); (3) *Holiness* (Nitzsch, Neand., Hofm., Lipsius); (4) Righteousness as *justifying* and sanctifying (the Greek Fathers, Mel., Calv., Oltram.),—this meaning is almost identical with Luther's; (5) Righteousness in so far as it carries the salvation of the elect to its goal; such is the meaning of Ritschl, which comes very near No. 3; (6) *Retributive justice* in God, considered here specially as the principle of the punishment of sin (de Wette, Mey., Philip.). The first five meanings all fall before one common objection; the Greek language, and Paul's vocabulary in particular, have special terms to express each of those particular attributes: χρηστότης, *goodness*; ἀλήθεια, *veracity*; πίστις, *faithfulness*; χάρις, *grace*; ἁγιωσύνη, *holiness.* Why not use one of these definite terms, instead of introducing into this so important didactic passage a term fitted to occasion the gravest misunderstandings, if it was really to be taken in a sense different from its usual and natural signification? Now this signification is certainly that of No. 6: righteousness, as the mode of action whereby God maintains the *right* of every

being, and consequently *order* throughout the whole moral universe, blessing him who has respect to this order, visiting with punishment him who violates it. The essence of God is the absolute love of the good, His *holiness* (Isa. vi. 3: "Holy, holy, holy" . . .). Now, the *good* is order, the normal relation between all free beings,[1] from God Himself to the last of them. The attribute of *righteousness*, eternally latent in holiness, passes into the active state with the appearance of the *free* creature. For in the fact of freedom there was included the *possibility* of disorder, and this possibility soon passed into reality. God's horror at evil, His holiness, thus displays itself in the form of righteousness preserving order and maintaining right. Now, to maintain order without suppressing liberty, there is but one means, and that is punishment. Punishment is order in disorder. It is the revelation of disorder to the sinner's conscience by means of suffering. It is consequently, or at least may be, the point of departure for the re-establishment of order, of the normal relation of free beings. Thus is explained the notion of the *righteousness of God*, so often proclaimed in Scripture (John xvii. 25; 2 Thess. i. 5; 2 Tim. iv. 8; Rev. xvi. 5, xix. 2, 11, etc.); and especially Rom. ii. 5 et seq., where we see the δικαιοκρισία, the *just judgment*, distributing among men *wrath* and *tribulation* (vv. 8, 9), *glory* and *peace* (vv. 7–10). — This meaning, which we give with Scripture to the word *righteousness*, and which is in keeping with its generally received use, is also the only one, as we shall see, which suits the context of this passage, and especially the words which follow.

How was the cross the *manifestation of the righteousness of God?* In two ways so closely united, that either of them separated from the other would lose its value. 1. By the very fact of Christ's sufferings and bloody death. If Paul does not see in this punishment a *quantitative* equivalent of the treatment which every sinner had incurred, this is what clearly appears from such sayings as 2 Cor. v. 21: "God *made Him sin for us;*" Gal. iii. 13: "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being *made a curse for us.*" Now, herein precisely consists the *manifestation* of the righteousness wrought out on the cross. God is here revealed as

[1] See E. Naville, *Le problème du mal*, first discourse.

one against whom no creature can revolt without meriting death; and the sinner is here put in his place in the dust as a malefactor worthy of death. Such is the *objective* manifestation of righteousness. 2. This demonstration, however striking, would be incomplete without the *subjective* or moral manifestation which accompanies it. Every sinner might be called to die on a cross. But no sinner was in a condition to undergo this punishment as Jesus did, accepting it as deserved. This is what He alone could do in virtue of His holiness.[1] The calm and mute resignation with which He allowed Himself to be led to the slaughter, manifested the idea which He Himself formed of the majesty of God and the judgment He was passing on the sin of the world; from His cross there rose the most perfect homage rendered to the righteousness of God. In this death the sin of mankind was therefore doubly judged, and the righteousness of God doubly manifested,—by the external fact of this painful and ignominious punishment, and by the inward act of Christ's conscience, which ratified this dealing of which sin was the object in His person. — But now it will be asked what rendered such a demonstration necessary: *Because,* says St. Paul, *of the tolerance exercised in regard to sins past.*

For four thousand years the spectacle presented by mankind to the whole moral universe (comp. 1 Cor. iv. 9) was, so to speak, a continual scandal. With the exception of some great examples of judgments, divine righteousness seemed to be asleep; one might even have asked if it existed. Men sinned here below, and yet they lived. They sinned on, and yet reached in safety a hoary old age! . . . Where were the *wages of sin?* It was this relative impunity which rendered a solemn manifestation of righteousness necessary. Many commentators have completely mistaken the meaning of this passage, by giving to the word πάρεσις, which we have translated *tolerance,* the sense of *pardon* (Orig., Luth., Calv., Calov.; see also the Geneva translation of 1557, and, following it, Osterv. etc.). This first mistake has led to another. There has been given to the preposition διά the meaning of *by,* which it cannot have when governing the accusative, or it has been

[1] "O *righteous* Father, the world hath not known Thee; but I have known Thee," John xvii. 25.

translated *in view of*, which would have required the preposition εἰς. The first error lies in confounding the term πάρεσις (*tolerance, impunity*) with ἄφεσις (*remission, pardon*). The second of these substantives comes from the verb ἀφίεναι, *to send away*, dismiss, pardon (*remittere*); while the first used here comes from the verb παρίεναι, *to let pass*, neglect, not to occupy oneself with (*prætermittere*); nearly the same idea as that expressed by the word ὑπεριδεῖν, *to close the eyes to*, Acts xviii. 30. The signification of the verb παρίεναι appears clearly from the two following passages: Sir. xxiii. 2: "Lest sins should remain unpunished (μὴ παριῶνται τὰ ἁμαρτήματα);" and Xenophon, *Hipparchic.* vii. 10: "Such sins must not be allowed to pass unpunished (τὰ οὖν τοιαῦτα ἁμαρτήματα οὐ χρὴ παρίεναι ἀκόλαστα)." It is worthy of remark also that in these two places sin is designated by the same word ἁμάρτημα as Paul employs in our passage: sin in the form of positive fault, *transgression*. The real sense of πάρεσις is therefore not doubtful. It has been given by Theodor., Grot., Beng.; it is now almost universally received (Thol., Olsh., Mey., Fritzs., Rück., de Wette, Philip. etc.).[1] The διά can thus receive its true meaning (with the accusative): *on account of;* and the idea of the passage becomes clear: God judged it necessary, on account of the impunity so long enjoyed by those myriads of sinners who succeeded one another on the earth, at length to manifest His righteousness by a striking act; and He did so by realizing in the death of Jesus the punishment which each of those sinners would have deserved to undergo.—Ritschl, who, on account of his theory regarding the righteousness of God (see on i. 18), could not accept this meaning, supposes another interpretation (II. p. 217 et seq.). *Tolerance* (πάρεσις) is not, according to him, contrasted with merited *punishment*, but with the *pardon* which God has finally granted. Ver. 25 would thus signify that till the coming of Jesus Christ, God had *only* exercised patience without pardoning, but that in Christ the righteousness of God (His faithfulness to the salvation of His elect) had advanced

[1] Morison (p. 323) refers to the strange misunderstanding of Chrysostom, reproduced by Œcumen., Theophyl., Phot., which makes πάρεσις (strictly: relaxation of the muscles) denote here the *paralysis*, the spiritual death of the sinner. Hence probably the reading πωρωσις (MS. 46).

so far as to give complete pardon. But where then, asks Gess, is this *only*, so necessary to indicate the advance from tolerance to pardon? The natural contrast to impunity is not pardon, but punishment; comp. ii. 4, 5, and the parallel passage to ours, Acts xvii. 30, 31: "*The times of ignorance God winked at*, but now commandeth men to repent, *because* He hath appointed a day in which He will *judge* the world *in righteousness*." Finally, it is impossible on this interpretation to give a natural meaning to the words *on account of*. For pardon was not given *because of* the impunity exercised toward those sins. Paul would have required to say, either: *because of* those sins themselves, or: *following up* the long tolerance exercised toward them.

Several commentators (Calovius, for example) refer the expression: *sins that are past*, not to the sins of *mankind* who lived before Christ, but to those committed by every believer *before his conversion*. It is difficult in this sense to explain the words which follow: *at this time*, which form an antithesis to the former. We must apply them to the moment when each sinner in particular *believes*. But this meaning does not correspond to the gravity of the expression: *at this time*, in which the apostle evidently contrasts the period of completion with that of general impunity, and even with the eternal decree (the προθεσις).

It may be further asked if those *sins that ar past* are those of all mankind anterior to Christ, or perhaps, as Philippi thinks, only those of the Jews. The argument which this commentator derives from the meaning of ἱλαστήριον, the lid of the ark, the *propitiatory* so called, has of course no weight with us. Might one be found in the remarkable parallel, Heb. ix. 15: "The transgressions that were *under the first testament*"? No, for this restricted application follows naturally from the particular aim of the Epistle to the Hebrews (comp. for example, ii. 16). It may even be said that the *demonstration* of which the apostle speaks was less necessary for Israel than for the rest of mankind. For the sacrifices instituted by God were already a homage rendered to His righteousness. But this homage was not sufficient; for there was wanting in it that which gives value to the sacrifice of Christ; the victim *underwent* death, but did not

accept it. Hence it was that the death of the Messiah necessarily closed the long series of the Levitical sacrifices. No more can we receive the opinion of Beza, Cocceius, Morison, who think the *sins that are past* are those of the faithful of the Old Testament whom God pardoned from regard to the future sacrifice of Christ. The article τῶν ("*the* sins") does not admit of this restriction, which there is nothing else to indicate. And the sacrifice of Christ cannot be explained here by an end so special.

But if it is asked why Paul gives as the reason for this sacrifice only the *past* and not the *future* sins of mankind, as if the death of Christ did not apply equally to the latter, the answer is easy, from the apostle's standpoint: the righteousness of God once revealed in the sacrifice of the cross, this demonstration *remains*. Whatever happens, nothing can again efface it from the history of the world, nor from the conscience of mankind. Henceforth no illusion is possible: all sin must be pardoned—or judged.

Regarded from the point of view here taken by the apostle, the death of Jesus is in the history of humanity, something like what would emerge in the life of a sinner had he a time of perfect lucidity when, his conscience being miraculously brought into one with the mind of God regarding sin, he should judge himself as God judges him. Such a moment would be to this man the starting-point of a total transformation. Thus the demonstration of righteousness given to the world by the cross of Christ at the close of the long economy of *sin tolerated*, founded the new epoch, and with the possibility of pardon established the principle of the radical renewal of humanity.

Ver. 26. The first words of this verse: *during the forbearance of God*, depend naturally on the word πάρεσις, *tolerance*: "the tolerance (exercised) during the forbearance of God." It is less simple to connect this regimen with the participle προγεγονότων: "committed formerly during the forbearance of God." For the principal idea in what precedes, that which needs most to be explained, is that of the *tolerance*, and not that expressed by this participle. Meyer gives to the preposition ἐν the meaning of *by*: "the tolerance exercised toward the sins that are past *by* the forbearance of God." But

the following antithesis: *at this time*, imperatively requires the *temporal* meaning of the clause ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ.—At the first glance it seems strange that in a proposition of which *God* is the subject, the apostle should say, not: "during *His* forbearance," but: "during the forbearance *of God*." The reason of this apparent incorrectness is not, as has been thought, the remoteness of the subject, nor the fact that Paul is now expressing himself as it were from his own point of view, and not from that of God (Mey.). Rather it is that which is finely given by Matthias: by the word *God* the apostle brings more into relief the contrast between *men's* conduct (their constant *sins*) and *God's* (His long-suffering).

We have seen that ver. 26 should begin with the words reproduced from ver. 25: *for the demonstration of His righteousness*. To what purpose this repetition? Had not the reason which rendered the demonstration of righteousness necessary been sufficiently explained in ver. 25? Why raise this point emphatically once more to explain it anew? This form is surprising, especially in a passage of such extraordinary conciseness. De Wette and Meyer content themselves with saying: Repetition of the εἰς ἔνδειξιν (*for the demonstration*), ver. 25. But again, why the change of preposition: in ver. 25, εἰς; here, πρός? We get the answer: a matter of style (Mey.), or of euphony (Gess), wholly indifferent as to meaning. With a writer like Paul—our readers, we hope, are convinced of this—such answers are insufficient. Rückert and Hofmann, to avoid these difficulties, think that the words: *for the demonstration* . . . should not be made dependent, like the similar words of ver. 25, on the verb προέθετο, *had established*, but on the substantive *forbearance*: "during the time of His forbearance, a forbearance which had in view the manifestation of His righteousness at a later period." De Wette replies, with reason, that were we to connect these words with so subordinate an idea, the reader's mind would be diverted from the essential thought of the entire passage. Besides, how can we fail to see in the πρὸς ἔνδειξιν (*for the manifestation*) of ver. 26 the resumption of the similar expression, ver. 25? The fact of this repetition is not, as it seems to us, so difficult to explain. The moral necessity of such a manifestation had been demonstrated by the tolerance of God in

the *past;* for it had thrown a veil over the righteousness of God. But the explanation was not complete. The object to be gained in the *future* by this demonstration must also be indicated. And this is the end served by the repetition of this same expression in ver. 26: "for the demonstration, I say, *in view of*" . . . Thus at the same time is explained the change of preposition. In ver. 25 the demonstration itself was regarded as an *end:* "whom He set forth beforehand as a propitiation *for* the demonstration (εἰς, with a view to)" . . . But in ver. 26 this same demonstration becomes a *means,* with a view to a new and more remote end: "*for* the demonstration of His righteousness, *that He might be* (literally, *with a view to being*) just, and the justifier" . . . The *demonstration* is always the end, no doubt, but now it is only the near and immediate object—such is exactly the meaning of the Greek preposition πρός, which is substituted for the εἰς of ver. 25—compared with a more distant and final end which opens up to view, and for which the apostle now reserves the εἰς (with a view to): "*with a view to* being just, and the justifier." Comp. on the relation of these two prepositions, Eph. iv. 12: "*for* (πρός) the perfecting of the saints *with a view to* a (εἰς) work of ministry." Here we may have a convincing proof that nothing is accidental in the style of a man like Paul. Never did jeweller chisel his diamonds more carefully than the apostle does the expression of his thoughts. This delicate care of the slightest shades is also shown in the addition of the article τήν before ἔνδειξιν in ver. 26, an addition sufficiently attested by the four Alex. Mjj., and by a Mj. from each of the other two families (D P). In ver. 25 the notion of demonstration was yet abstract: "*in demonstration* of righteousness." In ver. 26 it is now known; it is a concrete fact which should conspire to a new end; hence the addition of the article: "for that manifestation of which I speak, with a view to" . . . The following words: *at this time,* express one of the gravest thoughts of the passage. They bring out the full solemnity of the present epoch marked by this unexampled appearance, preordained and in a sense awaited by God Himself for so long. For without this prevision the long forbearance of the forty previous centuries would have been morally impossible; comp. Acts xvii. 30 (in regard to

the Gentiles), and Heb. ix. 26: "But now once in the end of the ages hath He appeared, to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself" (in regard to Israel).

And what was the *end* with a view to which this demonstration of righteousness was required at this time? The apostle answers: *that He might be just, and a justifier*—that is to say, "that while being and remaining just, God might justify." It was a great problem, a problem worthy of divine wisdom, which the sin of man set before God—to remain just while justifying (declaring just) man who had become unjust. God did not shrink from the task. He had even solved the difficulty beforehand in His eternal counsel, before creating man free; otherwise, would not this creation have merited the charge of imprudence? God had beside Him, in Christ (προέθετο, ver. 25; comp. Eph. i. 3, 4), the means of being at once *just* and *justifier*—that is to say, just while justifying, and justifying while remaining just.—The words: that He might *be just*, are usually understood in the logical sense: "that He might *be known* to be just." Gess rightly objects to this attenuation of the word *be*. The second predicate: *and the justifier*, does not suit this idea of *being known*. If God did not once *show Himself* perfectly just, *would* He be so in reality? Gess rightly says: "A judge who hates evil, but does not judge it, *is* not just: if the righteousness of God did not show itself, it would not exist." In not smiting those sinners at once with the thunderbolt of His vengeance, those who had lived during the time of forbearance, God had not *shown* Himself just; and if He had continued to act thus indefinitely, mankind and the entire moral universe would have had good right to conclude that He *was* not just. It is obvious that the words: *that He might be just*, do not, strictly speaking, express a new idea; they reproduce in a different form the reason for the demonstration of righteousness already given in ver. 25 in the words: "because of the tolerance exercised toward sins that were past." If this tolerance had not at length issued in a manifestation of righteousness, righteousness itself would have been annihilated. The thought is nevertheless of supreme importance here, at the close of this exposition. Men must not imagine, as they might easily do, especially with pardon before them, that the righteousness

of God is somehow completely absorbed in His grace through the act of justifying. There is in the firm and immoveable will of God to maintain right and order in the universe—His justice, that is to say—the principle of the *justification* of believers no doubt, but not less certainly that of the *judgment* of the impenitent. Now, if God did not show Himself *just* at the moment when He justifies the unjust, there would be in such a pardon what would plunge sinners into the most dangerous illusion. They could no longer seriously suppose that they were on their way to give in an account; and judgment would burst on them as a terrible surprise. This is what God could not desire, and hence He has exercised the divine privilege of pardon only through means of a striking and solemn manifestation of His righteousness. He would really have given up His justice if, in this supreme moment of His manifestation, He had not displayed it brightly on the earth.

After having secured His righteousness, He is able to *justify* the unjust; for He has, in Christ, the means of *justifying* him *justly*. We have seen that the cross re-establishes order by putting each in his place, the holy God on His throne, rebellious man in the dust. So long as this homage, making reparation for the past, remains without us, it does not save us; but as soon as we make it ours *by faith in Jesus*, it avails for us, and God can *justly* absolve us. This is what is expressed by the last words, to which the passage pointed from the first: *and the justifier of him who is of the faith in Jesus*. By adhering to this manifestation of divine righteousness accomplished in Jesus, the believer makes it morally his own. He renders homage personally to the right which God has over him. He sees in his own person the malefactor worthy of death, who should have undergone and accepted what Jesus underwent and accepted. He exclaims, like that Bechuana in his simple savage language: Away from that, Christ; that's my place! Sin is thus judged in his conscience, as it was in that of the dying Jesus—that is to say, as it is by the holiness of God Himself, and as it never could have been by the ever imperfect repentance of a sinner. By appropriating to himself the homage rendered to the majesty of God by the Crucified One, the believer is himself crucified

as it were in the eyes of God; moral order is re-established, and judgment can take end by an act of absolution. As to the impenitent sinner, who refuses to the divine majesty the homage contained in the act of faith, the demonstration of righteousness given on the cross remains as the proof that he will certainly meet with this divine attribute in the judgment. —The phrase: *to be of the faith*, has nothing surprising in Paul's style; comp. the εἶναι ἐκ, ii. 8; Gal. iii. 7, 10, etc. It forcibly expresses the new mode of being which becomes the believer's as soon as he ceases to draw his righteousness from himself and derives it wholly from Jesus.—Three Mjj. read the accusative Ἰησοῦν, which would lead to the impossible sense: "and the justifier of Jesus by faith." This error probably arises from the abridged form *IT* in the ancient Mjj., which might easily be read *IN*. Two MSS. (F G) wholly reject this name (see Meyer).[1] The phrase: "him who is of the faith," without any indication of the object of faith, would not be impossible. This reading has been accepted by Oltramare. But two MSS. of the ninth century do not suffice to justify it. Nothing could better close this piece than the name of the historical personage to whose unspeakable love mankind owes this eternal blessing.

The Expiation.

We have endeavoured to reproduce exactly the meaning of the expressions used by the apostle in this important passage, and to rise to the sum of the ideas which it contains. In what does the apostolical conception, as we have understood it, differ from the current theories on this fundamental subject?

If we compare it first with the doctrine generally received in the church, the point on which the difference seems to us to bear is this: in the ecclesiastical theory God demands the punishment of Christ as a satisfaction to Himself, inasmuch as His justice must have an equivalent for the penalty merited by man, if divine love is to be free to pardon. From the point of view to which the exposition of the apostle brings us, this equivalent is not intended to *satisfy* divine justice except by *manifesting* it, and so *re-establishing* the normal relation between God and the guilty creature. By sin, in short, God loses *His* supreme *place* in the conscience of the creature; by this demon-

[1] Tischendorf, eighth edition, does not mention this omission. Could he have found it to be not the fact?

stration of righteousness He recovers it. In consequence of sin, the creature no longer comprehends and feels the *gravity* of his rebellion; by this manifestation God makes it palpable to him. On this view it is not necessary that the sacrifice of reparation should be the equivalent of the penalty incurred by the multitude of sinful men, viewed as the *sum* of the merited sufferings; it is enough that it be so as regards the physical and moral *character* of the sufferings due to sin in itself.

The defenders of the received theory will no doubt ask if, on this view, the expiation is not pointed simply to the conscience of the creature, instead of being also a reparation offered to God Himself. But if it is true that a holy God cannot pardon, except in so far as the pardon itself establishes the absolute guilt of sin and the inviolability of the divine majesty, and so includes a guarantee for the re-establishment of order in the relation between the sinner and God, and if this condition is only found in the punishment of sin holily undertaken and humbly accepted by Him who alone was able to do so, is not the necessity of expiation in relation to the absolute Good, to God Himself, demonstrated? His holiness would protest against every pardon which did not fulfil the double condition of glorifying His outraged majesty and displaying the condemnation of sin. Now, this double end is only gained by the expiatory sacrifice. But the necessity of this sacrifice arises from His whole divine character, in other words, from His holiness, the principle at once of His love and righteousness, and not exclusively of His righteousness. And, in truth, the apostle nowhere expresses the idea of a conflict between righteousness and love as requiring the expiation. It is grace that saves, and it saves by the demonstration of righteousness which, in the act of expiation, restores God to His place and man to his. Such is the condition on which divine love can pardon without entailing on the sinner the final degradation of his conscience and the eternal consolidation of his sin.

This view also evades the grand objection which is so generally raised in our day against a satisfaction made to righteousness by means of the substitution of the innocent for the guilty. No doubt the ordinary theory of expiation may be defended by asking who would be entitled to complain of such a transaction: not God who establishes it, nor the Mediator who voluntarily sacrifices Himself, nor man whose salvation is effected by it. But, anyhow, this objection does not apply to the apostolical conception as we have expounded it. For whenever it ceases to be a question of legal satisfaction, and becomes a simple demonstration of God's right, no ground remains for protesting in the name of righteousness. Who could accuse God of un-

righteousness for having made use of Job and his sufferings to prove to Satan that He can obtain from the children of the dust a disinterested homage, a free submission, which is not that of the mercenary? Similarly, who can arraign the divine righteousness for having given to sinful man, in the person of Jesus, a convincing demonstration of the judgment which the guilty one deserved at His hand? Deserved, did I say? of the judgment with which He will visit him without fail if he refuses to join by faith in that homage solemnly rendered to God's rights, and rejects the reconciliation which God offers him in this form.

It seems to us, then, that the true apostolical conception, while firmly establishing the fact of expiation, which is, historically speaking,—as no one can deny,—the distinctive feature of Christianity, secures it from the grave objections which in these days have led so many to look on this fundamental dogma with suspicion.

But some would perhaps say: Such a view rests, as much as the so-called orthodox theory, on notions of *right* and *justice*, which belong to a lower sphere, to the *legal* and *juridical* domain. A noble and generous man will not seek to explain his conduct by reasons taken from so external an order; how much less should we have recourse to them to explain that of God?—Those who speak thus do not sufficiently reflect that we have to do in this question not with God in His essence, but with God in His relation to free man. Now, the latter is not holy to begin with; the use which he makes of his liberty is not yet regulated by love. The attribute of righteousness (the firm resolution to maintain order, whose existence is latent in the divine *holiness*) must therefore appear as a necessary safeguard as soon as liberty comes on the stage, and with it the possibility of disorder; and this attribute must remain in exercise as long as the educational period of the life of the creature lasts, that is to say, until he has reached perfection in love. Then all those factors, right, law, justice, will return to their latent state. But till then, God, as the guardian of the normal relations between free beings, must keep by law and check by punishment every being disposed to trample on His authority, or on the liberty of his fellows. Thus it is that the work of righteousness necessarily belongs to God's educating and redeeming work, without which the world of free beings would soon be no better than a chaos, from which goodness, the end of creation, would be for ever banished. Blot out this factor from the government of the world, and the free being becomes Titan, no longer arrested by anything in the execution of any caprice. God's place is overthrown, and the creatures destroy one another

mutually. It is common to regard *love* as the fundamental feature of the divine character; and in this way it is very difficult to reach the attribute of righteousness. Most thinkers, indeed, do not reach it at all. This one fact should serve to show the error in which they are entangled. *Holy, holy, holy,* say the creatures nearest to God, when celebrating His perfection (Isa. vi.), and not *good, good, good.* Holiness, such is the essence of God; and holiness is the absolute love of the good, the absolute horror of evil. Hence it is not difficult to deduce both love and righteousness. Love is the goodwill of God toward all free beings who are destined to realize the good. Love goes out to the individuals, as holiness to the good itself which they ought to produce. Righteousness, on the other hand, is the firm purpose of God to maintain the normal relation between all these beings by His blessings and punishments. It is obvious that righteousness is included no less necessarily than love itself in the fundamental feature of the divine character, holiness. It is no offence therefore to God to speak of His justice and His rights. The exercise of a right is only a shame when the being who exercises it makes it subservient to the gratification of his egoism. It is, on the contrary, a glory to one who, like God, knows that in preserving his place he is securing the good of all others. For, as Gess admirably expounds it, God, in maintaining His supreme dignity, preserves to the creatures *their most precious treasure,* a God worthy of their respect and love.

Unjustified antipathy to the notions of right and justice, as applied to God, has led contemporary thought to very divergent and insufficient explanations of the death of Christ.

Some see nothing more in this event than an inevitable historical result of the conflict between the holiness of Jesus and the immoral character of His contemporaries. This solution is well answered by Hausrath himself: "Our faith gives to the question: Why did Christ require to die on the cross? another answer than that drawn from the history of his time. For the history of the ideal cannot be an isolated and particular fact; its contents are absolute; it has an eternal value which does not belong to a given moment, but to the whole of mankind. Every man should recognise in such a history a mystery of grace consummated *also for him*" (*Neutest. Zeitgesch.* I. 450).

Wherein consists this mystery of grace contained in the Crucified One for every man? In the fact, answer many, that here we find the manifestation of divine love to mankind. "The ray of love," says Pfleiderer, "such is the true saviour of mankind. . . . And as to Jesus, He is the sun, the focus in whom all the rays of this light scattered elsewhere are concen-

trated" (*Wissensch. Vorträge über religiöse Fragen*). On this view, Jesus sacrificed Himself only to attest by this act of devotion the full greatness of divine love. But what, then, is a devotion which has no other object than to witness to itself? An exhibition of love, which might be compared to that of the woman who committed suicide, a few years ago, to awake, as she said, the dormant genius of her husband by this token of her love. Besides, how could the sacrifice of his life made by a man for his fellow-men demonstrate the love of God? We may, indeed, see in it the attestation of *brotherly* love in its most eminent degree, but we do not find the love *of the Father*.

Others, finally, regard the death of Christ only as the culminating point of His consecration to God and men, of His holiness. "These texts," says Sabatier, after quoting Rom. vi. and 2 Cor. v., "place the value of the death of Jesus not in any satisfaction whatever offered to God, but in the *annihilation of sin*, which this death brings about" (*L'ap. Paul*, p. 202). To the same effect M. de Pressensé expresses himself thus: "This generous suffering, which Jesus voluntarily accepts, is an act of love and obedience; and hence its restoring and redeeming character. . . . In the name of humanity Christ *reverses the rebellion of Eden; He brings back the heart of man to God*. . . . In the person of a holy victim, humanity returns to the God who waited for it from the first days of the world" (*Vie de Jésus*, pp. 642 and 643). Most modern theories (Hofmann, Ritschl), if we mistake not, are substantially the same, to wit, the spiritual resurrection of humanity through Christ. By the holiness He so painfully realized, and of which His bloody death was the crown, Jesus has given birth to a humanity which breaks with sin, and gives itself to God; and God, foreseeing this future holiness of believers, and regarding it as already realized, pardons their sins from love of this expected perfection. But is this the apostle's view? He speaks of a demonstration of *righteousness*, and not only of *holiness*. Then he ascribes to *death*, to *blood*, a peculiar and independent value. So he certainly does in our passage, but more expressly still in the words, v. 10: "If, when we were enemies, we were reconciled (*justified*, ver. 9) *by His death* (His blood, ver. 9), much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved *by His life* (*through Him*, ver. 9)." It is by His death, accordingly, that Jesus reconciles or justifies, as it is by His life that He sanctifies and perfects salvation. Finally, the serious practical difficulty in the way of this theory lies, as we think, in the fact that, like the Catholic doctrine, it makes justification rest on sanctification (present or future), while the characteristic of gospel doctrine, what, to use Paul's language, may be called *its folly*, but what

is in reality its divine wisdom, is its founding justification on the atonement perfected by Christ's blood, to raise afterwards on this basis the work of sanctification by the Holy Spirit.[1]

NINTH PASSAGE (III. 27–31).

The Harmony of this Mode of Justification with the true Meaning of the Law.

The apostle had asserted, ver. 21, that *the law* and *the prophets* themselves bear witness to the mode of justification revealed in the gospel. This he demonstrates, first generally, from the spirit of the law, then specially, from the example of Abraham, in the two following pieces: chap. iii. 27–31 and chap. iv. As the theme of the preceding piece was expressed in the words of vv. 21 and 22: *righteousness of God revealed without law . . . by faith in Jesus Christ,* that of the following development is found in the words of ver. 21: *witnessed by the law and by the prophets.* We see how rigorously the apostle adheres to order in his work.

The piece, vv. 27–31, argues from all that precedes to the harmony of justification by faith with the Old Testament—1. Inasmuch as the law and the gospel equally exclude justification by works, vv. 27 and 28; this is the negative demonstration; and 2. Inasmuch as only justification by faith harmonizes with the Monotheism which is the doctrinal basis of the whole Old Testament, vv. 29–31; such is the positive demonstration.

Vv. 27, 28. "*Where is the*[2] *boasting then? It is excluded. By what law? of works? Nay, but by the law of faith. For*[3] *we judge that man is justified by faith*[4] *without works of law.*"

[1] We would not hold Professor Gess bound to all the views which we have expressed in this excursus. But we must say, that if we have succeeded in throwing any light on this passage of St. Paul, and on the fact of the atonement (*that depth into which the angels desire to look,* 1 Pet. i. 12), we owe it chiefly to that eminent theologian; comp. especially, the two articles entitled, "Zur Lehre von der Versöhnung," and "Die Nothwendigkeit des Sühnens Christi," in the *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theol.* 1857, 1858, and 1859.

[2] F G It., Or. (Lat. trans.) Aug. add σου after καυχησις (*thy* boasting).

[3] ℵ A D E F G, It.: γαρ, *for,* instead of ουν, *then,* which T. R. reads, with B C K L P, Syr.

[4] T. R. places πιστει before δικαιουσθαι, with K L P, Syr., while all the rest place δικαιουσθαι before πιστει.

—*Οὖν, then:* in consequence of the great fact which has been explained, and of the means of justification which it implies (vv. 23–26). —*Καύχησις, boasting,* vainglory; this term denotes not the *object* boasted of, but the *act* of self-glorification. The article *ἡ, the,* marks this boasting as well known; it is therefore the boasting of the Jews which is referred to. The word might be connected with the *καυχᾶσθαι ἐν Θεῷ,* ii. 17, and understood of the glory which the Jews sought to borrow from their exceptional position; but the context, and especially the following verse, prove that the apostle has in view the pretension of the Jews to justify themselves by their own works, instead of deriving their righteousness from the work of Christ.—This pretension has been excluded for ever by the work described, vv. 24–26. There remains nothing else for man to do than to lay hold of it by faith. This question has something of a triumphant character; comp. the similar form, 1 Cor. i. 20. The self-righteousness of the Jews is treated here as the wisdom of the Greeks is in that passage. The apostle seeks it, and before the cross it vanishes. Hofmann understands this exclamation of the vainglory to which even Christians might give themselves up: "Have we then, we Christians, thus justified, whereof to boast?" This interpretation is bound up with that of the same author, according to which the question, iii. 9: "Have we any advantage (over those whom judgment will overtake)?" is also put in the mouth of Christians. But it is evident that, like the question of ver. 9, this refers specially to Jewish prejudice; for it is expressly combated in the following words, ver. 29, and it is alluded to by the article *ἡ, the,* before *καύχησις.*—Only the question arises, What leads the apostle to put such a question here? The answer seems to us to be this. His intention in these few verses is to show the profound harmony between the law and the gospel. Now the conclusion to which he had been led by the searching study of the law, vv. 9–20, was, that it was intended to shut the mouths of all men, and of the Jews in particular, before God, by giving them the knowledge of sin. Hence it followed that the mode of justification which best agreed with the law was that which traced the origin of righteousness not to the works of the law, by means of which man thinks that he can justify

himself, but to faith; for, like the law itself, the righteousness of faith brings all boasting to silence, so that the righteousness of works, which lays a foundation for boasting, is contrary to the law, while that of faith, which excludes it, is alone in harmony with the law. And this is exactly what Paul brings out in the following questions.—In these two questions the term *law* is taken in a general sense. This word is often used by Paul to denote a *mode of action* which is imposed on the individual, a rule to which he is subject, a principle which determines his conduct. Sometimes when thus understood it is taken in a good sense; for example, viii. 2: "the law of the spirit of life which is in Jesus Christ;" again it is used in a bad sense; so vii. 23: "the law which is in my members;" or, again, it is applied in both ways, good and bad at once; comp. vii. 21. As Baur well says, the word *law* denotes in general "a formula which serves to regulate the relation between God and man." The genitive *τῶν ἔργων, of works,* depends on a *νόμου* understood, as is proved by the repetition of this word before *πίστεως*.

That glory which man derives from his self-righteousness, and which the law had already foreclosed, has been finally excluded. And by what means? By a rule of works? Certainly not, for such a means would rather have promoted it, but by that of faith (ver. 26). The apostle thus reaches the striking result that the rule of works would contradict the law, and that the rule of faith is that which harmonizes with it.—He here uses the word *νόμος, rule,* probably because he was speaking of *excluding,* and this requires something firm.

Ver. 28. The relation between this verse and the preceding rests on the contrast between the two ideas *καύχησις* and *πίστει δικαιοῦσθαι, boasting* and *being justified by faith.* "We exclude boasting in proportion as we affirm justification by faith."—Several commentators read *οὖν, then,* after T. R., which is supported by the *Vat.* and the Byzs. In that case this verse would form the conclusion from what precedes: "We conclude, then, that man"... But if the apostle were *concluding* finally in ver. 28, why would he recommence to argue in the following verse? We must therefore prefer the reading of the other Alexs. and the Greco-Lats., *γάρ, for:* "For we deem, we assert that"... Another question is,

Whether, with the Byzs., we are to put the word πίστει, *by faith*, before the verb δικαιοῦσθαι, *to be justified*, or whether it it is better to put it after, with the other two families, and so give the idea of justification the dominant place over that of the means of obtaining it. The connection with ver. 27 certainly speaks in favour of the Byz. reading, which has the Peschito for it. It is the idea of being justified *by faith*, and not that of *being justified* in general, which excludes boasting.—It is worth remarking the word ἄνθρωπον, *man*. This general term is chosen designedly: "whatever bears the name of man, Jew as well as Gentile, depends on the justification which is of faith, and can have no other." If it is so, it is plain that boasting is *finally excluded*. The apostle adds: *without works of law*, that is to say, without participation in any of those works which are wrought in the servile and mercenary spirit which prevails under the rule of law (see on ver. 20). The matter in question here is neither final salvation nor works as fruits of faith (*good works*, Eph. ii. 10; Tit. iii. 8). For these will be necessary in the day of judgment (see on ii. 13).

If it were otherwise, if the works of the law had not been *excluded* by the great act of expiation described vv. 24–26, and by the *rule of faith* involved in it, it would be found that God provided for the salvation of a *part* of mankind only, and forgot the rest. The unity of God is not compatible with this difference in His mode of acting. Now the dogma of the unity of God is the basis of the law, and of the whole of Judaism. On this point, too, therefore the law is at one with faith, vv. 29–31.

Vv. 29, 30. "*Or is He the God of the Jews only?*[1] *is He*[2] *not also of the Gentiles? Yes, of the Gentiles also: seeing*[3] *it is one God, who shall bring out the justification of the circumcised from faith, and who shall bring about that of the uncircumcised through faith.*"—The meaning of the ἤ, *or*, when prefixed to a question by Paul, is familiar to us: "*Or* if you do not admit that" . . . ? This question therefore goes to show that the negation of what precedes violates the Monotheism

[1] B and several Fathers: μονων instead of μονον.

[2] T. R. reads δε after ουχι with L P only.

[3] Instead of επειπερ, which T. R. reads, with D E F G K L P, we find ειπερ in א A B C.

so dear to the Jews, and in which they gloried. The genitive Ἰουδαίων, *of Jews*, used without the article, denotes the category. Meyer refuses to take this word as the complement of the predicate Θεός, *God*, understood; but wrongly; the natural meaning is: "Is God *the God* of the Jews?" Comp. ii. 29, 1 Cor. xiv. 33, and Luke xx. 38 (with Matt. xxii. 32). Otherwise we should require to apply here the phrase εἶναί τινος, *to be the property of* (to belong to), which does not correspond to the relation between God and man.—To the question: *Is He not also the God of the Gentiles?* Paul could answer with assurance: *yes, of the Gentiles also;* for the entire Old Testament had already drawn from Monotheism this glorious inference. The psalms celebrated Jehovah as the God of all the earth, before whom the nations walk with trembling (Ps. xcvi.–xcviii., c.). Jeremiah called Him (x. 7) the *King of nations;* and the apostle himself had demonstrated in chap. i. the existence of a universal divine revelation, which is the first foundation of universalism.

Ver. 30. The Alex. read εἴπερ: *if truly.* This reading might suffice if the apostle were merely repeating the principle of the unity of God as the basis of the preceding assertion: "*if indeed* God is one." But he goes further; this principle of the unity of God serves him as a point of departure from which to draw important inferences expressed in a weighty proposition: "*who will justify.*" To warrant him in doing so, it is not enough that he has asserted the unity of God as an admitted supposition: "*if indeed.*" He must have laid it down as an indubitable fact which could serve as a basis for argument. We must therefore prefer the reading of the other two families: ἐπείπερ, *seeing that.* Monotheism has as its natural corollary the expectation of one only means of justification for the whole human race. No doubt this dogma is compatible with a temporary particularism, of a pedagogic nature; but as soon as the decisive question arises, that of final salvation or condemnation, the unity must appear. A dualism on this point would imply a duality in God's essence: "*who* (in consequence of His unity) *will justify.*" The future: *will justify,* has been variously explained. Some think that it expresses *logical* consequence (Rück. Hofm.); others, that it refers to the day of judgment

(Beza, Fritzs.); a third party refer it to *all the particular cases* of justification which have taken or shall take place in history. The last sense seems the most natural: the whole new development of history, which is now opening, appears to the apostle as the consequence of the fundamental dogma of Judaism.—Meyer alleges that the difference of the two prepositions ἐκ and διά, *from* and *by* (which we have sought to render in our translation), is purely accidental. Is it also accidental that the article τῆς, *the*, which was wanting in the first proposition before the word πίστεως, *faith*, is added in the second? Experience has convinced us that Paul's style is not at the mercy of chance, even in its most secondary elements. On the other hand, must we, with Calvin, find the difference a pure irony: "If any one insists on a difference between Jews and Gentiles, well and good! I shall make over one to him; the first obtains righteousness *from* faith, the second *by* faith." No; it would be much better to abandon the attempt to give a meaning to this slight difference, than to make the apostle a poor wit. The following, as it seems to me, is the shade of meaning which the apostle meant to express. With regard to the Jew, who laid claim to a *righteousness of works*, he contrasts category with category by using the preposition ἐκ, *from, out of*, which denotes origin and nature: *a righteousness of faith*. Hence, too, he omits the article, which would have described the concrete fact, rather than the quality. But when he comes to speak of the Gentiles, who had been destitute till then of every means of reaching any righteousness whatever, he chooses the preposition διά, *by: by means of*, which points to faith simply as the *way* by which they reach the unexpected end; and he adds the article because faith presents itself to his mind, in this relation, as *the* well-known means, besides which the Gentile does not dream of any other.

The harmony between the Mosaic law and justification by faith has been demonstrated from two points of view—1. That of the *universal humiliation* (the exclusion of all boasting), which results from the former and constitutes the basis of the latter (vv. 27, 28). 2. That of *the unity of God*, which is the basis of Israelitish Mosaism and prophetism, as well as that of evangelical universalism (vv. 29, 30).

Thereafter nothing more natural than the conclusion drawn in ver. 31.

Ver. 31. "*Do we then make void the law through faith? That be far from us! Yea, we establish*[1] *the law.*"—This verse has been misunderstood by most commentators. Some (Aug., Luth., Mel., Calv., Philip., Rück.) apply it to the sanctification which springs from faith, and by which the gospel finally realizes the fulfilment of the law. This is the thesis which will be developed in chaps. vi.–viii. We do not deny that the apostle might defer the full development of a maxim thrown out beforehand, and, as it were, by the way; comp. the sayings, iii. 3 and 20*b*. But yet he must have been logically led to such sentences by their necessary connection with the context. Now this is not the case here. What is there at this point to lead the apostle to concern himself with the sanctifying power of faith? Let us remark, further, that ver. 31 is connected by *then* with what precedes, and can only express an *inference* from the passage, vv. 27–30. Finally, how are we to explain the *then* at the beginning of chap. iv.? How does the mode of Abraham's justification follow from the idea that faith leads to the fulfilment of the law? Hofmann offers substantially the same explanation, only giving to the word *law* the meaning of *moral law* in general (instead of the Mosaic law). But the difficulties remain absolutely the same.—Meyer and some others regard ver. 31 as the beginning, and, in a manner, the theme of the following chapter. The term *law*, on this view, refers to the passage of Genesis which the apostle is about to quote, iv. 3: "The harmony of justification by faith with the law is about to be explained by what the law says of Abraham's justification." But it is difficult to believe that Paul, without the slightest indication, would call an isolated passage of the Pentateuch *the law*. Then, if the relation between ver. 31 and iv. 1 were as Meyer thinks, it should be expressed logically by *for*, not by *then*. Holsten, if we understand him rightly, tries to get rid of these difficulties by applying the term *law* in our verse to the *law of faith* (ver. 27), in which he sees an absolute rule of righteousness holding good for all men, and consequently for Abraham. One could not imagine a more

[1] T. R., with E K L P: ιστωμεν; ℵ A B C D: ιστανομεν.

forced interpretation. Our explanation is already indicated; it follows naturally from the interpretation which we have given of the preceding verses. Paul's gospel was accused of making void the law by setting aside legal works as a means of justification; and he has just proved to his adversaries that it is his teaching, on the contrary, which harmonizes with the true meaning of the law, while the opposite teaching overturns it, by keeping up the vainglory of man, which the law was meant to destroy, and by violating Monotheism on which it is based. Is it surprising that he concludes such a demonstration with the triumphant affirmation: "Do we then overturn the law, as we are accused of doing? On the contrary, we establish it." The true reading is probably ἱστάνομεν; the most ancient form, which has been replaced by the later form ἱστῶμεν. The verb signifies, not *to preserve, maintain*, but to cause to stand, *to establish*. This is what Paul does with regard to the law; he *establishes* it as it were anew by the righteousness of faith; which, instead of overturning it, as it was accused of doing, faithfully maintains its spirit in the new dispensation, the fact which he had just proved.

This verse forms a true period to the whole passage, vv. 21–30. The law had been called to give witness on the subject of the doctrine of universal condemnation; it had borne witness, vv. 7–19. It has just been cited again, and now in favour of the new righteousness; its testimony has not been less favourable, vv. 27–31.

After demonstrating in a general way the harmony of his teaching with Old Testament revelation, the apostle had only one thing left to desire in the discussion: that was to succeed in finding in the Old Testament itself a saying or an illustrious example which, in the estimation of the Jews, would give the sanction of divine authority to his argument. There *was* such a saying, and he was fortunate enough to find it. It was written by the hand of the legislator himself, and related to what was in a manner the typical example of justification with the Jews. It therefore combined all the conditions fitted to settle the present question conclusively. Thus it is that Gen. xv. 6 becomes the text of the admirable development contained in chap. iv. This piece is the counter-

part of the scriptural demonstration which had closed the delineation of universal condemnation, iii. 9–20. It belongs, therefore, to the exposition of the thesis of ver. 21: the righteousness of faith *witnessed* by the law and the prophets.

TENTH PASSAGE (IV. 1–25).

Faith the Principle of Abraham's Justification.

Abraham being for the Jews the embodiment of salvation, his case was of capital moment in the solution of the question here treated. This was a conviction which Paul shared with his adversaries. Was the patriarch justified, by faith and by faith alone, his thesis was proved. Was he justified by some work of his own added to his faith, there was an end of Paul's doctrine.

In the first part of this chapter, vv. 1–12, he proves that Abraham owed his righteousness to his faith, and to his faith alone. In the second, vv. 13–16, he supports his argument by the fact that the inheritance of the world, promised to the patriarch and his posterity, was conferred on him independently of his observance of the law. The third part, vv. 17–22, proves that that very posterity to whom this heritage was to belong was a fruit of faith. In the fourth and last part, vv. 23–25, this case is applied to believers of the present. Thus *righteousness, inheritance, posterity,* everything, Abraham received by faith; and it will be even so with *us,* if we believe like him.

1. Vv. 1–12.

Abraham was justified *by faith,* vv. 1–8, and by faith *alone,* vv. 9–12.

Vv. 1, 2. "*What shall we say then that Abraham our first father*[1] *has found*[2] *according to the flesh? For if Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory; but not before God.*" — The question with which this exposition opens is connected with the preceding by *then,* because the negative

[1] ℵ A B C read προπατορα, while T. R., with D E F G K L P It. reads: πατερα.

[2] ℵ C D E F G It., Or. (Lat. trans.) place ευρηκεναι immediately after τι ερουμεν, while T. R. places it, with K L P, Syr. after πατερα ημων; B omits it.

answer anticipated is a logically necessary consequence of the demonstration given iii. 27–31. The particular case of Abraham is subordinate to the general principle which has just been established.—It is not proper to divide this verse, as some have done, into two questions: "What shall we say? That Abraham has found [something] according to the flesh?" For then it would be necessary to understand an object to the verb *has found*, righteousness, for example, which is extremely forced. Or it would be necessary to translate, with Hofmann: "What shall we say? That *we* have found Abraham as our father according to the flesh?" by understanding ἡμᾶς, *we*, as the subject of the infinitive verb *to have found*. But this ellipsis of the subject is more forced still than that of the object; and what Christian of Gentile origin—for the expression *have found* could not be applied to the Judeo-Christians—would have asked if he had become a child of Abraham in the way of the flesh? Ver. 1 therefore contains only one question (see the translation). The apostle asks whether Abraham by his own action found some advantage in the matter of salvation. In the Received reading, which rests on the Byzs., the verb *has found* separates the words *our father* from the others: *according to the flesh*, so that this latter clause cannot apply to the substantive *father*, but necessarily qualifies the verb *has found*. It is otherwise in the Alex. and Greco-Latin readings, where the verb *has found* immediately follows the words: *What shall we say?* whereby the words *our father* and *according to the flesh* are found in juxtaposition, which might easily lead the reader to take the two terms as forming a single description: *our father according to the flesh*. But this meaning cannot be the true one; for the matter in question here is not yet the *nature* of Abraham's paternity, which is reserved to a later point, but the manner in which Abraham became *righteous* (vv. 2, 3). The reading was probably falsified by the recollection of the frequent phrases: *father* or *child according to the flesh*.—The *flesh* denotes here human activity in its state of isolation from the influence of God, and consequently in its natural helplessness so far as justification and salvation are concerned. The meaning is therefore: "What has Abraham found *by his own labour?*" The word *flesh* is probably chosen in reference to circumcision,

which became the distinctive seal of the elect family.—The term προπάτωρ, *first father*, which occurs here in the Alex. instead of the simple πατήρ (in the two other families), is strange to the language of the New Testament and of the LXX.; but this very circumstance speaks in favour of its authenticity. For the copyists would not have substituted so exceptional a term for the usual word. Paul probably used it to bring out the proto-typical character of everything which transpired in Abraham's person.—Does the pronoun *our* imply, as is alleged by Baur, Volkmar, etc., the Jewish origin of the Christians of Rome? Yes, if the translation were: *our father according to the flesh.* But we have seen that this interpretation is false. It is not even right to say, with Meyer (who holds the Gentile origin of the church of Rome), that the pronoun *our* refers to the Judeo-Christian minority of that church. For the meaning of this pronoun is determined by the *we*, which is the subject of all the preceding verbs (*make void, establish, shall say*); now, this refers to Christians in general. Is not the whole immediately following chapter intended to prove that Abraham is the father of believing Gentiles as well as of believing Jews (comp. the categorical declarations of vv. 12 and 16)? How, then, should the word *our* in this verse, which is as it were the theme of the whole chapter, be used in a sense directly opposed to the essential idea of the entire piece? Comp., besides, the use of the expression *our fathers* in 1 Cor. x. 1. What is the understood reply which Paul expected to his question? Is it, as is often assumed: *nothing at all?* Perhaps he did not go so far. He meant rather to say (comp. ver. 2): nothing, *so far as justification before God is concerned;* which did not exclude the idea of the patriarch having from a human point of view found certain advantages, such as riches, reputation, etc.

Ver. 2. Some commentators take this verse as the logical proof (*for*) of the negative answer which must be understood between vv. 1 and 2: "*Nothing; for,* if he had been justified by his works, he would have whereof to glory, which is inadmissible." But why would it be inadmissible? This is exactly the matter to be examined. The reasoning would then be only a vicious circle. The verse must be regarded, not as a proof of the negative answer anticipated, but as the

explanation why Paul required to put the question of ver. 1: "I ask this, because if Abraham had been justified by his works, he would really have something of which to glory; and consequently the boasting which I declared to be excluded (iii. 27) would reappear once more as right and good." Did not Abraham's example form the rule?—The expression *by works* is substituted for that of ver. 1: *according to the flesh*, as the term *being justified* replaces the *having found*. In both cases, the term appearing in ver. 2 indicates the concrete result (*works, being justified*), as that in ver. 1 expressed the abstract principle (*the flesh, finding*). The word καύχημα signifies a *matter for glorying in*, which is quite a different thing from καύχησις, *the act* of glorying. Paul does not say that Abraham would really glory, but only that he would have matter for doing so. But how can the apostle express himself at the end of the verse in the words: *but not before God*, so as to make us suppose that Abraham was *really* justified by his works, though not before God? Some commentators (Beza, Grot., de Wette, Rück., Philip.) think themselves obliged to weaken the sense of the word *justified*, as if it denoted here justification in the eyes of men: "If Abraham was justified by his works (in the judgment of men), he has a right to boast (relatively to them and himself), but not as before God." But would such an attenuated sense of the word *justify* be possible in this passage, which may be called Paul's classical teaching on the subject of justification? Calvin, Fritzsche, Baur, Hodge, assert that we have here an incomplete syllogism; the major: "If Abraham was justified by works, he has whereof to glory;" the minor: "Now he could not have whereof to glory before God;" the conclusion (understood): "Therefore he was not justified by works." But the minor is exactly what it would have been necessary to prove; for what had been said, ver. 27, of the exclusion of boasting or of justification by works, was again made a question by the discussion on the case of Abraham. Besides, the conclusion was the important part, and could not have been left to be understood. The apostle has not accustomed us to such a mode of arguing. Meyer, after some variations in his first editions, has ended by siding with the explanation of Chrysostom and Theodoret, which is to the following effect: "If Abraham was justified

by his works, he has undoubtedly something whereof to glory in his own eyes; but in this case he has received no favour from God, nothing which honours him as the object of divine grace; and his justification not coming from God, he has no cause to glory in relation to God." This meaning is very ingenious; nevertheless it is untenable; for—1. The term *glorying* would require to be taken in a good sense: glorying in a real favour received from God, while throughout the whole piece it is applied to an impure boasting, the ground of which man finds in himself and in his own work. 2. Paul must have said in this sense: ἐν Θεῷ, *in God*, rather than πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, *before* (*in relation to*) God, comp. ii. 17. 3. Ver. 3 does not naturally connect itself with ver. 2 when thus understood, for this verse proves not what it should (*for*), to wit, that Abraham has no cause for boasting in the case supposed, but the simple truth that he was justified by his faith. Semler and Glöckler have had recourse to a desperate expedient, that of taking πρὸς τὸν Θεόν as the exclamation of an oath: "But no, *by God*, it is not so." But this sense would have required πρὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ; and what could have led Paul to use such a form here? The turn of expression employed by the apostle is certainly singular, we shall say even a little perplexed. He feels he is approaching a delicate subject, about which Jewish national feeling could not but show itself very sensitive. To understand his meaning, we must, after the words: "If he was justified by works, he hath whereof to glory," add the following: "and he has really great reason for glorying; it is something to have been made an Abraham; one may be proud of having borne such a name, *but*" . . . Here the apostle resumes in such a way as to return to his theme: "but all this glorying has nothing to do with the account which he had to render to God." The words: *in relation to God*, πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, are evidently opposed to a corresponding: *in relation to man*, understood. In comparing himself with men less holy than he, Abraham might have some cause for glorying; but the instant he put himself before God, his righteousness vanished. This is exactly the point proved by the following verses.

Vv. 3–5. "*For what saith the Scripture? Now Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness.*

Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. But to him that worketh not, but believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness." —By the words of ver. 2: "*But it is not so in relation to God,*" the apostle gave it to be understood that he knew the judgment of God Himself on Abraham's works. Ver. 3 explains how he can pronounce regarding a fact which seems to lie beyond the reach of human knowledge. Scripture contains a declaration in which there is revealed the judgment of God respecting the way in which Abraham was justified. This saying is to be found in Gen. xv. 6. Called by God out of his tent by night, he is invited to contemplate the heavens, and to count, if he can, the myriads of stars; then he hears the promise: "so numerous shall thy seed be." He is a centenarian, and has never had children. But it is God who speaks; that is enough for him: *he believed God.* Faith consists in holding the divine promise for the reality itself; and then it happens that what the believer has done in regard to the promise of God, God in turn does in regard to his faith: He holds it for righteousness itself.—The particle δέ, *now,* takes the place of the καί, *and,* which is found in the LXX., though their reading is not quite certain, as the *Sinaït.* and the *Vatic.* have a blank here. It is possible, therefore, that, as Tischendorf thinks, the generally received reading in Paul's time was δέ, *now,* and not καί. For it is evident that if the apostle preserves this particle, which is not demanded by the meaning of his own text, it is to establish the literal character of the quotation. It is not said: he believed *the promise of God,* but: *God.* The object of his faith, when he embraced the promise, was God Himself—His truth, His faithfulness, His holiness, His goodness, His wisdom, His power, His eternity. For God was wholly in the promise proceeding from Him. It little matters, indeed, what the particular object is to which the divine revelation refers at a given moment. All the parts of this revelation form but one whole. In laying hold of one promise, Abraham laid hold of all by anticipation; for he laid hold of the God of the promises, and henceforth he was in possession even of those which could only be revealed and realized in the most distant future.—The Hebrew says: "*and God counted it* to him for righteousness." The LXX. have trans-

lated by the passive: *and it was counted to him;* Paul follows them in quoting. The verb λογίζειν, λογίζεσθαι, signifies: *to put to account;* comp. 2 Sam. xix. 19; 2 Cor. v. 19; 2 Tim. iv. 16; and Philem. ver. 18 (where Paul uses the analogous term ἐλλογεῖν, because he is speaking of an account properly so called: "If he has done thee any wrong, put it to my account"). It is possible to put to one's account what he possesses or what he does not possess. In the first case it is a simple act of justice; in the second, it is a matter of grace. The latter is Abraham's case, since God reckons his *faith* to him for what it is not: for *righteousness.* This word *righteousness* here denotes perfect obedience to the will of God, in virtue of which Abraham would necessarily have been declared righteous by God as *being* so, if he had possessed it. As he did not possess it, God put his faith to his account as an equivalent. Why so? On what did this incomparable value which God attached to his faith rest? We need not answer: on the moral power of this faith itself. For faith is a simple receptivity, and it would be strange to fall back on the sphere of meritorious work when explaining the very word which ought to exclude all merit. The infinite worth of faith lies in its object, God and His manifestation. This object is moral perfection itself. To believe is therefore to lay hold of perfection at a stroke. It is not surprising that laying hold of perfection, it should be reckoned by God as righteousness. It has been happily said: Faith is at once the most moral and the most fortunate of strokes (*coups de main*). In vv. 4 and 5, the apostle analyzes the saying quoted. This analysis proves that Abraham was justified not in the way of a man who had done works (ver. 4), but in the way of a man who has not done them (ver. 5); which demonstrates the truth of the affirmation of ver. 2: "but it is not so before God."—The two expressions: ὁ ἐργαζόμενος, *him that worketh,* and ὁ μὴ ἐργαζόμενος, *him that worketh not,* are general and abstract, with this difference, that the first refers to any workman whatever in the domain of ordinary life, while the second applies only to a workman in the moral sense. To the hired workman who performs his task, his reward is reckoned not as a favour, but as a debt. Now, according to the declaration of Moses, Abraham was not treated on this footing; therefore he is not

one of those who have fulfilled their task. On the other hand, to the workman (in the moral sense) who does not labour satisfactorily, and who nevertheless places his confidence in God who pardons, his faith is reckoned for righteousness. Now, according to Moses, it is on this footing that Abraham was treated; therefore he belongs to those who have not fulfilled their task. These two harmonious conclusions—the one understood after ver. 4, the other after ver. 5—set forth the contents of the declaration of Moses: Abraham was treated on the footing not of a good, but of a bad workman.—The subjective negation μή before ἐργαζόμενος is the expression of the logical relation: *because*, between the participle and the principal verb: "*because* he does not do his work, his faith is reckoned to him as work."—Paul says: He who justifieth the *ungodly*. He might have said the sinner; but he chooses the more forcible term to designate the evil of sin, that no category of sinners, even the most criminal, may think itself excluded from the privilege of being justified by their faith. It has sometimes been supposed that by the word *ungodly* Paul meant to characterize Abraham himself, in the sense in which it is said (Josh. xxiv. 2) that "Terah, the father of Abraham, while he dwelt beyond the flood, had *served other gods*." But idolatry is not exactly equivalent to ungodliness (impiety), and Paul would certainly never have called Abraham ungodly (impious). —To impute to the believer righteousness which he does not possess, is at the same time not to impute to him sins of which he is guilty. Paul feels the need of completing on this negative side his exposition of the subject of justification. And hence, no doubt, the reason why, to the saying of Moses regarding Abraham, he adds one of David's, in which justification is specially celebrated in the form of the *non-imputation* of sin.

Vv. 6–8. "*Even as*[1] *David also describeth the blessedness of the man, unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works: Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom*[2] *the Lord does not impute sin.*"—It need not be supposed that David here plays the part of a *second* example, side by side with Abraham. The position

[1] Instead of καθάπερ, D E F G read καθώς.
[2] Instead of ᾧ, ℵ B D E G read οὗ.

of the patriarch is unique, and Paul will return to it after this short interruption. He merely adduces a saying of David, the inspired singer, which seems to him to complete the testimony of Moses about Abraham.—The conjunction of comparison καθάπερ is more forcible than καθώς; it indicates an intrinsic and striking agreement: *exactly as.*—The word μακαρισμός, which we have translated by *blessedness,* strictly signifies: *the celebration of blessedness.* The verb λέγει, *says,* of which this word is the object, signifies here: *he utters* (this beatification). The following words are, as it were, the joyful hymn of the justified sinner. This passage is the beginning of Ps. xxxii., which David probably composed after having obtained pardon from God for the odious crimes into which passion had dragged him. Hence the expressions: *transgressions pardoned, sins covered, sin not imputed.* Here, then, is the negative side of justification, the evil which it removes; while in regard to Abraham it was only the positive side which was under treatment, the blessing it confers. Thus it is that the two passages complete one another.

This observation made, the apostle returns to his subject. It was not enough to prove that Abraham owed his justification to his faith. For the defenders of works might say: True; but it was *as one circumcised* that Abraham obtained this privilege of being justified by his faith. And so we have works driven out by the door, and returning by the window. The answer to the question of ver. 1: "What hath Abraham found by the way of the flesh?" would no more be: *nothing,* but: *everything.* For if it was to his circumcision Abraham owed the favour whereby God had reckoned his faith to him for righteousness, everything depended in the end on this material rite; and those who were destitute of it were *ipso facto* excluded from justification by faith. The nullity of this whole point of view is what Paul shows in the following passage, where he proves that the patriarch was not only justified by faith, but by faith *only.*

Vv. 9, 10. "*Is this beatification then for the circumcision, or for the uncircumcision also? for we say:*[1] *Faith was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness. How was it then reckoned? when he was in circumcision, or in uncircumcision? Not in cir-*

[1] ℵ B D omit the ὅτι, which T. R. reads with all the other documents.

cumcision, but in uncircumcision."—The *then* serves merely to resume the discussion: "I ask *then* if this celebration of the blessedness of the justified applies only to the circumcised, or also to the uncircumcised." On this everything really depended. For, on the first alternative, the Gentiles had no way left of admission to the privilege of justification by faith except that of becoming Jews; and there was an end of Paul's gospel. M. Reuss regards all this as an example "of the scholasticism of the Jewish schools of the day," and of a "theological science" which could supply the apostle only with "extremely doubtful modes of argument." We shall see if it is really so.—The second part of the verse: *for we say* . . . is intended to bring back the mind of the reader from David to Abraham: "For, in fine, we were affirming that Abraham was justified by faith. How is it then with this personage, whose example forms the rule? How was he justified by faith? as uncircumcised or as circumcised?" Such is the very simple meaning of ver. 10. The *then* which connects it with ver. 9 is thus explained: "To answer the question which I have just put (9*a*), let us *then* examine how the justification of Abraham took place."—The answer was not difficult; it was furnished by Genesis, and it was peremptory. It is in chap. xv. that we find Abraham justified by faith; and it is in chap. xvii., about fourteen years after, that he receives the ordinance of circumcision. The apostle can therefore answer with assurance: "not as circumcised, but as uncircumcised." There was a time in Abraham's life when by his uncircumcision he represented the Gentiles, as later after his circumcision he became the representative of Israel. Now, it was in the first of these two periods of his life, that is to say, in his Gentilehood, that he was justified by faith . . . the conclusion was obvious at a glance. Paul makes full use of it against his adversaries. He expounds it with decisive consequences in the sequel.

Vv. 11, 12. "*And he received the sign of circumcision,*[1] *a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had yet being uncircumcised: that he might be at once the father of all them that believe, that righteousness may be imputed unto them also; and the father of circumcision to them who are not of the*

[1] Instead of περιτομης, ℵ D, Syr. read περιτομην.

circumcision only, but who also walk in the steps of that faith of our father Abraham, which he had being yet uncircumcised." —*Καί, and,* signifies here: "and in consequence of the justification thus found."—*Περιτομῆς, of circumcision,* may be made a genitive of apposition: "the sign *which* is circumcision," or a genitive of quality: "a sign in the form of circumcision." The former is the simpler sense. In any case, the reading *περιτομήν* in two Mjj. is a correction. Circumcision appears even in Gen. xvii. 11 as the *sign of the covenant* between God and His people. The Rabbins express themselves thus: "God put the sign of love in the flesh." The term *σημεῖον, sign,* relates to the material thing; the term *σφραγίς, seal,* to its religious import. Far, then, from circumcision having been the antecedent condition of Abraham's justification, it was the mark, and consequently the effect of it.—The article *τῆς* (after the words *righteousness of faith*), which we have translated by: *which he had,* may relate to the entire phrase *righteousness of faith,* or to the word *faith* taken by itself. If we consider the following expression: "father of all *believers*" (not of all the justified), and especially the end of ver. 12, we cannot doubt that the article applies to the word faith taken alone: "the faith which he had yet being uncircumcised." The *in order that* which follows should not be taken in the weakened sense of *so that.* No doubt Abraham in believing did not set before himself the *end* of becoming the spiritual father of Gentile believers. But the matter in question here is the intention of God who directed things with this view which was His from the beginning of the history. The real purpose of God extended to the Gentiles; the theocracy was only a means in His mind. Had He not said to Abraham, when calling him, that "in him should all the families of the earth be blessed"? Gen. xii. 3.—On the meaning of *διά, in the state of,* see on ii. 27.—The last words: *that righteousness might be imputed unto them,* should not be regarded as a new end of the: *he received the sign,* to be added to the first already mentioned (that he might be the father . . .). The verb is too remote; we must therefore make the *that* . . . depend on the participle *πιστευόντων, them that believe* (though they be not circumcised); not certainly in Hofmann's sense: "who have faith *in the fact that* it will be imputed to them,"

but in the only grammatically admissible sense: "them who believe *in order that* righteousness may be imputed to them." There is a desire in faith. It seeks reconciliation with God, and consequently justification.—The pronoun *αὐτόν, he* ("that he might be, *even he*"), is intended to bring the person of Abraham strongly into relief, as called to fill, he, this one solitary man, the double place of father of believing Gentiles (ver. 11) and of believing Jews (ver. 12). It is very remarkable that the apostle here puts the believers of Gentile origin first among the members of Abraham's posterity. But was it not they in fact who were in the condition most similar to that of the patriarch at the time when he obtained his justification by faith? If, then, a preference was to be given to the one over the other, it was certainly due to them rather than to circumcised Christians. What a complete reversal of Jewish notions!

Ver. 12. There can be no doubt that this verse refers to believers of Jewish origin, who formed the other half of Abraham's spiritual family. But it presents a great grammatical difficulty. The Greek expression is such that it seems as if Paul meant to speak in this same verse of *two* different *classes* of individuals. It appears as if the literal translation should run thus: "father of circumcision, in respect of those who are not only of the circumcision, *but also* in respect of those who walk in the steps of" ... Proceeding on this translation, Theodoret, Luther, and others have applied the first words: "in respect of those who are not only of the circumcision," to *Jewish* believers, and the following words: "in respect of those who walk in the footsteps of Abraham's faith," to *Gentile* believers. But why then return to the latter, who had already been sufficiently designated and characterized in ver. 11? And how, in speaking of Jewish believers, could Paul content himself with saying that they are not of circumcision only, without expressly mentioning faith as the condition of their being children of Abraham? Finally, the construction would still be incorrect in this sense, which would have demanded *οἱ τοῖς ... μόνον* (*not only for those who belong* to the circumcision) instead of *τοῖς οὐ ... μόνον* (*for those who not only belong to ...*). This ancient explanation must therefore certainly be abandoned. There can be here

only one class of persons designated by *two* distinct *attributes.* The first is circumcision, and the second, a faith like Abraham's. But in this case the Greek construction seems again faulty in the second member. This is acknowledged by Tholuck, Meyer, etc. Philippi is fain to satisfy himself with the reflection that negligences of style are found in the best writers; which is true, but does not help us here; for the faultiness would be a real want of logic. On the other hand, the expedients recently devised by Hofmann and Wieseler are so far-fetched that they do not deserve even to be discussed. And yet the apostle has not accustomed us to inexactness unworthy even of an intelligent pupil; and we may still seek to solve the difficulty. This is not impossible, as it appears to us; we need only take the first τοῖς to be a pronoun (*those who*), as it incontestably is, but regard the second not as a second parallel pronoun (which would, besides, require it to be placed before the καί), but a simple definite article: "*the* (individuals) *walking* in the steps of" . . . The meaning thus reached is to this effect: "those who are not only of the circumcision, but who *are also*, that is to say, at the same time, *the* (individuals) *walking* in the steps of" . . . This article, τοῖς, *the*, is partitive; it serves to mark off clearly within the mass of the Jewish people who possess the sign of circumcision, a much narrower circle: *those walking in the faith*, that is to say, the Jews, who to circumcision add the characteristic of faith. These latter do not form a second class alongside of the first; they form within this latter a group apart, possessing beside the common distinction, an attribute (faith) which is wanting to the others; and it is to draw this line of demarcation accurately within the circumcised Israel that the article is used.[1] The τοῖς is here simply an article analogous to the τοῖς before πιστεύουσιν.

Paul is not satisfied with saying: "who also walk in the footsteps of Abraham's faith;" he expressly reminds us—for this is the point of his argument—that Abraham had this faith *in the state of uncircumcision.* What does this mean, if not that Abraham was still ranked as a Gentile when "he believed and his faith was counted to him for righteousness"?

[1] The complete Greek phrase would be as follows: οἱ οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον [ὄντες], ἀλλὰ καὶ [ὄντες] οἱ στοιχοῦντες.

Hence it follows that it is not, properly speaking, for Gentile believers to enter by the gate of the Jews, but for Jewish believers to enter by the gate of the Gentiles. It will be allowed that it was impossible for one to overwhelm his adversary more completely. But such is Paul's logic; it does not stop short with refuting its opponent, it does not leave him till it has made it plain to a demonstration that the truth is the very antipodes of what he affirmed.

We find in these two verses the great and sublime idea of *Abraham's spiritual family*, that people which is the product, not of the flesh, but of faith, and which comprises the believers of the whole world, whether Jews or Gentiles. This place of father to all the believing race of man assigned to Abraham, is a fundamental fact in the kingdom of God; it is the act in which this kingdom takes its rise, it is the aim of the patriarch's call: "*that he might be the father of* . . . (ver. 11), *and of*" . . . (ver. 12). Hofmann says rightly: "Abraham is not only the first *example* of faith, for there had been other believers before him (Heb. xi.); but in him there was *founded* for ever the community of faith." From this point the continuous history of salvation begins. Abraham is the stem of that tree, which thenceforth strikes root and developes. For he has not believed simply in the God of creation; he has laid hold by faith of the God of the promise, the author of that redeeming work which appears on the earth in his very faith. The notion of this spiritual paternity once rightly understood, the filiation of Abraham in the physical sense lost all importance in the matter of salvation. The prophets, John the Baptist, Jesus (John viii.), were already at one in *laying down* the truth which the apostle here *demonstrates:* faith as constituting the principle of life, as it were the life-blood of Abraham's family, which is that of God on the earth. Because, indeed, this principle is the only one in harmony with the moral essence of things, with the true relation between the Creator who gives of free grace, and the creature who accepts freely.—And this whole admirable deduction made by the apostle is to be regarded as a piece of Rabbinical scholasticism!

The apostle has succeeded in discovering the basis of Christian universalism in the very life of him in whose

person theocratic particularism was founded. He has demonstrated the existence of a time when he represented Gentilism, or, to speak more properly, mankind in general; and it was during this period, when he was not yet a Jew, but simply a man, that he received salvation! The whole gospel of Paul was involved in this fact. But a question arose: after receiving justification, Abraham had obtained another privilege; he had been declared, with all his posterity, to be the future possessor of the world. Now this posterity could be none else than his issue by Isaac, and which had been put in possession of circumcision and of Canaan. Through this opening there returned, with banners displayed, that particularism which had been overthrown in the domain of justification. Thus there was lost the whole gain of the preceding demonstration. Paul does not fail to anticipate and remove the difficulty. To this question he devotes the following passage, vv. 13–16.

2. Vv. 13–16.

Vv. 13, 14. "*For the promise, that he should be the heir of the*[1] *world, was not to Abraham, or to his seed, through the law, but through the righteousness of faith. For if they which are of the law be heirs, faith is made void, and the promise made of none effect.*"—The *for* bears on the understood objection which we have just explained: "For it need not be imagined that the promised inheritance is to be obtained by means of the law, and that the people of the law are consequently assured of it." Paul knew that this thought lay deep in the heart of every Jew. He attacks it unsparingly, demonstrating that the very opposite is the truth; for the law, far from procuring the promised inheritance for the Jews, would infallibly deprive them of it.—The *possession of the world*, of which the apostle speaks, had been promised to Abraham and his posterity in three forms.—1. In the promise made to the patriarch of the *land of Canaan*. For, from the prophetic and Messianic point of view, which dominated the history of the patriarchal family from the beginning, the land of Canaan was the emblem of the sanctified earth; it was the point of departure for the glorious realization of the latter. In this sense it is said in

[1] T. R., with K L Γ, reads του before κοσμου; omitted by all the others.

the *Tanchuma:*[1] "God gave our father Abraham possession *of the heavens and earth.*" 2. Several promises of another kind naturally led to the extension of the possession of the promised land to that of the whole world; for example, the three following, Gen. xii. 3: "In thee shall all families of the earth be blessed;" xxii. 17: "Thy seed shall possess the gate of his enemies;" ver. 18: "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." The two expressions: *in thee,* and *in thy seed,* alternate in these promises. But they are combined, as in our passage, in the verses, xxvi. 3, 4, where we also again find the two ideas of the possession of Canaan, and the blessing of the whole world through Israel. 3. Above all these particular promises there ever rested the general promise of the Messianic kingdom, the announcement of that descendant of David to whom God had said: "I have given thee the uttermost parts of the earth for an inheritance" (Ps. ii. 8). Now Israel was inseparable from its Messiah, and such an explanation led men to give to the preceding promises the widest and most elevated sense possible. Israel had not been slow to follow this direction; but its carnal spirit had given to the universal supremacy which it expected, a yet more political than religious complexion. Jesus, on the contrary, in His Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere, had translated this idea of dominion over the world into that of the humble love which rules by serving: "Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth." The apostle does not here enter on the question of *how* the promise is to be fulfilled; he deals only with the condition on which it is to be enjoyed. Is the law or faith the way of entering into the possession of this divine inheritance, and consequently are the people of law or of faith the heirs?—The word *inheritance,* to express *ownership,* reproduces the Hebrew name *Nachala,* which was used to designate the land of Canaan. This country was regarded as a *heritage* which Israel, Jehovah's first-born son, had received from his heavenly Father.

To prove that the inheriting seed is not Israel, but the nation of believers, Jews or Gentiles, Paul does not use, as Meyer, Hodge, and others suppose, the same argument as he follows in Gal. iii. 15 et seq. He does not argue here from

[1] *Commentary on the Pentateuch,* probably of the ninth century.

the fact that the law was given subsequently to the patriarchal covenant, and could make no change in that older contract, which was founded solely on the promise on the one hand, and faith on the other. The demonstration in our passage has not this historical character; it is, if one may so speak, dogmatic in its nature. Its meaning is to this effect: If the possession of the world were to be the reward of observing the law, the promise would thereby be reduced to a nullity. This declaration is *enunciated* ver. 14, and proved ver. 15. The inference is drawn ver. 16.

Ver. 14. If, in order to be *heir of the world,* it is absolutely necessary to come *under the jurisdiction of the law,* and consequently to be its faithful observer,—otherwise what purpose would it serve?—it is all over at a stroke both with *faith* and with the *promise:* with faith, that is to say, with the hope of that final heritage, since the realization of that expectation would be bound to a condition which sinful man could not execute, the fulfilment of the law, and since faith would thus be deprived of its object (literally, *emptied,* κεκένωται, from κενός, *empty*); and next, with the promise itself: for, an impossible condition being attached to it, it would thereby be paralysed in its effects (κατήργηται). Proof and conclusion, vv. 15, 16.

Vv. 15, 16. "*For the law worketh wrath: and, indeed,*[1] *where no law is, there is no transgression. Therefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace; to the end the promise might be sure to all the seed; not to that only which is of the law, but to that also which is of the faith of Abraham; who is the father of us all.*"—Faith deprived of its object, the promise made void for those who are under the law, why all this? Simply because the law, when not fulfilled, brings on man God's disapprobation, *wrath,* which renders it impossible on His part to fulfil the promise. This passage, like so many others already quoted, is incompatible with the idea which Ritschl forms of divine wrath. This critic, as we know (see on i. 18), applies the term *wrath,* in the Old Testament only, to the sudden punishment with death of exceptional malefactors, who by their crime compromised the existence of the covenant

[1] Instead of γαρ, which T. R. reads, with D E F G K L P, It. Syr., we read in ℵ A B C, Or. (Lat. trans.): δι.

itself. But in these words the apostle evidently starts from the idea that whatever is under the law is *ipso facto* the object of wrath, which applies to the entire people, and not to a few individuals only. Melanchthon applied the term wrath in this verse to the irritation felt by condemned *man* against the judgment of God. He forgot that the loss of the divine inheritance results to the sinner, not from his own wrath, but from that of the judge.—The article ὁ, *the*, before the word *law*, proves that the subject here is *the law* properly so called, the Mosaic law.—It would be improper to translate: "for *it is* the law *which* produces wrath," as if wrath could not exist beyond the jurisdiction of the law. Chap. i. proves the contrary. But the law produces it inevitably where it has been given. The preponderance of egoism in the human heart once granted, the barrier of the law is certain to be overpassed, and transgression is sure to make wrath burst forth.

T. R., with the Byzs., the Greco-Latins, and the oldest versions, connects the second part of this verse with the first by γάρ, *for*. This reading appears at the first glance easier than that of the Alex.: δέ (*now*, or *but*). But this very circumstance is not in its favour. The three γάρ, which have preceded, may have also led the copyists to write the same particle again. The context, carefully consulted, demands a δέ rather than a γάρ. For what says the second member? That without a law transgression is not *possible*. Now this idea does not logically prove that the law *necessarily* produces wrath. This second proposition of ver. 15 is not therefore a proof, but a simple observation in support of the first; and this connection is exactly marked by the δέ, which is the particle here not of opposition (*but*), but of gradation (*now*), and which may be rendered by *and indeed*. This second proposition is therefore a sort of parenthesis intended to strengthen the bearing of the fact indicated in the first (15*a*): "In general, a law cannot be the means fitted to gain for us the favour of God; on the contrary, the manifestations of sin, of the evil nature, acquire a much graver character through the law, that of *transgression*, of positive, deliberate violation of the divine will, and so increase wrath." Παράβασις, transgression, from παραβαίνειν, *to overpass*. A barrier cannot

be crossed except in so far as it exists. So without law there is no sin in the form of transgression.—The article ὁ is wanting here before *νόμος, law.* And rightly so; for this saying is a general maxim which does not apply specially to the Jews and the Jewish law (as 15*a*). The Gentiles have also a law (ii. 14, 15), which they can observe or violate. In the latter case, they become objects of wrath (chap. i.) as well as the Jews, though in a less degree.

Ver. 16. If, then, the promise of the inheritance was serious, there was only one way to its fulfilment—that the inheritance should be given by the way of faith and not of law. This consequence is expounded in ver. 16, which developes the last words of ver. 13: *by the righteousness of faith,* as ver. 15 had developed the first: *not by the law.*—*Therefore:* because of that condemning effect which attaches to the law. The verb and subject to be understood in this elliptical proposition might be: *the promise was made.* But the words following: *that it might be by grace;* do not allow this; the subject in question is evidently the fulfilment. What we must supply, therefore, is: *the promise will be fulfilled,* or: *the heritage will be given.* The inheritance, from the moment of its being granted to faith only, remains a gift of pure grace; and while remaining a gift of grace, it is possible for it not to be withdrawn, as it must have been if its acquisition had been attached to the fulfilment of the law. It is very important not to efface the notion of *aim* contained in the words εἰς τὸ εἶναι (*that the promise might be*), by translating, as Oltramare does, *so that.* There was positive *intention* on God's part, when He made the gift of inheritance depend solely on faith. For He knew well that this was the only way to render the promise *sure* (the opposite of *being made void,* ver. 14). And sure for whom? For all the seed of Abraham, in the true and full sense of the word; it was the fulfilment of those terms of the promise: "to thee and *to thy seed.*" After what precedes, this term can only designate the patriarch's *spiritual* family,—all believers, Jew or Gentile. Faith being the *sole condition* of promise, ought also to be the *sole characteristic* of those in whom it will be realized. These words: *sure for all the seed,* are developed in what follows. The apostle embraces each of the two classes

of believers contained in this general term: "sure," says he, "*not only to that which is of the law,*" believers of Jewish origin who would lose the inheritance if it was attached to the law, "*but also to that which is of faith,*" Christians of Gentile origin to whom the promise would cease to be accessible the instant it was made to depend on any other character than that of faith. It is plain that the expression used here has a wholly different meaning from the apparently similar form employed in ver. 12. There are *two classes* of persons here, and not *two attributes* of the same persons. The second τῷ is a pronoun as well as the first. It may be objected, indeed, that in designating the first of these two classes *Paul* does not mention the characteristic of *faith,* and that consequently he is still speaking of Jews simply, not believing Jews. But after all that had gone before, the notion of faith was naturally implied in that of *Abraham's seed.* And to understand the apostle's words, we must beware of connecting the μόνον, *only,* exclusively with the words ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, *of the law:* "those who are *of the law only,*" that is to say, who are simply Jews, and not believers. The μόνον refers to the whole phrase: τῷ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, *only that which is of the law,* as is shown in the following context by the position of the καί, *also, before* the second τῷ: "*not only that* which is of the law, *but also that which*" . . . that is to say: not only believers who were formerly under the law, but also Gentile believers. The attribute of *faith* is expressly mentioned in the case of the last, because it appears in them free from all legal environment, and as their sole title to form part of Abraham's descendants.—The last words: *who is the father of us all,* sum up all that has been developed in the previous context. Believing Jews and Gentiles, we all participate by faith not only in justification, but also in the future possession of the world; for the true seed to whom this promise was made was that of faith, not that according to the law. Abraham is therefore the sole stem from which proceed those two branches which form in him one and the same spiritual organism.—But after all a Jew might still present himself, saying: "Very true; but that this divine plan might be realized, it was necessary that there should be an Israel; and that there might be an Israel, there must needs come into the world an

Isaac. Now this son is born to Abraham in the way of natural, physical generation; and what has this mode of filiation in common with the way of faith?" Here in an instant is the domain of the *flesh* reconquered by the adversary; and to the question of ver. 1: "What has Abraham found by the flesh?" it only remains to answer: His son Isaac, consequently the chosen people, and consequently *everything*. A mind so familiarized as Paul's was with the secret thoughts of the Israelitish heart, could not neglect this important side of the question. He enters into this new subject as boldly as into the two preceding, and sapping the last root of Jewish prejudice by Scripture, he demonstrates that the birth of Isaac, no less than the promise of the inheritance and the grace of justification, was the effect of faith. Thus it is thoroughly proved that Abraham found *nothing* by the flesh; *quod erat demonstrandum* (ver. 1). This is the subject of the third passage, 17–21.

3. Vv. 17–21.

The birth of Isaac was the work of faith; the apostle proves it by the Scripture narrative, the memory of which was present to the mind of all his readers, and which was intended to be recalled to them by the declaration of ver. 3 relative to Abraham's justification.

Ver. 17. "*As it is written, I have made thee a father of many nations, before God whom he believed, as Him, that quickeneth the dead, and calleth those things which be not as though they were.*"—This verse is directly connected with the end of ver. 12; for the last words of ver. 16: *who is the father of us all,* are the reproduction of the last words of ver. 12: *the faith of our father Abraham.* The development, vv. 13–16, had only been the answer to an anticipated objection. First of all, the general paternity of Abraham in relation to all believers, Jew or Gentile, so solemnly affirmed at the end of ver. 16, is proved by a positive text, the words of Gen. xvi. 5. The expression: *father of many nations,* is applied by several commentators only to the Israelitish tribes. But why in this case not use the term *Ammim* rather than *Gojim,* which is the word chosen to denote *the Gentiles* in opposition to Israel?

The promise: "Thy seed shall be as the stars of heaven for multitude," can hardly be explained without holding that when God spoke thus His view extended beyond the limits of Israel. And how could it be otherwise, after His saying to the patriarch: "In thee shall *all the families of the earth* be blessed (or shall bless themselves)"? The full light of the Messianic day shone beforehand in all these promises.—But there was in this divine saying an expression which seemed to be positively contradicted by the reality: *I have made thee.* How can God speak of that which shall not be realized till so distant a future as if it were an already accomplished fact? The apostle uses this expression to penetrate to the very essence of Abraham's faith. In the eyes of God, the patriarch *is* already what he shall become. Abraham plants himself at the instant on the viewpoint of the divine thought: he regards himself as being already in fact what God declares he will become. Such, if we mistake not, is the idea expressed in the following words which have been so differently explained: *before God whom he believed.* This *before* is frequently connected with the words preceding the biblical quotation: *who is the father of us all.* But this verb in the present: *who is,* was evidently meant in the context of ver. 16 to apply to the time when Paul was writing, which does not harmonize with the expression *before,* which transports us to the very moment when God conversed with Abraham. It seems to me, therefore, better to connect this preposition with the verb: *I have made thee,* understanding the words: "*which was already true* before the God whom" . . .; that is to say, in the eyes of the God who was speaking with Abraham, the latter *was* already *made* the father of those many nations. There are two ways of resolving the construction κατέναντι οὗ . . . Θεοῦ; either: κατέναντι τοῦ Θεοῦ κατέναντι οὗ ἐπίστευσε (before the God before whom he believed); or: κατέναντι τοῦ Θεοῦ ᾧ ἐπίστευσε (before the God whom he believed). Perhaps the first explanation of the attraction is most in keeping with usage (anyhow there is no need to cite in its favour, as Meyer does, Luke i. 4, which is better explained otherwise). But it does not give a very appropriate meaning. The more natural it is to state the fact that Abraham *was there* before God, the more superfluous it is to mention further that it was in God's

presence *he believed*. The second explanation, though less usual when the dative is in question, is not at variance with grammar; and the idea it expresses is much more simple and in keeping with the context; for the two following participles indicate precisely the two attributes which *the faith* of Abraham lays hold of: "before the God whom he believed as *quickening* . . . and *calling*."—Two Mjj., F G, and the *Peschito* read ἐπίστευσας, *thou didst believe*. Erasmus had adopted this meaning in his first editions, and it passed into Luther's translation. These words were thus meant to be a continuation of the quotation. It would be best in this case to explain the κατέναντι οὗ in the sense of ἀνθ' οὗ: "*in respect of the fact that* thou didst believe." But this meaning is without example, and the reading has not the shadow of probability.—The two divine attributes on which the faith of Abraham fastened at this decisive moment, were the power to *quicken* and the power to *create*. It was, indeed, in this twofold character that God presented Himself when He addressed to him the words quoted: *I have made thee*—here is the assurance of a resurrection—*father of many nations*—here is the promise of a creation. Faith imagines nothing arbitrarily; it limits itself to taking God as He offers Himself, but wholly.—The first attribute, the power to *quicken* (or *raise again*), has sometimes been explained in relation to facts which have no direct connection with the context, such as the resurrection of the *dead*, spiritually speaking (Orig. Olsh.), or the conversion of the Gentiles (Ewald), or even the sacrifice of Isaac (Er. Mangold)! But ver. 19 shows plainly enough what is the apostle's meaning. It is in the patriarch's own person, already a centenarian, and his wife almost as old as he, that a resurrection must take place if the divine promise is to be fulfilled.—In the explanation of the second predicate, the far-fetched has also been sought for the obvious; there has been given to the word *call* a spiritual signification (calling to salvation), or it has even been applied to the primordial act of creation (καλεῖν, *to call*, and by this call to bring out of nothing). But how with this meaning are we to explain the words ὡς ὄντα, *as being?* Commentators have thus been led to give them the force of ὡς ἐσόμενα or εἰς τὸ εἶναι, *as about to be*, or *in order to their being;* which is of course impossible. The simple

meaning of the word call: *to invite one to appear*, is fully sufficient. Man in this way calls beings which are; on the summons of the master the servant presents himself. But it belongs to God to call beings to appear which are not, as if they already were. And it is thus God speaks to Abraham of that multitude of future nations which are to form his posterity. He calls them up before his view as a multitude already present, as really existing as the starry heaven to which He compares them, and says: "*I have made thee* the father of this multitude." The subjective negative μή before ὄντα expresses this idea: "He calls as being *what He knows Himself* to be non-existent." The two present participles, *quickening* and *calling*, express a permanent attribute, belonging to the essence of the subject. The passage thus understood admirably teaches wherein faith consists. God shows us by His promise not only what He wills to exist for us, but what He wills us to become and what we already are in His sight; and we, abstracting from our real state, and by a sublime effort taking the position which the promise assigns us, answer: Yea, I will be so; I am so. Thus it is that Abraham's faith corresponded to the promise of the God who was speaking to him face to face. It is this true notion of faith which the apostle seeks to make plain, by analysing more profoundly what passed in the heart of the patriarch at the time when he performed that act on which there rested the foundation of the kingdom of God on the earth.

Ver. 18. "*Who against hope believed in hope, that he might become the father of many nations, according to that which was spoken, So shall thy seed be.*"—The word *hope* is used here in two different senses, the one subjective: hope as a feeling (in the phrase: *in hope*), the other objective: hope to denote the *motive* for hoping (in the phrase: *against hope*). It is nearly the same in viii. 24, with this difference, that hope in the latter passage, taken objectively, does not denote the *ground* of hoping, but the *object* of hope (as in Col. i. 5). The apostle therefore means: without finding in the domain of sense or reason the least ground for hoping, he nevertheless believed, and that by an effort of hope proceeding from a fact which the eye did not see nor the reason comprehend, God and His promise. This is the realization of the notion of

faith expressed Heb. xi. 1, a notion which is so often wrongly contrasted with the conception of Paul. Instead of: *he believed in hope,* it seems as if it should have been: he hoped on (the foundation of) his faith. But the ἐπί is taken here nearly in the same sense as in the frequent phrases: ἐπ' εὐνοίᾳ, ἐπ' ἔχθρᾳ, *in goodwill, in hatred;* ἐπὶ ξενίᾳ, *in hospitality.* His faith burst forth in the form of hope, and that in a situation which presented no ground for hope.—Translators generally weaken the expression εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι, *in order to become,* by suppressing the idea of intention: "and *thus it is that* he became" (Oltram.), or: "and he *believed that* he would become" (Osterv.). This substitution of the result for the intention is grammatically inadmissible. He really believed with the *intention* of becoming. If he grasped the promise with such energy, it certainly was *in order that* it might be realized. It is therefore unnecessary to ascribe this notion of aim to God, as Meyer does.—The following verses develope the two notions: *against hope* (ver. 19), and *in hope* (vv. 20, 21.

Vv. 19, 20. "*And being not weak in faith, he considered*[1] *his own body now*[2] *dead—he was about an hundred years old—and the deadness of Sarah's womb; but having regard to the promise, he staggered not through unbelief; but was strong, giving glory to God by his faith.*"—Abraham is represented in this passage as placed between two opposite forces, that of sight, which turns to the external circumstances (ver. 19), and that of faith, which holds firmly to the promise (ver. 20). The δέ, *but,* of ver. 20, expresses the triumph of faith over sight.—We find in ver. 19 one of the most interesting various readings in the text of our Epistle. Two of the three families of MSS., the Greco-Latin and the Byz., read the negative οὐ before κατενόησε: *he considered not.* The effect of the subjective negative μή before ἀσθενήσας, *being weak,* on the principal verb would then be rendered thus, *because:* "because he was not weak in faith, he considered not" . . . The meaning is good: the look of faith fixed on the promise prevented every look cast on the external circumstances which

[1] The οὐ, which T. R. reads here, with D E F G K L P, It., is rejected by ℵ A B C, Syr. Or. (Lat. trans.).

[2] B F G, It. Syr. Or. omit ἤδη, which is found in all the rest.

might have made him stagger, as was the case with Peter, who, as long as he looked to Jesus, regarded neither the winds nor the waves. But the Alex. family, with the Peschito this time on its side, rejects the *οὐ*. The meaning is then wholly different: "not being weak in faith, he looked at (or considered) his deadened body . . . but for all that (*δέ*, ver. 20) he staggered not" . . . This reading seems to be preferable to the preceding, for it better explains the contrast indicated by the *δέ*, *but*, of ver. 20. The meaning is also more forcible. He considered . . . but he did not let himself be shaken by the view, discouraging as it was. The *μή* before *ἀσθενήσας* may be explained either as a reflection of the author intended to bring out a *circumstance* which accompanied this view (he considered *without being weak*), or, what is better, as indicating the *negative cause*, which controls all that follows (vv. 19, 20): "*because* he was not weak in faith, he regarded . . . but did not stagger." In favour of the Received reading: "he considered not" . . . the passage has been alleged: "Abraham laughed, and said in his heart, Shall a child be born unto him that is an hundred years old? and shall Sarah, that is ninety years old, bear?" (Gen. xvii. 17); a passage which, according to this view, gave occasion to the rejection of the negative *οὐ*. This is not wholly impossible. But the time to which this passage (Gen. xvii.) applies is not the same as that of which the apostle here speaks (Gen. xv.).

Ver. 20. The *δέ*, *but*, denotes the contrast to the possible and natural result of this consideration. Strictly speaking, the antithesis would have been the *ἐνεδυναμώθη*, *he strengthened himself;* but the apostle feels the need of reminding us first, in a negative form, of what might have been so easily produced under such conditions.—The *εἰς τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν*, *in regard to the promise*, stands foremost. It was the object in contrast to that which was presented to his view by the effeteness of his own body and Sarah's. For the force of *εἰς*, comp. xvi. 19.—The verb here: *διακρίνεσθαι*, *to doubt*, properly signifies *to be parted*, or to be divided into two men, one affirming, the other denying; one hoping and giving himself up, the other waiting to see: "but in regard to the promise, there was no division in him." The complement: *of God*, brings out that which gave the promise this full power over

his heart.—In the clause: *through unbelief*, the Greek substantive is preceded by the article: through *the* unbelief common among men, the well-known unbelief.—The ἀλλά, *but*, is more strongly adversative than the δέ: "But quite the contrary." This word forcibly contrasts the idea of the strength drawn from the promise with the weakness arising from doubt. The verb ἐνεδυναμώθη may be translated as a passive: *he was strengthened;* comp. Heb. xi. 34; but it may also be taken in the middle and reflective sense: *he strengthened himself*, reinvigorated himself, Acts ix. 22; Eph. vi. 10. The antithesis of the διακριθῆναι, *to doubt*, speaks rather in favour of the middle sense, unless we recur to the simply intransitive meaning: *he grew in strength;* this shade would perhaps be preferable; it harmonizes with the preposition ἐν, which enters into the composition of the verb, and denotes a growth of *inward* strength. In proportion as he contemplated the promise with a fixed regard, in which he put, so to speak, his whole soul, his entire being, body and spirit, was penetrated with a new force, the principle of the complete resurrection in which he had made bold to believe (ver. 17).

The clause *by faith* is usually connected with the verb *he was strengthened;* but so understood, these words do little more than repeat what has already been sufficiently expressed. It is better, therefore, to join them with the following participle: "by faith (by *this* faith) giving glory to God." The position of this word, heading the clause to which it is thus joined, corresponds with the importance of the idea of faith in the whole piece. Man was created to glorify God. He did not do so by his obedience. It is *by faith*, at least, that in his state of sin he can return to the fulfilment of this glorious destination.—*To give glory to God* means in Scripture, to render homage, either by word or deed, to one or other of God's attributes, or to His perfection in general. Wherein, in this case, did the homage consist? The apostle tells us in ver. 21: in the firm conviction which he cherished of God's faithfulness to His word and of His power to fulfil it.

Vv. 21, 22. "*Being*[1] *fully persuaded that, what He has promised, He is able also to perform. Therefore*[2] *also righteous-*

[1] E F G, It. omit the καί here, which all the others read.
[2] B D F G, Syr. omit καί after διό.

ness was imputed to him."—Πληροφορεῖν, *to fill a vessel to the brim;* this word used in the passive applies to a man filled with a conviction which leaves no place in his heart for the least doubt. It is the opposite of the διακρίνεσθαι, *to be inwardly divided,* of ver. 20. If the relation between the two participles: *giving glory* and *being persuaded,* is as we have said, we should probably omit the καί, *and,* which begins this verse in the Alex. and Byz., and prefer the Greco-Latin reading which rejects it.—As to the καί, *also,* before ποιῆσαι, *to do,* it well expresses the inseparable relation which the moral perfection of God establishes between His *saying* and His *doing.* If His power were not equal to the height of His promise, He would not promise.

Ver. 22 sums up the whole development relating to Abraham's faith, vv. 1–21, to clear the way for the final application which Paul had in view. Διό, *wherefore,* refers to what has just been said of the confidence with which Abraham laid hold of God's promise, ver. 21. God ascribed to that confidence which glorified Him the worth of perfect righteousness. The καί, *also* ("wherefore also"), found in the Alex. and Byz. Mjj., points to the moral relation which exists between faith and the imputation made of that faith. The subject of ἐλογίσθη, *was counted,* might be the πιστεῦσαι, *believing,* understood; but it is simpler to regard the verb as impersonal: "there was in relation to him an imputation of righteousness." This saying is more expressly connected with the first of the three subjects treated in this chapter, Abraham's justification, vv. 1–12; but it sums up at the same time the two others, the inheritance of the world and the birth of Isaac, which are, so to speak, its complements. Thus is introduced the fourth part, which contains the application to existing believers, vv. 23–25.

4. Vv. 23–25.

Vv. 23, 24. "*Now it was not written for his sake alone, that it was imputed to him; but for us also, to whom it shall be imputed, when we believe on Him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead.*"—The apostle extracts the permanent principle contained in Abraham's case to apply it to us. The δέ, *now,*

marks this advance. *Δι' αὐτόν, for him* (strictly: on account of him), does not signify *to his honour* (Beza, Thol.). The idea is that the narrative was written not merely to relate a fact belonging to Abraham's history, but also to preserve the knowledge of an event which should take place in ours. So it will be on the condition expressed by the following participle *τοῖς πιστεύουσιν, for us who believe,* the meaning of which we have rendered freely in the translation (*when we believe*). Every time this condition shall be fulfilled, the same imputation *will certainly take place;* such is the meaning of the word *μέλλει, is to.*—But what in our position now will be the object of faith? Faith in the biblical sense can only have one object. Whether Abraham or we be the parties in question, this object, always the same, is God and His manifestation. But, in consequence of the unceasing progress which takes place in the divine work, the *mode* of this manifestation cannot but change. In the case of Abraham, God revealed Himself by the promise of an event *to be accomplished;* the patriarch required therefore to believe in the form of *hope,* by cleaving to the divine attribute which could realize it. In our position now we are in presence of an *accomplished fact,* the display of the almighty grace of God in the resurrection of Jesus. The object of faith is therefore different in form and yet the same in substance: God and His manifestation, then in word, now in act. What closely binds the two historical facts brought into connection, though so distant, the birth of Isaac and the resurrection of Jesus, is that they are the two extreme links of one and the same chain, the one the point of departure, the other the consummation of the history of salvation. But it must not be imagined that, because it falls to us to believe in an accomplished fact, faith is now nothing more than historical credence given to the reality of this fact. The apostle at once sets aside this thought when he says, not: "when we believe in the resurrection of Jesus," but: "when we believe in *God who raised Jesus;*" comp. Col. ii. 12. He excludes it likewise when he designates this Jesus raised from the dead as *our Lord,* one who has been raised by this divine act to the position of representative of the divine sovereignty, and especially to the Headship of the body of the church. He gives it to be understood, finally, by unfolding in the

following verse the essential contents of this supreme object of faith.

Ver. 25. "*Who was delivered on account of our offences, and was raised again on account of our justification.*"—In the title *our Lord* there was involved the idea of a very intimate relation between Jesus and us. This mysterious and gracious solidarity is summed up in two symmetrical clauses, which in a few clear and definite terms present its two main aspects. *He was delivered on account of our offences.* Perhaps Paul means by the phrase: *being delivered,* to remind us of the description of the servant of Jehovah, Isa. liii.: "His soul was delivered (παρεδόθη) to death" (ver. 12). He who delivers Him, according to Rom. viii. 32, is God Himself: "who spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all." Paul has told us, iii. 25, for what end this act was necessary. It was required to manifest conspicuously the righteousness of God. Every sinner needed to be brought to say: See what I deserve! Thus justice was satisfied and pardon possible. *And He was raised again on account of our justification.* Commentators are unanimous, if I mistake not, in translating: *for our justification,* as if it were πρός or εἰς, and not διά (*on account of*). This *for* is explained in the sense that the resurrection of Christ was needed in order that faith might be able to appropriate the expiation which was accomplished, and that so justification, of which faith is the condition, might take place. But what a roundabout way of arriving at the explanation of this *for!* And if the apostle really meant *for* (*with a view to*), why repeat this same preposition διά, which he had just used in the *parallel* proposition, in its natural sense of *on account of,* while the language supplied him with prepositions appropriate to the exact expression of his thought (πρός, εἰς, iii. 25, 26)? I am not surprised that in this way several commentators have found in this symmetry established between the facts of salvation nothing more than an artificial distribution, belonging to the domain of rhetoric rather than to that of dogmatics, and that one has even gone the length of reproaching the apostle "for sacrificing to the mania of parallelism." If we were shut up to the explanation referred to, we could only join regretfully in this judgment. But it is not so. Let us take the διά in

its natural sense, as we are bound to do by its use in the first proposition. In the same way as Jesus died because of our offences, that is, our (merited) condemnation, *He was raised because of our* (accomplished) *justification.* Our sin had killed Him; our justification raised Him again. How so? The expiation of our trespasses once accomplished by His death, and the right of God's justice proved in earnest, God could pronounce the collective acquittal of future believers, and He did so. Over the blood of the sacrifice a sentence of justification was pronounced in favour of guilty man; his condemnation was annulled. Now, in view of this divine fact, a corresponding change must necessarily be wrought in the person of Christ Himself. By the same law of solidarity whereby our condemnation had brought Him to the cross, our justification must transform His death into life. When the debtor is proved insolvent, his security is thrown into prison; but as soon as the latter succeeds in clearing the debt, the debtor is legally set free, and his security is liberated with him. For he has no debt of his own. Such is the bond of solidarity formed by the plan of God between Christ and us. Our lot is as it were interwoven with His: we sin, He dies; we are justified, He lives again. This is the key to the declaration, 1 Cor. xv. 17: "If Jesus be not risen, ye are yet in your sins." So long as the security is in prison the debt is not paid; the immediate *effect* of payment would be his liberation. Similarly, if Jesus were not raised, we should be more than ignorant whether our debt were paid; we might be certain that it was not. His resurrection is the *proof* of our justification only because it is the necessary *effect* of it. What Paul required to say, therefore, was διά, *on account of*, and not εἰς, *with a view to.* If in Christ dead humanity disappeared condemned, in Christ raised again it appears acquitted. And now what is the part of *faith* in relation to the resurrection thus understood? Exactly that of Abraham in regard to the divine promise. On hearing the promise, he no longer saw himself as he was, but he considered himself as the promise made him. So, the resurrection of Christ once completed, we have no longer to see ourselves as we are in ourselves, but as this fact reveals us to our view: justified. For this resurrection is the incarnation of my justification. If death is the

payment of my debt, resurrection is, as it were, the acknowledgment of it.

We must beware, therefore, if we would not efface from the Scriptures their most magnificent revelation, of giving to the word δικαίωσις, *justification*, as several commentators, Döllinger for example, the entirely arbitrary sense of *sanctification*: Jesus was raised with a view to our moral amelioration!—or of bringing in here, as some Protestant commentators do (Calv., Thol., Philip.) into the notion of the resurrection, those of the heavenly dominion and intercession of Christ. The resurrection is here presented by Paul in express terms in its relation to what preceded, namely, His death, not the glorified existence which followed.

Thus is finished the demonstration of the harmony between the revelation of the Old Testament and the justification by faith revealed in the gospel. The grand truth of the righteousness of faith, summarily *enunciated* iii. 21, 22, was first *placed* on its historical foundation, the work of God in Christ, iii. 23–26; then it was *confirmed* by its harmony with the Old Testament; first with the spirit of the law, iii. 27–31, then with the example of Abraham, iv. 1–24. One question might yet be raised: Will this justification by faith, which saves us at present, hold good in the future? Can it assure us of salvation even before the judgment-seat? It is to the solution of this so grave question that the following piece is devoted. Thus will be closed the didactic exposition of justification by faith.

ELEVENTH PASSAGE (V. 1-11).

The Certainty of final Salvation for Believers.

The title which we have just given to this piece suffices to indicate the difference between the idea which we form of its scope and aim, and that which prevails on the subject in the commentaries. Commentators, except Meyer to some extent, and Th. Schott more completely, see in the following piece the exposition of the *fruits* of justification by faith; to wit, *peace*, ver. 1; *the hope* of glory, ver. 2; *patience*, ver. 3 et seq.; and the feeling of the love of God, ver. 5 et

seq.[1] But, first, such a juxtaposition of effects so diverse would not correspond with the nature of Paul's genius. Then chaps. vi.–viii. are intended, as all allow, to expound Christian sanctification as the fruit of justification by faith. But if the piece v. 1–11 were the beginning of the description of the *fruits of justification*, why interrupt the delineation by the parallel of Adam and Christ, which does not naturally belong to it? One cannot be surprised, if it is so, at the judgment of Reuss, who alleges that in the matter of systematic order our Epistle leaves something to be desired (*Gesch. d. N. T. Schr.* § 108). To escape this difficulty, Lange and Schaff, following Rothe's example, think we should close the exposition of justification at v. 11, and make the parallel of the two Adams the opening of a new division, that relating to sanctification. We shall state the exegetical reasons which absolutely prevent us from referring the passage v. 12–21 to the work of sanctification. Here we merely call the attention of the reader to the particle διὰ τοῦτο, *wherefore*, v. 12, by which the second part of our chapter is closely joined to what precedes, and which makes the following piece not the opening of a new part, but the close of that which we are studying (i. 18–v. 11). As to the disorder which Reuss attributes to the apostolic doctrine, we think we can show that the author of the Epistle is entirely innocent, and that it is solely

[1] Calvin: "The apostle begins to demonstrate what he has affirmed of justification *by its effects*."—Tholuck entitles this passage: "the beneficent pathologico-religious influence of this means of salvation."—Olshausen: *of the fruits of faith*, adding at the same time that the apostle could of course only sketch these consequences of faith here, but that he will develope them afterwards. Philippi: "the beneficent consequences of justification." Reuss says: "the piece describes the effects of justification on the man who is its object." Lange and Schaff: "the fruit of justification." Hodge: "the consequences of justification: 1. Faith; 2. Free access to God; 3. Our afflictions auxiliary to hope; 4. The certainty of final salvation." Renan says: "the fruit of justification is peace with God, hope, and consequently patience." Hofmann sums up thus: "Let us enter into this relation of peace with God, in which we have the hope of glory, consolation in trials, love to God, and the certainty of deliverance from final wrath." Bossuet: "the happy fruits of justification by faith." Meyer better: "Paul now expounds *the blessed certainty of salvation for the present and future*." Holsten has some expressions which approach this point of view. Schott is the only one with whom I find myself entirely in accord in the understanding of this piece. He entitles it: *The certainty of the believer's preservation in salvation, and of the final consummation of this salvation* (p. 234).

chargeable on his expositors. The apostle never thought of explaining, in the piece which we are about to study, *the fruits* of justification; he simply finishes treating the subject of justification itself. What good, indeed, would be served by an argument in regular form like that which we find in vv. 6–8 and in vv. 9, 10, which are real syllogisms, to demonstrate what is obvious at a glance: that peace with God flows from justification? Was it not enough to indicate the fact? The view of the apostle is therefore entirely different. From this point he turns his attention to the *future* which opens up before the justified soul. It is not at its goal; a career of trials and struggles awaits it. Will its state of justification hold good till it can possess the finished salvation? The apprehension of divine wrath exists in the profound depths of man's heart. A trespass suffices to reawaken it. What justified one will not sometimes put the anxious question, Will the sentence by which my faith was reckoned to me for righteousness be still valid before the judgment-seat; and *in the day of wrath* (ver. 9) will this salvation by grace, in which I now rejoice, still endure? It is the answer to this ever-reviving fear which the following piece is intended to give. We are still, therefore, engrossed with the subject of justification. The exegesis, I hope, will prove the truth of this view, which makes this piece an essential waymark in the progress of the Epistle. As is usual with Paul, the theme of the whole passage is expressed in the first words, vv. 1 and 2.

Vv. 1, 2. "*Therefore, being justified by faith, we have*[1] *peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ: by whom also we have obtained access by faith*[2] *into this grace wherein we stand, and triumph in the hope of the glory of God.*"—The meaning of ver. 1 is as follows: "Since, then, we have obtained by means of faith our sentence of justification from God, we find ourselves transferred relatively to Him into a state of peace, which henceforth displaces in our minds the fear of wrath."—The form of expression: εἰρήνην ἔχειν πρός, is common in classic Greek (see Meyer). But must we not read, with the great majority of Mjj. and Vss., the subjunctive ἔχωμεν, *let us have*,

[1] T. R. reads ἔχομεν, with F G P (and besides the first corrector of ℵ and the third of B). The eight other Mjj. It. Syr. read ἔχωμεν.

[2] The words τῇ πίστει are omitted by B D E F G, Or. (Lat. trans.).

instead of ἔχομεν, *we have, we possess?* This reading is adopted by Hofm., Gess, Volkm.; it makes this ver. 1 an exhortation. But how happens it that immediately afterwards the didactic tone recommences and continues uniformly to the end of the piece, without any resuming of the exhortation? This reading certainly arises from a mistaken correction, which owes its origin to the erroneous idea which has been formed of the piece (see above). Perhaps, also, it is due to the fact that a liturgical reading began with this verse. No exegete has been able to account satisfactorily for this imperative suddenly occurring in the midst of a didactic development.—The words: *through our Lord Jesus Christ,* are explained by commentators, and even by Meyer, as referring to the work of expiation previously described. We cannot admit this view, for the following reasons: 1. The work of expiation is cited in ver. 2 as a benefit wholly distinct from that to which ver. 1 refers; δι' οὗ καί, *by whom also,* are the words in the beginning of ver. 2. It is therefore impossible, without useless repetition, to explain the two expressions, *through our Lord,* ver. 1, and *by whom also,* ver. 2, in reference to the same mediation. Now the mediation of ver. 2 is undoubtedly that which Jesus effected by the atonement. That of ver. 1 must therefore refer to another work. 2. The mediation of which ver. 2 speaks is mentioned as an accomplished fact, the verb being in the perfect: ἐσχήκαμεν, *we have obtained,* while the present ἔχομεν, *we have,* refers to a present and permanent taking in possession. 3. If the clause: *through our Lord Jesus Christ,* referred to the work of expiation, it would probably be joined to the participle δικαιωθέντες, *having been justified,* rather than to the verb *we possess.* The mistake of exegesis arises from the fact that there has not been recognised in this verse the theme, and, so to speak, the title of the whole piece (on to ver. 11), a piece which refers not to the act of justification, but *to the present and future of the justified.* When he says: *we have peace with God,* the apostle means: we can henceforth regard God with entire serenity, not only as to the past, but also in view of the future, and even of the judgment; for—this is the thought with which he closes the exposition about to follow—we have in Christ, besides the mediation of *His death,* by which

we have already been justified (δικαιωθέντες), that of *His life*, by which we shall be maintained in this state of salvation; comp. vv. 9 and 10, which are the authentic explanation of the clause: *through our Lord Jesus Christ*, ver. 1. In this way ver. 2, which refers to the atonement, ceases to have the effect of a repetition.—Schott says to the same purpose: "As it is to the person of Christ that we owed access into grace (ver. 2), it is the same person of Christ which assures us of the perfecting of salvation (ver. 1)."

Ver. 2. Paul here reminds us that the Jesus who henceforth makes our salvation sure (*by His life*), is no other Mediator than the Jesus who has already purchased our justification (*by His death*). Thus is explained the δι' οὗ καί, "by whom *also*." The blessing of reconciliation by His death, explained above, was the foundation of the new grace he had in view throughout the whole piece. Comp. a similar return to a past development intended to serve as the starting-point of a new one, iii. 23. Before passing to the new grace, he is concerned to recall the former, to impress the conviction that we owe all, absolutely all, to this Jesus only. The perfect ἐσχήκαμεν expresses an act of taking possession already past, though the possession continues.—The term προσαγωγή, which we have translated by the word *access*, sometimes signifies *the act of bringing* or *introducing*; it may, for example, designate the manœuvre by which engines of war are brought close to the walls of a besieged city (comp. Meyer). It might be understood in this sense: "by whom we have obtained *introduction into this grace*." But the word has also sometimes an intransitive meaning: the *right of entering*, *access*. The other substantives compounded from the same verb have often an analogous meaning; thus ἀναγωγή, *setting out to sea*; περιαγωγή, *circular motion*. And certainly this intransitive meaning is preferable here. The first would be suitable if the matter in question were introduction to an individual, a sovereign for example; but with an impersonal regimen, such as *grace*, the meaning of *access to* is more natural. It is in this sense also that the word is taken Eph. ii. 18 and iii. 12, if we are not mistaken. The words τῇ πίστει, *by faith*, are wanting in the Vat. and the Greco-Latins. If they are authentic, they simply remind us of the part previously ascribed to faith in

justification. But it is improper, with some commentators, to make the regimen: *to this grace,* dependent on it. Such a form of speech: πίστις εἰς χάριν, would be without example in the New Testament. The words: *to this grace,* complete the notion of *access to:* "At the time when we believed (τῇ πίστει) we had access to this grace in which we are now established." — The perfect ἕστηκα signifies: I have been placed in this state, and I am in it. This word, which has the meaning of a present, recalls us to the ἔχομεν, *we have* henceforth, of ver. 1, and forms the transition to the following idea: "and (in this state) we glory."—This last proposition (ver. 2) might be made dependent on the relative pronoun *in which.* The meaning would be: "this grace in which we henceforth stand and glory." But this construction is somewhat awkward. Ver. 2 being already a sort of parenthesis, in the form of an incidental proposition, it is unnatural to prolong the appendix still further. We therefore connect the words: *and we glory,* with the principal idea of ver. 1: *we have peace.* It is a climax: "not only do we no longer dread any evil at the hand of God, but we have even when we think of Him the joyful hope of all blessing." It is the feeling of security raised to the anticipated joy of triumph. These last words confirm our explanation of the ἔχομεν, "we have *henceforth,*" ver. 1. For they express more obviously still the conviction of the justified man in relation to his future. In reality, the object of this triumphant conviction is the certain hope *of glory.* The phrase: *the glory of God,* denotes the glorious state which God Himself possesses, and into which He will admit the faithful; see on iii. 23.—The καυχᾶσθαι, *to glory,* is the blessed conviction and forcible (but humble, 1 Cor. i. 31) profession of assurance in God. But some one will ask the apostle: And what of the tribulations of life? Do you count them nothing? Do they not threaten to make you lower your tone? Not at all; for they will only serve to feed and revive the hope which is the ground of this glorying. This reply is contained and justified in the following verses.

Vv. 3, 4. "*And not only so, but*[1] *we glory in tribulations also: knowing that tribulation worketh endurance; and endurance, experience; and experience, hope.*"—This passage being, strictly

[1] B C read καυχωμενοι instead of καυχωμεθα.

speaking, the answer to an unexpressed objection, it is natural that it should recur (end of ver. 4 and 5) to the idea of *hope*. The participle *καυχώμενοι, and even glorying*, which is found in B C, would correspond very well with the digressive character evidently belonging to these verses. But it is probable that this form has been borrowed from that of ver. 11.—The regimen of *we glory*, literally translated, would be: *in* afflictions. But this translation would not render the idea of the text in our language [French]. It would express the circumstances *in the midst of which* the believer glories, while the Greek phrase denotes *the object* itself *of which* he boasts; comp. 1 Cor. i. 31: "to glory *in* the Lord," for: *on account of the possession of the Lord;* 2 Cor. xii. 9: "to glory *in* his weaknesses," for: to extract glory *from* his very weaknesses. Thus Paul means here: to make his afflictions themselves a reason of triumph. This strange thought is explained by what follows; for the climax which is about to be traced proves that it is tribulations that make hope break forth in all its vigour. Now it is this feeling which is the ground for *καυχᾶσθαι (to glory)*.—The words *knowing that* introduce the logical exposition of the process whereby affliction becomes transformed in the believer into hope. First, affliction gives rise to *patience*, *ὑπομονήν*. This Greek word, coming from *ὑπό* and *μένειν*, literally: *to keep good under* (a burden, blows, etc.), might be translated by *endurance*. From want of this word [in French] we say *constancy*.—Ver. 4. Endurance in its turn worketh *experience*, *δοκιμήν*. This is the state of a force or virtue which has stood trials. This force, issuing victorious from the conflict, is undoubtedly the faith of the Christian, the worth of which he has now proved by experience. It is a weapon of which henceforth he knows the value. The word *δόκιμος* frequently denotes in the same sense the *proved* Christian, the man who has shown what he is, comp. xiv. 18, and the opposite, 1 Cor. x. 27. We find in the New Testament two sayings that are analogous, though slightly different: Jas. i. 3, where the neuter substantive *δοκίμιον* denotes, not like *δοκιμή* here, the state of the thing proved, but the *means* of proof, tribulation itself; and 1 Pet. i. 7, where the same substantive *δοκίμιον* seems to us to denote that which in the faith of the believer has held good in suffering, has shown itself

real and effective, the gold which has come forth purified from the furnace.—When, finally, the believer has thus experienced the divine force with which faith fills him in the midst of suffering, he feels his *hope* rise. Nothing which can happen him in the future any longer affrights him. The prospect of glory opens up to him nearer and more brilliant. How many Christians have declared that they never knew the gladness of faith, or lively hope, till they gained it by means of tribulation! With this word *hope* the apostle has returned to the end of ver. 2; and as there are deceitful hopes, he adds that the one of which he speaks (*the hope of glory*, ver. 2) runs no risk of being falsified by the event.

Ver. 5. "*Now hope maketh not ashamed; because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us.*"—This verse is the central saying of the entire passage. On the one hand, it is directly connected with the two first verses: "We no longer feel any fear; nay, rather, we triumph in the hope of glory, a hope which is rendered brighter even by sufferings." On the other hand, this verse contains all that follows. This hope will not be falsified in the end by the event; this is what the second part of the passage proceeds to prove (vv. 6–11).—The word *make ashamed* refers to the non-realization of the hope when the hour of glory has struck. The present *maketh not ashamed* is the present of the idea. This falsification, inflicted on the hopes of faith by facts, and the possibility of which is denied by the apostle, is not that with which the truth of materialism would confound them. This idea is foreign to the mind of Paul. The matter in question in the context is the terrible position of the justified man who in the day of judgment should find himself suddenly face to face with unappeased wrath. Paul declares such a supposition impossible. Why? Because the source of his hope is the revelation of God Himself which he has received, of the love of which he is the object. The reawakening of wrath against him is therefore an inadmissible fact.—The *love of God* cannot denote here *our love* for God, as Hofmann would have it. It is true this critic thoroughly recognises the imperfections always attaching to our love. But he thinks that Paul is here looking at the believer's love to his God only as a *mark* of our renewal by the Holy Spirit.

Nevertheless, this meaning must be rejected; first, on account of the choice of the verb ἐκκέχυται, *is shed abroad* (see below); next, because the following verses (6–8), joined by *for* to ver. 5, develope the idea of God's love to us, not that of our love to God; finally, because the syllogism finished in vv. 9, 10 would want its basis (its minor) if the fact of God's love to us had not been established in the preceding context. *The love of God* is therefore the love with which God loves us. The verb translated by *is shed abroad*, literally signifies: *to be poured out of.* Paul means: out of the heart of God, where this love has its source, into ours. The perfect used here signifies that there was a time when this effusion took place, and that since then it has not been withdrawn. It is this meaning of the perfect which explains the use of the preposition of rest, ἐν (*in*, without the idea of motion), instead of εἰς (*into*, with motion). This preposition refers to the whole state which has resulted from the effusion. There was an act of revelation in the heart of believers, the fruit of which is the permanent impression of the love which God has for them. The medium of this transfusion of the divine love into their heart was the Holy Spirit. We see, 1 Cor. ii. 10–12, that this Divine Being, after having sounded the depths of God, reveals them to the man to whom He imparts Himself. Thereby we become privy to what is passing in God, in particular, to the feeling which He cherishes towards us, just as we should be to a feeling which we might ourselves cherish towards another. In general, the work of the Spirit consists in breaking down the barrier between beings, and placing them in a common luminous atmosphere, in which each hears the heart of his neighbour beat as if it were his own. And this is the relation which the Spirit establishes, not only between man and man, but between man and God Himself; comp. John xiv. 19, 20. The aorist participle δοθέντος, *which is given to us*, reminds us of two things: the time when this heaven was opened to the believer, and the objective and perfectly real character of this inward revelation. It was not a case of exalted feeling or excited imagination; it was God who imparted Himself; comp. John xiv. 21 and 23.—The transition from ver. 5 to 6 seems to me to be one of the points on which exegesis has left most to be desired. Commentators

confine themselves in general to saying that ver. 6 gives the external proof, the proof from fact, of that divine love shed abroad in our hearts, and that the proof is the sacrifice of Christ, vv. 6–8. But this inorganic juxtaposition of the internal proof, ver. 5, and the external proof, ver. 6, is not satisfactory; and this explanation does not correspond to the use of the particle *for*, which implies a much more intimate relation of ideas. The object is to *prove* that this hope of glory, whose source is the inward revelation of the love of God, will not be falsified by the event in the hour of judgment. For this end, what does the apostle do? He does not merely allege an external fact already past; he penetrates to the essence of that internal revelation of which he has just been speaking in ver. 5. He analyses, so to speak, its contents, and transforming this ineffable feeling into a rigorous syllogism, he deduces from it the following argument, which is that of the Spirit Himself in the heart of the believer: God loved thee when thou wast yet a sinner, giving thee a proof of love such as men do not give to one another, even when they respect and admire one another the most, and when the devotion of love is carried among them to its sublimest height (vv. 6–8). Such is the minor, the divine love already manifested in the fact of redemption. The understood major is to this effect: Now the love which one has testified to his enemies does not belie itself when these have become better than enemies, friends. The conclusion is expressly stated, vv. 9, 10: If, then, God testified to thee, to thee when yet an enemy, a love beyond all comparison, how shouldst thou, once justified and reconciled, have to fear falling back again under wrath? It is obvious that to the end of the passage, from ver. 6, the whole forms one consecutive reasoning, and this reasoning is joined by *for* to ver. 5, because it serves only to expound in a reasoned form the language which the Holy Spirit holds to the heart of the believer, and by which He sustains his hope, even through earthly tribulations.

Vv. 6–8. "*For when we were yet*[1] *without strength*,[2] *in due*

[1] Three principal readings: T. R. with ℵ A C D E K P, the Mnn. Marc. Or. (Lat. trans.) Syr. read ετι γαρ; F G, It.: ως τι γαρ; B: ω γε.

[2] ℵ A B C D E F G read ετι after ασθενων (consequently, ℵ A C D E read this word twice).

time Christ died for the ungodly. For hardly for a righteous man will one die:[1] *for peradventure for the good man some would even dare to die. But God commendeth His love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.*"—The *for* might be rendered by *in fact.* The inward revelation of divine love, whereby the Holy Spirit certifies to the believer that his hope of glory shall not be deceived, is now to be set in full light. The authenticity of this *for* is sufficiently attested—(1) By the reading of the Alex., Byz.: ἔτι γάρ; (2) By that of the Greco-Latin: εἰς τί γάρ; (3) By that of the *Vat.* itself, which reads εἴγε; for this γ seems to be a remnant of the primitive γάρ. The reading of the Alex. and Byz. MSS., which put the ἔτι, *yet,* at the head of the sentence, is likewise authentic. For, to the weight of the authorities there is added the decisive importance of this little word, in which there is concentrated the whole force of the following verses: "God testified His love to us when we were yet in a state which rendered us wholly unworthy of it. . . . How much more" . . . ! The Greco-Latin reading: εἰς τί γάρ, *for what end?* is a corruption of this not understood ἔτι. A question relative to the *end* of divine love would be out of place in this argument, where it is not the end, but the particular *character* of the love which is in question. It is wholly different with the reading of the *Vat.*: εἴγε, *if at least,* which perfectly suits the meaning of the passage, whether the *if* be made dependent on the proposition: *hope maketh not ashamed,* ver. 5,—and to this the *at least* points,—or whether it be taken as the beginning of the following argument: "If Christ died . . . with much stronger reason . . . (ver. 9)." This construction, adopted by Ewald, is excellent; only it obliges us to make vv. 7 and 8 a parenthesis, which is complicated and unnecessary, since the reading ἔτι, *yet,* gives in a simpler form exactly the same sense: "When we were yet without strength, Christ died . . .; with much stronger reason . . . ver. 9." Ver. 6 describes the miserable condition in which we were at the time when divine love was extended to us. We were *weak,* ἀσθενεῖς. The word often means *sick* (1 Cor. xi. 30). Here it expresses total incapacity

[1] Instead of δικαίου, which all the documents read, the Syriac translation seems to have read ἀδίκων.

for good, the want of all moral life, such as is healthy and fruitful in good works. It was certainly not a state fitted to win for us the sympathy of divine holiness. On the contrary, the spectacle of a race plunged in such shameful impotence was disgusting to it. Seven Mjj. read after ἀσθενῶν the word ἔτι, *yet* (five of them read it previously in the beginning of the verse). If this somewhat strange reading be admitted, the comma need not be placed where Tischendorf puts it (8th edition), after this ἔτι, to connect it with what precedes, but before, to join it to the following word: κατὰ καιρόν, *yet in time*. What led Tischendorf to this construction was, that he mistakenly connected the first ἔτι, in the opening of the verse, with the verb: Christ *died*. Neither the sense nor grammar is favourable to this connection. But, on the other hand, if the second ἔτι were joined to κατὰ καιρόν, *yet in time*, there would be too marked an emphasis on an idea in the passage which is purely secondary. We conclude, therefore, that the second ἔτι should be rejected from the text. It is, as Meyer thinks, a mistaken repetition arising from the fact that this little word did not appear suitable in the beginning of the passage, especially if a liturgical lesson commenced with ver. 6. So copyists have first transposed it after the ἀσθενῶν, then doubled it by combining the two readings.—The words: *in due time, at the right moment*, may contain an allusion to the eternal plan, iii. 25: "at the *hour fixed beforehand* by divine wisdom." Or they express the idea of the suitability of this time in relation to the state of mankind, either because having now made full trial of their misery, they might be disposed to accept with faith the salvation of God; or because it was the *last hour*, when, the time of forbearance having reached its limit (iii. 26), God, if He did not pardon, must judge. This last meaning seems to us, from iii. 25, 26, to be the one which best corresponds to the mind of the apostle. —The incapacity of mankind for good, their moral sickness, arose from their separation from God, from their voluntary revolt against Him. This is what the apostle brings out in the words: *for ungodly ones*, which indicate the *positive* side of human perversity. Their malady inspires disgust; their ungodliness attracts wrath. And it was when we were yet plunged in this repulsive state of impotence and ungodliness

that the greatest proof of love was given us, in that Christ died for us. The preposition ὑπέρ, *for*, can only signify: *in behalf of*. It neither implies nor excludes the idea of substitution (*in the room of*); it refers to the *end*, not at all to the *mode* of the work of redemption.

To shed light on the wholly exceptional character of the love testified to mankind in this death of Christ, the apostle compares the action of God in this case with the noblest and rarest proofs of devotion presented by the history of our race; and he bids us measure the distance which still separates those acts of heroism from the sacrifice of God, vv. 7 and 8.

In ver. 7 he supposes two cases in the relations of man to man, the one so extraordinary that it is hardly (μόλις, *hardly*) conceivable, the other difficult indeed to imagine, but yet supposable (τάχα, *peradventure*). The relation between those two examples has been variously understood. According to the old Greek commentators, Calv., Beza, Fritzs., Mey., Oltram., etc., the relation is that of complete identity; the expression: ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, *for the man who is good*, in the second proposition, designating no essentially different character from the ὑπὲρ δικαίου, *for a righteous man*, in the first. The second proposition on this view is simply the justification of that remnant of possibility which was implied in the word *hardly* in the first: "hardly will one die for a just man; I say, hardly; for after all I do not absolutely deny that for such a man of probity one might be found willing to sacrifice his life." But if such were really the apostle's meaning, why substitute in the second proposition for the word δικαίου, *the just man*, the term ἀγαθοῦ, *the good man* (or *goodness*)? Why prefix the article to the latter, which did not stand before the former: *a* just . . . *the good* (or *goodness*)? Why put the word ἀγαθοῦ first in the proposition obviously indicating the purpose to establish an antithesis between the two ideas: *the good man* (or *goodness*), and *a just man?* Why, finally, in the second proposition add the word καί, *even*, which establishes a gradation, and consequently a difference between the two examples quoted? We are aware of the reason that has led so many commentators to this explanation, which is inconsistent with all the details of the text. It is the difficulty of pointing out a satisfactory distinction between the two words δικαίου,

righteous, and ἀγαθοῦ, *good*. According to Olshausen, the first denotes the man who does no evil to any one; the second, the man who does positive good, that is to say, more than men have a right to exact from him. According to De Wette, the one is the simply just man, the other the man who, to justice, adds nobleness. According to Hodge, the one is the man who does everything the law demands, and whose character commands *respect;* the other, the man whose conduct is directed by love, and inspires *love*. According to Ewald, the *just* man is he who is acknowledged innocent in regard to some specific charge; the *good* man, one who is irreproachable in all respects. Philippi thinks that the *righteous one* is the honest man, and the *good*, the generous and amiable man who does good to those about him, in his family, his city, his country, in a word, the *pater patriæ*. Tholuck, finally, arrives at a clearer and more precise distinction, by giving, like many other commentators, to ἀγαθός, *good*, the meaning of a beneficent man, first, and then by derivation, that of *benefactor*. In this latter case the article *the* is explained by saying that the person meant is *the* benefactor of the man who devotes himself to death, or rather, according to Tholuck himself, by the rhetorical use of the article ὁ, *the*, in the sense of our phrase: *the* man of virtue, *the* philanthropist. This latter explanation of the article might be applied also to the other meanings. But, despite the enormous erudition displayed by the defenders of these various distinctions to justify them from classic writers, all that is gained by most of them is to father a subtlety on the apostle; and all that is gained by the last, the only one which presents a clear contrast between the two terms, is to make him say what he has not said. To express, indeed, this idea of *benefactor*, he had in Greek the hallowed terms ἀγαθοποιός or εὐεργέτης. Why not use them? Besides, the addition of the article finds no natural explanation in any of these senses. Reuss has even resolutely sacrificed it in his translation: "one may dare to die for *a* man of virtue." Jerome, and after him Erasmus, Luther, Melanchthon, have taken the two terms, the just and the good, in the neuter sense: *justice, goodness*. But as to the former, this meaning would have absolutely demanded the article; the meaning of ὑπὲρ δικαίου can be nothing else than: *for a just man*.—This

last explanation, however, brings us within reach of the solution. Nothing in fact prevents us from applying Jerome's idea to the second of the two terms, and taking ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ in the sense of: *for goodness* (and not for the *good man*). This is the explanation which Rückert in particular has defended, and which Hofmann has finally adopted. Not that we understand, with the former, *the good*, in the sense of the *useful*. The idea of the whole passage would be falsified if there were introduced into it a notion foreign to the purely moral domain. *The good* here, in opposition to ἀσεβεῖς, *the ungodly*, ver. 6, and ἁμαρτωλοί, *sinners*, ver. 8, can only signify a *holy* cause; for example, the fulfilment of a sacred duty to which one sacrifices his life, like Antigone; or the defence of the law to which one remains faithful even unto death, like the martyrs in the time of the Maccabees; or the deliverance of our country for which so many men have sacrificed themselves, even among the heathen; or the good of humanity in general, which has inspired so many deeds of heroic devotion. It is in this way that Julius Müller, in his *Christl. Lehre v. d. Sünde*, ends by returning to the masculine meaning of τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, applying the adjective to Him who is *good* par excellence, to God: "For a righteous man one will hardly die; but, *for God*, yes, peradventure such a thing will occur." This meaning would be excellent, and the contrast striking: "Hardly will men die for God, the perfectly good, and God puts Christ to death for men the ungodly!" Nevertheless, we believe that if the apostle had thought of God personally, he would have designated Him more clearly. In any case, this last sense would coincide with that of Rückert, since God is *the good* in the absolute sense of the word.—The reading of the Peschito ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων, *for unrighteous men*, in the first proposition, gives a very simple meaning, only too simple, and one which completely enervates the force of the contrast to the terms *ungodly*, and *sinners*, in vv. 6 and 8. It is condemned, besides, by all the documents.—Τολμᾷν, to dare, to have courage for; hence, to resolve to.—Καί: it is a case which is *also* supposable. See, then, how far, in some exceedingly rare cases, the devotion of man in its sublimest manifestations can rise. To sacrifice his life for one whose honourable character inspires respect; hardly! to sacrifice

yourself on the altar of a cause whose grandeur and holiness have possessed you; perhaps also (*καί*)! And now for the contrast between these supreme acts of human devotion and God's conduct toward us.

Ver. 8. The *δέ, but,* indicates this contrast. What man hardly does for what is most worthy of admiration and love, God has done for that which merited only His indignation and abhorrence. On the verb *συνιστάναι,* see on iii. 5; here it is the act whereby God *establishes* beyond question the reality of His love. The apostle says *τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγάπην*: His *own* love, or the love that is peculiar *to Him.* The expression contrasts God's manner of loving with ours. God cannot look above Him to devote Himself, as we may, to a being of more worth than Himself. His love turns to that which is beneath Him (Isa. lvii. 15), and takes even the character of sacrifice in behalf of that which is altogether unworthy of Him.—*Ὅτι, in that,* is here *the fact* by which God has proved His peculiar way of loving.—In the word *ἁμαρτωλός, sinner,* the termination *ωλος* signifies abundance. It was by this term the Jews habitually designated the Gentiles, Gal. ii. 15. The *ἔτι, yet,* implies this idea: that there was not *yet* in humanity the least progress toward the good which would have been fitted to merit for it such a love; it was *yet* plunged in evil (Eph. ii. 1–7).—The words: *Christ died for us,* in such a context, imply the close relation of essence which unites Christ and God, in the judgment of the apostle. With man sacrificing himself, Paul compares God sacrificing Christ. This parallel has no meaning except as the sacrifice of Christ is to God the sacrifice of Himself. Otherwise the sacrifice of God would be inferior to that of man, whereas it must be infinitely exalted above it.—Finally, it should be observed how Paul places the subject *Θεός, God,* at the end of the principal proposition, to bring it beside the word *ἁμαρτωλῶν, sinners,* and so brings out the contrast between our defilement and the delicate sensibility of divine holiness.

In vv. 6–8 the minor premiss of the syllogism has been explained: God loved us when wicked, loved us as we ourselves do not love what is most excellent. Here properly the major should stand: Now, when one has done *the most* for his *enemies,* he does not refuse *the least* to his *friends.* But Paul

passes directly to the conclusion, introducing into it at the same time the idea of the major. Reuss says, in passing from ver. 8 to 9: "Finally, hope is also founded on a *third* consideration." The apostle does not compose in so loose a style.

Vv. 9, 10. "*Much more then, being now justified by His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him. For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by His life.*" —The *οὖν, then,* concludes from the proof of love already received to the proof of love to be hoped for. The πολλῷ μᾶλλον is certainly taken here in the logical sense: much more *certainly,* and not: much more *abundantly.*—Meyer is right in saying that the conclusion proceeds not from *the least to the most,* but from *the most to the least.* The work already finished is summed up in the words: *being now justified by His blood.* The word *now* contrasts the present state of justification, on the one hand, with the former state of condemnation (the: *yet* sinners of ver. 8); and, on the other, with the state of future salvation (*we shall be saved*). The state in which we now are is greatly more inconsistent with final wrath than that from which we have *already* been rescued.—But what is that *wrath* from which we have yet to be delivered? That spoken of by Paul, ii. 5, 6, in the words: "the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God," the day when "God will render to every one according to his deeds;" comp. 1 Thess. i. 10; 2 Thess. i. 8. Our Lord speaks, Luke xii. 47, 48, of the punishment in store for the servant who knew the will of his master and did it not: *he shall be beaten with many stripes.* "To whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required." A ground this for serious vigilance on the part of the justified man, but not of fear. Paul explains why: there is in Christ more than the expiation (the blood) by which He has introduced us into the state of justification; there is His living person, now glorified, and consequently able to interpose in new ways in behalf of the justified, and to bring to a successful end the work of salvation so well begun in them. Such is the meaning of the words: "we shall be saved *through Him* (*δι' αὐτοῦ*)." Comp. viii. 34: "Who died, *yea rather,* that is risen again; who is at the right hand of God, who *also* maketh intercession for us;" Gal. ii. 20:

"I live, yet not I, but Christ in me;" Heb. vii. 25: "Ever living to make intercession for us;" John xiv. 19: "Because I live, ye shall live also." Paul here explains himself clearly regarding the double mediation indicated (vv. 1 and 2) by means of the two διά, *through:* "*through* our Lord . . . (ver. 1), *through* whom *also* . . . (ver. 2)." The one expressed in ver. 1 was that which was implied here in the words *through Him:* we are delivered from all fear though Him (as to our future). The other, expressed in ver. 2 ("*through whom also* we have obtained access" . . .), was that of His blood, through which we have been justified, delivered from condemnation (as to the past). It is obvious how profoundly the apostle's work is weighed, and that we were not mistaken in alleging that in the words: "We have peace with God," he had his eyes already turned to the future, the final salvation.

Ver. 10 is, strictly speaking, only a stronger repetition of the argument of ver. 9. Paul makes the reasoning more evident—1. By adding the term *enemies*, which renders the *a fortiori* character of the proof more striking; 2. By substituting for *justified* (ver. 9) the term *reconciled*, which corresponds better with the word *enemies;* 3. By describing the death of Christ as that of the *Son of God*, which presents its value more impressively; 4. By explaining the indefinite term: *through Him* (ver. 9), by the more precise expression: *by His life.*—The *for* is explained by the new force which the argument derives from these various changes. It is our *en effet* (in fact); comp. the relation between vv. 3 and 5 in John iii.—Three stages are indicated: *enemies, reconciled, saved.* Divine love, which has brought us from the first to the second, will yet more certainly bring us from the second to the third.—The terms: *without strength, ungodly, sinners* (vv. 6 and 8), are here summed up in the word *enemies.* Does this word denote man's enmity to God, or that of God to man? Hating God (*Dei osores*), or hated of God (*Deo odiosi*)? The first notion would evidently be insufficient in the context. The enmity must above all belong to Him to whom *wrath* is attributed; and the blood of Christ, through which we have been *justified,* did not flow in the first place to work a change in our dispositions Godward, but to bring about a change in God's conduct toward us. Otherwise this bloody death would have to be

called a demonstration of *love*, and not of *righteousness* (iii. 25). Here, besides, the saying xi. 28 should be compared, where the term *enemy* of God is contrasted with the title *beloved* of God; the first therefore signifies: one not loved, or hated of God; comp. Eph. ii. 3: "by nature *children of wrath*." We must obviously remove from this notion of divine enmity every impure admixture, every egoistic element, and take this hatred in the sense in which Jesus speaks of His disciple *hating* his father, mother, wife, children, and *his own life*, Luke xiv. 26. This hatred is holy; for it is related only to what is truly hateful to ourselves and others, evil, and what is fitted to lead to it. But yet it is not enough to say, with many commentators, that what God hates in the sinner is the sin and not the person. For, as is rightly observed by Oltramare (who on this account rejects the passive sense of the word *enemies*, which we defend), it is precisely hatred against *the sinners*, and not against *the sin*, which meets us in the expression *enemies of God*, if it be taken in the sense: *hated of God*. The truth is, as it appears to me, that God first of all hates sin in the sinner, and that the sinner becomes at the same time the object of this holy hatred in proportion as he voluntarily identifies himself with sin, and makes it the principle of his personal life. Undoubtedly, so long as this development remains unfinished, the sinner is still the object of divine compassion, inasmuch as God continues to regard him as His creature destined for good. But the co-existence of these two opposite sentiments, of which, xi. 28, we have a very striking particular example, can only belong to a state of transition. The close of the development in good or evil once reached, only one of the two sentiments can continue (see on i. 18). While maintaining as fundamental the notion of *divine* enmity in the term *enemies of God*, we do not think it inadmissible to attach to it as a corollary that of man's enmity to God. Our heart refuses to embrace the being who refuses to embrace us. It is in this double sense that the word *enemy* is taken in common language. It implies a reciprocity; comp. the expression ἐν ἔχθρᾳ ὄντες, used of Pilate and Herod (Luke xxiii. 12).—A somewhat analogous question arises as to the meaning of the expression κατηλλάγημεν τῷ Θεῷ, *we were reconciled to God*. The words may signify two things: either

that man gives up the enmity which had animated him against God, or that God gives up His enmity to man. Taken in themselves, the two meanings are grammatically possible. The words 1 Cor. vii. 11 present a case in which the reconciled person becomes so by giving up his own enmity ("if the woman depart, let her remain unmarried, or, *be reconciled to* her husband"); 1 Sam. xxix. 4 and Matt. v. 24 offer two examples of the opposite sense. In the first of these passages, the chiefs of the Philistines, suspecting the intentions of David, who asks permission to join them in fighting against Saul, say to their king: "Wherewith should he reconcile himself (διαλλαγήσεται, LXX.) to his master (τῷ κυρίῳ αὐτοῦ), if not with the heads of our men?" In the second, Jesus exhorts the man who would bring his offering to the altar, and who remembers that *his brother has something against him*, to go and first *be reconciled* to him. In both cases it is evident that the enmity, and consequently the giving up of the enmity, are ascribed to the man *with whom* the reconciliation has to take place (Saul, and the neighbour who thinks himself offended). In our passage the true meaning does not seem to us doubtful. The word *being reconciled* reproducing the *being justified* of ver. 9, it follows from this parallelism that it is God, and not man, who gives up His enmity. In the same way as by justification God effaces all condemnation, so by reconciliation He ceases from His wrath. This meaning results also from that of the word ἐχθρός, *enemy*, which we have just established, as well as of the term *wrath*, ver. 9. If it is God who is *hostile* and *provoked*, it is in Him first of all that the act of reconciliation must take place. This view is confirmed by the main passage, iii. 25. If it was man who had to be brought first to abandon his hostility, the reconciling act would consist, as we have just said in speaking of the word *enemy*, in a manifestation of love, not of righteousness. Finally, as Hodge observes, to make these words signify that it is we who in the reconciliation lay down our enmity to God, is to put it in contradiction to the spirit of the whole passage. For the apostle's object is to exhibit the greatness of the love testified by God to unworthy beings, in order to conclude therefrom to the love which will be testified to them by the same God in the future. The whole argument thus rests on God's love to man, and not

on man's to God. On the other side it is true, as Oltramare remarks, that the expression *to be reconciled* is nowhere applied to God. It is only said, 2 Cor. v. 19: "that He *reconciled the world unto Himself*, not imputing their trespasses unto them." How explain this fact? Certainly the sacred writers felt that it is impossible to compare the manner in which God becomes reconciled to men, with the manner in which one man becomes reconciled to another. It was God Himself who began by doing everything to establish His righteousness and secure the majesty of His position, that He might then be able to pardon. Here there was a mode of action which does not enter into human processes of reconciliation; and hence the apostles, in speaking of God, have avoided the ordinary expression.

If for the word *blood* ver. 10 substitutes *death*, which is more general, it is in order to call up better the Passion scene as a whole. The words: *of His Son*, exhibit the immensity of the sacrifice made for *enemies!* Conclusion: If God (humanly speaking) did not shrink from the painful sacrifice of His Son in behalf of His enemies, how should He refuse to beings, henceforth received into favour, a communication of life which involves nothing save what is ineffably sweet for Himself and for those who receive it! Thus is proved the certainty of final salvation (salvation in the day of wrath), toward which everything pointed from the first words: *we have peace.* —The clause ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ, *by His life*, must not be regarded as indicating the *object* of the being saved (introduced into His life). The ἐν, *in*, can only have the instrumental sense, like that of the ἐν τῷ αἵματι, *in* His blood, ver. 9; saved *through* His life, from which ours is henceforth drawn; comp. viii. 2: "The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death." In fact, justification is not the whole of salvation; it is the entrance on it. If sin continued to reign as before, wrath would reappear at the close. For "without holiness no man shall see the Lord," Heb. xii. 14. But the mediation *of the life* completes that of the blood, and makes sure of holiness, and thereby of final salvation. Comp. chaps. vi.–viii., intended to develope the thought which is here merely enunciated in connection with the grace of justification. The expression *be saved* therefore

denotes *salvation* in the full sense of the word,—the final sentence which, along with justification, assumes the restoration of holiness. A sick man is not *saved* when the trespass which has given rise to his malady has been pardoned; he must also be cured. There are therefore, as we have elsewhere[1] shown, a sentence of *initial* grace,—*justification*, in the ordinary sense of the word,—founded solely on faith; and a sentence of *final* grace, which takes account not only of faith, but also of the fruits of faith. The first is the fruit of Christ's *death;* the second flows from participation in His *life*. For both of these graces *faith* is and remains, of course, the permanent condition of personal appropriation. If this is not expressly mentioned in our passage, it is because it refers solely to *believers* already justified (ver. 1).

We cannot help remarking here, with Olshausen, how entirely at variance with the view of the apostle is the Catholic doctrine, which is shared by so many Protestants of our day, and which bases justification on the *new life* awakened in man by faith. In the eyes of St. Paul, justification is entirely independent of sanctification, and precedes it; it rests only on faith in the *death* of Christ. Sanctification flows from the *life* of Christ by the work of the Holy Spirit.

At the end of ver. 2, Paul had passed from the absence of fear ("*we have peace*," ver. 1) to the positive *hope of glory*, in which already we triumph. This same gradation is reproduced here from the passage from ver. 10 to ver. 11, after which the theme contained in the first two verses will be exhausted, and the proposition: "hope maketh not ashamed" (ver. 5), fully demonstrated.

Ver. 11. "*And not only* [*so*],[2] *but even glorying*[3] *in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the reconciliation.*"—The general gradation from ver. 10 to ver. 11 is well explained by Philippi: "Salvation is not merely negative: deliverance from wrath; we hope for better: participation in glory." It was by this idea of triumphant entrance into glory that the apostle behoved to crown this whole exposition of justification. For then it is that it will

[1] *Etudes bibliques*, II. pp. 150, 229 et seq. (3d ed.).

[2] D E F read τουτο after δι.

[3] Instead of καυχωμενοι, L, 30 Mnn. It. Syr. read καυχωμεθα; F G: καυχωμεν.

become complete and final.—The construction presents a difficulty. What are we to make of the participle καυχώμενοι, *glorying*, which does not rest on any finite verb? The ancients and several moderns (Thol., Philip., Rück., Fritzs., Hodge) regard it as the equivalent of a finite verb, understanding ἐσμέν, *we are* glorying, for *we glory*. This is the meaning indicated by the reading of L and of the ancient Versions. In this case, we must understand another finite verb after *not only*, which can be no other than the: *we shall be saved*, of ver. 10. The meaning is: "and not only shall we be saved, but we glory in God even now over this assured salvation." The logical progress is from the future to the present. It has been objected that it is impossible to make a simple participle a finite verb (at least in prose), for poetry furnishes numerous examples of such licence. But how otherwise are we to explain 2 Cor. vii. 5? The real difficulty is to resolve the disagreement between the future *we shall be saved* and the present *we glory*. It seems that if the gradation in the mind of the apostle really bore on the matter of time, the νῦν, *now*, which occurs in the following proposition, should have been placed in this: "not only *shall* we *be* saved, but we are so certain of it that *now* already we triumph in God." If Paul has not expressed himself so, it is because this was not his meaning. A second construction is adopted by Meyer, Hofmann, and others: it consists in supplying after *not only*, not: the verb σωθησόμεθα, *we shall be saved*, but the participle καταλλαγέντες, *being reconciled*, so that this participle as well as the καυχώμενοι, *glorying*, rest both of them on the *we shall be saved* of ver. 10: "We shall be saved, and that not only *as reconciled*, but also *as glorying*." The gradation in this case is not from the future to the present, but from the joy of reconciliation to that of triumph. The objection to this construction is this: The participle *being reconciled*, in ver. 10, is not a simple qualification of *we shall be saved;* it is a participle of *argumentation*, as is well said by Oltramare (see also Philippi). It cannot therefore be made logically parallel with the participle *glorying*. What is to be done if we will not return to the first construction? It only remains, as it seems to me, to derive from the verb σωθησόμεθα, *we shall be saved*, the idea of *salvation*, by supplying the participle σωζόμενοι, *saved*,

after *not only*, and to refer this participle, as well as the following καυχώμενοι, *glorying*, to the time of final salvation: "Much more certainly shall we be saved (ver. 10), and that not only as *saved*, but as *glorying in God*." The meaning is almost the same as in the preceding construction, but more precise: "And when this hour of salvation shall come, it will not be as men barely saved, like those rescued from shipwreck or a deserved death, that we shall cross the threshold of eternal salvation; it will be in the triumphant attitude of men whom the Son of God has crowned with His own holiness and renewed in His glorious image, and whom the Father has marked with the seal of His adoption, viii. 15, 29." It may be objected, no doubt, that by referring this participle *glorying* to the final hour, we depart from the meaning of the same verb in ver. 2, which contains the theme of the whole passage. But Paul, on reaching the close of this development, may easily substitute for the present glorying in hope, the song of triumph at the moment of entrance into glory.—*To glory in God* was the privilege of which the Jews boasted in virtue of their monotheistic revelation (ii. 17). St. Paul here applies this expression to the sanctified Christian who has not only nothing to fear from God, but who as *His child* is also *His heir* (viii. 17).—Yet he takes care in the same breath to cast down all that might be opposed to humility in this hope of future triumph, by adding: *through our Lord Jesus Christ.* Even in the possession of perfect holiness and on the threshold of glory, it will be impossible for the Christian to forget that it is to Christ he owes all his eternal triumph as well as his past reconciliation, which was its condition. The last words: *by whom we have now received the reconciliation*, might be taken to remind the believer in what a sad state he was found, and by what painful means he needed to be rescued from it. The word *now* would then contrast his present with his *past* state. But this meaning is not the most natural after the preceding context. In closing, Paul rather contrasts the present with the future state: "through whom ye have *now already* received the reconciliation," that first pledge of the deliverance to come. He who acquired for us the first of these favours by His sufferings, even that which is the condition of all the others, will not fail to carry the work to its completion, if we remain

attached to Him by persevering faith. This: *by whom we have received,* is the parallel of the *by whom also* of ver. 2, as the *through our Lord Jesus Christ,* which precedes, is the parallel of the same words in ver. 1. The cycle is closed. It is now demonstrated by this summary argument, that justification by faith includes the resources necessary to assure us of the final justification,—that spoken of ii. 13,—and even of final triumph, and that, consequently, the grace of justification is complete.

After thus expounding in a first section (i. 18–iii. 20) *universal condemnation,* in a second section (iii. 21–v. 11) *universal justification,* there remains nothing more for the apostle to do than to compare these two vast dispensations by bringing together their two points of departure. Such is the subject of the third section, which closes this fundamental part.

Hofmann thinks that, after describing divine wrath in the section i. 17–iii. 4, the apostle from iii. 5–iv. 25 contrasts with it the state of justification which Christians enjoy without cause of boasting; this teaching is entirely in keeping with monotheism, strengthens moral life instead of weakening it (iii. 31), and is not at all invalidated by the case of Abraham. The conclusion is drawn v. 1–11, namely, to lead believers to enjoy this blessed state fearlessly and full of hope. This construction breaks down before the following facts: iii. 5 cannot begin a new section; iii. 9 cannot be a question of the Christian conscience; iii. 31 does not refer to the moral fulfilling of the law: Abraham's case cannot have so slight a bearing as that which Hofmann is obliged to ascribe to it; v. 1 is not an exhortation in the form of a conclusion.—The construction of Volkmar is wholly different. According to him, the *exposition* of justification by faith, begun iii. 9, closes at iii. 30. Here begins the *confirmation* of this mode of justification by the Old Testament. It goes from iii. 31–viii. 36. And, first, confirmation by the *book* of the law, chap. iv. (the text of Genesis relating to Abraham); then, confirmation by the *law* itself, the biblical narrative of the condemnation of all in Adam, which corresponds to the doctrine of the justification of all in Christ, v. 1–21; finally, confirmation by the harmony of the moral consequences of justification with the *essence* of the law, vi.–viii. But, independently of the false sense given to iii. 31 as a general title of iv.–viii., how are we to place the piece v. 1–11 in one and the same subdivision with the parallel between Adam and Jesus

Christ, and how are we to see in this last piece only a confirmation of justification by faith, by means of the narrative of the fall in the Old Testament? Finally, this distinction between the *book* of the law, the *law* and the moral *essence* of the law, is certainly foreign to the mind of the apostle. Holsten rightly says: "It is unnecessary to prove that these thoughts and this order belong to Volkmar, not to Paul." Our construction approaches much nearer to that which Holsten himself has just published (*Jahrb. für protest. Theol.* 1879, Nos. 1 and 2). The essential difference begins only with the following piece regarding Adam and Christ. This passage, while stating the result of the preceding part, belongs nevertheless, according to Holsten, to the following part, chap. vi.–viii., of which it is in his view the foundation.

Without failing to perceive a certain *transitional* character in this passage, we must regard it mainly as a *conclusion*. Thus it is regarded also by Lipsius in his recent work on the Epistle to the Romans (*Protestanten-Bibel*).

THIRD SECTION.

TWELFTH PASSAGE (V. 12–21).

The Universality of Salvation in Christ proved by the Universality of Death in Adam.

Justification by faith had just been expounded; the historical foundation on which it rested, its harmony with the Israelitish revelation, the certainty of its enduring to the end, —all these points had been illustrated; and the major part of the theme, iii. 21 and 22, was thus developed. One idea remains still, and that the most important of all, which was expressed in the theme in the striking words: *εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας, for all and upon all who believe.* Universalism was the peculiar character of Paul's gospel; justification by faith, the subject of exposition thus far, was its necessary condition. To omit expressly developing this decisive feature would have been to leave the fruit ungathered after laboriously cultivating the tree. The apostle could not commit such a mistake. He performs this final task in the last piece, the very peculiar nature of which suffices to demonstrate its importance.

Commentators have understood the idea and object of the passage in various ways. According to Baur and his school, as well as several other commentators, the apostle has in view the Judeo-Christianity reigning in the Roman Church. He wishes at once to refute and gain it, either by expounding a conception of history in which the law finds no more place (Baur), or by proving that salvation, like condemnation, depends in no degree on the conduct of individuals and their works, but solely on an objective standard, on the unconditional and absolute dispensation of God (Holsten). But this piece does not answer exactly either to the one or other of these two views. The observation made in ver. 20 on the secondary part played by the law, cannot express the intention of the entire piece. This remark, rendered indispensable in this universal survey by the important place filled by the Mosaic law in the religious history of mankind, is thrown out too much by the way to allow of its concentrating upon itself the interest of so vast an exposition. The other view, that of the absolute determinism which Holsten ascribes to St. Paul, would no doubt serve to cut by the roots the system of justification by works; but it would be of those remedies which destroy the suffering by killing the sufferer. For determinism excludes human merit only by suppressing moral liberty and responsibility. It is not so that Paul proceeds. In any case, it is easy to see that the apostle's direct aim in this piece is not to exclude legal righteousness; he has done with this idea. It is the universality of the Christian salvation which he wishes to demonstrate. Ewald, Dietzsch, and Gess rightly advance the striking difference which there is between the argument of the Epistle to the Galatians and the teaching of the Epistle to the Romans. In the former, where Paul is attacking Judeo-Christianity, his argument starts from the theocratic history, from Abraham; in the latter, which expounds the relation of the gospel to human nature, Jewish and Gentile, the argument starts from general history, from Adam, the father of all mankind. From the very beginning of the Epistle the standpoint is universal (Gentiles, chap. i.; Jews, chap. ii.).

Very many commentators hold the opinion that the apostle's purpose is to ascend to the source of the two currents, whether

of condemnation and death, or of justification and life, which sway the life of mankind; or, as Dietzsch puts it, to the very powers which determine present facts, the lot of individuals. The practical aim of this investigation would thus be that indicated by Chrysostom in the words: "As the best physicians turn their whole attention to find out the root of maladies, and thus reach the very source of the evil, so it is that Paul acts." Every reader would thus be invited by the passage to break the bond of oneness (solidarity) which naturally unites him to the head of lost humanity, and to contract by faith the new bond whereby he can have fellowship with the head of justified humanity. This view is the most widely spread, and we do not conceal from ourselves the measure of truth which it contains. But two difficulties arrest us when we attempt to make this idea the key to the whole passage. It is perfectly obvious from ver. 12 that the apostle is rather concerned with the origin of death than with that of sin, and that he mentions the latter only to reach the former. It is also to the fact of death that he returns most frequently in the course of this piece, comp. vv. 15–18, 21. Would it be so if his direct aim were to ascend to sin, the *source* of evil? Then we find him nowhere insisting on the gravity of sin and on the necessity of faith for salvation. No exhortation to the reader to form a personal union with the new Adam reveals this directly practical intention which is ascribed to him, especially by Hofmann and Th. Schott. We are therefore forced to conclude that we are not yet on the right track.

Rothe starts from the idea that the first part of chap. v. has already begun the exposition of *sanctification* as the fruit of justification by faith, an exposition which continues in chap. vi. The passage from vv. 12–21 would thus be a simple episode intended to prove that as men became *sinners* in common by the sin of one, so they can only become *saints* in common—that is to say, in Christ. The piece would thus treat of the *moral assimilation*, either of corruption or holiness, by individual men. Such is also the opinion of Lange and Schaff, who make chap. v. 12 begin the part of the Epistle relating to moral regeneration by the appropriation of the holy life of the new Adam (vi.–viii.). There is certainly mention of sanctification in the passage, v. 1–11; we grant this to

Rothe (comp. vv. 9, 10: *by Him; by His life*), but, as we have seen, only in relation to final justification, which rests on the continuance of the action of the living Christ in the justified soul. As to the subject of sanctification thus announced beforehand, it is not actually treated till chap. vi. The relations to vi.–viii. are no doubt real and profound. Lange proves them perfectly. But it is exaggerating their scope to make them a reason for detaching the passage v. 12–21 from the preceding context, in order to make it the preface to the doctrine of sanctification. The dominant ideas in the passage are not those of sin and of the new life; they are only, as we shall see, those of condemnation and justification, which had been the subject of the whole preceding part. This piece must therefore be regarded as its conclusion.

By the first term of the comparison (our common condemnation in Adam) this parallel certainly recalls the whole section of the ὀργή, *wrath*, i. 18–iii. 20, as by the second (common salvation in Christ) it recalls the subject of the second section, *the righteousness of faith*, iii. 21–v. 11. But this resemblance is far from exhausting the connection of this piece with all that precedes. The two terms of comparison, Adam and Christ, are not only put in juxtaposition with one another; they are put in logical connection, and it is in this living relation that the true idea of the piece is contained. With a boldness of thought which it is scarcely possible to imagine, Paul discovers, in the extension and power of the mysterious condemnation pronounced in Adam, *the divine measure* of the extension and power of the salvation bestowed in Christ, so that the very intensity of the effects of the fall becomes transformed, in his skilful hands, into an irresistible demonstration of the greatness of salvation. And this final piece is thus found to be at one and the same moment the counterpart of the first section (condemnation) and the crowning of the second (justification).

The following parallel falls, as it were, of itself into four distinct paragraphs:—

1. V. 12–14: the universal diffusion of death by the deed of one man.

2. V. 15–17: the superiority of the factors acting in

Christ's work over the corresponding factor in the work of Adam.

3. V. 18, 19: the certainty of equality in respect of extension and effect between the second work and the first.

4. V. 20, 21: the indication of the true part played by the law between these two universals of death and righteousness.

Exegesis has been led more and more to the grouping which we have just indicated (see Dietzsch, and especially Hodge), though the idea of those four paragraphs and their logical relation are still very variously understood.

1. Vv. 12–14.

Ver. 12. "*Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death*[1] *passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.*" — The logical connection between this piece and the preceding is expressed by διὰ τοῦτο, *wherefore.* Some, like Meyer, make this expression refer solely to the last words of ver. 11: *we have received the reconciliation.* But we have seen that this incidental proposition, which the context itself did not require, was added there with the view of recapitulating the whole previous section, before and with the view of passing to the following passage. The very term καταλλαγή, *reconciliation,* which contains an allusion to the name ὀργή, *wrath,* is chosen so as to remind us not only of the second section (that of justification), but also of the first (that of condemnation); so that in reality to say that the *wherefore* refers to the last proposition of ver. 11 is to admit, with Tholuck, Rückert, Holsten, etc., that it bears on all the preceding context from i. 17: "Since, condemned as we all were, we have found reconciliation in Christ, there is therefore between our relation to Him and our relation to the head of natural humanity the following resemblance." Hofmann and Schott make the *wherefore* refer to the piece v. 1–11 only: "On account of this assurance of final salvation which we possess in Christ" . . . According to Hofmann, the verb which is wanting should contain an exhortation to realize holiness (the contents of viii. 1 et seq.), an exhortation judged

[1] D E G, It. omit the words ὁ θανατος (*death*).

to correspond with that of the alleged ἔχωμεν, *let us have*, of v. 1. This is all pure romance. Schott derives the verb more naturally from the preceding: "Wherefore we shall be saved by Him alone (vv. 9, 10), as we perished by Adam"... (But see below.)

The ὥσπερ, *even as*, has been construed grammatically in a multitude of ways.—1. It has been thought that the principal proposition (the verb of the *wherefore*) had been forgotten by the apostle, distracted as he was by the host of thoughts which presented themselves successively to his mind (see Rückert and Hofmann for example). I hope our readers are convinced that such an explanation, or rather absence of explanation, is impossible. We have had sufficient proof hitherto that the apostle did not compose without having fully taken account of what he meant to say.—2. The main correlative proposition is supposed to be understood; requiring to be inferred from what precedes. De Wette adduces in this sense Matt. xxv. 14, where we find an *even as*, to which there is no corresponding principal clause, and which depends simply on the preceding sentence. Lange almost in the same way derives the understood verb from ver. 11: "Wherefore we have reconciliation by Christ, as by one sin and death came upon all;" Umbreit and Schott, from ver. 10: "We shall be saved by Christ, as we perished in Adam;" van Hengel simply understands the verb: "Wherefore *it is the same in Christ* as it was in Adam." Dietzsch fills up the ellipsis by taking the verb from what follows: "*Wherefore life came by a man*, in the same way as by a man sin and death came." De Wette's explanation breaks down under the *wherefore*, which distinguishes our passage from the one quoted. In the other views the question arises, How in a didactic piece so severely composed, the apostle, instead of making such an ellipsis and holding the mind of the reader in suspense to the end as he does without satisfying him after all, did not simply write like this: διὰ τοῦτο ἐγένετο ἐν Χριστῷ ὥσπερ.... "Wherefore it is the same in Christ as in Adam"...—3. The principal verb on which ὥσπερ depends is sought in the words which follow; Erasmus and Beza, in the clause: "*and death by sin*," giving to καί the meaning of *also*. Taken rigorously, the construction would be admissible, though it

would have been more correct to write οὕτως καί, or to put the καί after the regimen (*thus also*, or *by sin also*); but this meaning is absolutely excluded by the fact that Paul does not think of comparing the entrance of sin with that of death. It is evident that when he wrote the *as*, he had in view as the second term of the comparison the entrance of justification and life by Christ. A similar reason is also opposed to the explanation of those who, like Wolf, find the principal clause in the more remote words: "and so death passed upon all." Paul has as little thought of comparing the mode in which death entered with that of its diffusion. Besides, this would have required οὕτως καί, and not καὶ οὕτως.—4. A more generally admitted explanation is that of Calvin (Thol., Philip., Mey., Holst.), who finds the principal clause indicated, at least so far as the sense goes, at the close of ver. 14, in the words: "who is the type of Him that was to come." The meaning of these words is to this effect: "*Even as, . . . so by a new Adam, of whom he was the type,* justification came on mankind." We must hold on this view that the explanation interposed in vv. 13 and 14 led Paul away from finishing the construction begun in ver. 12. But it would be a strange style to give the principal proposition, which the reader was expecting after the *as* of ver. 12, in the form of this incidental proposition: *who is the type of Him that was to come.* Then in what immediately follows, ver. 15, Paul does not expound this idea of the equality between Adam and Christ, which had been announced by the *as*, and which in its substance the last proposition of ver. 14 was meant to recall. He explains, on the contrary, the difference between the two terms of comparison, so that he only raises (end of ver. 14) the idea of equality to abandon it at the same instant (vv. 15–17); what an unnatural proceeding!—5. We pass rapidly over the hypotheses of Mehring and Winer, who seek the chief clause, the former in the first proposition of ver. 15 by taking it interrogatively, the latter in the second proposition of the same verse; two equally impossible attempts, since ver. 15*a* cannot be an interrogation (see below), and since ver. 15*b* can only correspond to the subordinate proposition which precedes in the same verse: "*for if*," etc.—There is only one explanation admissible, that of Grotius, Bengel, Flatt,

best defended by Hodge, who finds the principal clause in ver. 18. It is there, indeed, that we have the close of the comparison begun in ver. 12 in the form of equality. Vv. 13 and 14 have been an explanation required by the last words of ver. 12, one of those digressions which, in our modern fashion, we put in a note. Vv. 15–17 have been brought in by the expression: "type of Him that was to come" (end of ver. 14), which demanded an immediate modification or restriction, so that it is not till ver. 18 that the apostle is free to finish the comparison he has begun. The proof that in ver. 18 Paul at length resumes the idea of ver. 12, is found in these two characteristic features: (*a*) the ἄρα οὖν, *so therefore*, which indicates the resuming of a previously expressed idea; (*b*) the reappearance of the contrast between *one* and *all* (εἷς and πάντες), which was that of ver. 12, but which had been dropped in the interval for the contrast between *one* and *many* (εἷς and οἱ πολλοί, vv. 15–17). As to the idea, it is evident that ver. 18 logically completes ver. 12. The words: *as by one fall condemnation came upon all men*, reproduce the idea *as*, etc., of ver. 12; and the following: *so also by one righteousness justification of life came upon all*, are manifestly the long delayed second term of the comparison. As to the end of ver. 14, in which so many commentators have found the principal idea, it was simply a way of announcing to the reader this second part of the comparison, which was to be still further prefaced (vv. 15–17) before being enunciated (ver. 18).

Ver. 12 describes the entrance of *death* into the world. The emphasis is on the words: *by one man.* Adam is here characterized not merely as the *first* of sinners, but as the one who laid human life open to the power of sin. If Paul does not speak of Eve, as in 2 Cor. xi. 3, *et al.*, it is because the fall of the race was not necessarily bound up with that of the woman. Adam alone was the true representative of mankind still included in him at that time.—The term *sin* should be taken here in its greatest generality. The apostle is not speaking specially of sin either as a tendency or an act, either as an individual act or as a collective fact; but of the principle of revolt whereby the human will rises against the divine in all its different forms and manifestations. Holsten sees in

sin an objective power controlling human existence even in Adam. But from the Bible standpoint sin exists only in the will. It has no place in objective existence and outside the will of the creature. Julius Müller reaches a result almost the same by starting from an opposite point of view; according to him, the will of individual men has been corrupted by a free transgression previously to their earthly existence. On both of these views the apostle should have said: sin *appeared with* or *in* the first man; but not: *sin entered by him.* The word *entered* indicates the introduction of a principle till then external to the world, and the word *by* throws back the responsibility of the event on him who, as it were, pierced the dyke through which the irruption took place; comp. the term *disobedience,* ver. 19.—The word κόσμος, *the world,* evidently denotes here, as in John iii. 16, *et al.,* only the domain of human existence. Paul certainly holds, with Scripture, the previous existence of evil in a superhuman sphere.—Assuredly no subsequent transgression is comparable to this. It created a state of things here below which subsequent sins only served to confirm. If the question is asked, how a being created good could perpetrate such an act, we answer that a decision like this does not necessarily suppose the existence of evil in its author. There is in moral life not only a conflict between good and evil, but also between good and good, lower good and higher good. The act of eating the fruit of the tree on which the prohibition rested, was not at all illegitimate in itself. It became guilty only through the prohibition. Man therefore found himself placed—and such was the necessary condition of the moral development through which he had to pass—between the inclination to eat, an inclination innocent in itself, but intended to be sacrificed, and the positively good divine order. At the instigation of an already existing power of revolt, man drew from the depths of his liberty a decision whereby he adhered to the inclination rather than to the divine will, and thus created in his whole race, still identified with his person, the permanent proclivity to prefer inclination to obligation. As all the race would have perished with him if he had perished, it was all seized in him with the spirit of revolt to which in that hour he had adhered. We are nowhere told, however, that his descendants are individually responsible

for this diseased tendency. It is in proportion as each individual voluntarily resigns himself to it that he becomes personally responsible for it.—But was it compatible with divine perfection to let this succession of generations, stained with an original vice, come into the world? God certainly might have annihilated the perverted race in its head, and replaced it by a new one; but this would have been to confess Himself vanquished by the adversary. He might, on the contrary, accept it such as sin had made it, and leave it to develope in the natural way, holding it in His power to recover it; and this would be to gain a victory on the field of battle where He seemed to have been conquered. Conscience says to which of these two courses God must give the preference, and Scripture teaches us which He has in reality preferred.

But the point which Paul has in view in this declaration is not the origin of sin, but that of death. And hence he passes immediately, understanding the same verb as before, to the second fact: *and death by sin.* It would have been wholly different had he meant to begin here to treat the subject of sanctification; he would in that case have at least stopped for a moment at this grave fact of the introduction of sin. If sin is not mentioned by him except by way of transition to death, this is because he is still on the subject of justification, the corresponding fact to which is condemnation, that is to say, death. Death is the monument of a divine condemnation, which has fallen on mankind.—The term *death* is used by Scripture in three senses—1. *Physical* death, or the separation of soul and body; in consequence of this separation from its life principle, the body is given over to dissolution. 2. *Spiritual* death, or the separation of the soul from God; in consequence of this separation from its principle of life, the soul becomes corrupt in its lusts (Eph. iv. 22). 3. *Eternal* death, or the *second death;* this is in the human being the consummation of his separation from God by the separation of the *soul* from the *spirit,* the soul's faculty for the divine. The soul and body then deprived of this superior principle, the native element of the soul, become the prey of the *worm which dieth not* (Mark ix. 43–48). Of these three meanings, the last does not suit this passage; for the second death does not begin till the judgment. The second is equally inappli-

cable, because the idea of *death* would then be compounded with that of *sin*, which is distinguished from it in this very passage. There remains, therefore, only the first meaning. It is confirmed, besides, by the obvious allusion to the narrative of Genesis (ii. 17, iii. 19), as well as by the explanation contained in the following verses (13 and 14), where the word *death* is evidently taken in its strict sense. We should add, however, that death, even when taken simply as physical death, always implies an abnormal state in relation to God, a state which, if it continues and developes, cannot fail to draw after it fatal consequences to man.

What, according to the apostle's view, is the relation between sin and death contained in the preposition διά, *by*, which he uses a second time? It might be said that death is simply the natural consequence of sin, since, God being the source of moral and physical life, once the bond is broken between Him and man, man must die. But in ver. 16 the apostle makes death the consequence of sin through a positive sentence, which proves that if we have to do here with a natural consequence, it is one which is also willed. It is true, two objections may be urged against this opinion, which makes death a consequence of sin. The first is what Paul himself says, 1 Cor. xv. 42, that our earthly body is sown in *corruption*, *weakness*, and *dishonour*, and that because it is *psychical*. A little further on, ver. 47, alluding to Gen. iii. 19, he adds that the first man is *of the earth, earthy*, which seems to make the dissolution of his body a natural consequence of his *nature*. The second objection is this: Long before the creation of man, the existence of death is proved in the domain of animal life. Now the body of man belongs to the great sum total of animal organization, of which he is the crown; and therefore the law of death must already have extended to man, independently of sin. Paul's words in the Epistle to the Corinthians, as well as those of Genesis, the sense of which he reproduces, prove beyond doubt the natural *possibility* of death, but not its necessity. If man had remained united to God, his body, naturally subject to dissolution, might have been gloriously transformed, without passing through death and dissolution. The notion of the *tree of life*, as usually explained, means nothing else. This

privilege of an immediate transformation will belong to the believers who shall be alive at the time of our Lord's return (1 Cor. xv. 51, 52); and it was probably this kind of transformation that was on the point of taking effect in the person of the Lord Himself at the time of His transfiguration. This privilege, intended for holy man, was withdrawn from guilty man; such was the *sentence* which gave him over to dissolution. It is stated in the words: "Thou art dust (that is to say, thou *canst* die), and to dust shalt thou return (that is to say, thou *shalt* in fact *die*)." The reign of death over the animals likewise proves only this: that it was in the *natural* condition of man to terminate in dissolution. Remaining on the level of animalism by the preference given by him to inclination over moral obligation, man continued subject to this law. But had he risen by an act of moral liberty above the animal, he would not have had to share its lot (see also on viii. 19–22).

From the origin of sin, and of death by sin, the apostle passes to a third idea: the *diffusion* of death. Once entered among mankind, death took hold of all the beings composing the race. The two prepositions εἰς (*into*) and διά (*through*) in the two verbs εἰσῆλθεν and διῆλθεν, indicate exactly this connection between entrance and propagation. As poison once swallowed penetrates to all parts of the body, so it happened in Adam, in whom the whole race was virtually contained; in him the tendency to dissolution victoriously asserted itself over all the individuals that were to come, so that every one of them was born dying. The word οὕτως, *so*, may be explained in three ways: either it repeats, as Dietzsch, Hofm. think, the notion: *by one man:* "death, after having entered by one, spread *in the same manner* (by this one)." Or, as is held by Meyer and Philippi, this *so* alludes to the relation of cause and effect, which has just been pointed out between sin and death: "and so, by reason of this connection between sin and death, death passed on all," which assumes as a premiss the understood idea that sin also extended to all. Or, finally, is it not more natural to explain the word *so* by the connection between the two verbs? "And *once entered*, it gained by its very entrance the power of passing on all." The threshold crossed, the enemy could strike immediately

all the inmates of the house. What mode would have presented the opposite of that characterized by the *so*, if death had reached each man individually by a door which he himself had opened? The *all* is expressly emphasized in contrast to *one*, because in this contrast between one and all there is concentrated the idea of the whole piece. The Greco-Latin MSS. here omit ὁ θάνατος, *death*. In this case we must either take the verb διῆλθεν in an impersonal sense: "and so *it* (this connection between sin and death) happened to all;" or, what would be preferable, take the whole following proposition as the subject: "and so there passed on all, that *in consequence of which*, or *in virtue of which*, all have sinned." Both of these constructions are obviously forced. It is probable that the omission of ὁ θάνατος has arisen, as van Hengel well suggests, from the fact that the whole of the verse was connected with *sin;* the words: *and death by sin*, being consequently regarded merely as incidental or parenthetical, and so there was given as a subject to διῆλθε, ἡ ἁμαρτία, *sin*, of the first proposition.

But why does Paul add the last words: ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, which we have translated by: *for that all have sinned?* They seem to contradict the idea expressed in the first part of the verse, and to ascribe the death of each man not to the sin of Adam, but to his own. The numerous explanations which have been given of these words may, it seems to us, be reduced to three principal heads; they amount in fact to one or other of these three ideas—1. The death of individual men results wholly from their own sins. 2. The death of individual men results partly from Adam's sin and partly from their own sins. 3. The death of all individual men arises solely from Adam's sin.

Let us begin with the study of the form ἐφ' ᾧ.[1] In the New Testament it is found in the local sense (Luke v. 25); in the moral sense, it is applied either to the *object:* ἐφ' ᾧ

[1] Ἐπί with the dative denotes—1. In its primitive (*local*) meaning: the object *on* or *near* which a thing is placed; thus ἐφ' ᾧ κατέκειτο, the couch *on which* he lay; ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις, *near*, or *at the door*. 2. In the sense *of time: at the date of*, in the lifetime of; for example: ἐπὶ Μωϋσῆ, *in the time of* Moses; ἐπὶ νεκροῖς, *when one is dead*. 3. In the *moral* sense: *on the ground of*, that is to say, *by reason of*, or *on condition of*, or *in view of*. 4. In the *logical* sense: *as may be seen by* . . . All these different meanings may be applied to the phrase ἐφ' ᾧ.

πάρει, "*with what object* art thou here?" or to the determining *cause* of the action or feeling; so without doubt 2 Cor. v. 4: ἐφ' ᾧ οὐ θέλομεν ἐκδύσασθαι, "*for that* we would not be unclothed, but clothed upon;" probably also Phil. iii. 12: ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ κατελήφθην, "I seek to apprehend, *because that* also I have been apprehended;" perhaps also Phil. iv. 10: ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ ἐφρονεῖτε, "(I say so), *because that* ye also thought;" but this ἐφ' ᾧ may also be understood as a pronoun connected with what precedes: "as regards what concerns me, *with which* ye were also occupied." It is easy to see, in fact, that the phrase may have two different meanings, according as we take it as *pronominal* or *conjunctive*. In the former case, it bears on what precedes: *on account of*, or *in view of which*, that is to say, of the idea just expressed (*propterea*). In the second it bears on what follows: *because*, or *in view of the fact that*, that is to say, of the idea just about to be enunciated (*propterea quod*). The difference is analogous to that of διό and διότι. We shall have need, as will appear, of all these meanings in the study of the following phrase.

The first explanation is that which makes the apostle explain the death of all by the individual sin *of all*. This is the meaning adopted by Calvin, Melanchthon, and several others, particularly by Reuss. The latter expresses himself thus: "No question here of the imputation of Adam's sin or hereditary sin; these are scholastic theses. All have been visited with the same punishment as Adam, therefore they must all have merited it like him." The idea would thus be that all men die in consequence of their individual sins. There are three reasons which render this explanation impossible— 1. The καὶ οὕτως, *and so*, evidently signifies that each individual dies in consequence of the entrance of sin, and therefore of death, into this world *by one man*. 2. This idea would be in contradiction to the very aim of the whole passage, which is to make the death of all rest on Adam, even as the righteousness of all rests on Christ. 3. The death of infants would be inexplicable on this interpretation; for they have certainly not brought death on themselves by their individual sins. Calvin, Tholuck, and others on this account apply the ἥμαρτον, *have sinned*, not to particular acts, but to the evil disposition: *have become sinners*, which might be said also of

infants who have died without actual sins. But the verb ἁμαρτάνειν cannot have this meaning. It always denotes sin as an act, not as a state. Paul would have said: ἁμαρτωλοὶ ἐγενήθησαν, or, as in ver. 19: ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν. Mangold alleges that Paul did not take account of infants when he expressed himself thus, and that he meant only to speak of mankind, so far as they really sin. But Paul is not explaining the death of this or that individual; he is explaining the fact of death in itself. If there are examples of death, and that in great number, which do not come under the explanation he gives, it is not enough to say that he does not take account of them; his explanation must be declared insufficient.

A second class of commentators seek to modify the preceding and evidently inadmissible explanation; they give a restricted or determinate sense to ἐφ' ᾧ, making it signify: *seeing that besides*, or *on this condition that*, or *in so far as;* so Julius Müller, Rothe, Ewald. The object of all these attempts is to get at this idea: that the diffusion of death in the world, in consequence of Adam's sin, took place only on a certain condition, and on account of a subsidiary cause, the particular sins committed by each man. There is on this view a personal act of appropriation in the matter of death, as there is one, namely faith, in the matter of salvation. But such a meaning of ἐφ' ᾧ cannot be demonstrated; it would have required ἐφ' ὅσον, or some other phrase. Then this meaning is opposed to ver. 16, which directly contrasts condemnation as a thing which has come *by one*, with the gift of grace as applying to the sins of the many. Besides, would it be possible for Paul to seek to establish no logical relation between these two causes, the one principal, the other secondary, and to content himself with putting them in juxtaposition, notwithstanding their apparent contradiction?

The third class of interpretations may be divided into two groups—1. Those which take ἐφ' ᾧ as a relative pronoun. So Hofmann, who makes θάνατος (*death*, in the physical and moral sense) the antecedent, and gives to ἐπί and ἐφ' ᾧ the temporal sense: "during the existence, or in the presence of which (death) all have sinned,"—that is to say, that when all individual men sinned, the reign of death was already

established here below, which proves clearly that it was so not in consequence of our particular sins, but on account of Adam's sin. Dietzsch interprets almost in the same way as Hofmann, only he sets aside the *temporal* meaning of ἐπί, to substitute for it the notion of the *condition* on which, or the state of things in which, the fact takes place. The same relation of the ἐφ' ᾧ to θάνατος is followed by Gess, except that he understands the word θάνατος of *spiritual death*, sin: "Upon all (spiritual) death has come, on the ground of which all individual men have consequently committed sin." We omit other less comprehensible shades.[1] But why have recourse to this form of expression ἐφ' ᾧ, which has usually a quite different sense in Paul, and not say simply, if such was his meaning, that death here below preceded individual sins, and consequently is not their effect? Besides, the fact itself, here ascribed to the apostle, is not strictly true. For the first death on the earth, that of Abel, was certainly preceded by a multitude of particular sins. In Gess's explanation the idea is much simpler: "In Adam death came upon all, moral corruption, as a consequence of which all since have sinned individually." But this idea lies without the context; for Paul, as we have seen, is not treating here of the origin of *sin*, but of the origin of *death*, and of death taken in the *physical* sense. Death appears here as the visible proof of the invisible judgment which hangs over mankind. Vv. 13, 14, as well as 15 and 17, leave no doubt on this head. In this way it would seem to us simpler to give to ἐφ' ᾧ the neuter sense: *on which, in consequence of which*, all have sinned. Only this meaning of ἐφ' ᾧ would be, we fear, without precedent. 2. The second mode of interpretation in this third class takes the ἐφ' ᾧ as a conjunctive phrase: *for that*, and connects it with the idea following: *all have sinned*. How sinned? Through this one man who introduced sin. So Bengel: *quia omnes*, ADAMO PECCANTE *peccaverunt*. It must be allowed that the thought of the δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου, *by one man*, which begins the verse, so controls the mind of the apostle that he does not count it

[1] So Wendt, p. 196, who, if we understand him rightly, makes Paul say: "On all there has come death, *by which it may be seen* that all have sinned (ideally, that is to say, have been treated as sinners without really being so)." It is impossible for us to comprehend this meaning of ἐφ' ᾧ.

necessary expressly to repeat it. This meaning is in harmony with the best established use of the ἐφ' ᾧ in the New Testament (see above) and in the classics (see Meyer). And the idea expressed in this proposition thus understood, appears again without doubt in the first part of ver. 15: "through the offence of one *many* be dead;" and in that of ver. 17: "by one man's offence death reigned *by one;*" comp. 1 Cor. xv. 22: "as in Adam *all die.*" No doubt it is objected that the essential idea in this case: "*in Adam,*" is omitted; but we think we have accounted for the omission. And we find, as Bengel has already remarked, a somewhat similar ellipsis in the analogous though not parallel passage, 2 Cor. v. 15: "If one died for all, then all died;" understand: in him.—True, the question is asked, if it is possible that the eternal lot of a free and intelligent person should be made dependent on an act in which he has taken no part with will and conscience. Assuredly not; but there is no question here about the *eternal* lot of individuals. Paul is speaking here above all of *physical* death. Nothing of all that passes in the domain in which we have Adam for our father can be decisive for our eternal lot. The solidarity of individuals with the head of the first humanity does not extend beyond the domain of natural life. What belongs to the higher life of man, his spiritual and eternal existence, is not a matter of species, but of the individual.—The Vulgate has admitted an interpretation of this passage, set in circulation by Origen and spread by Augustine, which, in a way grammatically false, yet comes to the same result as ours. Ἐφ' ᾧ is taken in the sense of ἐν ᾧ: "*in whom*" (Adam). But ἐπί cannot have the meaning of ἐν, and even if ᾧ were a relative pronoun here, it would neither refer to Adam, who has not been named, nor to *one man,* from which it is separated by so many intermediate propositions.

The most impenetrable mystery in the life of nature is the relation between the individual and the species. Now to this domain belongs the problem raised by the words: "*for that* (in this one man) *all have sinned.*" Adam received the unique mission to represent the whole species concentrated in a single individual. Such a phenomenon cannot be repeated, at least in the domain of nature. The relation of each of us

to that man, the incarnation of the species itself, has nothing in common with the relation which we have to sustain to any other man. In the revelation of salvation given to the apostle this mysterious connection was assumed, but not explained. For it belongs to a sphere on which the revealing ray does not fall. And therefore it is that in the two following verses the apostle thinks it necessary to *demonstrate* the reality of the fact which he had just announced: the death of all through the sin of one. We shall see that the meaning of these two verses comes out only when we approach them with the explanation just given of the last words of ver. 12; this will be the best proof of its truth.

Vv. 13, 14. "*For until the law sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed when there is no law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned*[1] *after the similitude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of Him that was to come.*"—According to the first two interpretations of the preceding proposition, which lay down the sins committed by each individual as the sole or secondary cause of his death, the argument contained in vv. 13, 14 would be this: "All die because they have all sinned; for even during the time which elapsed down to the giving of the law sin was in the world; now sin is *undoubtedly* not reckoned in the absence of law. *Nevertheless*, that did not prevent sin from reigning during all the interval between Adam and Moses, which proves certainly that it was nevertheless imputed in some measure. How could that be? Because of the law of nature written even in the *heart* of the Gentiles." Such is de Wette's interpretation, also that of Lange and Reuss. In this sense the second proposition of ver. 13 must be taken as an objection made to Paul on which he raises himself. Then he would be made to answer in the sequel by confining himself to stating the very fact of the reign of death. But the explanation of death is the very point in question; how could the fact itself be given in proof? Then a simple δέ would not have sufficed to indicate such a shifting in the direction of the thought. The text rather produces the impression of a consecutive argument. Finally, at the close of such an argument, the apostle could not have left to

[1] 3 Mnn. several Lectionaries, Or. omit μη before αμαρτησαντας.

be understood the solution which he himself gave of the problem, namely, the natural law written in the heart of the Gentiles. This idea, on which everything rested, was at once too essential and too unfamiliar to the minds of his readers to be passed over in silence as self-evident. It has been sought to meet these difficulties by giving to the word ἐλλογεῖν, *to put to account*, a purely subjective meaning, and so to make the proposition, ver. 13*b*, a simple observation interjected by the way. Ambrose and Augustine, then Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon, and in our days Rückert, Rothe, and J. Müller, do in fact apply the imputation expressed by ἐλλογεῖν not to the judgment of God, but to the reckoning which the sinner makes to himself of the trespass which he has committed: "Every one died for his own sin, for sin existed even before the law, though the sinners did not take account of it, nor esteem themselves guilty. But death, which nevertheless reigned, proved that God on His part imputed it to the sinner." But this purely subjective signification of the term ἐλλογεῖν cannot be justified. It would require to be indicated in some way. How, besides, could Paul have affirmed in terms so general that the sinners between Adam and Moses did not impute their sins to themselves, after saying of the Gentiles, ii. 15, that "their thoughts mutually accuse or excuse one another," and i. 32, that these same Gentiles "knew the judgment of God, that those who do such things are worthy of death"? Finally, the idea that, notwithstanding this want of subjective imputation, the divine imputation continued ever in force, would have required to be more strongly emphasized in ver. 14. In general, all these modes of interpretation, according to which Paul is held to explain the death of individuals by their own sins, run counter to the object which he had before him in this whole passage, the parallel between the justification of all in one, and the condemnation of all in one.

Let us then return to our explanation of the end of ver. 12; and let us seek from this viewpoint to give account of vv. 13, 14: "Death passed upon all, for that (in Adam) all sinned." The course of the following argument at once becomes easy to understand: "*Sin was assuredly in the world* at that time (and you might consequently say to me: it was for that reason men died); but I answer: *sin is not imputed*

if there is no law (it could not therefore be the cause of the death with which every individual was visited); *and yet death reigned even over those who had not like Adam violated a positive law.*" The conclusion is obvious: "Therefore all these individuals died, not for their own sin, but because of Adam's," which had been affirmed in the close of ver. 12, and which was to be proved. We might in our own day argue in exactly the same manner to explain the death of the heathen or of infants: Since they are still without law, they die, not because they have sinned personally, but because they all sinned in Adam. It is clear also how the argument thus understood is in keeping with the object of this passage. All having been, as is proved by the death of all, condemned in Adam, all can likewise be really justified in Christ. Hofmann and Dietzsch, who have explained ἐφ' ᾧ in the sense of: "on the ground of which (death) all have sinned," are of course obliged to interpret vv. 13 and 14 differently from us, though to arrive at the same result. We think it useless to discuss their explanation, which falls to the ground of itself, with that which they give to the last words of ver. 12.[1]

Having explained the argument as a whole, let us return to the details of the text itself. The *for*, at the beginning of ver. 13, bears not only on the proposition of which it forms part, but on the entire argument to the end of ver. 14.—The words ἄχρι νόμου, *until the law*, might signify, as the old commentators would have it: "as long as the law existed,"

[1] Let us note two other explanations which, while differing considerably from ours, come near it in their result, those of Tholuck and Holsten. According to the first, Paul would prove in vv. 13 and 14 the fact of *original sin*. He does so by the existence of death during the time between Adam and Moses. For the sin which certainly existed at that period was not imputable in the absence of law. Now that men died then, is certain; this could therefore only be in consequence of the predisposition to death which they had inherited from Adam, by receiving from him the disposition to sin. So at least it is that we understand this commentator. But this explanation breaks down—1. On the meaning of ἥμαρτον, which cannot signify *became sinners*; and, 2. On the whole context, which goes not to demonstrate the fact of original sin, but to explain the universality of death.—According to Holsten, the sin of which Paul here speaks, and in which he sees the cause of death, exists first in human nature as an *objective principle*; it does not become personal sin (παράβασις) until the latent principle passes into an anti-legal act, as in Adam. Now between the time of Adam and Moses that was impossible. Sin existed objectively, but without personal transgression, properly so called. If, therefore, sin reigned

that is to say, from Moses to Jesus Christ. For ἄχρι may have the meaning of *during*. But ver. 14, which paraphrases the words thus: "from Adam to Moses," excludes this meaning.—The absence of the article before νόμου, *law*, certainly does not prevent it here from denoting the Mosaic law; comp. ver. 14: *until Moses*. But it is not as Mosaic law, but as law strictly so called, that the Jewish law is here mentioned. And so the translation might well be: *till a law*, that is to say, a law of the same kind as the commandment which Adam violated. The absence of the article before ἁμαρτία, *sin*, has a similar effect; there was sin at that period among men. In the following proposition it is again sin as a category which is designated (being without article). If the substantive ἁμαρτία, *sin*, is repeated (instead of the pronoun), it is because, as Meyer says, we have here the statement of a general maxim.—The verb ἐλλογεῖν is not found elsewhere except in the Epistle to Philemon, ver. 18, where Paul asks this Christian *to put to his account*, his, Paul's, what Onesimus, whom he is recommending, may still owe to him. Between this term and λογίζειν, which he more frequently uses, the one shade of difference is that of the ἐν, *in*, which enters into the composition of ἐλλογεῖν: to inscribe *in* the account book. It is wholly arbitrary to apply this word to the subjective imputation of conscience. The parallel from the Epistle to Philemon shows clearly what its meaning is. But does the apostle then mean to teach the irresponsibility of sinners who,

then, it could only be as a punishment of that objective sin manifested for the first time as transgression in Adam's sin, and not as a punishment of subjective or individual sins. But, 1. The sin of Adam, according to Paul, was the *introduction*, and not a first *manifestation* of sin. Wendt justly says: "To enter into the world signifies that something which was not there arrives in it, and not that something shows itself" (p. 194). 2. The very fact which Paul exhibits as the *cause* of death is Adam's sin, which on Holsten's explanation is completely lost in objective sin. 3. Holsten's idea, expressed in common language, amounts to this: human nature has sin inherent in it from its origin, and sin has death for its necessary consequence. Therefore death is not explained by the sin of individuals, but belongs essentially to the human species. These are propositions belonging to Determinism and Pantheism, but not to the Theism of St. Paul.

Yet these two interpretations, that of Tholuck, by laying stress on the universality of sin as a disposition, and that of Holsten, by making death an element of human nature, are *negatively* at one with ours, inasmuch as they exclude, as we do, the explanation of death by the sin of individuals.

like the Gentiles, have not had a written law? No; for the whole book of Genesis, which describes the period between Adam and Moses, would protest against such an assertion. The matter in question is an immediate and personal imputation, resting on a threatening like this: "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt die." The infliction of the punishment of death in the sense of this divine saying necessarily supposes a positive law violated; it supposes in general a theocratic government set up. Only in such circumstances can the violator be brought to account to be immediately judged and subjected, either to capital punishment, or to the obligation of providing an expiatory act, such as sacrifice (taking the place of the punishment of death). Outside of such an organization there may be other great dispensations of a collective and disciplinary character, such as the deluge, the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrha, or the abandonment of the Gentiles to their own corruption (chap. i.). These historical dispensations are vast pedagogical measures taken in respect of the whole human race; they have not the character of judicial and individual sentences, like those which rest on some article of a code violated by an individual with full knowledge of the law; comp. the contrast between the *ἀπολοῦνται, shall perish,* and the *κριθήσονται, shall be judged,* ii. 12.—The subjective negative *μή* before *ὄντος νόμου* transports the fact into the mind of the author of the maxim.

Ver. 14. *Ἀλλά*: *and nevertheless;* a strongly emphasized contrast to the idea of non-imputation (ver. 13).—The word *reign* denotes a power firmly established, resting on the immoveable foundation of the divine sentence pronounced over the whole race. *Death* cannot denote more here than the loss of life in the ordinary sense of the word. There is no reference either to spiritual death (sin, Gess), or to the sufferings and infirmities of life (Hodge), but simply to the fact that between Adam and Moses men *died* though there was no law. This imputation of Adam's sin, as the cause of death to every individual man, would be absolutely incomprehensible and incompatible with the justice of God, if it passed beyond the domain of natural life marked off by the mysterious relation between the individual and the species. The sequel will show that as soon as we rise to the domain of spiritual life,

the individual is no longer dependent on this solidarity of the species, but that he holds his eternal destiny in his own hands. —The words: "*also*, or (*even*) over them that had not sinned," are taken by Meyer as referring to a part only of the men who lived between Adam and Moses, those, namely, who did not enjoy the positive revelations granted during this period, the Noachian commandments, for example, Gen. ix. 1–17. Thus understood, Paul reminds us of the fact that the men of that time who were without those precepts were, as well as their contemporaries who enjoyed such light, subjected to death. But the whole passage, on the contrary, implies the absence of all positive law which could have been violated between Adam and Moses; consequently, the phrase: "*even* over them who sinned not," etc., embraces the whole human species from Adam to Moses without distinction; mankind during this interval are contrasted with Adam on the one hand, and with the people of Israel from Moses on the other. All these who were not under conditions of a capitally penal kind (ver. 13) died nevertheless.—The words: "*after the similitude of Adam's transgression*," are certainly not dependent, as the old Greek expositors thought, on the word *reigned:* "death reigned on the ground of a sin similar to that of Adam." This sense leaves the words: *even over them that sinned not*, without any reasonable explanation. We must therefore bring this clause under καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας, in this sense: "*even over them that did not sin after the fashion of Adam's sin*," that is to say, by transgressing as he did, a positive prohibition.—Hofmann insists on the strict meaning of the word which Paul uses, ὁμοίωμα, *the object* like (differing from ὁμοιότης, *the resemblance*), and, taking the genitive παραβάσεως as a subjective genitive, he explains: *according to the form which was that of . . .* or *on the type presented by the transgression of . . .* To render this shade into English, we must translate, not *after the similitude*, but *after the fashion of* Adam's transgression.

From this whole argument it appeared that Adam had been the sole author of the reign of death, and herein precisely was he the counterpart of Him who was to come to be the sole principle of life here below. Thus it is easy to understand why the apostle, after explaining the origin of death, closes

with these words, appropriately introducing the statement of the other member of the parallel: *who is the type of the Adam that was to come.* It is improper, with Bengel, to give to the participle μέλλοντος the neuter sense: *of that which* was to come (by regarding the masculine ὅς as a case of attraction from τύπος). The word Adam, immediately preceding, more naturally leads us to make μέλλων a masculine. One might more easily, with Hofmann, regard this participle as a masculine *substantive: Him* who should come, in the sense in which the Messiah is called the ἐρχόμενος, *the coming one.* The meaning is not essentially different. If the Rabbinical sayings in which the Messiah is designated as the second or the last Adam were older than the seventh century of our era (*Targum* of the Psalms), or the sixteenth (*Nevé schalom*), it might be inferred from these passages that the description of the Messiah as the Adam to come was already received in the Jewish schools, and that the phrase of the apostle is a reference to this received notion. But it is quite possible that these sayings themselves were influenced by the texts of the New Testament. So Renan says positively: "In the Talmudic writings *Adam ha-rischôn* simply denotes the first man, Adam. Paul creates *Ha-adam ha-aharôn* by antithesis." We must certainly set aside de Wette's idea, which applies the phrase: *the future Adam,* to Christ's *final* advent. The term μέλλων, *future,* is related to the time of the *first Adam,* not to the time when the apostle writes.—The word *type* denotes in Scripture language (1 Cor. x. 11) an event, or a person realizing a law of the kingdom of God which will be realized afterwards in a more complete and striking manner in a corresponding future event or person. Adam is the type of the Messiah, inasmuch as, to quote Ewald, "each of them draws after him all mankind," so that "from what the one was to humanity we may infer what the other is to it" (Hofmann). —This proposition is a sort of provisional apodosis to the *even as* of ver. 12. It reminds the reader of the comparison which has been begun, and keeps the thought present to his mind till the comparison can be finished and grammatically completed by the true principal clause (ver. 18).

2. Vv. 15–17.

A certain superiority of action is ascribed to Christ's work as compared with Adam's, in these three verses. What object does the apostle propose to gain by this demonstration? Why interrupt in this way the statement of the *parity* between the two works begun ver. 12? It has been thought that Paul is simply gratifying a want of his heart by displaying in the outset the infinite superiority of the second work over the first, that he may not compromise its dignity by abandoning himself without reserve to the idea of equality. But whatever overflow of feeling there may be in St. Paul, it is always regulated, as we have seen, by the demands of logic. We think, therefore, that these three verses, which are among the most difficult of the New Testament, will not be understood till we succeed in making them a necessary link in the argument.

It may be said that the sagacity of commentators has exhausted itself on this passage. While Morus holds that from vv. 15–19 the apostle merely repeats the same thing five times over in different words; while Rückert supposes that Paul himself was not quite sure of his own thoughts, Rothe and Meyer find in these verses traces of the most profound meditation and mathematical precision. Notwithstanding the favourable judgment of the latter, it must be confessed that the considerable variety of expositions proposed to explain the course and gradation of the thoughts seem still to justify to some extent the complaints of the former. Tholuck finds in ver. 15 a contrast of *quantity* between the two works, and in vv. 16, 17 a contrast of *quality* (the contrast between *right* and *grace*). Ewald thinks that the contrast of ver. 15 bears on the *thing* itself (a sad effect and a happy effect,—this would be the *quality*), that of ver. 16 on the *number* and *kind* of the persons interested (*one* sinner condemned, *thousands* justified); then he passes on to ver. 17 with the simple remark: "to conclude," and yet there is a *for*. Meyer and Holsten find in ver. 15 the contrast of *effects* (*death* and the *gift of grace*), in ver. 16 a *numerical* contrast, as Ewald does, and in ver. 17 the *seal put* on the contrast of ver. 16 by the certainty of the future life. Dietzsch finds the gradation

from ver. 15 to ver. 16 in the transition from the idea of *grace* to that of the *re-establishment of holiness* in pardoned believers; so he understands the δικαίωμα of ver. 16. Reuss sees in ver. 15 the contrast between *just recompense* and *free grace* (a contrast of *quality*), in ver. 16 that between *a single* sinner and a whole *multitude* of sinners (a contrast of *quantity*), and in ver. 17, finally, one as to the *degree of certainty* (a *logical* gradation). Hodge finds in ver. 15 the contrast between the *more mysterious* character of condemnation and the *more intelligible* character of pardon in Christ (a contrast evidently imported into the text), and in ver. 15 the idea of Christ's delivering us from a *culpability greater* still than that of Adam's sin,—that is to say, besides that of Adam, He takes away what we have added to it ourselves; finally, in ver. 17, he finds this gradation, that not only does Christ save us from *death*, but He introduces us into a state of *positive* and eternal *felicity*.—After all this, one needs a certain measure of courage to enter this double labyrinth, the study of the text and that of the exegetical interpretations.

We have seen that the apostle's argument aims at proving the *parity* between the two works. This is the idea of ver. 12 (*even as . . . death . . . upon all . . .*), as well as of ver. 18 which completes it (*so . . . on all to justification of life*). From this connection between ver. 12 and ver. 18 it follows that the development of the superiority of action belonging to Christ's work, vv. 15–17, must be a *logical means of demonstrating the equality of extension and result*, which forms the contents of the conclusion expressed in vv. 18 and 19. The relation between the first proposition of ver. 15 and the first of ver. 16 leads us to expect two contrasts, the first expounded in ver. 15, the second in vv. 16, 17.

Ver. 15. "*But not as the offence, so is the act of grace. For if through the offence of one the many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto the many.*"—What the apostle here compares is not, as some have thought, the abundance of the effects, but rather the *degree of extension* belonging to the two works; for the emphasis is on the term *the many*, of the two sides of the parallel; and this degree of extension he measures very logically according to the degree of abundance in the factors,—

a degree indicated on the one side by the subordinate clause of the first proposition: *through the offence of one*, on the other by the subject of the second: *the grace of God*, and *the gift through this grace of one man*. From the contrast between these factors it is easy to arrive at this conclusion: If from the first factor, so insignificant in a way—the offence of one! —there could go forth an action which spread over the whole multitude of mankind, will not the conclusion hold *a fortiori* that from the two factors acting on the opposite side, so powerful and rich as they are, there must result an action, the *extension* of which shall not be less than that of the first factor, and shall consequently also reach the whole of that multitude? Such is the general idea of this verse. It may be illustrated by a figure. If a very weak spring could inundate a whole meadow, would it not be safe to conclude that a much more abundant spring, if it spread over the same space of ground, would not fail to submerge it entirely?

The term *παράπτωμα, fall, offence*, is not synonymous with *παράβασις, transgression*. It is applied, Eph. i. 7, ii. 1, to the sin of the Gentiles. It has something extenuating in its meaning; it is, as it were, a mere false step. Such is the active principle in the first case. On the other hand, it is the *χάρισμα, the act of grace*, whose contents Paul will state in the double subject of the principal proposition. Some commentators have taken this first proposition of ver. 15 interrogatively. But the construction of the sentence does not lead naturally to the idea of an interrogation. And what is still more strongly opposed to this explanation is, that the sentence so understood would express the development of an analogy, while the rest of the verse states a difference. The two parallel members present a common term: *οἱ πολλοί*, literally, *the many*. This term has often been ill understood, or badly rendered; so when Oltramare translates by *the majority* in the first proposition, and *a greater number* in the second, which gives rise to more than one kind of ambiguity. Ostervald translates: *many*, which is as far from being exact. By this form Paul dénotes, just as much as he would have done by the pronoun *all*, the totality of the human race. This is proved by the article *οἱ, the*, which he prefixes for the very purpose of indicating the idea of a totality to *πολλοί*,

many. Only this term *many* is chosen with the view of establishing the contrast to the *one* from whom the influence went forth. *All* would be opposed to *some*, and not to *one*. It would not be suitable here. Paul will return to it at ver. 18. He is dealing in ver. 15 with the possibility of the action of *one* on *many*. We have sought to render the meaning of this οἱ πολλοί, by translating: *the many* (*the multitude*). —An offence of one, says the apostle, sufficed to bring about the death of this multitude. This expression confirms the sense which we have given of the last clause of ver. 12; it is clearly through Adam's sin, and not through their own, that men die. This fact, established by the demonstration of vv. 13 and 14, serves as a point of support for the conclusion drawn in the following proposition.—The term χάρισμα, *act of grace*, used in opening the verse, combined the two ideas which Paul now distinguishes: the *grace* of God and the *gift* by which it is manifested, Jesus Christ. Grace is the first source of salvation. The richness of this source, which is no other than the infinite love of God Himself, at once contrasts with the weakness of the opposite factor, the offence of one. But how much more striking is the contrast, when to the love of God we add the gift whereby this love is displayed! Comp. John iii. 16. The substantive ἡ δωρεά, *the gift*, denotes not the thing given (δώρημα, ver. 16), but *the act* of giving, which is more directly related to the idea of grace.—Commentators differ as to the grammatical relation of ἐν χάριτι, *in* (or *by*) *the grace of the one man.* Meyer and others make these words depend on the verb ἐπερίσσευσεν: "The gift *flowed over through the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ.*" But the expression: *the gift*, can hardly remain without an explanatory regimen. And the idea: *through the grace*, connected with the verb *overflowed*, weakens the meaning of the clause instead of strengthening it. For it diverts the thought from the essential word: *on the many.* Meyer alleges that there must be in the second member a counterpart to the words: *through the offence of one*, in the first, and that this counterpart can only be found in these: *through the grace of the one, Jesus Christ.* He thus misses one of the greatest beauties of our verse—I mean the reversal of construction introduced by the apostle in passing from the subordinate to the principal pro-

position; there, the intransitive form: *By . . . many are dead;* here, the active form: *the grace of God, and the gift . . . have abounded to the many.* In the first case, there was a disagreeable accident involuntarily experienced: *the many* fell stricken with death; in the second, on the contrary, they are the objects of a double personal action put forth in their behalf. In reality, then, the counterpart of the expression: *through the offence of one,* is found in the second clause, but as the subject, and no longer as a simple regimen. We shall again find a similar change of construction in ver. 17. Comp. also 2 Cor. iii. 9. The clause ἐν χάριτι is therefore the qualification of the word *the gift:* "*the gift consisting in the grace* of the one man, Jesus Christ." The love of God is a love which gives another love; it is the grace of a father giving the love of a brother. The absence of the article between δωρεά and ἐν χάριτι is explained by the intimate relation subsisting between these two substantives, which express, so to speak, a simple notion. The idea of the *grace of Christ* is developed in all its richness, 2 Cor. viii. 9: "Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that, though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might be rich." This relation of solidarity and fraternity between Christ and us is strongly brought out by the phrase: *of the one man,* ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου. Comp. the similar expressions, 1 Cor. xv. 21: "*By man* (δι' ἀνθρώπου) came death, and by man (δι' ἀνθρώπου) the resurrection of the dead;" and 1 Tim. ii. 5: "There is one Mediator . . . *the man* Christ Jesus." The incarnation has had for its effect to raise the whole human race to the rank of His family. The adjective ἑνός, *of one,* is prefixed to contrast Christ, as well as Adam, with *the many.* And after these accumulated descriptions, all calculated to display the greatness of the gift of divine grace, there is at length pronounced the name which in the history of mankind is the only one that can figure side by side with that of Adam: *Jesus Christ.* Comp. John i. 17, where this name, long delayed, is proclaimed at last with special solemnity (in contrast to Moses); and John xvii. 3, where it is joined, as here, with the name of God, to describe the source of salvation and the supreme object of faith. What must have been the impression produced by the appearance of Jesus on His con-

temporaries, when, only twenty odd years after His death, He could be put with the avowal of the entire church—for the apostle evidently reckons on the absolute assent of his readers —on a parallel with the father of the first humanity! The regimen εἰς τοὺς πολλούς is placed immediately before the verb, because it is on this idea that the emphasis rests.—Ἐπερίσσευσεν, *abounded;* it might be translated: *overflowed.* This verb properly denotes the outflow of a liquid lapping over a vessel more than filled. Christ is the vessel filled with grace, whence salvation overflows on *the many.* The aorist indicates an already accomplished fact; the subject, then, is not a future grace, but the work of justification expounded from iii. 21. If Adam's offence was sufficiently influential to tell in the form of death on the whole multitude of the race, much more should a grace like that of God, and a gift like that of Jesus, be capable of acting on the same circle of persons! The superiority of abundance in the factors of Christ's work thus establishes an *a fortiori* conclusion in the view of the apostle in favour of the *equality* of extent belonging to the two works here compared. Hence it follows that the πολλῷ μᾶλλον, *much more,* should be understood in the logical sense: *much more certainly,* and not in the *quantitative* sense: *much more abundantly* (as is the opinion of Er., Calv., Rück., Rothe, Hofm., and Dietzs.). Chrysostom, Meyer, and Philippi have been led to the same view as ours. The apostle is not at all concerned to demonstrate that there is more grace in Christ than there was of death in Adam. What he wishes to prove is, that if a slight cause could bring sentence of death on all mankind, this same mankind will experience in its entirety the salutary effect of a much more powerful cause. The idea of superabundant quantity (*more richly*) is not in πολλῷ μᾶλλον, as has been thought by so many interpreters, misled by the relation between this adverb and the verb ἐπερίσσευσε, *abounded.* It is merely indicated as a premiss of the argument in the double subject of the second proposition (the grace of God and the gift of Christ); at the most, a sort of involuntary indication of it may be seen in the meaning of the verb ἐπερίσσευσε, *abounded.*—We have already seen the logical sense of πολλῷ μᾶλλον in vv. 9 and 10 of our chapter. It is found perhaps also in 2 Cor. iii. 7, 9, 11.

The reasoning is extremely bold; it is as if one were to argue thus: Adam's offence has reached down to me, having had the power of subjecting me to death; how much more certainly will the grace of God and the grace of Christ combined have the power of reaching to me to save me!

A second difference is evidently *announced* in the first words of ver. 16; the end of ver. 16 is intended to *expound* it, and ver. 17 to *demonstrate* it.

Ver. 16. "*And not as it was by one that sinned,*[1] *so is the gift: for the judgment is by one to condemnation, but the free gift is of the many offences unto justification.*"—Most expositors hold with us that the apostle is here expounding a second contrast between Adam's work and Christ's; only it should be remarked that the form of ver. 16 is very different from that of ver. 15. We no longer find here the *a fortiori* argument there indicated by the πολλῷ μᾶλλον, *much more*, while, strange to say, this same form of reasoning reappears in ver. 17, which is thus presented as a stronger reproduction of the argument of ver. 15. This difference between vv. 16 and 15, and this quite peculiar relation between vv. 17 and 15, prevent us from regarding ver. 16 as a second argument entirely parallel to that of ver. 15, so as then to make ver. 17 *the conclusion* of both. Hofmann is so well aware of this that he refuses to see in the first words of ver. 16 the announcement of a second contrast, and has connected them directly with the close of ver. 15. In fact, he uniformly supplies in the three propositions of ver. 16 the verb and the regimen: *abounded unto many*, of ver. 15: "And *the gift did not abound unto the many*, as in that case in which the imputation took place through one who had sinned; *for judgment abounded from one to many* in condemnation, and *the gift of grace abounded from one to many* in justification." It is obvious how such an ellipsis thrice repeated burdens and embarrasses the course of the argument. What of truth there is in this view is that *the gift* mentioned in ver. 16 is no other than that referred to in the words of ver. 15: ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι . . ., *the gift by grace of* . . ., and that consequently the

[1] T. R. reads, with A B C K L P, Mnn., αμαρτησαντος; D E F G, It. Syr. Or. (Lat. trans.) read αμαρτηματος. ℵ is doubtful, the syllable which follows ση being wanting.

second contrast, vv. 16 and 17, should be regarded as serving to bring out a particular aspect of the general contrast pointed out in ver. 15. The *καί, and,* at the beginning of the verse is thus equivalent to a sort of *nota-bene:* "And mark well this circumstance" . . . An objection might be made to the *πολλῷ μᾶλλον, much more certainly,* of ver. 15. One might say: True, the factors acting on Christ's part (15*b*) are infinitely more abundant than the weak and solitary factor acting on Adam's part (15*a*); but, on the other hand, was not the work to be wrought on Christ's part much more considerable than that accomplished in Adam! If the source was richer, the void to be filled was deeper: In Adam a single actual sinner,—all the rest playing only an unconscious and purely passive part; in Christ, on the contrary, a multitude of sinners to be justified, equally conscious and responsible with the first, having all voluntarily added their own contingent of sins to the original transgression. Undoubtedly, answers the apostle; but in the matter of salvation the part of those interested is also quite different. In the one case they were passively and collectively subjected to the sentence of death; here, we have to do with beings who lay hold individually and personally of the sentence which justifies them. There, a single and solitary condemnation, which embraces them all through the deed of one; here, a justification, collective also, but appropriated by each individually, which is transformed into as many personal justifications as there are believing sinners, and which cannot fail to establish the kingdom of life more firmly still than the kingdom of death was founded on the condemnation of all in Adam. This antithesis, established as a *fact* in ver. 16, is demonstrated in ver. 17 by an *a fortiori* argument, entirely similar to that of ver. 15.

Nothing more is to be understood in the first proposition than the verb *γίνεται, comes about:* "And the gift does not *come about* by one sinner" (as the condemnation had done). Some have supposed a more extensive ellipsis: "The gift did not come about by one (*as the condemnation had done*), by one sinner." But this ellipsis is unnecessary, and even impairs somewhat the meaning of the contrast, for the words: *by one who sinned,* depend directly on the verb: *does not come about.*

The reading *ἁμαρτήματος* ("by one *sin*"), though supported by the ancient versions, is a correction, the origin of which is easily understood; it is borrowed from the *ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων* which follows, understood in the sense of: *of many sins.* The idea *of one sin* seemed to contrast better than the idea *of one sinner* with the expression thus understood. The contrast which Paul has now in view certainly demands the Received reading. With "*the offence* of one," ver. 15, he has contrasted the grace of God and of Jesus Christ in its double fulness. Now, with the *one* sinner, in the first case, he contrasts the *multitude* of sinners who are the objects of justification in the second. What a difference between the power of the spark which sets fire to the forest by lighting a withered branch, and the power of the instrument which extinguishes the conflagration at the moment when every tree is on fire, and makes them all live again!

The substantive *δώρημα* denotes the concrete gift, the blessing bestowed; here it is the gift of justification by Christ, as described iii. 21–v. 11.—The two propositions develope the contrast announced (*for*). The term *τὸ κρῖμα* properly signifies: *the judicial act,* the sentence pronounced, in opposition to *χάρισμα, the act of grace* (in the second proposition).—The regimen *ἐξ ἑνός, of one,* indicates the point of departure for this judicial act, the material on which it operated. This *one* is not neuter (one *offence*), but masculine, agreeably to the reading *ἁμαρτήσαντος*: *the one* who had committed the act of sin, and whose sin had become the object of judgment. It is on the word *ἐξ ἑνός* that the emphasis lies. Its counterpart in the second proposition is *ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων,* which may be translated either by: *of many sins,* or by making *πολλῶν* a pronoun and a complement: *of the sins of many.* In the former case, each of those numerous offences must be regarded as the summary indication of the fall of a particular individual, in opposition to *one sinner.* But in the second the contrast is clearer: the plurality of individuals is exactly expressed by the pronoun *πολλῶν, of many.* Dietzsch denies that this last construction is possible. But it is found very probably in Luke ii. 35 (*ἐκ πολλῶν καρδιῶν, of the hearts of many*) and 2 Cor. i. 11.—As the preposition *ἐκ* relates to the matter of the judgment,

εἰς denotes the result in which it issues: "*to* condemnation." The reference is to the sentence of death pronounced on mankind because of one who had sinned; for this one contained in him the entire race.—The antithesis to this κατάκριμα, *sentence of condemnation*, appears in δικαίωμα, which must be translated by *sentence of justification*. This meaning arises from the contrast itself, as well as from the meaning of the words δικαιοῦν and δικαιοσύνη (*justify, righteousness*) throughout this part of the Epistle, and with St. Paul generally. Only the question may be asked, whether the apostle has in view here the justification granted to the sinner at the very hour of his believing, or justification in the absolute sense, as it will be pronounced in the day of judgment (ii. 13). Two reasons seem to us to decide in favour of the second alternative—1. The passage, v. 1–11, in which the final sentence of acquittal is represented as the indispensable complement of the righteousness of faith, this becoming eternally valid only by means of the former. 2. Ver. 17, which is connected by *for* with ver. 16, and the second part of which refers to the most distant future (*the reign in life*). Hence we must conclude that the term δικαίωμα, *sentence of justification*, also embraces that supreme sentence of acquittal whereby we shall conclusively escape from *wrath* (v. 9, 10). This parallel between Adam and Christ manifestly assumes the whole doctrine of justification from iii. 21, including the final passage on the justification to come, v. 1–11. The *absolute* meaning which we here give to δικαίωμα is thus in keeping with the position of the whole passage. Dietzsch is certainly mistaken in applying this word δικαίωμα to the sanctification of the sinner by the Holy Spirit. It is nevertheless true that if we extend the meaning of this term to the final justification, on entering upon glory, it involves the work of sanctification as finished (see on v. 9, 10). But this does not in the least modify the sense of the word itself (*a justificatory sentence*), as appears from the meaning of the word δικαιοῦν and from the context (in contrast to κατάκριμα, *a condemnatory sentence*).—It is unnecessary to refute the divergent constructions proposed by Rothe and Dietzsch, according to which τὸ μέν and τὸ δέ are taken as the subjects of the two propositions having κρῖμα and χάρισμα either as predicates (Rothe), or in

apposition (Dietzsch).—It has often been thought that the emphasis in this verse was on the idea of the contrast between the nature of the two results: *condemnation* and *justification.* It is not so. The real contrast indicated by the Greek construction is that between ἐξ ἑνός, *one (who sinned)*, and ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων, the sins of *many.* There, by a judicial act, condemnation goes forth *from one sinner;* here, by the act of grace, *from the offences of a multitude,* there proceeds a justification.—We come now to the most difficult point of the whole passage: the relation of ver. 17 to what precedes, and the exposition of the verse itself.

Ver. 17. "*For if by the one*[1] *man's offence death reigned by this one; much more they which receive the superabundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness shall reign in life by the one, Jesus Christ.*"—The *for* beginning this verse has been the torture of expositors, for it seems as if it should rather be *therefore,* since this verse appears to give the conclusion to be drawn from the difference indicated in ver. 16. Meyer seeks to get over the difficulty of the *for* by making it bear on the idea of δικαίωμα, ver. 16, and finding in the certainty of the *future reign* (end of ver. 17) the joyful confirmation of the grace of *justification* (ver. 16); Philippi almost the same: "The justified shall reign in life (ver. 17), which proves that they are really justified (ver. 16)." But is it logical to argue from a future and hoped-for event to demonstrate the certainty of a present fact? Is not justification at least as certain as the future reign of the justified? Hofmann here alleges a forced turn in the dialectic. According to him, ver. 17 does not prove the fact alleged in ver. 16, but the reasoning of ver. 17 is intended to demonstrate that the second part of ver. 16 (from τὸ μὲν γὰρ . . ., *for the judgment* . . ., to the end) has really proved the truth of the first (καὶ οὐχ ὡς . . ., and the gift did not come about as by . . .). The meaning he holds to be: "I have good reason to say that it is not so with the judgment . . . as with the gift of grace . . .; for if . . . (ver. 17)." Dietzsch rightly answers that the demonstration given in ver. 16 would be very weak if it needed to

[1] Instead of τῳ τοῦ ἑνός, which T. R. reads, with ℵ B C K L P, Syr. It$^{alliq.}$, there is found in A F G: ἐν ἑνὶ παραπτώματι, and in D E, It$^{alliq.}$: ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ παραπτώματι.

be propped with the complicated reasoning of ver. 17. Dietzsch himself, starting from his sense of δικαίωμα, *the restoration of holiness*, ver. 16, thus understands the argument: "This holiness will be really restored in believers; for, according to the divine promises, they are one day to enter into the kingdom of life (ver. 17), which cannot take place without holiness." Everything is erroneous in this explanation—1. The meaning of δικαίωμα; 2. The intervention of the divine promises, of which there has been no mention in the context; 3. The idea of sanctification, which is out of place in this passage. Rothe has given up in despair the attempt to discover a logical connection between vv. 17 and 16. He has accordingly attempted to refer the *for* of ver. 17 to the argument of ver. 15, making ver. 16 a sort of parenthesis. There is something seductive about this solution. We have already seen in vv. 9, 10 of this chapter, two verses which followed one another, both beginning with *for*, and the second of which was merely the repetition (reinforced with some new elements) of the first, and so its confirmation. It might therefore be supposed that it is the same in this case, only with the difference that ver. 16 would be inserted in order to enunciate those new elements which are to play a part in ver. 17. So it was that, following the path opened by Rothe, we long flattered ourselves that we had solved the difficulty. Yet we have been obliged to abandon this solution by the following considerations:—1. Can the *for* of ver. 17, after the insertion of a new contrast specially announced, ver. 16*a*, and expounded, ver. 16*b*, be purely and simply parallel to the *for* of ver. 15? 2. How happens it that in ver. 17 there is no further mention of the *many*, nor consequently of the extent of the two works, but solely of the equality of the *effect produced* (on the one side a *reign of death*, on the other a *reign in life*), and specially, that instead of the past ἐπερίσσευσεν (ver. 15), we are all at once transported into the future by the words: *they shall reign* (end of ver. 17)? Finally,—and we long held to this idea also,—the *for* of ver. 17 might be taken to refer to the affirmation (vv. 15*a*, 16*a*) of the two differences: "*It is not with the offence as with the gift* . . . (ver. 15*a*);" "*the gift did not come about* . . . (ver. 16*a*)." But the second part of ver. 16 would thus be sacrificed; now it is too im-

portant to be only a parenthesis. We must therefore revert to the attempt of Meyer and Philippi, which consists in connecting the *for* with ver. 16; this is, besides, the only probable supposition; only we must seek to justify, better than they have done, the logical relation established by this *for*. And that does not seem to us impossible if what we have observed regarding the meaning of δικαίωμα, *the sentence of justification*, ver. 16, be borne in mind. The parallel between Christ and Adam strikes its roots into the whole previous doctrine regarding *the righteousness of faith*, iii. 21–v. 11; witness the *wherefore* (v. 12). Now Paul had demonstrated, v. 1–11, that once justified by the death of Christ, all the more may we be certain of being saved and glorified by His life. It is this very idea which forms the basis of the second part of ver. 17, which thus contains the paraphrase of the term δικαίωμα, *sentence of justification*, at the end of ver. 16. The relation between vv. 16, 17 is therefore as follows: Two facts are set forth in ver. 16 parallel to one another: *one* sinner, the object of the act of condemnation; *a multitude* of sinners, the objects of the act of justification. The reality of the first of these facts was demonstrated by vv. 12–14. It remained to demonstrate that of the second. This is the object to which ver. 17 is devoted. The mode of reasoning is as follows: The apostle starts (ver. 17*a*) from the first fact as certain, and *by means of it* he infers (17*b*) *the still more certain reality* of the second. Ver. 17 has thus its logical place between the two propositions of ver. 16 to prove *by the first* the truth of the second. Not only so. But in reproducing ver. 16*a* in the first proposition of 17*a*, he combines with 16*a* the contents of the first proposition of ver. 15 (15*a*); and in reproducing, in the conclusion 17*b*, the second proposition of ver. 16 (16*b*), he combines with it the contents of the second proposition of ver. 15 (15*b*), and that in order to give *double* force to the *a fortiori* reasoning whereby from the premiss he reaches the conclusion; in other words, 16*a*, supported by 15*a*, serves him as a premiss in 17*a* to reach the conclusion 17*b*, containing 16*b* combined with 15*b* by a double *a fortiori*. The meaning of this forceful turn of logic, simpler than would have been thought possible, is as follows: If a *weak* cause, the single sin (15*a*) of one sinner (16*a*), *passively* endured,

could bring about the death of every man (17*a*), *much more certainly* shall the *more powerful* cause (16*b*), assimilated by each one *personally* (16*b*), produce in him *an effect* not *inferior* to the effect produced by the first cause (17*b*). If a weak deleterious cause passively endured by me has been able to produce my death, a life-giving cause much more powerful, which I appropriate to myself actively, will far more certainly give me life.—We thus apprehend at the same time the relation between vv. 16, 17 and ver. 15. Ver. 15 relates to the two *circles* influenced; they must cover one another perfectly (*the many*, of the two sides); for the more powerful cause cannot have extended less widely than the weaker. In vv. 16, 17 the subject is the *result* obtained in *every individual* belonging *to the many* in the direction either of death or of life. The second of these effects (life) cannot fail to be less real than the first (death), for it has been produced by a *more powerful* and *individually appropriated* cause. Ver. 15: *as many individuals;* vv. 16, 17: as much *effect produced* in each one. Let us now enter upon the detailed study of this verse, in which the apostle has succeeded in combining with the argument which he was following the full riches of the antithesis already contained in vv. 15, 16.

In the first clause there is a difference of reading. Instead of: *by one man's offence,* some Greco-Latin copyists have written: *by one offence,* or again: *by the one single offence.* This reading, opposed to that of the two other families, and also of the Peschito, can only be regarded as an erroneous correction. The idea *of one* (sinner) has been rejected, because it seemed to involve a repetition when taken with the immediately following words: *by this one.* But it has been overlooked that the terms: *by one man's offence,* are intended to reproduce the idea of the first proposition of ver. 15, as the words: *by this one,* reproduce the idea of the ἐξ ἑνός, *of one,* in the first proposition of ver. 16. These expressions have something extenuating about them: only one act, only one actor. The apostle means to contrast the weakness of these causes with the greatness of the result: a *reign of death* established in the world. We see a whole race of slaves with their heads passively bent, through the solitary deed of one, under the pitiless sceptre of death. The words: *by one,* are added as by

an after-thought, in order to emphasize the *passivity* of the individuals subjected to this order of things. The apostle does not here mention, as in ver. 15, *the many*, in opposition to *this one*. He has not in view *the extent* of the reign of death, but the *part played by the individuals* in relation to this tragical situation. He sees them all as it were absorbed in the one being who has acted for all.—The expression: *death reigned*, denotes a firmly established order of things against which, for individuals, there is no possibility of resistance. Nothing more desperate in appearance than this great historical fact of the reign of death, and yet it is this very fact which becomes in the eyes of the apostle a principle of the most powerful encouragement and the most glorious hope. For this terrible reign of death, established on the weak foundation of a single sin and a single sinner, may serve as a *measure* to establish the greater certainty of the reign of life which will come to light among the justified by the freely accepted gift of God. Such is the idea of the second part of the verse. Instead of this impersonal multitude involved in the act, and thereby in the condemnation of a single sinner, Paul contemplates a plurality of distinct individuals appropriating to themselves, consciously and freely, the fulness of the gift of righteousness; and he asks himself, with a tone of triumph, whether a glorious reign of life will not spring up under similar conditions more certainly still than the sinister reign of death established itself on the weak foundation which he has just mentioned.—The outstanding expression in this second part of the verse is the *οἱ λαμβάνοντες*, *they who receive* (literally, the receivers or accepters). The verb *λαμβάνειν* may signify *to take, to lay hold of*, or again: *to receive* (more or less passively). As it here evidently denotes the act of *faith*, it expresses the idea of a *taking in possession* resting on a free *acceptance* (see on i. 17). The form of the present participle is variously explained. According to Philippi, it denotes the *continuousness* of the acceptance of salvation by believers during the whole period of grace. Meyer and others take the present as referring to the epoch *now in progress*, as the intermediate station between the natural order of things and the future kingdom. But what have these two ideas to do with Paul's intention in the context? It seems

to me that this present is rather that of *moral condition* relatively to the state which ought logically to arise from it. Whoever joins the number of *those acccpters,* shall reign in life.—The definite article *οἱ, the,* presents all these accepters as distinct persons, individually capable of accepting or rejecting what must decide their lot. It is no longer that undistinguished mass which had disobeyed and perished in one. Here we meet again those *πολλοί,* the many sinners, mentioned in ver. 16, who, under the burden of their personal offences, have accepted for themselves the act of grace, and shall become individually the objects of the *δικαίωμα,* the sentence of justification. It is to be remarked that even in ver. 16 the article had ceased to be prefixed to the word *πολλῶν* (*many;* not: "*the* many"), and that Paul does not even speak of *πολλοί, many.* The accepters are not the *totality* of men condemned to die; Paul does not even say that they are necessarily numerous. His thought here is arrested by *each* of them, whatever shall be their number. In this fact, taken by itself, of individual acceptance, on the side of grace there is a complete difference of position as compared with the passivity of the individuals on the opposite side. It is a first difference fitted to establish an *a fortiori* conclusion. But there is another fact, which combines with it the infinitely greater power of the cause, on the same side. The apostle had already remarked it in ver. 15: *the grace of God, and the gift of Jesus Christ.* It is easy to see the connection of the expressions used with those of 15*b*: And first: *τὴν περισσείαν, the abundance,* which reproduces the idea of the verb *ἐπερίσσευσε, hath abounded;* then *τῆς χάριτος, of the grace,* which goes back upon *the* double *grace* of God and *of the one man Jesus Christ;* finally, the term *δωρεά, the gift,* which appears in both verses. The complement *τῆς δικαιοσύνης, of righteousness,* is alone added here, because the subject in question is the gift accepted by faith and transformed into individual righteousness. The destination (ver. 15) has become possession. Thus the thought of the apostle is clear: as the term *οἱ λαμβάνοντες, the receivers,* forms an antithesis to *διὰ τοῦ ἑνός, by this one,* so the expressions: *the abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness,* form an antithesis to the: *by the offence of one.* Not only, then, is there on this side individual

appropriation (ver. 16), but this appropriation rests on a more powerful cause (ver. 15).

Thus is seen the justice of the observation: that in this ver. 17 there are designedly combined to establish a double *a fortiori*, the two previously described contrasts: "If a weak objective cause, without personal appropriation on the part of those interested, has been able to establish a reign of death, with stronger reason should it be certain that a still more powerful objective cause, and one individually appropriated, will be capable of establishing a glorious reign of life." *Περισσεία*: *abundance*, or more strictly *superabundance*, so that the superfluity flows over; *χάριτος*, *of grace*, applies at one and the same time, according to ver. 15, to the love of God and to that of Jesus Christ. The *gift of righteousness* is that justification objectively realized in Christ *for the many* (mankind), and apprehended by the faith of every receiver. When the empty vessel of the human heart has once become filled by faith with this fulness of grace and righteousness, the sinner is raised to the place of a *king in life*. This last expression also forms an antithesis to an analogous one in the first proposition: *death reigned*. But the apostle has too lively a conviction of spiritual realities to say here: *life shall reign*. Death reigns; it is a tyrant. But life does not reign; it has not subjects; it makes kings. Besides, Paul transforms his construction, as he had already done with a similar intention in ver. 15. This change admirably suits the thought of the context. Instead of the sombre state of things which bears sway as a reign of death, it is here the individuals themselves who, after having personally appropriated righteousness, reign personally in the luminous domain of life. Comp. on this reign what Paul said, iv. 13, of *the inheritance of the world*; then the *καυχώμενοι*, *glorying*, v. 11; finally, viii. 17.

The clause *ἐν ζωῇ*, *in life*, does not denote a period, as when we say: in eternal life. If the word *life* were taken in this sense, it would undoubtedly be defined by the article *τῇ*. The preposition *ἐν* must not be taken in the instrumental sense, as in v. 10 (*by* life). Contrasted as it is to this: *reign of death*, the expression denotes the *mode* or *nature* of the reign of believers. A new, holy, inexhaustible, and victorious vitality will pervade those *receivers of righteousness*, and make them so

many kings. If the collective condemnation could make each of them a subject of death, the conclusion therefrom should be that their individual justification will make each of them a king in life.—The meaning of πολλῷ μᾶλλον, *much more*, is, as in ver. 15, purely logical: *much more certainly*. Unquestionably there is no doubt that there is a greater abundance of life in Christ than there was of death-power in Adam. But this is not what the apostle says here. He is not aiming to establish either a contrast of *quality* (between *life* and *death*) or a contrast of *quantity* (*more* of life *than* of death). It is a higher degree of *certainty* which he enunciates and demonstrates. Justified, we shall reign still *more certainly* in Christ, than as condemned we are dead in Adam. Our future glory is more certain even than our death; for a more powerful cause, and one individually assimilated, will make us live *still more certainly* than the weak unappropriated cause could make us die.

There remains a last word which, put at the close of this rich and complicated period, has peculiar solemnity: *by the one, Jesus Christ.* Τοῦ ἑνός, *the one*, is a pronoun, and not an adjective: the only one, opposed to the other only one. The name *Jesus Christ* is in apposition: "by the one *who is* Jesus Christ." These final words remind us that He has been the sole instrument of the divine love, and that if the *receivers* have a righteousness to appropriate, it is solely that which He has acquired for them.

Again, at this point (vv. 15, 16) the reasoning of the apostle is amazingly bold. It is as if a justified sinner dared to find in the very power of the miserable lust which dragged him into evil, the irrefragable proof of the power which will more certainly still be exercised over him by the grace of God and of Jesus Christ, to save him and raise him to the throne.

Let us sum up this passage, unique as it is of its kind.

Ver. 15 demonstrates the *universal destination* of justification in Christ. The argument runs thus: If a cause so weak as Adam's single offence could influence a circle so vast as that of the entire *multitude* of mankind, with greater reason must a far richer cause (the double grace of God and of Jesus Christ) extend its action over *this same multitude*.—It is the

universalism of the gospel, the εἰς πάντας, *for all* . . ., of iii. 22, proved by the very universality of death.

Vv. 16 and 17 demonstrate the full reality and quickening efficacy of the *personal application* which every believer makes of the justification obtained by Christ. Affirmed in ver. 16, this individual efficacy is proved in ver. 17: One single agent, serving as the instrument of a very weak cause, could bring about the death of so many individuals who had not personally taken part in his act. Consequently, and *much more certainly*, will each of those same individuals, by *personally* appropriating a force *far superior* in action to the preceding, become thereby a possessor of life.—Here is *the individualism of the gospel*, the ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας, *upon all that believe*, of iii. 22, fully established by the very fact of their individual death in Adam.

We have thus reached the complete demonstration of these two words πάντι and τῷ (πιστεύοντι), *all* and *every* (believer), which are the essential characteristics of Paul's gospel, according to i. 16.

As the argument of vv. 12–14 was a necessary logical premiss to that of vv. 15–17, the latter was a no less indispensable premiss for the conclusion finally drawn by the apostle, vv. 18, 19. In fact, to be entitled to affirm, as he does in these two verses, the universality of justification in Christ as the counterpart of the universality of death in Adam, he must prove, first, that all men died in Adam and not through their own deed,—such are the contents of vv. 12–14; then, that from this universal and individual death in Adam there followed *a fortiori* the certainty of the universal destination, and of the individual application of justification in Christ,—such are the contents of vv. 15–17. It remains only to draw this conclusion: *all* (as to destination) and *each* (by faith) are justified in Christ (ver. 18); this conclusion is at the same time the second and long-delayed part of the comparison begun in ver. 12. The apostle could not state it till he had logically acquired the right to do so.

3. Vv. 18, 19.

Vv. 18, 19. "*Therefore as by one offence there was condemnation for all men; so also by one act of justification there*

was for all men justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience the many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one shall the many be made righteous."—The result on the side of righteousness is at least equal to that which history attests on the side of condemnation: the apostle could make this affirmation after the previous demonstration, and at length close the parallel opened at ver. 12.—The ἄρα, *in consequence*, introduces this declaration as a conclusion from the argument which precedes, and the οὖν, *therefore*, takes up the thread of the sentence broken since ver. 12. These two particles combined thus exhaust the logical connection of this verse with all that prepared for it.

The first proposition is the summary reproduction of ver. 12. The understood verb is ἀπέβη, *issued*, here taken in an impersonal sense (*there came about, res cessit*, Mey.). Philippi takes ἑνος as a masculine pronoun: "by *one's* offence." But in that case we must take the ἑνὸς of the second proposition in the same sense, which, as we shall see, is impossible.—The κατάκριμα, *sentence of condemnation*, denotes the condemnation to death which has overtaken mankind, the: "Thou art dust, and to dust shalt thou return." There is no reference here to eternal condemnation (the ἀπώλεια).

The particles οὕτω and καί, *so* and *also*, refer, the one to the moral *analogy* of the two facts, the other, simply to the repetition of the two similar facts. Many commentators apply the expression: *by one act of righteousness*, δι' ἑνος δικαιώματος, to the *holy life* of Jesus, which was throughout, as it were, one great act of righteousness, or to His *expiatory death*, as the culminating point of that perfect life. The meaning of the Greek term, which Aristotle (Nicom. v. 10) defines: ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος, *a reparation of injury*, might suit either the one or the other of these senses. They are, however, both inadmissible for the following reasons: 1. It is not natural to depart from the meaning the word has in ver. 16; now there it forms (in a rigorously symmetrical proposition) the antithesis of κατάκριμα, *sentence of condemnation;* this positively determines its meaning: *sentence of justification.* 2. If this term be applied to the holy life or expiatory death of Jesus Christ, there arises a complete tautology with the second proposition of ver. 19, where ὑπακοή, *obedience*, has the very

meaning which is here given to δικαίωμα. And yet the *for*, which connects the two verses, implies a logical gradation from the one to the other. 3. In Paul's terminology it is God and not Jesus Christ who is *the justifier*, viii. 33 (Θεὸς ὁ δικαιῶν). By ἓν δικαίωμα we must therefore understand a divine act. It is therefore *the one collective sentence of justification*, which in consequence of the death of Christ has been pronounced in favour of all sinners, of which, as we have seen, iv. 25, the resurrection of Jesus was at once the effect and proof. It is ever this same divine declaration which takes effect in the case of every sinner as he believes. If such is the meaning of the word δικαίωμα, the ἑνος is obviously an adjective and not a pronoun: "by *one act* of justification."—The verb to be understood is neither in the present nor the future: *there is*, or *there will be*. For the matter in question is an accomplished fact. It is therefore the past: *there was*, as in the first member.—The sentence already passed is *destined for* all men with a view to their personal justification. It is this *destination* which is expressed by the εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς, *to justification of life*, exactly like the εἰς πίστιν, i. 17, and the εἰς πάντας (*for all*), iii. 22. The apostle does not say that all *shall be* individually justified; but he declares that, in virtue of the one grand sentence which has been passed, all *may* be so, on condition of faith. The strongly active sense of the word δικαίωσις (the act of justifying) fits it peculiarly to denote the individual sentence by which the collective justification is applied to *each* believer.—The genitive ζωῆς is the genitive of effect: "the justification which produces life." By this word *life* Paul here denotes above all spiritual life (vi. 4, 11, 23), the re-establishing of holiness; then, in the end, the restoration and glorification of the body itself (viii. 11). The word thus hints beforehand the entire contents of the following part (chap. vi.–viii.).

Ver. 19. At the first glance this verse seems to be a mere useless repetition of the foregoing. Looking at it closely, we see that, as the γάρ, *for*, indicates, it is meant to state the moral cause which gives rise to the two facts put parallel to one another in ver. 18. In fact, ver. 19*a* serves to explain 18*a*, and 19*b* to explain 18*b*. This logical relation accounts for two modifications, apparently accidental, which are in-

troduced into the parallel expressions in ver. 19. For the simple ὡς, *as*, of ver. 18, there is substituted here ὥσπερ, which is more emphatic and precise, *for precisely as*. For the new contrast is meant to give the key to the preceding one. Then, for the antithesis of *one* offence, or *one* sentence of justification, to the notion of *universality*, (*all*), ver. 18, there is substituted the antithesis between εἷς and οἱ πολλοί, *one* and *the many*. Why the reappearance of this expression used in ver. 15, but abandoned since vv. 16 and 17? It is because the apostle would here ascend from historical effects to moral causes or hidden principles. Two historical facts sway the life of mankind (ver. 18): the condemnation which kills, and the justification which quickens it. These two great facts rest on two individual moral acts: an act of *disobedience*, and an act of *obedience*. Now in both cases the extension to *all* of the effect produced can be explained only on one condition: the possibility, namely, of the action of *one* on *many*. This second antithesis: *one* and *many*, belongs therefore to the exposition of *the cause* (ver. 19), as the first: *one act* and *all*, belongs to the exposition of the historical fact (ver. 18). Hence the reason why in ver. 15, where he had to do with the antithesis between the two *causes*, the apostle had dropped the pronoun πάντες, *all*, used in ver. 12, to apply the form εἷς and οἱ πολλοί, *one* and *the many*, and why he reverts to it here, where he is ascending from the effect to the cause. New proofs of the scrupulous care with which the apostle watched over the slightest details of his writings.—This word παρακοή, *disobedience*, denotes the moral act which provoked the sentence of condemnation (ver. 18*a*). There had been in the case of Adam ἀκοή, *hearing;* a positive prohibition had sounded in his ears. But this prohibition had been for him as it were null and non-existent (παρακοή).—The verb κατεστάθησαν, which we have translated literally by *were made*, signifies, when it is applied to an office: *to be established* in it (Luke xii. 14; Acts vii. 10, 27; and even Heb. v. 1); but when it is applied, as here, to a moral state, the question arises whether it is to be taken in the sense of *being regarded and treated as* such, or *being rendered* such. The second meaning, if I am not mistaken, is the most common in classic Greek: τινὰ εἰς ἀπορίαν

καθιστάναι, to put one into a state of embarrassment; κλαίοντα καταστῆσαί τινα, to make one weep, etc. In the two principal examples taken from the New Testament there is room for some hesitation; Jas. iv. 4: "Whosoever will be a friend of the world is made the enemy of God," may signify: "*is proved,* or *is rendered* the enemy" . . . The last sense is the more natural. In 2 Pet. i. 8: "Such virtues will make you neither barren nor unfruitful," the second meaning is the more probable. It is also the meaning which the context appears to me to demand here. The apostle is explaining the moral cause of the fact stated 18*a*. The meaning: *to be regarded,* or *treated as* . . ., will only yield a tautology with the fact to be explained. The real gradation from the one verse to the other is as follows: "They were *treated* as sinners (by the sentence of death) (ver. 18); for they were really *made* sinners in Adam (ver. 19)." The last words of ver. 12 already involved the same idea. "They all participated mysteriously in the offence (*ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*);" the first fact whence there resulted the inclination to sin affirmed in our ver. 19. Moreover, the *διά* construed with the genitive (*by*) would suffice to demonstrate the *effective* sense of the *καθιστάναι, to constitute,* in ver. 19. With the other sense, the *διά* with the accusative (*on account of*) would have been more suitable.

With the disobedience of one there is contrasted the *obedience* of one. Some understand thereby the *expiatory sacrifice* of Jesus. But as in the Levitical *cultus* the victim required to be without blemish, so in the true expiatory sacrifice the victim required to be without sin. It is impossible, therefore, to isolate the death of Christ here from His holy life; and the term *obedience* embraces both; comp. Phil. ii. 8.—If the word *δίκαιοι, righteous,* denoted here a moral state, like the *ἁμαρτωλοί, sinners,* in the first proposition, the same question would be raised here as to the meaning of *καθίστασθαι.* But if the word *righteous* is applied, as the sense of this whole part requires, to *imputed* righteousness, then the verb naturally takes the meaning of *being constituted righteous,* though there would be nothing to hinder us from translating it, as in the first member, by: *being rendered righteous.* For as the case in question is a state obtained in a

declaratory way, *being rendered* amounts to the same thing as *being constituted.* The future: *will be rendered,* or *constituted* righteous, is referred by some to the successive justification of those sinners who during the present economy come to faith; by others, to the final declaration at the judgment day. In the passages 16*b* and 17*b* the apostle transported himself, as we have seen, to the *close* of the economy of probation. This connection decides in favour of the second meaning. The time in question is that described v. 9–11. If, then, the idea of *moral righteousness* is not that of this word *righteous,* as Dietzsch and others will have it, the fact of sanctification is nevertheless involved in the supreme absolution to which the second part of this verse refers.—The expression: *the many,* or *the multitude,* cannot have the same extension in the second member as in the first. For it is not here as in ver. 15, where the question was only of the destination of righteousness. This passage refers, as is proved by the future: *will be made righteous,* to the effectual *application.* Now, nowhere does St. Paul teach universal salvation. There are even passages in his writings which seem expressly to exclude it; for example, 2 Thess. i. 9; Phil. iii. 19. On the other hand, the pronoun *the many* cannot denote a simple *plurality* (the majority); for, as we have seen in vv. 15 and 19*a*, the article *οἱ, the,* implies a *totality.* The totality must therefore be restricted to those whom, ver. 17, Paul called *the accepters, οἱ λαμβάνοντες,* and of whom he said: *they shall reign in life.* This future: *shall reign,* is in close connection with the future: *will be made,* in our verse; for the declaration of righteousness (ver. 19) is the condition of reigning in life (ver. 17).

We cannot hold, with the school of Baur, that this parallel between Adam and Christ was inspired by a polemical intention in opposition to a legal Judeo-Christianity. But it is nevertheless evident that in so vast a survey of the principal phases of the religious development of mankind, a place, however small, could not fail to be granted to the Mosaic institution. The part of the *law* is therefore briefly indicated ver. 20; ver. 21 is the general conclusion.

4. Vv. 20, 21.

Vv. 20, 21. "*Now the law was added, that the offence might abound. But where sin abounded, grace did much more abound: that as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord.*" —*Νόμος*, (the) *law*, undoubtedly denotes the Mosaic law; but as positive law in general (regard being had to the absence of the article), we might almost translate: *a law*.—The Jews attributed a particularly important part to this institution in the history of mankind; they claim to make it the means of education and salvation of the whole world (ii. 17–20). Paul shows that it plays only a secondary part. It was *added* during the era of sin and death to prepare for the era of justification and life. It is from want of a more exactly corresponding term that we translate *παρεισῆλθεν* by *was added*. It should be: *came alongside of*. Compounded of the word *εἰσέρχεσθαι*, *to enter*, to appear on the stage (ver. 12), and the preposition *παρά*, *by the side of*, it applies to an actor who does not occupy the front of the stage, and who appears there only to play an *accessory* part. It is a mistake, therefore, to ascribe to this verb the notion attached to it by the *Vulgate*, when it translates *subintravit*, *came in*, as it were *stealthily*, a meaning which, besides, is incompatible with the solemn promulgation of the law. Calvin finds in this verb the notion of an *intermediate* which took its place *between* Adam and Christ, and Chrysostom, that of a *passing* appearance. But *παρά* signifies neither *between* nor *in passing*. The true meaning of the word is: *by the side of*, and this is also the meaning which best suits the passage. The Mosaic economy was, as it were, a *side* economy, an institution parallel to the economy of sin; as Philippi says, "it is a particular economy by the side of the great general economy." It might be compared to a canal flowing by the side of the river which feeds it.—And why this special economy? *That the offence might abound*. If, instead of the word *παράπτωμα*, *offence*, *fall*, the apostle had said *παράβασις*, *transgression*, the thought would be easily understood. For he has himself said (iv. 15): "Where no law is, there is no transgression;" that is to say, in that case sin does not present itself as the violation of a

positive command. The sense would consequently be this: The law was given to Israel that in this particular field of fallen humanity sin might take a graver and more pronounced character, that of *transgression*, and so manifest completely its malign nature; a process which should be the means of its cure. But this sense would require the use of the term παράβασις (*transgression*). The term chosen: παράπτωμα, *offence*, has a wider meaning (see on ver. 15). The word, indeed, denotes every *particular act of sin* committed under the law or without the law. This meaning is, on the other hand, more restricted than that of the word ἁμαρτία, *sin*, which comprehends, besides, the external acts, the corrupt *inward disposition*. The apostle therefore did not mean to say that the law was given to increase *sin* itself. Not only would the word ἁμαρτία have been required in this sense, but this thought would also be incompatible with divine holiness. Neither do I think the expression can be explained exactly by the passage, Rom. vii. 10–13, which refers to the use made of the law by *sin*; while Paul is here speaking of its providential object. The meaning rather is: that the law by multiplying prescriptions also gives rise to much more frequent occasions of offence. Now, each of these particular offences requiring to be expiated either by a sacrifice or a penalty, human guilt is thus more clearly manifested, and condemnation (apart from the intervention of grace) better founded. Man does not thereby necessarily become worse than he was; he only shows what he is already. Yet, if we went no further, we should still fail to apprehend the full thought of the apostle. Throughout the whole of this passage (vv. 15, 17, 18) the term τὸ παράπτωμα, *the offence*, has a sort of technical meaning: *the offence of Adam*. Is it not natural to take the word here in this definite acceptation? The meaning is therefore as follows: By the law it has come about that the offence of the first man has multiplied, or in a sense reproduced itself among his descendants in a multitude of particular acts of sin, like a seed which reappears in a harvest of fruits like itself. Those acts of sin are *the offences of many*, spoken of in ver. 16, and which are the object of individual justification. And the end of the law in making the manifestation of sin abound in Israel in this concrete form was to prove the inward malady, and to

pave the way for its cure. How? The sequel will explain. —In connection with what precedes, the *οὗ* (*δέ*) (*but*), *where*, cannot have the general meaning of *wherever . . .*, as if the saying which follows were a maxim of universal application. The connection between the first and second part of the verse requires that the word *where* be taken in a strictly local and limited sense: *where*, that is to say, in the domain where the law has done its work, and made the offence abound in Israel. Against this view, Meyer urges the general character of the whole passage, and especially that of ver. 21, and, like Schott and many others, he refers the words: *where . . .*, to the whole world. This objection ignores the fact stated in ver. 21, that the experiment made in Israel was intended to profit the whole world. As to the *temporal* meaning given to the word *where* by Grotius, de Wette, etc.: *at the time when*, it would suit the idea perhaps. But this use of *οὗ* is without example in the New Testament, and cannot even be demonstrated with certainty in the classics (*ἀφ' οὗ* is different). The sense is therefore that given by Abélard in the words: *in eodem populo quo . . .* —As the law gave more frequent occasions in Israel of proving individual guiltiness, by that very means it gave occasion to grace to manifest itself in a manner more abundant and extraordinary (ii. 4). Among the manifestations of mercy referred to by these last words of our verse: *grace did much more abound*, we cannot but suppose that the apostle places foremost the great expiatory act on which all the sins of Israel converged (Heb. ix. 15). As in the expression: *sin abounded*, he naturally thinks of the greatest crime of the Jewish people, that in which was concentrated their whole spirit of revolt, the murder of their Messiah, their deicide, the catastrophe of their history; so in the following words there is presented to the rapt view of the apostle the advantage which divine mercy has taken of this crime, by making it immediately the instrument of salvation for Israel themselves and all mankind. The word *where* might thus receive a yet stricter application than that which we have been giving to it till now. Golgotha, that theatre where human sin displayed itself as nowhere else, was at the same time the place of the most extraordinary manifestation of divine grace. The term *ὑπερεπερίσσευσε*, *superabounded over*, is explained by Hofmann in

the sense of: *grace abounded beyond itself;* it, as it were, surpassed itself. This meaning is far-fetched. It would be better to refer the ὑπέρ, *over*, to the sin which was, as it were, submerged under this flood of pardon. But if Paul had meant to state this relation, he would certainly have repeated the same verb as he had just used in speaking of sin. It seems most natural to me to take this ὑπέρ, *over*, as expressing the superlative of the verbal idea: Grace overflowed beyond all measure to infinity. Philippi accurately observes that πλέον in πλεονάζειν is a comparative (*the more*): while ὑπέρ (in ὑπερπερισσεύειν) expresses not only a *more*, but a superlative of abundance.

Ver. 21. This verse declares the *universal* end of this divine dispensation which seemed at first to concern only Israel. Paul thus returns to the general idea of the entire passage. The *that*, as well as perhaps the ὑπέρ in the verb of the preceding sentence, implies that what was passing in Israel contemplated the establishment of a reign of grace capable of equalling and surpassing in mankind generally the reign of sin founded in Adam. This is what the legal dispensation could never effect. Far from bringing into the world the grace of justification, the law taken in itself made the offence and condemnation abound. The passage, Gal. iii. 13 and 14, is also intended to point out the relation between the curse *of the Jewish law*, borne by the Messiah, and the gift of grace made *to the Gentiles*. This superabounding of pardon brought to bear on this superabounding of sin in the midst of the Jewish people, had therefore for its *end* (ἵνα, *that*) to display grace in such a way as to assure its triumph over the reign of sin throughout the whole earth, and to replace one economy by another. —Ὥσπερ, *absolutely as*. The work of grace must not remain, either in extent or efficacy, behind that of sin.— The words ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ, *in death*, remind us that the reign of sin is present; it manifests itself, wraps, as it were, and embodies itself *in* the palpable fact of *death*. The meaning: *by* death, would not give any clear idea. Far from sin reigning by death, it is death, on the contrary, which reigns by sin.— The antithesis to the words *in death* is distributed between the two terms: *through righteousness*, and *to life*. The first has no reference whatever, as one whole class of exegetes would

have it, to *moral* righteousness; for in this case its meaning would trench upon that of the following term. The word denotes, as in this whole part, of which it contains the summary, the righteousness freely granted by God to faith. Hence the apostle says: "that grace may reign through righteousness." It is in fact by free justification that grace establishes its reign.—The *end* of justification is *life;* εἰς, *unto,* is opposed to "*in* death," as the future is to the present. But this word *eternal life* does not refer merely to future *glory.* It comprehends the holiness which from this time forward should flow from the state of justification (comp. vi. 4, 11, 23). If the word *through righteousness* sums up the whole part of the Epistle now finished, the words: *unto eternal life,* are the theme of the whole part which is now to begin (vi.–viii.).—The last words: *by Jesus Christ our Lord,* are the final echo of the comparison which formed the subject of this passage. We understand the object of this piece: By the collective and individual fact of death in one, Paul meant to demonstrate the reality of universal and individual justification in one,—universal as to destination, individual through its application to each believer. And now—so this last word seems to say—Adam has passed away; Christ alone remains.

Adam and Christ.—It is to be borne in mind, if we are not to ascribe to the apostle ideas which nothing in the doctrine of this passage justifies, that the consequences which he deduces from our solidarity with Adam belong to a wholly different sphere from those which flow, according to him, from our solidarity with Christ. We are bound to Adam by the fact of *birth.* Every man appears here below in some sort as a fraction of that first man in whom the entire species was personified. Adam, to use the expression of the jurist Stahl, is "*the substance* of natural humanity;" and as the birth by which we emanate from him is a fact outside of consciousness, and independent of our personal will, all that passes in the domain of this natural existence can have no other than an educational, provisional, and temporary character. So, too, *the death* of which St. Paul speaks in this whole passage is, as we have seen, not eternal damnation, but death in the ordinary sense of the word. Sin itself, and the proclivity to evil which attached to us as children of Adam, as well as the individual faults which we may commit in this state, place us no doubt in a critical position, but are not yet the cause of final perdition. These facts only constitute

that imperative need of salvation which is inherent in every human soul, and to anticipate which divine grace advances with love. But on reaching the threshold of this superior domain, we find ourselves face to face with a new and wholly different solidarity, which is offered to us in Christ. It is not contracted by a natural and unconscious bond, but by the free and deliberate act of *faith*. And it is here only, on the threshold of the domain of this new life, that the questions relative to the eternal lot of the individual are raised and decided. To use again the words of the writer whom we just quoted: "Christ is the *divine idea* of humanity;" He is this idea perfectly realized. The first humanity created in Adam, with the characteristic of *freedom* of choice, was only the outline of humanity as finally purposed by God, the characteristic of which, as of God Himself, is *holiness*. The man who by faith draws his righteousness and life from the new Head of humanity is gradually raised to His level, or, as St. Paul says, to His *perfect stature;* this is *life eternal*. But the man who refuses to contract this bond of solidarity with the second Adam, remains for that very reason in his corrupt nature: he *becomes* answerable for it because he has refused to exchange it for the new one which was offered him, while he is at the same time responsible for the voluntary transgressions added by him to that of his first father; and, corrupting himself more and more by his lusts, he moves onward through his own fault to eternal perdition, to the *second death*.

We have reached the close of the fundamental part of the treatise which forms the body of the Epistle. In the first section Paul had demonstrated universal condemnation. In the second, he had expounded universal justification obtained by Christ and offered to faith. The third section has furnished the demonstration of the second, founding on the fact of the condemnation of all in one, rendered indubitable by the reign of death, and proceeding, in the way of an *a fortiori* argument, to establish the fact of the justification of all in one. The question now arises, whether the mode of justification thus expounded and demonstrated can secure the moral renewal of mankind, and explain the theocratic history of which it is the consummation. Such is the subject of the two following parts.

FIRST PART.—SUPPLEMENTARY.

CHAPS. VI.–VIII.

SANCTIFICATION.

By faith in the expiatory sacrifice of Jesus Christ the believer has obtained a sentence of justification, in virtue of which he stands reconciled to God. Can anything more be needed for his salvation? It seems not. The didactic treatise, intended to expound salvation, seems thus to have reached its close. Why then a new part?

The attentive reader will not have forgotten that in the first part of chap. v. the apostle directed our attention to a day of *wrath*, the day of the judgment to come, and that he dealt with the question by anticipation, whether the justification now acquired would hold good in that final and decisive hour. To settle this question, he brought in a means of salvation of which he had not yet spoken: participation in the *life of Christ;* and it was on this fact, announced beforehand (v. 9, 10), that he based the assurance of the validity of our justification even in the day of supreme trial. When uttering those words, Paul marked out in advance the new domain on which he enters from this time forward, that of *sanctification.*

To treat this matter is not to pass beyond the limits traced in the outset by the general thesis expressed i. 17: "The just shall live by faith." For in the expression *shall live,* ζήσεται, there is comprehended not only the grace of *righteousness,* but also that of the new life, or of *holiness. To live* is not merely to regain peace with God through justification; it is to dwell in the light of His holiness, and to act in permanent communion with Him. In the cure of the soul, pardon is only the crisis of convalescence; the restoration of health is sanctification. Holiness is true life.

What is the exact relation between these two divine blessings which constitute salvation in its real nature: justification and holiness? To put this question is at the same time to inquire into the true relation between the following part,

chaps. vi.–viii., and the portion of the Epistle already studied. The understanding of this central point is the key to the Epistle to the Romans, and even to the whole Gospel.

1. In the view of many, the relation between these two blessings of grace ought to be expressed by a *but*. "No doubt you are justified by faith; *but* beware, see that you break with the sin which has been forgiven you; apply yourselves to holiness; if not, you shall fall into condemnation again." This somewhat prevalent conception of the relation between justification and sanctification seems to us to find instinctive expression in the words of Th. Schott: "Here we enter upon the domain of the *preservation* of salvation." According to this view, salvation consists essentially of justification, and sanctification appears solely as the condition of not losing it.

2. Other expositors make what follows, in relation to what precedes, a *therefore*, if one may so speak: "You are justified freely; *therefore*, impelled by faith and gratitude, engage yourselves now to renounce evil, and do what is well-pleasing to God." This mode of understanding the relation between justification and holiness is probably that followed by most of the readers of our Epistle at the present day.

3. According to others, Reuss, and Sabatier for example, the connection sought would require to be expressed by a *for*, or *in fact:* If faith justifies you, as I have just shown, it is because *in fact*, by the mystical and personal union which it establishes between Christ and us, it alone has the power to sanctify us. The gift of pardon flows, on this view, from that of holiness, and not the reverse; or, to speak the truth, these blessings of grace are confounded with one another. "Paul knows nothing," says Sabatier expressly, "of the subtle distinction which has given rise to so many disputes between *declaring righteous* and *making righteous, justum dicere* and *justum facere*."[1] So thought also Professor Beck of Tübingen. This is the opinion which was elevated by the Council of Trent to the rank of a *dogma* in the Catholic Church.

4. Finally, in these last days a bold thinker, M. Lüdemann,[2] has explained the connection sought after a wholly new fashion. The appropriate form for expressing the connection

[1] *L'apôtre Paul*, p. 220.

[2] *Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus*, 1872.

is, according to him: *or rather.* This author will have it that the first four chapters of our Epistle expound a wholly *juridical* theory of justification, of purely Jewish origin, and not yet expressing the real view of the apostle. It is a simple accommodation by which he seeks to gain his Judeo-Christian readers. His true theory is of Hellenic origin; it is distinguished from the first by its truly *moral* character. It is the one which is expounded chaps. v.–viii. Sin no longer appears as an *offence* to be effaced by an arbitrary pardon; it is an objective *power* which can only be broken by the personal union of the believer with Christ dead and risen. By the second theory, therefore, Paul rectifies and even retracts the first. The notion of justification is suppressed, as in the preceding view, at least from the standpoint of Paul himself; all that God has to do to save us is to sanctify us.

We do not think that any of these four solutions exactly reproduces the apostolic view; the two last even contradict it flatly.

1. Sanctification is more and better than a restrictive and purely negative *condition* of the maintenance of the state of justification once acquired. It is a new state into which it is needful to penetrate and advance, in order thus to gain the complete salvation. One may see, x. 10, how the apostle distinguished precisely between the two notions of *justification* and *salvation.*

2. Neither is it altogether exact to represent sanctification as *a consequence* to be drawn from justification. The connection between the two facts is still more intimate. Holiness is not an obligation which the believer deduces from his faith; it is a fact implied in justification itself, or rather one which proceeds, as well as justification, from *the object* of justifying faith, that is, Christ dead and risen. The believer appropriates this Christ as his *righteousness* first, and then as his *holiness* (1 Cor. i. 30). The bond of union which connects these two graces is not therefore logical or subjective; it is so profoundly impressed on the believer's heart only because it has an anterior reality in the very person of Christ, whose holiness, while serving to justify us, is at the same time the principle of our sanctification. Reuss justly observes in this relation, that from the apostle's point of view we have not to say to

the Christian: "Thou shalt sin no more;" but we must rather say: "The Christian sins no more."

3. As to the third view, which finds in sanctification *the efficient cause* of pardon and justification, it is the antipodes of Paul's view. Why, if he had understood the relation between the two in this way, would he not have commenced his didactic treatise with the part relating to sanctification (vi.–viii.), instead of laying as its foundation the exposition of justification (i.–v.)? Besides, is not the *then* (vi. 1): "What shall we say *then?*" enough to show the contradiction between this view and the apostle's conception? He must have said: "*For* (or *in fact*) what shall we say?" Finally, is it not evident that the whole deduction of chap. vi. assumes that of chap. iii., and not the reverse? If the opinion which the works of Reuss have contributed to accredit in the Church of France were well founded, we must acknowledge the justness of the charge which this writer brings against the apostle of "not having followed a rigorously logical course, a really systematic order."[1] But it is a hundred to one when a reader does not find the Apostle Paul logical, that he is not understanding his thought; and this is certainly the case with the critic whom we are combating. The apostle knew the human heart too well to think of founding faith in reconciliation on the moral labours of man. We need to be set free from ourselves, not to be thrown back on ourselves. If we had to rest assured of our justification, little or much, on our own sanctification, as it is always imperfect, our heart would never be wholly made free Godwards, absolutely set at large and penetrated with that filial confidence which is itself the necessary condition of all true moral progress. The normal attitude Godwards is therefore this: first *rest* in God through justification; thereafter, *work* with Him, in His fellowship, or sanctification. The opinion before us, by reversing this relation, puts, to use the common expression, the cart before the horse. It can only issue in replacing the church under the law, or in freeing it in a manner far from salutary, by setting before it a degraded standard of Christian holiness.

4. The fourth view, while equally at variance with the

[1] *Les Epîtres paulinicnnes*, t. II. p. 14, and *Gesch. der Neu-Testam. Schr.* § 108.

doctrine of the gospel, compromises, besides, the loyalty of the apostle's character. Who can persuade himself, when reading seriously the first part of the Epistle relating to justification by faith, that all he demonstrates there with so much pains, and even with so great an expenditure of biblical proofs (iii. and iv.), is a view which he does not adopt himself, and which he proposes afterwards to set aside, to substitute in its room one wholly different? To what category morally are we to assign this process of substitution presented (vi. 1) in the deceptive form of a *conclusion* (*then*), and so ably disguised that the first who discovers it turns out to be a professor of the nineteenth century? Or perhaps the apostle himself did not suspect the difference between the two orders of thought, Jewish and Greek, to which he yielded his mind at one and the same time? The antagonism of the two theories perhaps so thoroughly escaped him that he could, without suspecting it, retract the one while establishing the other. Such a confusion of ideas cannot be attributed to the man who conceived and composed an "Epistle to the Romans."

Sanctification, therefore, is neither a *condition* nor a *corollary* of justification: nor is it its *cause*, and still less its *negation*. The real connection between justification and Christian holiness, as conceived by St. Paul, appears to us to be this: justification by faith is the *means*, and sanctification the *end*. The more precisely we distinguish these two divine gifts, the better we apprehend the real bond which unites them. God is *the only good;* the creature, therefore, cannot do good except *in Him*. Consequently, to put man into a condition to sanctify himself, it is necessary to begin by reconciling him to God, and replacing him in Him. For this purpose, the wall which separates him from God, the divine condemnation which is due to him as a sinner, must be broken down. This obstacle once removed by justification, and reconciliation accomplished, the heart of man opens without reserve to the divine favour which is restored to him; and, on the other hand, the communication of it from above, interrupted by the state of condemnation, resumes its course. The Holy Spirit, whom God could not bestow on a being at war with Him, comes to seal on his heart the new relation established on justification, and to do the work of a real and

free inward sanctification. Such was the end which God had in view from the first; for holiness is salvation in its very essence. Justification is to be regarded as the *strait gate*, through which we enter on the *narrow way* of sanctification, which leads to glory.

And now the profound connection between the two parts of the Epistle, and more especially between the two chaps. v. and vi., becomes manifest. It may be expressed thus: Even as we are not *justified* each *by* himself, but all *by one, by Jesus Christ our Lord* (comp. v. 11, 17, 21); so neither are we *sanctified* each *in* himself, but all *in one, in Jesus Christ our Lord* (vi. 23, viii. 39).

The *course of thought* in the following part is this: In the first section the apostle unfolds the new principle of sanctification contained in the very object of justifying faith, Jesus Christ, and shows the consequences of this principle, both as to sin and as to law (vi. 1–vii. 6).

In the second, he casts a glance backwards, in order to compare the action of this new principle with the action of the old, the law (vii. 7–25).

In the third, he points to the Holy Spirit as the divine agent who causes the new principle, or the life of Christ, to penetrate the life of the believer, and who by transforming him fits him to enjoy the future glory, and to realize at length his eternal destiny (viii. 1–39).

In three words, then: holiness *in Christ* (vi.–vii. 6), *without law* (vii. 7–25), *by the Holy Spirit* (viii. 1–39). The great contrast on which the thought of the apostle moves here is not, as in the previous part, that between *wrath* and *justification;* but the contrast between *sin* and *holiness.* For the matter in question is no longer to efface sin, as *guilt*, but to overcome it as a *power* or disease.

The apostle was necessarily led to this discussion by the development of his original theme. A new religious conception, which offers itself to man with the claim of conducting him to his high destiny, cannot dispense with the demonstration that it possesses the force necessary to secure his moral life. To explain this part, therefore, it is not necessary to assume a *polemic* or *apologetic* intention in relation to a so-called Judeo-Christianity reigning in the Church of Rome

(Mangold), or to some Judeo-Christian influence which had begun to work there (Weizsäcker). If Paul here compares the moral effects of the gospel (chap. vi.) with those of the law (vii.), it is because he is positively and necessarily under obligation to demonstrate the right of the former to replace the latter in the moral direction of mankind. It is with Judaism, as a preparatory revelation, that he has to do, not with Judeo-Christianity, as in the Epistle to the Galatians. Here his point of view is vastly wider. As he had discussed (chap. iii.) the question of the value of the law in relation to *justification*, he could not but take up the same subject again in connection with the work of sanctification (vii.). Besides, the tone of chap. vi. is essentially *didactic;* the *polemical* tendency does not come out till chap. vii., to give place again in viii. to positive teaching, without the slightest trace of an apologetic or polemic intention.

It is equally plain how palpably erroneous is the view of those who would make the idea of *Christian universalism* the subject of the whole Epistle, and the principle of his plan and method.[1] The contrast between universalism and particularism has not the slightest place in this part, which would thus be in this exposition wholly beside the subject.

How bold was the apostle's undertaking, to found the moral life of mankind on a purely spiritual basis, without the smallest atom of legal element! Even to this hour, after eighteen centuries, how many honourable spirits hesitate to welcome such an experiment! But Paul had made a convincing personal trial, on the one hand, of the powerlessness of the law to sanctify as well as to justify; and, on the other, of the entire sufficiency of the gospel to accomplish both tasks. This experiment he expounds under the guidance of the Spirit, while generalizing it. Hence the personal turn which his exposition takes here quite particularly (comp. vii. 7–viii. 2).

[1] If we are rightly informed, this was the idea of the venerated and lamented Professor Beck in his courses on this Epistle.

FIRST SECTION (VI. 1-VII. 6).

THE PRINCIPLE OF SANCTIFICATION CONTAINED IN JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH.

This entire section is intended to lay the foundations of Christian sanctification. It includes three passages.

The first (vi. 1–14) unfolds the *new principle* of sanctification in the very object of justifying faith.

The second (vi. 15–23) exhibits the intrinsic *power* possessed by this principle, both to free the believer from sin, and to subject him to righteousness.

In the third (vii. 1–6), Paul infers from this double fact the right henceforth possessed by the believer to renounce the use of the former means, the law. The new morality is thus solidly established.

THIRTEENTH PASSAGE (VI. 1-14).

Sanctification in Christ dead and risen.

The apostle introduces this subject by an *objection* which he makes to his own teaching, ver. 1; he gives it a *summary answer*, ver. 2, and *justifies* this answer by appealing to a known and tangible fact, namely baptism, vv. 3 and 4. Then he gives a complete and didactic exposition of the contents of his answer, vv. 5–11. Finally, he applies it to the practical life of his readers, vv. 12–14.

Ver. 1. "*What shall we say then? Should we continue*[1] *in sin, that grace may abound?*"—The meaning of this question: *What shall we say then?* can only be this: What consequence shall we draw from the preceding? Only the apostle's object is not to draw a true consequence from the previous teaching, but merely to reject a false conclusion which might be deduced by a man still a stranger to the experience of justifying faith. It need not therefore be concluded from this *then* that the apostle is now passing from the principle to its consequences.

[1] T. R., with some Mnn., only: ἐπιμενοῦμεν; A B C D E F G L: ἐπιμείνωμεν; ℵ K P: ἐπιμένωμεν.

In that case he would have said directly: "Shall we then continue" . . . ?—This question is usually connected with the declaration, v. 20: "Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." But this saying referred solely to the part played by the law in the midst of the Jewish people, while the question here put is of universal application. We should rather be inclined to hold that Paul was alluding to the saying, v. 16. There, he had pointed to all the offences committed by the many sinners, terminating through the act of grace in a sentence of universal justification; and he may well, consequently, ask himself, in the name of those who do not believe in such a divine act, whether believers will not abuse it in the line of the question proposed. But even this connection would still be too narrow. If account is taken of the meaning of the whole previous part, and of the calumnious accusation already expressed iii. 8, it will rather be concluded that the question bears on the whole doctrine of justification by grace, chaps. i.–v. As to believers justified in the way described above, it is evident that they will never put this alternative: Shall I sin, or shall I not sin? For the seal of holiness has already been impressed on their inner and outer life by the manner of their justification. This is what the apostle proceeds to show while answering the objection suggested.

The reading of the T. R., ἐπιμενοῦμεν, *shall we continue?* has no critical authority; it probably arises from the preceding ἐροῦμεν. The reading of the *Sinait.* and of two Byz., ἐπιμένομεν, *let us continue!* or *we continue,* expressing either an exhortation or a resolution, would make believers hold a language far too improbable. That of the Alex. and of the Greco-Lats., ἐπιμένωμεν, *that we should continue!* or *should we continue?* is the only admissible one. Hofmann takes it in the first of these two senses as a mutual exhortation, and with this view supplies a new: *Shall we say?* understood before the second question. But this invitation to sin, which believers would thus be made to address to one another, is too improbable a supposition; and the ellipsis of the verb: *Shall we say?* is arbitrary and superfluous. The second of the two meanings of ἐπιμένωμεν, *should we continue?* (the deliberative conjugation), is the only natural one: Should we take the

resolution of continuing in our old state of sin? The following conjunction: *that*, corresponds well with this deliberative meaning. It is a calculation: the more sins committed, the more material will grace find on which to display itself.—Ἐπιμένειν, *to continue, persevere*, in a state to which a decisive circumstance ought to have put an end.—The reply is forcible and summary. A fact has taken place which renders this calculation absolutely impossible.

Ver. 2. "*Let it not be so! How shall we, that are dead to sin, live*[1] *any longer therein?*"—Just as a dead man does not revive and resume his former occupations, as little can the believer return to his old life of sin; for in his case also there has been a *death*.—The phrase μὴ γένοιτο, *let it not be so!* expresses the revolting character of the rejected assertion, as well as a conviction of its falsehood.—The pronoun οἵτινες is the relative of quality: *people like us who*. We have a quality which excludes such a calculation: that of beings who have passed through death. To what fact does the phrase relate: *we are dead*, literally, *we have done the act of dying?* It is obvious at a glance that there can be no reference here to the condemnation which came upon us in Adam ("dead *through* sin"). It is difficult to understand how the Swiss version could have committed such an error. All that follows (the being buried with Christ, ver. 3; participation in His death and resurrection with Him, vv. 4–8; and especially the expression: *dead unto sin, alive unto God*, ver. 11) leaves no doubt as to the apostle's thought. The regimen τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, *to sin*, is the dative of relation; comp. the expressions: *to die to the law*, vii. 4, Gal. ii. 19; *to be crucified to the world*, Gal. vi. 14. The words therefore denote the absolute breaking with sin. It is the opposite of *persevering in sin*, ver. 1.—This figure of *dying* is generally applied to baptism. But we shall see that baptism is the consequence of the death spoken of by Paul in ver. 2, not that death itself. What proves it, is first the οὖν, *therefore*, of ver. 4, then the ἐθανατώθητε, *ye were put to death*, vii. 4,—an expression which, accompanied with the words: *through the body of Christ*, sets aside every attempt to identify the death undergone by believers with their baptism. The fact in the

[1] C F G L: ζησωμεν (*should we live?*) instead of ζησομεν (*shall we live?*).

mind of the apostle is of a purely moral nature. It is the appropriation of our Lord's expiatory death. The sentence of death with which God visited the sin of the world in Christ is reproduced in the conscience of every sinner. The instant he applies the expiation to himself, it becomes in him the sentence of death on his own sin. He could not appropriate Christ to himself as dead *for* his sin, without finding himself die, through this death undergone for him, *to* sin itself. It was under this impression that the believing Bechuana exclaimed: "The cross of Christ condemns me to be holy."

The *righteousness of God,* pronouncing this sentence of death on the sin of the world, the *consciousness of Jesus* accepting and submitting to this sentence in the tortures of the cross and the agonies of His abandonment by God, and ratifying it with a humble submission in the name of humanity which He represented, have thus smitten sin in the consciousness of every believer with a mortal blow. Such is the unparalleled moral fact which has brought the former life of the world in general to an end, and which puts an end to the life of sin in every individual believer. And this result is so thoroughly implied in that of justifying faith, that Paul appeals to it in our passage as a fact already known by his readers (comp. chaps. i.–v.), and understood as a matter of course.

On the meaning of the expression: To die unto sin.—We find ourselves here met by four interpretations, which seem to us more or less false, and which it is well to set aside.

1. Many find in this and the relative expressions in the following verses nothing more than simple figures, metaphors signifying merely the duty of imitating the example of virtue which Christ has left us. Even Ritschl declares (II. p. 225) that "this reasoning of the apostle makes rather too strong an appeal to the powers of imagination." But we think we have just demonstrated the grave moral reality of the relation by which Christ brings the believer into the fellowship of His death. We shall see immediately the not less grave reality of the relation through which He communicates to him His own heavenly life, and thus makes him a risen one. The death and resurrection of Jesus are metaphors, not of rhetoric, but of action; it is divine eloquence.

2. R. Schmidt[1] regards the death to sin of which Paul speaks as of a purely *ideal* nature, and as exercising no immediate

[1] *Paulinische Christologie,* p. 66 et seq.

influence whatever on the moral state of believers. The apostle simply means, according to him, that to the divine mind they appear as dead in Christ. He would have it that participation in the life of the Risen One is the only real fact, according to the apostle. But we do not find Paul making such a distinction in the sequel. He regards participation in the death of Christ as being as real, and even more so (for he puts it in the past, vv. 4, 6, 8); and fellowship in His life, which is represented as a future to be realized (vv. 4, 8); and in ver. 11 he puts the two facts exactly on the same footing.

3. Death to sin is regarded by most commentators as expressing figuratively the act of will by which the believer undertakes for himself, and promises to God, on the blood of reconciliation, henceforth to renounce evil. This would make it an inward resolution, a voluntary engagement, a consecration of the heart. But St. Paul seems to speak of something more profound and stable, "which not only *ought to be*, but *which is*" (as Gess says). This appears clearly from the passive form: *ye have been put to death*, vii. 4; this expression proves that Paul is thinking above all of a divine act which has passed on us in the person of another (*by the body of Christ*), but which has its counterpart within us from the moment we appropriate it by faith. It is not, then, an *act* merely which is in question, but a *state* of will determined by a fact performed without us, a state from which our will cannot withdraw itself from the time that our being is swayed by the power of faith in the death of Christ for us.

4. It was attempted, in the religious movement which stirred the church so deeply a few years ago, to represent the effect produced on the believer by the death of Christ as a fact achieved in us once for all, existing in us henceforth after the manner almost of a physical state, and as outside of the will itself. From this point of view men spoke daringly of a *death of sin*, as if this were identical with Paul's expression: *death to sin*. We appreciate the intention of those who promoted this style of teaching; their wish was to bring back the church to the true source and the full reality of Christian sanctification. But they committed, if we mistake not, a grave and dangerous exaggeration. This *mirage* of an absolute deliverance, which had been reflected on the eyes of so many souls thirsting for holiness, soon vanishing before the touch of experience, left in them a painful disappointment and even a sort of despair. The death to sin of which the apostle speaks is a *state* no doubt, but a state *of the will*, which continues only so long as it keeps itself under the control of the fact which produced it, and produces it constantly—the death of Jesus. As at every

moment Jesus could have withdrawn Himself from death by an act of His own will (Matt. xxvi. 53), so the believer may at any moment free his will from the power of faith, and take up the thread of that natural life which is never completely destroyed in him.

If it were otherwise, if ever the believer could enter into the sphere of absolute holiness, a new fall, like that of Adam, would be needed to remove him from it. If ever sin were entirely extirpated from his heart, its reappearance would be something like the resurrection of a dead man. At what point, besides, of the Christian life would such a moral event be placed? At the time of conversion? The experience of all believers proves the contrary. At some later period? The New Testament teaches us nothing of the kind. There is found in it no particular name for a second transformation, that of the convert into a perfect saint.

We conclude by saying that death to sin is not an absolute cessation of sin at any moment whatever, but an absolute breaking of the will with it, with its instincts and aspirations, and that simply under the control of faith in Christ's death *for* sin.

The practical application of the apostle's doctrine regarding this mysterious death, which is at the foundation of Christian sanctification, seems to me to be this: The Christian's breaking with sin is undoubtedly gradual in its realization, but absolute and conclusive in its principle. As, in order to break really with an old friend whose evil influence is felt, half measures are insufficient, and the only efficacious means is a frank explanation, followed by a complete rupture which remains like a barrier raised beforehand against every new solicitation; so to break with sin there is needed a decisive and radical act, a divine deed taking possession of the soul, and interposing henceforth between the will of the believer and sin (Gal. vi. 14). This divine deed necessarily works through the action of faith in the sacrifice of Christ.

Ver. 3. "*Or know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ*[1] *were baptized into His death?*"—The ἤ, *or, or indeed,* ought, according to the usual meaning of the phrase: *or know ye not,* to be paraphrased thus: Or, *if you do not understand what I have just said* (that there has been among you a death to sin), know you not then what was signified by the baptism which ye received? If you understood that rite, you would know that it *supposes* a death, and

[1] B and some Mnn. and Fathers reject Ἰησοῦν.

promises a second birth, which removes every possibility of a return to the old life. It has been generally concluded, from this mode of expression: *Or know ye not . . .?* that baptism was represented as being itself the death spoken of by St. Paul in ver. 2. I believe it is thereby made impossible to explain satisfactorily the whole of the following passage, especially the words: "*Therefore* we are buried with Him by baptism into His death." According to these words, it is not to death, it is to the *interment of the dead*, that Paul compares baptism. And, indeed, just as the ceremony of interment, as a visible and public fact, attests death, so baptism, in so far as it is an outward and sensible act, attests faith, with the death to sin implicitly included in faith. As to the phrase: *Or know ye not?* it finds a still more natural explanation if baptism is regarded as the *proof* of death, than if, as is constantly done, to the detriment of the sense of this beautiful passage, baptism is identified with it. St. Paul means: "Ye know not that ye are dead . . .? Well then, ye are not ignorant that as many of you as there are, are men *interred* (baptized)! People do not bury the living." The ὅσοι, a pronoun of quantity: *as many individuals as*, differs from the pronoun of quality οἵτινες, *a kind of people who*. The point in question here is not, as in ver. 2, one of quality, but of quantity: "Ye know not then that as many baptized (buried) persons as there are, so many dead are there."—Some take the word *baptize* in its literal sense of *bathing, plunging*, and understand: "As many of you as were *plunged into Christ*." But in the similar formula, 1 Cor. x. 2: "*to be baptized into Moses* (εἰς τὸν Μωσῆν βαπτίζεσθαι)," the meaning is certainly not: *to be plunged into Moses*. The word *baptized* is to be taken in its technical sense: *to be baptized with water* (by the fact of the passage through the sea and under the cloud), and the regimen ought consequently to signify: *in relation to Moses*, as a typical Saviour,—that is to say, in order to having part in the divine deliverance of which Moses was the agent. Such is likewise the meaning of the *being baptized into Christ Jesus*, in our passage: "Ye received *baptism with water* in relation to the person of Jesus Christ, whose property ye became by that act." Comp. the phrase: *being baptized* εἰς τὸ ὄνομα, *in the name of* (Matt. xxviii. 19 and 1 Cor. i. 13), which should be

explained in a similar manner. One is not plunged into a name, but into water *in relation to* (εἰς) a name,—that is to say, to the new revelation of God expressed in a name. It is to the God revealed under this form that the believer consecrates himself externally by baptism.—The title *Christ* is placed here, as i. 1, before the name of the historical person (*Jesus*). The idea of the office evidently takes precedence in the context of that of the person. Yet Paul adds the name *Jesus*, which is wrongly omitted by the *Vatic.*, for this name is closely connected with the fact of the *death* which is about to be brought into relief.—In this expression: *being baptized into death*, the sense *plunged* would be less inadmissible than in the preceding phrase; for an abstract regimen like *death* lends itself better to the notion of *plunging into*, than a personal regimen like Moses or Christ. But if such had been the apostle's meaning, would he not rather have said: *into His blood*, than *into His death?* We think, therefore, that here too it is more exact to explain: "*baptized* with water in relation to His death." When one is baptized into Christ, it is *in virtue of His death* that the bond thus formed with Him is contracted. For by His blood we have been *bought with a price.* Baptism serves only to give him *in fact* what belongs to him *in right* by this act of purchase. Baptism thus *supposes* the death of Christ and that of the baptized man himself (through the appropriation of Christ's death). Hence the conclusion drawn in ver. 4, and which brings the argument to a close.

Ver. 4. "*Therefore we are buried with Him by baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life.*"—If baptism *were*, or *represented*, the death of which Paul had spoken, the *therefore* would be very hard indeed to explain (see the commentaries). But if baptism is in his view the external proof of death, as burial is the proof of decease, he can take up again the course of his argument and say: "In consequence of this death to sin undergone in Christ, we have *therefore* been buried with Him . . . in order also to rise with Him," which signifies: "buried with Him, not to the end of remaining in the tomb or of issuing from it to return to the past life, but to penetrate into a new life, whence a return

to the old is definitely precluded." The regimen *into death* cannot depend on the verb *we are buried*, as Grot., Hofm., and Osterwald's version would have it. How could it be said of one interred that he thereby descends into death? The converse would be the truth. This regimen, therefore, must be made directly dependent on the word *baptism:* "by baptism into death." The substantive *βάπτισμα, baptism*, like those generally derived from verbs in *ιζω*, has a forcible meaning which allows it easily to have a regimen, and the relation between the notions expressed by the two substantives is so close, that no article was needed to connect them. What also guides us quite naturally to make the regimen *into death* dependent on the word *baptism*, is ver. 3: *We were baptized into His death.* Undoubtedly we must explain the phrase: *baptism into death*, like the similar ones preceding: "baptism (with water) in relation to death." Our versions translate: "into *His* death" (Osterv., Oltram.). But if this had been the apostle's view, he would have expressed it by adding the pronoun *αὐτοῦ, of Him.* He evidently wished to leave the notion of *death* in all its generality, that the word might be applied at once to *His* death, and *ours* included in His. It is in relation to these two deaths which have taken place that the believer is baptized.[1]—Modern commentators are not at one on the question whether the apostle means to allude to the external form of the baptismal rite in the primitive church. It seems to us very probable that it is so, whether primitive baptism be regarded as a complete immersion, during which the baptized disappeared for a moment under water (which best corresponds to the figure of *burial*), or whether the baptized went down into the water up to his loins, and the baptizer poured the water with which he had filled the hollow of his hands over his head, so as to represent an immersion.

[1] We recall a fact which proves how these sayings of the apostle, apparently so mysterious, find an easy explanation under the light of the lively experiences of faith. The missionary Casilis told us that he was one day questioning a converted Bechuana as to the meaning of a passage analogous to that before us (Col. iii. 3). The latter said to him: "Soon I shall be dead, and they will bury me in my field. My flocks will come to pasture above me. But I shall no longer hear them, and I shall not come forth from my tomb to take them and carry them with me to the sepulchre. They will be strange to me, as I to them. Such is the image of my life in the midst of the world since I believed in Christ."

The passage, Mark vii. 4, where the term *βαπτισμός*, a *laving, bath, lustration, baptism* (Heb. vi. 2), is applied not only to the cleansing of cups and utensils, objects which may be *plunged* into water, but also to that of couches or divans, proves plainly that we cannot insist on the sense of *plunging*, and consequently on the idea of total immersion, being attached to the term baptism. It is nevertheless true, that in one or other of these forms the going down into the water probably represents, in Paul's view, the moral burying of the baptized, and his issuing from the water, his resurrection.—The relation between the two facts of burial and baptism indicated by the apostle is this: Burial is the act which consummates the breaking of the last tie between man and his earthly life. This was likewise the meaning of our Lord's entombment. Similarly by baptism there is publicly consummated the believer's breaking with the life of the present world, and with his own natural life.

It is a mistake to represent the idea of the first proposition of the verse as closed, independently of all that follows. Paul means, not only that we have been buried with Christ, but that we have been so, like Him, *in order to rise again.*—The *ἵνα, in order that,* is the essential word of the verse. In the case of an ordinary death, the man is enclosed in the tomb, to remain there; but he who is *buried with Christ* is buried with one who died and *rose*, consequently with the intention of rising also. This idea is essential to the apostle's argument. Indeed, the believer's death, even with the baptism which seals it, would not suffice for a sure guarantee that he will not return to his old life of sin. Did not Lazarus come forth from the tomb to resume life? What, for one dead, renders his return to an earthly existence definitively impossible, is his passing to a new and higher life by the way of a resurrection. Now, such is precisely the believer's case. By being buried with Christ by baptism, he does not intend to remain thereafter inactive and lifeless, any more than Christ Himself, when giving Himself up to the grave, thought of remaining in it. As Christ gave His life *to take it again* (John x. 17, 18), the believer renounces his life of sin for Him only to receive from Him another and wholly different life (Luke xvii. 33). His baptism, which supposes his death, tends to life. To die

to sin, is it not to die to death, and consequently to spring to life? As, then, by His burial Christ broke the last tie with His earthly life and entered on a higher life, so the believer, by his baptism, finds himself placed between a life which has taken end, and a wholly different one which opens before him. Paul knew by experience the situation indicated by his ἵνα, *in order that.* In Acts ix. we behold him placed between death on the one hand (vv. 8, 9), and the burial of baptism, followed by resurrection through the Holy Spirit, on the other (vv. 17, 18). Comp. also the position of the penitents of Pentecost, to whom Peter says: "Be baptized for the pardon of your sins, and ye shall receive the Holy Spirit." It is therefore true, as the end of the verse says, that what the resurrection was to Christ, renewing by the Holy Spirit is to believers. And in this last fact there is found the answer to the question of ver. 2: "How shall we, who are dead to sin, live any longer therein?" Perhaps, if we were *no more than* dead, it would not be possible to answer this question so positively. But if, being dead, we have penetrated to a higher life, the relation to the old life is most certainly terminated. The conjunction ὥσπερ, *even as,* indicates only an analogy, a resemblance. The sequel will bring out the internal necessity on which this resemblance rests.—The expression: *from the dead,* is an allusion to the state of death to sin in which the believer receives baptism, and which paves the way for his spiritual resurrection.—*The glory of the Father by which* Christ was raised, is not the display of His power apart from His other perfections; but, as usual, that of all the divine attributes combined. For they have all contributed to this masterpiece of the revelation of God on the earth, righteousness as well as mercy, wisdom as well as holiness. Speaking of the resurrection of Lazarus, Jesus said to Martha: "Thou shalt see the glory *of God.*" But here we have to do with the resurrection *of the Son;* and therefore Paul says: by the glory *of the Father.*—The word *so* expresses the analogy of the second fact with the first, irrespectively of the individuals in whom it is realized; the *we also* sets forth the living personalities in whom the prototype is reproduced.—In speaking of believers, the apostle does not rest, as in the case of Christ Himself, on the bare fact of their resurrection, but solely on

its permanent consequence, the new life which flows from it: *that we should walk in newness of life.* He does so because, in regard to believers, he wishes solely to shut out their return to their former life; now this result springs from life in a state of complete realization, rather than from the act by which it is entered on.—The term περιπατεῖν, *to walk*, is a frequent figure with Paul for moral conduct.—Paul says: *newness of life*, instead of *new life.* By this turn of expression he gives less prominence to the idea of life (in contrast to that of *death*) than to the new nature of the second life in contrast to the nature of that which it excludes. The slightest detail of style is always strictly determined in his writing by the principal thought.

Infant baptism does not seem to me to be either *assumed* or *excluded* by this passage. The baptism *assumed* here is certainly that of adults, and adults only. The act of baptism is put *between* faith (with death to sin through faith) on the one hand, and renewing by the Holy Spirit on the other. Baptism, thus understood, therefore involves the actual fact of faith and of death to sin, as much as burial implies the death of the buried. But, at the same time, it is clear that Paul adduces the rite of baptism such as it exists at the time of his writing. The baptism of adults was that which, from the nature of things, suited the first generation of believers, as the parents required to belong to the church before there could be any question of introducing their children into it. The apostle does not therefore think of *excluding* a form which may arise when, circumstances having changed, family life shall have become an integral element in that of the church. The only question is, whether this modification is in keeping with the spirit of the gospel. And this is a question which it seems to me impossible to examine here without breaking the plan of our exegesis.

Ver. 5. "*For if we have become one and the same plant [with Him] through the likeness of His death, we shall be also partakers of His resurrection.*"—The apostle had used the rite of baptism to illustrate the impossibility experienced by the believer of continuing in his former life. Now he expounds the same truth didactically. The *in order that* of ver. 4 becomes as it were the text of this development (vv. 5–11), of which ver. 5 contains the summary.—The *for* bears directly on this *in order that.* The idea of ver. 4 was: "We were

buried by baptism only *with the intention* of rising again." This intention is demonstrated by the moral fact formulated ver. 5: "The man who participates in the death of Christ cannot but participate in His resurrection." There is much said in a certain theological school about the possession of the life of Christ. This vague phrase seems intended to take the place of all Christian doctrine. Does it really mean what St. Paul understood by it? I do not examine the subject here. But in any case it should not be forgotten, as is usually done from this view-point, that the participation in the life of Christ of which the apostle speaks, has as its necessary and preliminary condition, participation in His death. The docile acceptance of the cross is the only pathway to communion in the life of the Risen One. Forgetfulness of this point of departure is full of grave consequences. For the second fact has no reality save in connection with the first.— The construction of each of the two propositions of this verse has been understood in a variety of ways. Bisping has proposed to make τοῦ θανάτου, *of death*, the complement not of τῷ ὁμοιώματι (*the likeness*), but of σύμφυτοι (*partakers*), while taking τῷ ὁμοιώματι as an adverbial regimen, meant to indicate the *means* or *mode* of this participation: "If we were made partakers of His death *in a likeness*;" this notion of resemblance being applied either to the figurative rite of baptism, or to the internal fact of death to sin, which would thus be as it were the moral copy of Christ's death. This construction would enable us to establish an exact parallelism between the two propositions of the verse, for the genitive τῆς ἀναστάσεως (*of the resurrection*) in the second proposition would depend on σύμφυτοι (*partakers*), exactly as τοῦ θανάτου (*of death*) in the first on this same adjective. But one cannot help feeling how harsh and almost barbarous this construction is. Besides, it is now abandoned. The complement *of death* depends naturally on τῷ ὁμοιώματι, *the likeness*, as has been acknowledged by Chrys., Calv., Thol., Rück., Olsh., de Wette, Mey., Philip., Hofm. By this *likeness* may be understood either the external act of baptism, as representing figuratively the death of Christ, or our own death to sin as spiritually reproducing it. But whether in the one sense or the other, it is surely uncouth to connect so concrete a term

as *σύμφυτος, born with, partaking,* with an abstract notion such as *likeness.* One is made a partaker not of the likeness of a thing, but of the thing itself. Besides, baptism is not the representation of death, but of burial (see above). It therefore appears to us, that the only admissible construction is to join the adjective *σύμφυτοι* with the understood regimen *σὺν αὐτῷ, with Him;* "*born with Him,* united *to Him,* by the likeness of His death." This is the opinion of Er., Grot., and others. The ellipsis of this pronoun arises naturally from the preceding phrase: *we were buried with Him,* ver. 4; it reappears obviously in ver. 6 (*συνεσταυρώθη, was crucified with*). The expression: *through the likeness of His death,* refers, according to what precedes, to the inner fact by which the death of Christ *for sin* is reproduced in us, that is to say, to our own death *to sin* implied in the act of faith.—The term *σύμφυτος* (in classic Greek more commonly *συμφυής*) is derived from the verb *συμφύω, to be born, to grow together.* This adjective, therefore, denotes the organic union in virtue of which one being shares the life, growth, and phases of existence belonging to another; so it is that the existence, prosperity, and decay of the branch are bound up with the state of the stem. Hence we have ventured to translate it: *to be made one and the same plant with Him.* Not a case of death to sin passes in the church which was not already included in the death of Christ, to be produced wherever faith should be realized; not a spiritual resurrection is effected within the church, which is not Christ's own resurrection reproduced by His Spirit in the heart which has begun by uniting itself to Him in the communion of His death.—It must, however, be remarked (and we shall meet with this characteristic again in the sequel of the passage) that the fact of participation in the death is put in the past (*we have become one and the same plant . . .*), while participation in the resurrection is expressed in the future: *we shall be partakers . . .* Some of the Fathers have concluded from this change of tense, that in the latter words the apostle meant to speak of the *future* resurrection, of the bodily glorification of believers. But this idea is unrelated to the context, which is governed throughout by reference to the objection of ver. 1 (the relation of the believer to sin). The expression, therefore, denotes only sanctification, the believer's moral

resurrection. The contrast indicated between the past and the future must find an entirely different explanation. As the communion of faith with Christ crucified is the condition of sharing in His life as risen, the apostle speaks of the first event in the past, and of the second in the future. The one *having taken place,* the other *must follow.* The past and future describe, the one the principle, the other the consequence. We begin with union to the person of Christ by faith in that mysterious: *He for me,* which forms the substance of the gospel; then this union goes forward until His whole being as the Risen One has passed into us. Gess makes τῷ ὁμοιώματι a dative of aim: "We have been united to Him *in order to the likeness* of His death," to be made conformable to it (Phil. iii. 10). But this meaning does not harmonize with ver. 2, where the reproduction of the death is looked upon as wrought in the believer by the fact of his death to sin implied in his faith.

The words ἀλλὰ καί, which connect the two propositions of the verse, might here be rendered: *well then also!* The second fact stands out as the joyous consequence of the first.— The genitive τῆς ἀναστάσεως, *of the resurrection,* cannot depend on the verb ἐσόμεθα, *we shall be:* "we *shall be of* the resurrection," meaning: we shall infallibly have part in it (in the sense of the expressions: *to be of the faith, to be of the law*). Such a mode of speech would be without ground in the passage; and the term resurrection is not taken here in the general sense; it refers solely to Christ's personal resurrection. Meyer and Philippi, true to their explanation of the first proposition, here supply the dative τῷ ὁμοιώματι: "As we have shared in the likeness of His death, we shall share also *in the likeness* of His resurrection." This ellipsis is not impossible, but it renders the phrase very awkward. Following the construction which we have adopted in the first clause, it is simpler merely to understand σύμφυτοι in the second, making the genitive τῆς ἀναστάσεως, *of the resurrection,* dependent on this adjective: "Well, then, we shall be partakers also of His resurrection!" This solution is possible, because the word σύμφυτος is construed indifferently with the genitive or dative, like our English word *to partake* (to partake *of* or *in*). This direct dependence (omitting the idea of *likeness*) is according

to the nature of things. Jesus does not communicate to us His death itself; we possess only its likeness in our death to sin. It is otherwise with His resurrection and His life as risen. It is this life itself which He conveys to us: "And I live; yet not I, but Christ in me" (Gal. ii. 20). "Because I live, ye shall live also" (John xiv. 18). The believer being once ingrafted into Christ by faith in His death, and thereby dead to his own life, lives again through the Holy Spirit on the very life of the risen Christ. Thus the difference of form between the first and second propositions is perfectly explained. —This summary demonstration of the truth of the *in order that* (ver. 4) required to be developed. Vv. 6 and 7 expound the contents of 5*a*; vv. 8–10 those of 5*b*.

Ver. 6. "*Understanding this, that our old man is crucified with Him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin.*"—Why introduce abruptly the notion of *subjective knowledge* into a relation which ver. 5 seemed to have laid down as objectively necessary? This phenomenon is the more remarkable because it is reproduced in ver. 9 in the εἰδότες, *knowing that,* and even in the λογίζεσθε, *reckon that* (ver. 11). Meyer thinks that the believer's subjective experience is cited here to *confirm* the moral bond indicated in ver. 5 as necessary in itself: "We shall certainly be partakers . . ., *a fact besides which we cannot doubt,* for we know that" . . . This appendix so understood has all the effect of an excrescence. Philippi, on the contrary, finds a consequence to be drawn indicated by this participle: "*And thus* (in proportion as the *we shall be* of 5*b* is realized in us) we shall know experimentally that" . . . But the present participle does not naturally express a relation of consequence. There would rather have been needed καὶ γνωσόμεθα, *and thus we shall know.* Hofmann paraphrases: "And we shall make the experience that that has really happened to us, and happened in order that" . . . We do not see much difference between this meaning and that of Philippi whom this author criticises. The relation between the participle *understanding* and the verb *we shall be* (ver. 5*b*), is rather that of a moral condition, a means. As Gess puts it: "Our participation in Christ's resurrection does not take place in the way of a physical and natural process. That such a result may take

place, there is needed a moral co-operation on the part of the believer." And this co-operation of course supposes a *knowledge*, knowledge of the way (ver. 6) and of the end (ver. 8). The believer understands that the final object which God has in view in crucifying his old man (ver. 6) is to realize in him the life of the Risen One (vv. 8, 9), and he enters actively into the divine thought. Thereby only can this be realized. This notion of subjective knowledge, expressed by the words: *understanding this*, was contained in the previous ἵνα, *in order that*, of ver. 4: "We were buried with Him *to the intent* of rising with Him, *understanding* that" . . . The whole piece, beginning with the *or know ye not that* of ver. 3, transports us into the inmost consciousness of the believer, as it has been formed in the school and through the personal assimilation of the death of Christ. The believer knows certainly that he is called to die, but to die in order to live again.—The expression: *our old man*, denotes human nature such as it has been made by the sin of him in whom originally it was wholly concentrated, fallen Adam reappearing in every human *ego* that comes into the world under the sway of the preponderance of self-love, which was determined by the primitive transgression. This corrupted nature bears the name of *old* only from the view-point of the believer who already possesses a renewed nature.—This old man *has been crucified* so far as the believer is concerned in the very person of Christ crucified. The apostle does not say that He has been *killed*. He may exist still, but like one crucified, whose activity is paralyzed. Up to the solemn hour of believing, sin puts on the behaviour of triumphant independence, or presents itself to us as an excusable weakness. The instant we contemplate it in Christ crucified, we see it as a malefactor condemned and capitally punished by the justice of God; and its sentence of death pronounced in our conscience is the same to it within us as the cross was to Christ,—not an immediate death certainly, but the reduction of it to powerlessness.—The purpose of this moral execution, included in the very fact of faith, is *the destruction of the body of sin*. There ought to be a complete difference between this second fact indicated as the aim and the foregoing one. What the apostle calls *the body of sin*, cannot therefore be identical with what he calls *our old man*.

Must we, with several, understand *the body* in the strict sense of the word, the apostle seeing in it the *principle* of evil in our human nature? But the sequel proves that he does not at all regard sin as inherent in the body and inseparable from it; for in ver. 13 he claims the body and its members for the service of God, and represents them as under obligation to become *instruments of righteousness*. It is the same in 2 Cor. iv. 10–12, where the life of Jesus is spoken of as displaying itself in *the body*, the *mortal flesh* of believers, which has become the organ of this heavenly life. So far is the apostle from regarding our bodily nature as the cause of sin, that in 2 Cor. vii. 1 he contrasts the defilements *of the spirit* with those of the flesh. And herein he is perfectly at one with the Lord, who, Matt. xv. 19, declares that "*from the heart* proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, thefts, false witness, blasphemies." The very fact of the real incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, as taught by Paul, Rom. viii. 3 (see on the passage), suffices to refute the opinion which would hold the body to be the principle of sin. These considerations have led several commentators (Calv., Olsh., J. Müller, Philippi, Baur, Hodge) to understand the word *body* here in a figurative sense. According to them, it denotes sin itself as a heavy *mass*, or even as an *organism*, a *system* of evil dispositions, which keeps the soul under its yoke. The complement *of sin* they take as a genitive of apposition. One can easily understand in this sense how Paul should demand the destruction of this *body of sin*, that is to say, of sin itself. But it is impossible to harmonize this meaning with vv. 12 and 13, in which Paul, applying our passage, evidently speaks of the holy consecration of the *body*, taking the term in its strict sense. Besides, it would be difficult to escape from a tautology between this and the preceding proposition. There remains a third explanation found with varying shades in Meyer, Hofm., etc. It regards the genitive *of sin* as a complement of property or quality: the body so far as it serves as an instrument of sin in human life. This meaning is certainly the one which corresponds best with the thought of the apostle. Only, to understand the genitive *of sin*, we must add the idea: that from our birth there exists between our body and our sinful will that intimate relation whereby the two

elements are placed in mutual dependence. This relation is not a simple accident; it belongs to the fallen state into which our soul itself has come.—The verb καταργεῖν, which we translate by *destroy*, strictly signifies: *to deprive of the power of action;* and hence *to make needless* or *useless*, as in Luke xiii. 7, Rom. iii. 3; or *to annul, bring to an end, destroy*, as in 1 Cor. xiii. 8, 10; 1 Cor. vi. 13; Eph. ii. 15, etc. Neither the meaning: *to render inactive*, nor *to destroy*, could be applied to the body, if we had to understand thereby the physical organism in itself. But the apostle has no thought here of recommending bodily asceticism to believers. It is not of the body as such that he is speaking; it is of the *body* so far as it is an instrument in the service *of sin*. Of the body in this special relation, he declares that it should be *reduced to inaction*, or even *destroyed*. It is obvious that in this application the two meanings of the word καταργεῖν amount nearly to the same. But the translation *destroyed* probably renders the thought best. A body, that of sin, is destroyed that another may take its place, the body which is an instrument of righteousness (ver. 13).—In the third proposition, which expresses the final aim of this inward labour, the apostle introduces a third subject: *we*, ἡμᾶς, a term which denotes the entire moral personality independently of the question whether it is or is not under the dominion of sin. This third subject differs wholly from that of the first proposition: *the old man*, as well as from that of the second: *the body of sin*. The old man is crucified by faith in Christ's crucifixion; the body of sin is destroyed, because in consequence of the crucifixion of the old man the corrupt will which formerly used the body for its own satisfaction is paralyzed, and so can dispose of it no more. And the *ego*, the true I, the moral personality in its essence, is thus set free at once, both from the power of the old nature and of the body its instrument, and can consequently consecrate this last to a wholly new use. The apostle illustrates the truth of this moral situation by an example taken from common life.

Ver. 7. "*For he that is dead is of right freed from sin.*"—Many commentators, from Erasmus to Thol., de Wette, Philip., Hodge, Gess, etc., take the participle ἀποθανών, *he that is dead*, in the figurative sense (comp. the similar expressions in vv. 6 and 8). But these critics divide immediately as to the mean-

ing of the term δεδικαίωται, literally, *is justified;* some applying it to deliverance from *guilt* and punishment (Hodge for example),—as the ordinary meaning of the word *justify* by Paul seems to demand,—the others to deliverance from the *power* of sin, in the sense that he who is dead is no longer subject to this master, no longer owes him anything. Yet neither of these meanings is satisfactory. The first would take us back to the subject of justification, which was concluded at the end of chap. v. According to Gess, Paul means to express the idea that "the believer's absolution from sin (*justification*) takes place only on condition of his death to sin." That would result in making sanctification the principle of justification. The other meaning would be more suitable in some respects: "He who is dead spiritually (in the sense of ver. 6), is thereby set free from the *power* of sin." Undoubtedly in a general way this is the apostle's meaning in ver. 7; the context demands it. But we do not think that this interpretation accounts exactly for the expressions used. The word δικαιοῦν, even with the preposition ἀπό, cannot signify: *to free from the power of,* or, at least if we reach this meaning, it must be shown in what legitimate way that is possible. Then the participle ὁ ἀποθανών, *he that is dead,* not being accompanied by any qualification, is rather to be understood in the strict sense, and the more so as in the following verse, when the apostle returns to the spiritual meaning, he expressly indicates the change by adding the words σὺν Χριστῷ, *with Christ.* It is therefore a maxim borrowed from common life which the apostle expresses here, leaving it to the reader to apply it immediately to the corresponding fact of the moral life, which is precisely that just described by him in ver. 6. It follows that the word *justify,* δικαιοῦν, must have a somewhat different meaning from its ordinary dogmatic sense in Paul's writings; for the domain to which he here applies it is altogether different. One who is dead, he means to say, no longer having a body to put at the service of sin, is now legally exempted from carrying out the wishes of that master, who till then had freely disposed of him. Suppose a dead slave; it will be vain for his master to order him to steal, to lie, or to kill. He will be entitled to answer: "My tongue and hands and feet no longer obey

me." How, then, could he be taken to task for refusing to serve? Such is the believer's position after the crucifixion of his own will (of his *old man*) has reduced his *body of sin* (ver. 6) to powerlessness. He can no longer serve sin in the doing of evil, any more than the slave deprived of his body by death can continue to execute the orders formerly given him by his wicked master. The verb δικαιοῦσθαι, *to be justified*, signifies in this connection: to be free from blame in case of disobedience; to be legally entitled not to obey. The idea of *legality* is in the word δικαιοῦν, *to justify*, that of *liberation* in the preposition ἀπό, *from*. Taking the term ὁ ἀποθανών in the literal sense, as we have done, commentators have sometimes restricted its application to the malefactor, who, by submitting to the punishment he deserved, has effaced his guilt, and can no longer be apprehended for the same crime. But the words: *he who is dead*, are too general to bear so special an application, and the sentence thus understood would reopen the subject of justification, which is exhausted.—The case of the dead slave described in ver. 7, as we understand it, is the exact counterpart of the believer's moral situation described in ver. 6. The apostle leaves the reader to make this application himself, and passes in the following verses from the negative side of sanctification, crucifixion with Christ, to the positive side of this great truth, resurrection with Him. This second side is the necessary complement of the first. For the sinful will being once crucified in Christ, and its organ the body reduced to inaction, the believer's moral personality cannot remain inert. It must have a new activity; the body itself demands a new employment in the service of this activity. We have seen how this idea was contained in the *in order that* of ver. 4. The believer dies, not to remain dead, but *in order to* rise again; and this he knows well, for in the person of Him with whom he dies, the Risen One, he beholds beforehand the moral necessity of the event. This relation of thought, already indicated vv. 4, 5, is now developed vv. 8–10; comp. Gal. ii. 20.

Vv. 8–10. "*Now, if we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live*[1] *with Him:*[2] *knowing that Christ being raised*

[1] C K P: συζησωμεν instead of συζησομεν.

[2] D E F G, It. Syr^{rch}: τῳ Χριστῳ instead of αυτῳ.

from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over Him. For as to what He died, He died unto sin once: and as to what He liveth, He liveth unto God."—The δέ, *now*, marks the progress to be made from participation in Christ's death to communion in His life. This gradation corresponds exactly with the force of the *well then also*, ἀλλὰ καί, ver. 5. As, indeed, vv. 6 and 7 were the didactic paraphrase of 5*a*, so vv. 8–10 are that of 5*b*. Participation in death is mentioned as a *past* event, included in the fact of faith (*we are dead with Him*; comp. 5*a*), while participation in the life is described as an event *to come: we shall also live* with Him. The first, indeed, is to every true believer an object of experience; it is not so yet with the second. At the time of baptism, the view-point of the apostle (vv. 3, 4), the new life is yet an object of hope and faith. Hence, in relation to the former, the term γινώσκοντες, *knowing*, ver. 6, and in relation to the latter πιστεύομεν, *we believe*, ver. 8. The baptized one stands between the death which he experienced on believing, and the life which he awaits with certainty as a gift from Him who is not only dead, but risen again.—*To live with Christ*, συζῆν αὐτῷ, is to share His life as one risen and glorified. Jesus, from the depths of His heavenly state, communicates Himself to the man who has appropriated His death by faith, and thus fills up with His holy life the void formed in us by the renunciation of our own life. This is our Pentecost, the analogue of His resurrection.

Ver. 9. This faith, this firm expectation of the believer who is dead with Him, is not a vain imagination. It rests on a positive fact, the resurrection of Christ Himself: εἰδότες, *knowing that*. This participle justifies the *we believe* of ver. 8. *We believe* that our spiritual resurrection will come about, because *we know* that His resurrection has taken place, and that irrevocably. Now the latter gives us assurance of the former. But faithful to his original subject, the apostle, instead of developing the idea of the new life of Jesus, confines himself to expressing this consequence: *that He dieth no more*. It is easy to see the logical relation between this purely negative turn of expression, and the question put in ver. 2: "How shall we who are dead to sin live any longer therein?" There is no return backwards for the risen Jesus; how should

there be one for us, from the time that we share His life as the Risen One? No doubt, His death alone would not have rendered His return to an earthly life impossible; but His entrance upon a celestial life absolutely excludes such a retrograde step. Thus mere communion with His death would not suffice to furnish an unhesitating answer to the question of ver. 2, while participation in His new life settles it once and for ever.—The last words of ver. 9 form an independent proposition. This break in the construction throws the idea more into relief. The time past when death was permitted to stretch its sceptre over Him, He is freed from its power for ever.

Ver. 10. The first proposition of ver. 10 unfolds the reason why death was allowed to reign over Him for a little; the second explains the reason why this cannot be repeated.—The two pronouns ὅ, *that which*, may be taken either as a determining expression: *in that so far as*, or as the direct object of the two verbs: *that which He died, that which He lived.* For in Greek it is allowable to say: to die a death, to live a life; comp. Gal. ii. 20. This parallel and the sense itself appears to us to decide in favour of the second construction. The first would seem to indicate a power of *partial* rather than *temporary* death, which is not natural in the context.—The shortlived power of death over Jesus is explained by the regimen τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, *to sin.* The relation which Jesus sustained to sin was the sole cause of His subjection to death. As in this piece *death unto sin* denotes an absolute breaking with it (ver. 2), it might be attempted here to give the meaning: Jesus struggled victoriously against sin during His whole life, not granting it for a moment the right of existing in His person. But the abverb ἐφάπαξ, *once*, forbids us to extend the application of the term *dying unto sin* to His whole life. Besides, the commentators who, like Meyer and Hofmann, adopt this meaning, limit the expression to the moment of death: with *the end* of His life His struggle with sin ended; from that moment sin (in the form of temptation) exercised no more power over His person. This meaning would certainly account to some extent for the ἐφάπαξ, *once.* But it forces us to take the word *die* in two wholly different senses in the same sentence, and it is not easy to get a clear idea of this *dying unto sin* ascribed to Jesus. Does it refer

to His struggle against temptation? The phrase *dying unto sin* is unsuitable. One dies to a real, not a possible fact. Are we to think of the struggle against sin outside of Him? But this struggle continues to this very hour. Is it a personal breaking with evil which is meant? He did nothing else during His whole life. The only possible meaning, therefore, seems to me to be that adopted by Grot. and Olsh.: He died to *expiate* sin, a sense connected quite naturally with that given by Chrys., Calv., etc.: and *to destroy* it. There was a moment in His existence in which He bore its penalty, and thereby established its defeat. But this moment was short, and remains single and alone. Such is the force of the term ἐφάπαξ, *once for all.* It was a transient necessity which He consented to encounter; but such a crisis will not be renewed. The debt once paid is so completely and for ever; comp. Heb. vii. 27, ix. 12, 26, 28, x. 10; 1 Pet. iii. 18. The dative τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, *unto sin,* thus signifies: *unto the service of sin,* that is to say, to accomplish all that was demanded by the entrance and destruction of this fact among mankind. It is obvious from the *once for all* that the death of Jesus occupies a place by itself in His work, and should not be regarded merely as the culminating point of His holy life.—This crisis once past, Jesus no longer owes anything to sin, and His life may manifest itself without hindrance as an instrument of the life of God.—*To live to God,* is to live solely to manifest and serve Him, without having to submit any more to certain obligations imposed by a contrary principle. The meaning of this expression is, as Meyer says, exclusive: to God *only.* The glorified Jesus lives and acts for no other object than to manifest in the heart of men by the Holy Spirit the life of God which has become His life, life eternal; comp. John xvii. 2: "As Thou hast given me power over all flesh, that I should give eternal life to as many as Thou hast given me." Thus it is that He serves and glorifies God.

As Christ, then, once entered upon this life and glorious activity, does not depart from it to return back again, so the believer, once dead to sin and alive to God in Christ, cannot return to his old life of sin. Ver. 11 explicitly draws this conclusion, held in suspense since ver. 8, and prepared for in vv. 9 and 10.

Ver. 11. "*Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be*[1] *dead indeed unto sin, and alive unto God in Christ Jesus our Lord.*"[2] —The *οὕτω, likewise,* indicates the inference to be drawn from the conformity between the case of believers and that of Jesus.—*Ye also:* ye, as well as He.—*Λογίζεσθε, reckon, consider,* is evidently an imperative, not an indicative; comp. the following imperatives, vv. 12 and 13. The apostle means: Behold, in consequence of what you witness in Jesus Himself, the view-point at which you ought to put yourselves when you regard your own case. You have no longer to see your condition as you were in yourselves: slaves of sin, dead unto God. You have to regard yourselves as you are in Christ, as I have just explained to you: dead to sin, alive to God. Beside and above the old man which still lives in him, the believer possesses a new *ego* contained in Christ who lives in him; this *ego* has broken with sin, it is wholly consecrated to God. Such is the being whom he ought henceforth to regard as his true self; he ought consequently to appropriate it subjectively by constantly substituting it for his natural self, which is henceforth denied at the foot of the cross. Such is the divine secret of Christian sanctification, which distinguishes it profoundly from simple natural morality. The latter says to man: Become what thou wouldst be. The former says to the believer: Become what thou *art* already (in Christ). It thus puts a positive fact at the foundation of moral effort, to which the believer can return and have recourse anew at every instant. And this is the reason why his labour is not lost in barren aspiration, and does not end in despair. The believer does not get disentangled from sin gradually. He breaks with it in Christ once for all. He is placed by a decisive act of will in the sphere of perfect holiness; and it is within it that the gradual renewing of the personal life goes forward. This second gospel paradox, sanctification by faith, rests on the first, justification by faith.

After having shown the believer how he is to regard him-

[1] The verb εἶναι is placed by T. R. and K L P after νεκρους μεν; by ℵ B C after ἑαυτους; the word is rejected by A D E F G, It.

[2] A B D E F G omit the words τω κυριω ημων, found in T. R., with ℵ C K L P.

self in virtue of his union with Christ, the apostle calls him not to let this new position be a mere matter of theory, but to work it into his real life, to make it his life from moment to moment. As Philippi says, Christians ought to begin with discerning what they are, and then labour to manifest it. Such is the subject of vv. 12–14.

Vv. 12, 13. "*Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey its lusts.*[1] *Neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness: but yield yourselves unto God, as*[2] *those that have become alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness unto God.*"—In Christ all is done. In the believer all is doing and can be done only with the concurrence of his will. Hence the following exhortation which is connected by *therefore*.—It might have been thought from certain previous expressions, that Paul did not admit the existence of sin any longer in the believer; but he is far from giving himself up to such exaggerations. The very word: "Let not sin *reign*," assumes that it *is* still there. But it ought no longer to be there as sovereign; for it has lost its powerful instrument and auxiliary, *the body;* the latter has become in Christ the instrument of God. These two aspects of the sanctification of the body, its liberation from sin and its consecration to God, correspond respectively to vv. 6 and 7 and vv. 8–10, and are developed, the former in vv. 12 and 13*a*, and the latter in ver. 13*b*.

The imperative *μὴ βασιλευέτω, let it not reign,* is addressed grammatically to sin, but in meaning to the believer himself; for it is he who has the task of bringing this reign to an end. The exhortation thus placed as the sequel of what precedes, reminds us of the passage Col. iii. 5: "Ye *are dead* (ver. 3); *mortify therefore* (ver. 5) your members, which are upon the earth." It is because *we are dead* to sin in Christ that we can *mortify* it in ourselves in daily life. The present imperative, with the negative *μή*, implies the notion of a state which

[1] Three readings: T. R. reads, with K L P: εις το υπακουειν αυτη εν ταις επιθυμιαις αυτου; the Greco-Lat. D E F G, Ir. Or. Tert. read: εις το υπακουειν αυτη, omitting the words: εν ταις επιθυμιαις αυτου; the Alex. ℵ A B C, Syr^{sch} Vg. read: εις το υπακουειν ταις επιθυμιαις αυτου, omitting αυτη.

[2] Instead of ως, A B C read ωστε.

existed till now, but which must terminate.—We must not, as some do, give to the ἐν, *in*, the meaning of *by*, as if the apostle meant that the body was *the means by which* sin exercises its dominion over us. The natural meaning is: "*in* your mortal body." The body is the *domain*, as it were, in which the dominion of sin is exercised, in this sense, that when once the will has been subjugated by sin, it gives the body of which it disposes over to sin, and this master uses it for his pleasure.

The epithet θνητῷ, *mortal*, must bear a logical relation to the idea of the passage. The object of this term has been understood very variously. Calvin regards it as expressive of contempt, as if Paul meant to say that man's whole bodily nature hastens to death, and ought not consequently to be pampered. Philippi thinks that the epithet refers rather to the fact of sin having *killed* the body, and having thus manifested its *malignant* character. Flatt thinks that Paul alludes to the *transient* character of bodily pleasures. Chrysostom and Grotius find in the word the idea of the *brevity of the toils*, which weigh on the Christian here below. According to Tholuck, Paul means to indicate how evil lusts are inseparable from the present state of the body, which is destined by and by to be glorified. According to Lange and Schaff, the sanctification of the mortal body here below is mentioned as serving to prepare for its glorification above. It seems to us that this epithet may be explained more naturally: It is not the part *destined to die* which should rule the believer's personality; the higher life awakened in him should penetrate him wholly, and rule that body even which is to change its nature.—It is obvious that in the last proposition of the verse, the Received reading: *to obey it in its lusts*, does not yield a simple meaning. To obey sin in its lusts is an artificial and forced expression. The Greco-Latin reading: *to obey it*, is rather superfluous; what would this regimen add to the idea expressed by the previous words: "Let not sin reign in your body"? The Alexandrine reading: *to obey its lusts* (αὐτοῦ, *the body's*), so far as the meaning is concerned, is preferable to both the others; and it has the advantage besides, as we shall show, of explaining easily how they arose.—The *lusts of the body* are its instincts and appetites, which, acting on the soul, determine within it the passionate and disorderly

motions of sin. The term *ἐπιθυμία, lust* (from *ἐπί, upon, toward,* and *θυμός*, the *heart, feeling, passion*), denotes the violence with which, under the dominion of bodily appetite, the soul is carried to the external objects, which can satisfy the desires excited within it. Although, then, it is still sin, the egoistical instinct of the soul, which reigns in the body and directs its use, it thus happens that the appetites of the latter become the masters of conduct; for they present themselves to the soul as the means of satisfying the ardent desire of enjoyment with which it is consumed. In this way the beginning and end of the verse harmonize, the reign of sin over the body, and the supremacy of the body over the person himself. But this relation of ideas was not understood by the copyists. As at the beginning of the verse *sin* was the subject of the verb *reign,* it seemed to them that the obedience spoken of in the following words was meant to be rendered to it also, and they added (as in the Byz.) the pronoun *αὐτῇ, it* (sin), which necessitated the adding also of the preposition *ἐν, in,* before the word *ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, the lusts.* Such is the origin of the Received reading. Or, again, they rejected all this final regimen, which did not seem to be in keeping with the beginning; and thus was formed the Greco-Latin reading.

Ver. 13. After speaking of the body in general, the apostle in ver. 13*a* mentions the *members* in particular. Philippi, who, with Calvin, has understood the body in ver. 12, not of the body properly so called, but of the body and soul united (in so far as the latter is not under the influence of the Holy Spirit), gives also to the word *members,* ver. 13, a moral as well as physical sense. It is not only the eyes, hands, feet, tongue, etc., but also the heart, will, understanding. There could be nothing more arbitrary than this extension to the soul of the meaning of the words *body* and *members.* The members of the body correspond to the various *lusts,* ver. 12, and are the particular instruments of their gratification. The term *ὅπλα* may be translated by *arms* or by *instruments.* Meyer insists strongly on the first meaning, the only one, according to him, used in the New Testament (comp. 2 Cor. vi. 7, x. 4). But we doubt much whether this observation applies to Rom. xiii. 12 (see on the passage); and the meaning: *instrument,* seems to us much more suitable here, as

there is no reference to war, but to the gratification of *lusts*. —The present imperative παριστάνετε, *present, yield*, like the βασιλεύετω of ver. 12, denotes the *continuance* of an actual state. With the negative μή, it therefore signifies: *cease from yielding*, as you have done till now. The verb παριστάνειν signifies: to present in order to put at the disposal of. The word ἀδικία, *unrighteousness*, here embraces all acts contrary to moral obligation in general.—It may be doubted whether the dative τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, *to sin*, depends on the verb *yield*, or on the substantive *instrument*. Perhaps it should be connected with both at once.—Vv. 12 and 13*a* have expounded the notion of the sanctification of the body from a negative point of view. Ver. 13*b* expounds it positively. It is the same gradation as we have from 5*a* to 5*b*, and from ver. 7 to ver. 8.

The apostle here uses the aorist παραστήσατε instead of the present παριστάνετε, ver. 13*a*. Critics are not agreed as to the meaning and intention of this form. Meyer takes this imperative aorist as indicating the *instantaneousness* with which the consecration of the body should be carried out. Fritzsche finds in it the notion of the continual *repetition* of the acts in which this consecration takes effect. Philippi thinks that this form expresses the idea of a consecration accomplished *once for all*. As the aorist strictly denotes the passing into action, the imperative aorist strongly calls upon the individual to accomplish without delay the act indicated by the verb (almost the meaning indicated by Meyer). The difference between this aorist imperative and the present imperatives preceding is therefore this: the latter were an exhortation not to continue the old state; the former insists on an immediate transition to the new state (comp. Hofmann, p. 246). This change should affect not the body only, but the whole person: *yield yourselves*. The consecration of the body and of the members is included in that of the person. The *as* which follows does not signify: *as if* (ὡσεί, Alex. reading), but: *as being really* (ὡς, Byz. reading).—The expression *dead* has been understood here in two ways. Some, like Philippi, have found in it the notion of spiritual death, in which the sinner still lies, comp. Eph. ii. 1 and 5. The apostle is thought to be contrasting the old state of estrangement from God, in which the Romans formerly were, with their present state of life in God. Others, on the

contrary, like Meyer, starting from the comparison between vv. 2 and 11, think that the subject in question is the *death to sin* consummated by faith in Christ. The apostle is thought to be contrasting the state of the body's inactivity at the time when the believer is only experimentally dead with Christ (vv. 6, 7), with his new activity from the time that he receives a new life (vv. 8–10), through experimental acquaintance with the Lord's resurrection. This second meaning is obviously forced; the first, simpler in itself, also agrees better with the contrast between the believer's new and old state (vv. 12 and 13*a*). The term δικαιοσύνη, *righteousness*, in contrast to ἀδικία, *iniquity*, can only denote here moral righteousness, the fulfilment of all human obligations.—The dative Θεῷ, *to God*, does not depend probably on the understood verb *yield*, since it would have been useless in this case to repeat this regimen already expressed in the previous line. It must therefore be connected with the expression ὅπλα δικαιοσύνης, *instruments of righteousness for God*. All those works of righteousness which God could not execute Himself here below without constant miraculous interventions, He accomplishes by believers, who eagerly lend their bodies and members to Him as instruments for this end.

Ver. 14. "*In fact, sin will not*[1] *have dominion over you: for ye are not under the law, but under grace.*"—We have not here a disguised exhortation, expressed by a future taken in the sense of an imperative: "Let not sin reign any more" . . .! Why would the apostle not have continued the imperative form used in the preceding verses? It is a future fact made sure to the believer as a glorious promise: "What I have just asked of you (to die unto sin and consecrate yourselves to God), ye will certainly be able to do; for it will be impossible for sin to hold its place longer in you; it will no longer be able to reign over you." This promise is the justification of the command given ver. 12: "Let not sin reign" . . .! Ver. 14 is thus the transition from the preceding exhortation to the subsequent development which treats of the believer's emancipation.—The promise contained in the first proposition is justified in the second. The state of grace, χάρις, reconciliation to God, the enjoyment of His favour and the possession

[1] ℵ K read ουκετι (*no more*) instead of ου (*not*).

of His Spirit, communicate to the soul a victorious power all unknown to the legal state. In this latter there reign the feeling of sin, the fear of condemnation, and the servile spirit, which are the opposite of inward consecration.—And hence sin can be overcome *under grace*, while it reigns inevitably *under law*. The apostle has not put the article before the word *νόμον, law;* for, though he is thinking substantially of the Mosaic law, it is as *law* that he wishes to designate it here, and not as *Mosaic* law. What he affirms applies to every institution having the character of an external commandment.—But why use the preposition *ὑπό, under*, and not the preposition *ἐν, in*, which seems more suitable to a notion like that of *the state of grace?* Is grace, then, a yoke, as well as the law? Is it not, on the contrary, an inner life, a power? In other connections Paul would certainly have made use of the preposition *ἐν, in*, with the word *grace*. But the idea of the whole passage about to follow is precisely that of the decisive control which grace exercises over the believer to *subject him* to righteousness with an authority not less imperious, and even more efficacious than the law (vv. 15–23). And it is this idea which is expressed and summed up by the preposition *ὑπό, under*.—In the same way, indeed, as the second passage of the section (vv. 15–23) is the development of the words, *under grace*, the third, as we shall see, will be the development of the words, *no more under the law*. And the logical connection of the three passages is consequently this: After demonstrating in the first that faith in Christ crucified and risen contains in it the principle of a reign of holiness (vi. 1–14), the apostle proves that this principle is not less powerful than a law to subdue man to itself (vv. 15–23), and that in consequence of this moral subjugation the believer can henceforth without danger renounce the yoke of the law (vii. 1–6).

FOURTEENTH PASSAGE (VI. 15-23).

The Power of the new Principle of Sanctification to deliver from Sin.

The new principle had just been laid down. The apostle had found it in the object of justifying faith. But could a

principle so spiritual, apart from every external and positive rule, take hold of the will with power enough to rule it thoroughly? To this natural objection, formulated in ver. 15, St. Paul answers as follows: By the acceptance of grace *a new master* has been substituted for the former, sin (vv. 16–19); and the believer feels himself obliged to serve this new master with the more fidelity because he rewards his servants by communicating *life* to them, whereas the former master pays his by giving them *death* (vv. 20–23). Thus it is proved that the new principle is clothed with sufficient, though purely internal authority, to control the believer's entire life.

Ver. 15: "*What then? should we sin,*[1] *because we are not under the law, but under grace? Let it not be so!*" The question of ver. 15 is not a repetition of that in ver. 1. The discussion has advanced. The principle of holiness inherent in salvation by grace has been demonstrated. The apostle only asks himself whether it will have the power necessary to rule man without the assistance of a law? This is the point at which the question τί οὖν, *what then*, resumes the discussion. Thus is explained the difference of style between the question of ver. 1 and that of ver. 15. In the former, Paul asked: Should we continue in sin? Here he says simply: *should we sin*, ἁμαρτήσωμεν. There is no doubt that the Received reading: *shall we sin*, ἁμαρτήσομεν, should be rejected, for it is not found in a single majuscule. The aorist subjunctive ἁμαρτήσωμεν does not denote, as the present would do, the permanent state, but the isolated act, which is perfectly suitable here. The question is no longer, as in ver. 1, whether the justified believer will be able to continue the life of sin which he formerly led. The answer has been given in vv. 1–14. But the matter in question is whether the new dominion will be strong enough to banish sin *in every particular case*. Hence the form of the aorist subjunctive: *should we commit an act of sin?* Could we act thus voluntarily in a single instance? And, in point of fact, a believer will not easily say: By grace I shall remain without any change what I have been till now. But he will find himself only too easily regarding some particular leniency

[1] All the Mjj. read αμαρτησωμεν instead of αμαρτησομεν, which is read by T. R. with some Mnn. only.

toward sin as admissible, on account of the freeness of pardon. The gradation between the question of ver. 1 and that of ver. 15 makes itself also felt in the form of the motive alleged in favour of unfaithfulness. The apostle does not say now: "*that* grace may abound," words which could only come from a heart yet a stranger to the experiences of faith; but he says here: "*because* we are under grace." The snare is less gross in this form. Vinet one day said to the writer of these lines: "There is a subtle poison which insinuates itself into the heart even of the best Christian; it is the temptation to say: Let us sin, not *that* grace may abound, but *because* it abounds." Here there is no longer an odious calculation, but a convenient let alone.—Where would be the need of holding that the apostle, to explain this question, has in view an objection raised by legal Judeo-Christianity? The question arises of itself as soon as the gospel comes in contact with the heart of man. What proves clearly that the apostle is not thinking here of a Jewish-Christian scruple, is the fact that in his reply he does not make the least allusion to man's former subjection to the law, but solely to the yoke which sin laid upon him from the beginning. And the literal translation of our verse is not: "For ye are no more under *the* law," but: "For ye are no more *under law*, but *under grace*." It is understood, of course, that when he speaks of *law* he is thinking of the Mosaic dispensation, just as, when speaking of *grace*, he is thinking of the revelation of the gospel. But he does not mention the institutions as such; he designates them only by their moral *character*.

Vv. 16–19 describe the new subjection (*to righteousness*) by which grace displaces the old subjection (*to sin*).

Ver. 16. "*Know ye not, that in respect of Him to whom ye yield yourselves as servants to obey, ye are henceforth His servants who owe obedience to Him; whether it be sin unto death, or obedience unto righteousness?*"—The question of ver. 15 arose from an entirely erroneous way of understanding the relation between the moral will of man and the acts in which it is manifested. It seemed to hear the objection, that an act of liberty is merely an isolated fact in human life, and that an act of God's grace is enough to annul it, so that not a trace of it shall remain. So it is that a superficial Pelagianism

understands moral liberty. After the doing of each act, it can return to the state in which it was before, exactly as if nothing had passed. But a more serious study of human life proves, on the contrary, that every act of will, whether in the direction of good or of evil, as it passes into reality, creates or strengthens a tendency which drags man with increasing force, till it becomes altogether irresistible. Every free act, then, to a certain degree determines the future. It is this psychological law which the apostle here applies to the two principles: of sin on the one hand, and grace on the other. He calls attention to the fact that he is appealing to an experiment which every one can make: *Know ye not that . . .?* Jesus had already expressed this law when He uttered the maxim: "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant [of sin]," John viii. 34.—The words: *him to whom ye yield yourselves as servants,* refer to the first steps taken in one or other of the two opposite directions. At this point, man still enjoys a certain degree of moral liberty in relation to the principle which tends to master his will; he therefore *yields himself,* as the apostle says. But in proportion as he yields himself to this principle by certain acts of compliance, he falls more and more under its sway: *ye are the servants of him whom ye obey.* These last words characterize the more advanced state of things, in which, the bond of dependence once formed, the will has lost all power of resistance, and exists only to satisfy the master of its choice. The words: ᾧ ὑπακούετε, *whom ye obey,* are strictly speaking a pleonasm; for this idea was already contained in the expression: δοῦλοί ἐστε, *ye are servants;* but yet they are not superfluous. They signify: "to whom obedience is now the order of the day, whether ye will or not." A man does not put himself at the service of a master to do nothing for him. In other words, *absolute* liberty cannot be the condition of man. We are made, not to create our guiding principle, but simply to adhere to one or other of the higher moral powers which solicit us. Every concession freely made to either is a precedent which binds us to it, and of which it will avail itself to exact more. Thus there is gradually and freely established the condition of dependence spoken of by the apostle, and which issues, on the one side, in the absolute incapacity of doing evil (1 John iii. 9), the

state of true liberty; on the other, in the total incapacity either to will or to do good (Matt. xii. 32), the state of final perdition. Since Paul is not speaking as a philosophical moralist, but as an apostle, he immediately applies this truth to the two positive principles which he is here contrasting with one another, namely, as he says in the second part of the verse, *sin* and *obedience*. Of the two disjunctive particles ἤτοι (*whether certainly*) and ἤ (*or*), the first is somewhat more emphatic, as if the apostle meant to rely more strongly on the first alternative: "Whether *certainly* of sin unto death, or, if this result do not suit you, of obedience unto righteousness." —Sin is put first, as the master to whom we are naturally subject from infancy. It is its yoke which faith has broken; and consequently the Christian ought ever to remember that should he make any one concession to this principle, he would thereby begin to place himself anew under its dominion, and on the way which might guide him back to the goal of his previous life: death. The word *death* here cannot denote physical death, for the servants of righteousness die as well as the servants of sin. We are no longer in that part of the Epistle which treats of condemnation, and in which death appeared as a doom pronounced on the first sin, consequently as death strictly so called. It is the contrast between sin and holiness which prevails in this part, chap. vi.–viii. The matter in question, therefore, is *death* in the sense of moral corruption, and consequently of separation from God here and hereafter; such is the abyss which sin digs ever more deeply, every time that man, nay, that the believer, even gives himself over to it.—Why, in opposition to sin, does the apostle say in the second alternative: *of obedience*, and not: *of holiness*; and why, in opposition to: *unto death*, does he say: *unto righteousness*, and not: *unto life?* *Obedience* is frequently understood in this passage as obedience to good or to God, in a general way. Obedience in this sense is certainly opposed to sin; and if Paul were giving a course of morals, instead of an exposition of the Gospel, this meaning would be the most natural. But in the following verse there can be no doubt that the verb *obey* denotes the act of *faith* in the teaching of the Gospel. We have already seen, i. 5, that the apostle calls faith an *obedience*. It is the same xv. 18, where he designates

the faith of the Gentiles by the name of obedience. Faith is always an act of docility to a divine manifestation, and so an obedience. Thus, then, it is faith in the gospel which the apostle here designates by the word *obedience;* and he can perfectly contrast it with sin in this sense, because it is faith which terminates the revolt of sin and establishes the reign of holiness. Every time the gospel is preached to the sinner, he is challenged to decide between *the obedience* (of faith) or the carnal independence of sin. Man does not escape from his state of sin by the simple moral contemplation of good and evil, and their respective effects, but solely by the efficacy of faith.—The words: *unto righteousness,* have been applied by some—Meyer, for example—to the sentence of *justification* which will be passed on the sanctified Christian at the last day. This interpretation has been adopted from the contrast between this term and the preceding regimen: *unto death.* But we have just seen the term *righteousness* used, ver. 13, in the sense of *moral* righteousness; and this is also the most suitable meaning here, where the object is to point out the holy consequences which will flow from the principle of faith. The antithesis to the term *death* also finds a simple explanation with this meaning. As death, the fruit of sin, is separation from God; so righteousness, the fruit of faith, is spiritual communion with God. The former contains the idea of moral corruption, as the *way,* and the latter includes the idea of life, as the *goal.* If it were wished to render the contrast completely, we should have to say: "whether of *sin,* unto *unrighteousness* which is *death,* or of *obedience,* unto *righteousness* which is *life.*" By expressing himself as he does, Paul wishes, on the one hand, to inspire a horror of sin, whose fruit is *death;* on the other, to bring into relief the essentially moral character of faith, the fruit of which is *righteousness.*

Vv. 17, 18. "*Then God be thanked that ye were the servants of sin, but ye have obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine which was delivered you; then*[1] *being made free from sin, ye became the servants of righteousness.*"—Ver. 16 established the necessity of choosing between the two masters: sin which leads to death, and faith which produces righteousness. The apostle declares in ver. 17—and he gives God thanks for it

[1] ℵ C read ουν instead of δε.

—that the Romans have already made their choice, and that the good one. The exclamation: *thanks be to God*, is not an oratorical form; it is a cry of gratitude from the depths of the apostle's heart for the marvellous work which God has wrought without him among those former Gentiles.—But can he give thanks because they were formerly *servants of sin?* There are two ways of understanding the form used here by St. Paul: either the thanksgiving is made to bear only on the second proposition, and the first is regarded as serving only to bring out by contrast the excellence of the change which has passed over his readers: "God be thanked that *whereas formerly ye were* servants . . ., ye have now obeyed" . . . Or it is held that the first proposition belongs also to the contents of the thanksgiving; for this view it is enough to emphasize strongly the imperfect *were:* "because ye *were*, that is to say, are no longer." In this sense the analogous expressions are compared, 1 Cor. vi. 11; Eph. v. 8 (see Meyer, Philippi). The second explanation is supported by the fact, that in the first meaning the contrast could not fail to be indicated by the particle *μέν*, as well as by the prominent position occupied at the beginning of the sentence by the verb *ἦτε*, *ye were*. But the use of the particle *μέν* is much rarer in the New Testament than in profane Greek. The place of the verb would undoubtedly be a more valid reason; in any case it explains how the apostle could follow up the expression: *thanks be to God*, immediately with the idea: *servants of sin*. But it is nevertheless true that the first meaning remains the simplest and most natural. Numerous examples of this mode of expression can be cited.—The imperfect *ἦτε*, *ye were*, brings out the *duration* of the past state; the aorist *ὑπηκούσατε*, *ye obeyed*, refers to the decisive fact by which they adhered to the gospel and broke with that former state.—The expression *ἐκ καρδίας*, *from the heart*, indicates their inward readiness, and the absence of all constraint. The gospel answered to a moral want within them. —The following proposition may be construed in three ways: 1. *τῷ τύπῳ διδαχῆς εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε*, *because ye obeyed the form of doctrine to which ye were given over* (Chrys., Thol., de W., Mey., Philip., Winer); 2. *εἰς τὸν τύπον διδαχῆς ὃν παρεδόθητε*, *because ye gave obedience to* (or: *in relation to*) *the form*

of doctrine which was transmitted to you (ὃς παρεδόθη ὑμῖν); so Hofmann; 3. εἰς τὸν τύπον διδαχῆς εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε (combining the meanings of the previous constructions). Of these three constructions the first alone is admissible, because *to obey any one* or *anything* is expressed in Greek by ὑπακούειν with the dative, and not with the preposition εἰς; the latter would denote quite a different thing (the *aim* of the obedience). Paul congratulates the Romans on the fact that they have adhered with faith, docility, and eagerness to the form of Christian doctrine which was brought to them by those who first communicated to them the knowledge of the gospel. Does this *form of doctrine* denote Christianity in general, or a more special form of Christian teaching? In the former case, would not Paul have simply said: "because from the heart ye obeyed Christ or the gospel"? The choice of so exceptional a term, and so unique as that which he thinks good to use here, leads us rather to think of a special and precisely-defined form of Christian teaching. The reference is to that *gospel of Paul* (ii. 16, xvi. 25) which the first propagators of the gospel at Rome had preached there. Paul knew well from his own experience it was only in the pure spirituality of "his gospel" that the true power of Christian sanctification was to be found, and that every concession to the legal principle was at the same time a barrier interposed to the operation of the Holy Spirit. Hence his heartfelt joy because of the *form of doctrine* which had marked with its profound impress the moral life of the Christians of Rome. Could he without charlatanism have expressed himself thus, if, as so many critics think, the doctrine received by those Roman Christians had been of a Judaizing nature, and in contradiction to his own?—All the terms are, as it were, deliberately chosen to express the receptive condition of the readers. And first the word τύπος, *type, form* (from τύπτειν, *to strike*), which denotes an image deeply engraved, and fitted to reproduce its impress; comp. Acts xxiii. 25, where this word denotes the *exact tenor* of a missive, and the analogous term ὑποτύπωσις, 2 Tim. i. 13, used almost in the same meaning as here. Then the passive παραδοθῆναι, literally, *to be given over*, which strongly expresses the sort of moral subjection which results from the power of Christian truth once accepted.

One is free to acquiesce in it or to reject it; but the Christ received becomes a master who instantly dispossesses the previous master.

If it is asked wherein exactly consisted this precise form of the truth of the gospel of which the apostle was here thinking, it seems to us that we find it best summed up in 1 Cor. i. 30, where Christ is presented, first, as *our righteousness*, then as *our sanctification*, lastly, *our* final *redemption*. It may be said that the whole didactic part of our Epistle is embraced in these three terms: chap. i.–v. in the first (δικαιοσύνη, *righteousness*), chap. vi. 1 to viii. 11 in the second (ἁγιασμός, *holiness*), and the end of chap. viii. in the third (ἀπολύτρωσις, *redemption*).

Some critics regard ver. 18 as the conclusion of the argument; but instead of the particle δέ, *now*, it would require to have been οὖν, *therefore*, which is found indeed in two Mjj., led astray by this supposition. We are not yet at the conclusion. The assertion: *ye were made subject to righteousness*, belongs still to the premisses of the argument. Here in fact is the reasoning as a whole: In ver. 15 the objection: Will the believer wish to sin even once? From ver. 16 to ver. 18 the answer. Ver. 16, the major: Man cannot be absolutely free; he cannot help choosing between two masters, sin or righteousness. Vv. 17, 18, the minor: Now when you decided for faith (ver. 17), you accepted subjection to righteousness (ver. 18). The conclusion follows of itself. Therefore your progress in goodness is henceforth a matter of necessity. Accordingly, the objection started is resolved: you could not sin even once without renouncing the new principle to which you have given yourselves. We thus see how Paul has succeeded in rediscovering a law even in grace, but a law inward and spiritual, like his whole gospel. It is Christ Himself who, after having freed us from sin by His death, by uniting us to His life as the Risen One, has made us subject to righteousness.

But the apostle, in his exposition of the relation between the believer and his new master, had used an expression which jarred on his own sense of propriety, and which he feels the need of excusing and explaining. It was the word *servitude* (*slavery*), applied to the believer's dependence on *righteousness*.

Is then the practice of goodness a servitude? Is it not, on the contrary, the most glorious freedom? Most certainly, and to this thought the remark applies which begins ver. 19; after which, in the second part of the verse, the apostle concludes this development with a practical exhortation.

Ver. 19. "*I speak after the manner of men because of the infirmity of your flesh: for as ye have yielded your members servants to uncleanness, and to iniquity unto iniquity; even so now yield your members servants to righteousness unto holiness.*" —Several critics (Beng., de Wette, Mey., Philip.) refer the *fleshly infirmity* of the Romans, of which the apostle here speaks, to their *intellectual* weakness, their inability to apprehend religious truth adequately. This is the reason which has led him to make use of a *human* mode of speaking, calling the fulfilment of righteousness a *servitude*, which, from the divine point of view, is, on the contrary, true liberty. What is well-founded in this explanation is the application of the first words of ver. 19 to the term *servitude* used in ver. 18. But what seems to me inexact, is to apply the expression *weakness of the flesh* to a defect of understanding. Does not this explanation contradict what the apostle recognises in such forcible terms, xv. 14: the high degree of Christian knowledge to which the Church of Rome has already attained? *Weakness of the flesh* (more literally: *proceeding from the flesh*) must therefore denote a general state shared by the Romans with the great majority of the members of the Christian Church, consequently a moral rather than an intellectual state; and this is really what the expression used by the apostle naturally indicates. If the obligation to practise righteousness seems to the greater number of believers to be a subjection to a strange principle, it is not in consequence of a want of understanding; the cause is deeper; it is because *the flesh*, the love of the *ego*, has not yet been completely sacrificed. From this moral fact there arises even in the Christian the painful impression that perfect righteousness is a most exacting, sometimes even a harsh master, and that the obligation to conform in all points to the will of God makes him a slave. Such is the imperfect moral condition to the impressions of which Paul accommodates his language in the expressions used in ver. 18. The ancient Greek interpreters thought this

remark, ver. 19*a*, should be connected with what follows, giving it the meaning: "I do not mean to ask of you what goes beyond your human weakness, caused by the flesh; yield your members only to righteousness *in the same measure* as you formerly yielded them to sin. I do not ask more of you." But it is evident that the apostle, in a passage in which he is describing the standard of Christian holiness, cannot think of abating ought of the demands of the new principle. The exhortation which follows cannot be less absolute than that which preceded, vv. 12, 13, and which was unaccompanied by any such clause. Hofmann and Schott take the two words *ἀνθρώπινον λέγω, I speak as a man*, as a parenthesis, and join the regimen *διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν, on account of the weakness of the flesh*, to the verb: *ye became subject*, ver. 18. According to this view Paul recognises that the practice of goodness *is* really a servitude for the believer, subjection to a strange will; and that arising from the persistence of the old nature, and from the fact that the flesh requires to be constantly subdued. But it is very doubtful whether the apostle here seriously called by the name of servitude that Christian life which he represents always, like Jesus Himself, as the most glorious emancipation. Undoubtedly, in 1 Cor. ix. 27, he uses the expression *δουλαγωγεῖν, to bring into subjection*, but in a figure, and in relation to the *body*.

The imperative *yield* proves that the second part of the verse is an exhortation. But in this case why connect it with a *for* to what precedes? Can an exhortation serve to demonstrate anything? Does it not require itself to be founded on a demonstration? To understand this strange form, we must, I think, change the imperative *yield* into the form: "*ye are held bound* to yield." We can then understand how this idea may be connected by *for* with ver. 18: "Ye were made subject to righteousness henceforth, since, in fact (*for*), it remains to you only to yield your members." It must not be forgotten, indeed, that the exhortation: *yield your members*, was already expressed previously in vv. 12 and 13, and that as logically based on all that preceded (*therefore*, ver. 12), and that consequently the transition from ver. 18*b* to 19*b* may be thus paraphrased: "ye became the servants of righteousness, for, in fact, as I have shown you, ye

have now nothing else to do than to yield your members to righteousness." The only difference between the exhortation of vv. 12 and 13 and that of 18*b* is that Paul said in the former: *do;* while here, in keeping with the object of this second passage, he says: "And *ye cannot* do otherwise." By this relation between the *for* of ver. 19*b* and ver. 18, it may be proved that 19*a* is indeed, as we have seen, an interjected observation.

There is a slightly ironical touch in the meaning of the second part of ver. 19. It concerns the readers to be now in the service of their new master, righteousness, as active and zealous servants as they formerly were in the service of their old master. "Ye were eager to yield your members to sin to commit evil, be ye now as eager to yield them to righteousness to realize holiness. Do not inflict on this second master the shame of serving him less faithfully than the first." The old master is denoted by the two terms *ἀκαθαρσία, uncleanness,* and *ἀνομία, lawlessness,* life going beyond all rule, licentiousness. The first of these terms characterizes sin as personal degradation, the second as contempt of the standard of right written in the law on every man's conscience (ii. 14, 15). This distinction seems to us more natural than that laid down by Tholuck, who takes the term *uncleanness* in the strictly proper sense of the word, and who takes *lawlessness* to be sin in general. The broad sense which we give to the word *uncleanness* appears clearly from 1 Thess. iv. 7. The two expressions therefore embrace each, as it seems to us, the whole sphere of sin, but from two different points of view. —From sin as a principle, the apostle passes to sin as an effect. The regimen *εἰς ἀνομίαν, unto lawlessness,* signifies: to do all one's pleasure without being arrested in the least by the line of demarcation which separates good from evil. This expression *ἀνομία, lawlessness,* so expressly repeated, and this whole description of the previous life of the readers, is evidently more applicable to men formerly Gentiles than to believers of Jewish origin.—With sin characterized as an evil disposition, as an inward *principle,* in the two forms of degradation and lawlessness, there is contrasted goodness, also as a principle and as a moral disposition, by the term *δικαιοσύνη, righteousness.* This is the will of God, moral obligation

accepted by the believer as the absolute rule of his will and life. Then with sin as an *effect* produced in the form of ἀνομία, the rejection of every rule in practice, there is contrasted goodness as a result obtained, by the term ἁγιασμός: this is the concrete and personal realization of goodness, the fruit of perpetual submission to the principle of righteousness, *holiness*, or *sanctification*. The word ἁγιασμός is usually translated by *sanctification*, and this is represented as the progressive amelioration of the individual resulting from his moral self-discipline. It is certain that Greek substantives in μος or σμος are, as Curtius says (*Schulgramm.* § 342), *nomina actionis*, denoting properly an action put forth, rather than a state of being. But we must not forget two things: 1. That, from the Scripture point of view, the author of the act denoted by the term *sanctify* is God, and not man; this is established, as it seems to me, by 1 Pet. i. 2, 2 Thess. ii. 13, and 1 Cor. i. 30, where this act is ascribed to the Holy Spirit and to Christ. 2. That even in the Old Testament the term ἁγιασμός seems to be used in the LXX. to denote not the progressive work, but its result; thus Amos ii. 11, where the LXX. use this word to translate *nezirim, the consecrated ones*; and Ezek. xlv. 4, where it seems to be taken in the same sense as *mikdasch, sanctuary*. In the New Testament, likewise, it more naturally denotes the result reached than the action put forth, in the following passages: 1 Thess. iv. 3; 1 Tim. ii. 15; Heb. xii. 14. We are thus led to translate it rather by the term *holiness*. And this seems to be confirmed by the preposition εἰς, *for, unto*, which expresses the goal rather than the way. If it is asked wherein the term ἁγιασμός, taken in the sense of *holiness*, still differs from ἁγιότης (Heb. xii. 10) and ἁγιωσύνη (i. 4; 1 Thess. iii. 13; 2 Cor. vii. 1), which seem to be completely synonymous, the indication of the shade may be found in the form of the terminations: ἁγιότης denotes holiness as an abstract idea; ἁγιωσύνη, as a personal quality, an inward disposition; ἁγιασμός, as a work which has reached the state of complete realization in the person and life, the result of the divine act expressed by ἁγιάζειν.

The apostle has thus reminded the church of the two principles between which it has finally made its choice, and the necessity laid on the believer to be as thoroughgoing in his new

master's service as he had been in that of the former; he now labours to strengthen this choice and decision by presenting the consequences of the one and the other condition of dependence. On the one side, shame and death; on the other, holiness and life. Here is the second part of the passage; vv. 20 and 21 describe the consequences of the service of sin to their extreme limit; ver. 22 gives the consequences of dependence on God also to their final goal; ver. 23, in an antithesis full of solemnity, formulates this double end of human life.

Vv. 20, 21. "*For when ye were the servants of sin, ye were free in respect of righteousness. What fruit had ye then? Things of which ye are now ashamed; for certainly*[1] *their end is death.*"—We must seek the counterpart of ver. 20, not in ver. 18, which belongs to a passage now concluded, but in ver. 22. In ver. 20, indeed, there begins the description of the *consequences* of the two services. The *for* bears on the exhortation contained in ver. 19*b*. It would be impossible to depict the degrading character of the former dependence in which his readers had lived, more keenly than the apostle does in the words: *free in respect of righteousness.* The conviction of what is righteous did not for a moment hamper them in their course of life. This was an annoyance which they did not feel! To use the expression of Scripture, they drank iniquity as one drinketh up water.

Ver. 21. And what was the result of this shameful liberty? The apostle analyzes it into a *fruit*, καρπός, and an *end*, τέλος. *What fruit had ye then?* he asks literally. The verb ἔχειν, *to have*, no more here than in i. 13, signifies *to produce.* Paul would rather have used for this meaning one of the verbs φέρειν or ποιεῖν. By saying that they *have* this fruit, he wishes to express not only the idea that they produce it, but that they possess and keep it in themselves, that they drag it with them as forming part of their own moral life. "Their works follow them," as is said. Commentators are not at one as to the meaning of the following words: *things of which ye are now ashamed.* Some, like the Peschito, Theod., Theoph., Er., Luth., Mel., Thol., de W., Olsh., Philip., take these words as the answer to the question put: "This is the fruit, namely,

[1] B D E F G read here μεν (το μεν γαρ); T. R., with ℵ A C K L P, omits the μεν.

acts of which, now that ye are in Christ, ye cannot think without confusion; for ye now see clearly that the goal to which they were leading you inevitably was death." But some commentators (Chrys., Grot., Beng., Fritzs., Mey.) regard these words as a continuation of the preceding question: "What fruit did ye derive from those things of which ye are now ashamed?" The answer in this case would be understood. According to Meyer, it would simply be: *none*, of course taking the word *fruit* in an exclusively good sense. Or the answer might be supposed to be: *a very evil fruit*, finding the proof of this evil quality in the following words: "For their end is death." But whatever may be the answer which is sought to be supplied, this construction, by prolonging the question with this long incidental proposition, has the disadvantage of taking away from its vivacity, and making the sentence extremely heavy. Besides, we must supply before the relative ἐφ' οἷς, *of which*, some antecedent or other, such as ἐκείνων or ἐξ ἐκείνων, which is not very natural. If account is taken of the very marked contrast between the two adverbs of time, *then* and *now*, τότε and νῦν, we shall be led rather to see here two distinct propositions than only one. Finally, we find in ver. 22 the result described under two distinct aspects: as *fruit*, καρπός, and as *end*, τέλος. Should it not be the same in our verse, to which ver. 22 corresponds? This would not be the case in the sense preferred by Meyer. It would be necessary to make τέλος (*end*) almost the synonym and explanation of καρπός (*fruit*). This commentator relies especially on the fact that the apostle gives to the word *fruit* only a good sense; so Gal. v. 19 and 22, where he speaks of the *works* of the flesh and the *fruit* of the Spirit, and Eph. v. 11, where he characterizes the *works* of darkness as being *without fruit* (ἄκαρπα). But Meyer does not take into consideration that the mind of the apostle is here moving in the domain of a *sustained figure*, which he applies successively to the two opposite servitudes. On both sides he sees: 1. A *master* (sin, God); 2. A *servant* (the natural man, the believer); 3. Some *work* or other in the service of the master; 4. *Fruit*, which is the immediate product of the labour, the work itself (the things of which the workers are ashamed, or those which lead to holiness); 5. An *end*, as retribution at

the hand of the master (death, eternal life). It is therefore evident that the figure of *fruit* is in place on the one side as well as on the other. So thoroughly is this the thought of the apostle, that in ver. 22 he says to the believer: Ye have "*your fruit*," in evident contrast to that which they had previously as sinners. As to those who to the question: *What fruit had ye?* understand this wholly different answer: a *bad, detestable* fruit, it is impossible for them to explain so important an ellipsis. We do not therefore hesitate to prefer the first of the two explanations proposed: "What fruit did ye then derive from your labour in the service of sin? Such fruit, that now when ye are enlightened, it only fills you with shame," ἔργα τοῦ σκότους (the works of darkness), Eph. v. 11.

The *for* which connects the last proposition with the preceding bears on the notion of *shame*. In point of fact, the final result of those things, their τέλος (*end*), which is *death*, demonstrates their shameful nature. "It is most fitting indeed that ye should blush for them now; for their end is death." In this fact: death, as the end, there is expressed the estimate of God Himself. I regard as authentic the particle μέν, which is read here by five Mjj. It seems to me impossible that it should have been added; its omission, on the contrary, is easily explained. It is the particle known under the name of μέν, *solitarium*, to which there is no corresponding δέ, and which is merely intended expressly to reserve a certain side of the truth which the reader is guarded against forgetting: "For (whatever may be the virtue of grace) it remains nevertheless true that" . . .—The *end* differs from the *fruit* in that the latter is the immediate result, the very realization of the labour, its *moral* product; while the *end* is the manifestation of God's approval or displeasure.—*Death* here evidently denotes *final* death, eternal separation from God, ἀπώλεια (*perdition*).

Ver. 22. "*But now, being made free from sin and become servants to God, ye have your fruit holiness, and your end everlasting life.*"—For the abstract master designated above, namely righteousness, Paul here substitutes *God* Himself; for in Christ it is to the living God the believer is united. The form of expression used by Paul, literally rendered, would be: "Ye have your fruit in the direction of holiness." It is to the state of holiness that ye are brought. Such, in fact, is

the result of action constantly kept up in dependence on God. Every duty discharged is a step on the way at the end of which God's servant sees the sublime ideal of ἁγιασμός, completed holiness, shining.—To this *fruit* God is pleased to add what Paul calls the *end:* eternal life. Besides holiness, this expression embraces glory, imperishable happiness, perfect action.

In ver. 23 the apostle sums up in a few definite strokes those two contrasted pictures.

Ver. 23. "*For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life in Jesus Christ our Lord.*"—On the one side, *wages,* something earned. The word ὀψώνιον strictly denotes *payment in kind,* then the payment in money which a general gives his soldiers. And so it is obvious that the complement τῆς ἁμαρτίας, *of sin,* is not here the genitive of the object: the wages paid *for* sin, but the genitive of the subject: the wages paid *by* sin. Sin is personified as man's natural master (vv. 12, 14, 22), and he is represented as paying his subjects with *death.* This term, according to the apostle, does not seem to denote the annihilation of the sinner. To pay any one is not to put him out of existence; it is rather to make him feel the painful consequences of his sin, to make him reap in the form of corruption what he has sowed in the form of sin (Gal. vi. 7, 8; 2 Cor. v. 10).—In the second proposition the apostle does not speak of *wages,* but of a *gift of grace* (χάρισμα). This term is taken here in its most general sense; it comprehends the *fulness of salvation.* Everything in this work, from the initial justification to the final absolution, including sanctification and preparing for glory, is a free gift, an unmerited favour, like that Christ Himself who has been made unto us righteousness, holiness, and redemption. "Hell," says Hodge, "is *always* earned; heaven, *never.*" The apostle closes with the words: *in Christ Jesus our Lord;* for it is *in* Him that this entire communication of divine mercy to the faithful takes place. Here, again, for the διά, *by,* which was the preposition used in the preceding part (for example, v. 1, 2, 11, 17, 21), Paul substitutes the ἐν, *in,* which is more in keeping with the mode of sanctification. After being justified *by Him,* we are sanctified *in Him,* in communion of life with Him.

It is commonly thought that this twenty-third verse, as well as the whole passage of which it is a summary, applies to the *believer* only from the view-point of the second alternative, that of eternal life, and that the unconverted only are referred to by the apostle when he speaks of the *service* of sin and of its fatal goal, *death*. But the tenor of ver. 15 proves how erroneous this view is. What is the aim of this passage? To reply to the question: "Shall we sin because we are under grace?" Now this question can only be put in reference to believers. It is to them, therefore, that the reply contained in this whole passage applies. Neither could Paul say in respect of unconverted sinners what we find in ver. 21: "those things whereof we are now ashamed." It is therefore certain that he conceives the possibility of a return to the service of sin,—a return which would lead them to eternal death as certainly as other sinners. It follows, even from the relation between the question of ver. 15 and the answer, vv. 16–23, that such a relapse may arise from a single voluntary concession to the continual solicitations of the old master, sin. A single affirmative answer to the question: "Shall I commit an act of sin, since I am under grace?" might have the effect of placing the believer again on the inclined plane which leads to the abyss. A striking example of this fact occurs in our very Epistle. In chap. xiv. 15 and 20, Paul declares to the man who induces a weak brother to commit an act of sin contrary to his conscience, that thereby he may *cause that brother to perish for whom Christ died*, and *destroy in him the work of God*. Such will infallibly be the result, if this sin, not being quickly blotted out by pardon and restoration, becomes consolidated, and remains permanently interposed between him and his God.

END OF VOL. I.

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